Metics and identity in democratic Athens by Kears, Matthew John
  
 
METICS AND IDENTITY IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 
 
By MATTHEW JOHN KEARS 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity 
College of Arts and Law 
University of Birmingham 
March 2013
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the metics, or resident aliens, in democratic Athens and how they 
affected ideas of identity, with a particular focus on the fourth century BC. It looks at 
definitions of the metics and how the restrictions and obligations which marked their status 
operated; how these affected their lives and their image, in their own eyes and those of the 
Athenians; how the Athenians erected and maintained a boundary of status and identity 
between themselves and the metics, in theory and in practice; and how individuals who 
crossed this boundary could present themselves and be characterised, especially in the public 
context of the lawcourts. 
 
The argument is that the metics served as a contradiction of and challenge to Athenian ideas 
about who they were and what made them different from others. This challenge was met with 
responses which demonstrate the flexibility of identity in Athens, and its capacity for variety, 
reinvention and contradiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Summary and Argument 
 
This thesis investigates the metics, or resident aliens, in democratic Athens and how they 
affected ideas of identity. Due to the nature of the evidence the focus is particularly on the 
fourth century BC, though the fifth is also covered. As non-citizens of many different 
backgrounds and ethnicities, who were nevertheless free and in some cases citizens of other 
states, the metics offered a challenge to what might otherwise be relatively straightforward 
oppositions between Athenian and foreigner, Greek and barbarian, and, in the case of 
freedmen, free and slave. My aim is not to produce simple, definitive summaries of ‘what the 
Athenians thought’, but rather to look at and explore the varied, sometimes contradictory 
ways in which they thought about and made use of identity.  
 
In the first chapter I look at definitions of the metics – the conception of them as immigrants 
and non-citizens, descriptions of their legal status, what modern scholars have made of them 
and their relation to the rest of Athenian society, and what marked them out as metics. 
 
In the second chapter, the focus is on how these marks of status operated, and what special 
restrictions the metics lived under: the effects, both practical and ideological, which these had 
on the metics; what they meant to the Athenians; why they were put in place; and how they 
related to areas of life in which metics were more integrated into Athenian society. I argue 
that the overriding concerns were establishing difference, a boundary, between Athenians and 
metics, and putting in place a framework in which those metics who attempted to avoid the 
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restrictions, and thus blur the boundary, were severely punished. The importance of these 
concerns far outweighed any practical negative impact that was involved, but nevertheless 
carried with them considerable disadvantages, and prejudice against metic groups could be 
and was exploited by Athenians when it was to their benefit. They also tended to deny male 
metics access to traditional ways of expressing masculine identity. None of this, however, 
stopped Athenians and metics from forming close relationships and networks of support, and 
outside of official Athenian structures and institutions there was considerable scope for 
metics to compensate for their denial of agency (and potential isolation) in private and among 
their own communities. 
 
In chapter three, I look at how the Athenians theorised, explained and justified their 
privileged position through the myth of autochthony and the extreme boundary of status and 
identity which it represented, through its public proclamation and enactment via the ritual of 
the funeral oration. I consider the effects and importance it had not only for Athenians, but 
also for the metics who witnessed it. I also examine doubts about and dissent against this 
model and its effects. My conclusion is that its ritual context privileged it and protected it 
from rational analysis, allowing what would otherwise seem to be obvious falsehoods to both 
unify the Athenians and divide them from the other residents of the polis, at least for the 
duration of the ritual; there is evidence, however, that it was not entirely effective or 
genuinely believed in. 
 
The fourth chapter examines how (and how successfully) this boundary was enacted and 
policed in practice, and the efforts of the Athenians to keep themselves pure by preventing 
metics from crossing the boundary and infiltrating the citizen body. The evidence indicates 
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that the measures they took to keep infiltrators out were ineffective, and often acknowledged 
as such, but that this did not lead the Athenians to abandon their ideology of difference and 
superiority. As a group they were prepared, when required for pragmatic reasons, to allow 
non-Athenians into the citizen body, either tacitly or overtly, but when this was no longer 
necessary they reverted to type. The anxiety this contradiction created led to their taking, in 
the mid-fourth century, extreme action against those who they believed had become citizens 
illegitimately. They also attempted to make the boundary between Athenian and metic more 
clear-cut by marking the agora, the most cosmopolitan area of the town, as specifically 
Athenian space, and by remaking Athenian citizens through the institution of the reformed 
ephêbeia. 
 
Finally, in chapter five I look at individuals who did cross the boundary, and how they 
presented themselves and were characterised when in the courts: how naturalised citizens, 
those metics who had managed legitimately to become Athenian citizens, acted when facing a 
jury of Athenians; the strategies which could be used to attack citizens who had not lived up 
to the Athenian ideal; and how a man whose citizenship and Athenian identity had been 
judged invalid appealed against the decision. My conclusions are that in our examples, in a 
courtroom context naturalised citizens presented themselves only as provisional, qualified 
citizens who still knew their inferior place and recognised the fundamental difference 
between themselves and the real Athenians; they acted more like highly honoured metics than 
citizens. This identity, however, could be and was exploited to their advantage. With 
‘unworthy’ and rejected citizens there was considerable scope for variety; it was possible to 
present either an idealised version of Athenian identity, which more-or-less matched the 
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ideology (at least as an aspiration), or a more pragmatic, honest conception which looked 
realistically at the doubtful basis of what the Athenians professed to believe. 
 
In most cases Greek names have been given in their traditional English form or Latinised (e.g. 
Neaera rather than Neaira) for the sake of what consistency is possible. Greek words are 
usually transliterated and put in italics except in quotations. Except where indicated the 
translations are my own, made in consultation with the usual editions and those listed in the 
bibliography; Greek oratory, in particular, has become increasingly well served by English 
translators over recent years. Where textual questions are relevant they are discussed, usually 
in the footnotes. 
 
2. Scope and Evidence 
 
I make use of evidence relating to Athens from the mid-fifth century down to the 320s BC. I 
have not attempted to trace the development through time of metic status or the attitudes 
towards them, however, because our evidence does not enable us to do so; the picture it 
provides is not comprehensive enough. As my focus is on identity and Athenian attitudes and 
values, I have focused mostly on forensic oratory and the law; I have not ignored other types 
of evidence, but could have looked in far more depth at the views about and depictions of 
metics in philosophical texts, for example. I have not done so because I wish to use evidence 
that is as representative of typical Athenian attitudes as possible – and that kind of evidence 
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comes from the law courts. This evidence is far from unproblematic, however, and therefore I 
shall outline its difficulties and how it can be used.
1
 
 
In the first place, we often do not know what the text of a law actually was, because we are 
frequently dependent on the tendentious summaries of them given by orators. There is also no 
reason to assume that the Athenian laws were comprehensive or non-contradictory, or that 
they were not frequently ignored.
2
 Even when a law seems clear, understanding the motives 
behind it is extremely difficult. We cannot reasonably hope to give definitive answers to the 
questions of why the Athenians in the mid-fifth century made citizenship qualifications more 
restrictive, for example, or indeed why they convicted Socrates.
3
 
 
Quite apart from this difficulty in reconstructing motives, there is also the problem that what 
a law actually meant, and what the Athenians thought was its purpose, could change, and was 
there to be argued over. In Todd’s phrase, ‘the language of the law was the language of the 
street’;4 the original context in which a law might have been written is never discussed by 
Athenian litigants, except as a ‘reductio ad absurdum’. 5  Instead, litigants speak with 
reference to its ‘natural and contemporary meaning’ and purported effects.6  
 
Litigants could argue about intent and meaning, and if they persuaded the jurors successfully 
they could set ‘informal but nonetheless authoritative social precedents’7 – or at least that is 
                                                          
1
 The key modern works, on which my approach is based, include Ober 1989, Carey 1994, Todd 1990a, 1990b, 
1990c. For descriptions of Athenian law see Todd 1993, MacDowell 1978 and Harrison 1968. 
2
 Foxhall 1996: 142-143. 
3
 Lanni 2006: 177. 
4
 Todd 1996: 121; Carey 1994: 178 calls it ‘the language of everyday life’. 
5
 Todd 1996: 120-122, Lysias 10 being the reductio ad absurdum and only example. 
6
 Todd 1996: 121. 
7
 Lape 2006: 140. 
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what the litigants themselves would have the jury believe.
8
 Whether these precedents were 
actually binding in practice is another matter. A litigant could argue that the jury should be 
consistent with a decision made in the past,
9
 but his opponent could counter that the original 
verdict was a terrible mistake, perhaps due to the pleading of an unscrupulous sukophantês. 
In other words, the meaning of a trial and the jury’s decision could still be reinterpreted;10 
jurors did not give reasons for their verdicts, so they were there to be argued over.
11
 
 
We should be very careful, then, about looking for the meaning of laws. We can, however, 
understand how individual Athenians (and sometimes foreigners) explained and made use of 
laws, precedents and past events in particular situations. When the context of these situations 
is understood we can understand what at least some of the aims of the individual were, and 
hence what sort of response he hoped to create in his audience. 
 
The context is that of the law courts, which in Athens had large juries made up of citizen 
males over the age of thirty.
12
 As a general rule, it can be supposed that a litigant’s main aim 
was to convince a jury to find in his favour.
13
 Any statements he made are therefore likely to 
have been calculated to present his case in a light which, to the litigant’s own mind, was most 
likely to strike a chord with the jury. In other words, given the make-up of an Athenian jury, 
any ideological statement is likely to reflect an individual Athenian’s assessment of what a 
                                                          
8
 Quillin 2002 provides a model, based on decision theory, of how jurors could reach verdicts based on what 
they perceived to be the social consequences of their decisions. Quillin looks specifically at cases involving 
supporters of the Thirty Tyrants, but the model could be applied more generally. 
9
 Aeschines 1.173 provides us with an extreme example when he claims that the example of the execution of 
Socrates compels the jury to convict Demosthenes. 
10
 Rubinstein 2007: passim and esp. 360-361.  
11
 Lanni 2006: 120. 
12
 On the make-up of the Athenian juries and their attitudes see Todd 1990c. 
13
 Ober 1989: 45. They had considerable leeway; as Carey 1994: 177 notes that ‘the criteria for decision-making 
were never spelled out’. 
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majority of adult male citizens thought and/or wanted to hear. Whether the facts they present 
are true is usually unimportant; as Edward Cohen has put it, ‘although Athenian forensic 
speeches are rhetorical contrivances that virtually always present evidence tendentiously (and 
often dishonestly), the presuppositions underlying litigants’ claims are generally reliable’.14 
 
There are important limiting factors to be placed on this confidently stated principle, however. 
First, the facts of the case may have compelled a litigant to make statements or take positions 
that were controversial, or reflected a minority view or ideology. In such cases, however, we 
can reasonably expect a defence of the position to be made, and since these instances are 
likely to be rare it should be possible to spot them through their incongruity. 
 
Second, while a desire to win the case will always be one motive, it may not be the only one, 
and conceivably might not even be the main one. The higher the stakes of a case, of course, 
the greater the imperative for victory must have been. But in some circumstances, the defence 
or furtherance of the litigant’s general reputation might be of more importance than winning 
this particular case.
15
 Alternatively, there might simply be a desire for the truth to be heard.  
 
Another complicating factor that is particularly relevant to cases concerning metics
16
 is that 
speeches were often given on behalf of someone else. Here it is evident that the speaker’s 
own reputation, as well as that of the litigant himself, was on trial. In such cases the speaker’s 
desire for an acquittal might be less dominant a motive than in a case where the defendant 
himself speaks. The need to appeal in terms that were conventional and acceptable to the jury, 
                                                          
14
 E. Cohen 2005: 160. 
15
 Wout 2010: 179-181, 197, Foxhall 1996: 152. 
16
 See section 2.2 (d). 
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however, would remain; the speaker would still be subject to the moral and social, if not the 
legal, judgement of his peers. There was also the extra-legal audience of onlookers to 
consider; this could include foreigners,
17
 but it was surely the citizen component that was 
considered the most important. 
 
Third, there is also the possibility that a speaker has misread or misrepresented the ideology 
of the jury through stubbornness, ignorance or incompetence. In this case, the fact that almost 
all of the speeches we have were written by professional
18
 logographers is an advantage. 
Their experience and the ability which made them successful are likely to have reduced the 
chances of such blunders being made.
19
 This does not completely eradicate the possibility, 
however, firstly because a misjudgement can be made by anyone, and secondly because we 
cannot rule out the input of the litigants themselves. If a litigant insisted on taking a particular 
line of argument the logographer would presumably have been obliged to follow it, even if it 
was against his better judgement. 
 
The question of the influence of clients on forensic speeches has been controversial. Dover 
argued that full collaboration between a logographer and his client was the norm, to the 
extent that the words of the speech itself were the product of the two.
20
 This extreme position 
was directly opposed by Usher,
21
 who argued that the ancient terminology and testimony 
pointed to no collaboration at all – ‘after initial consultation, which would vary in 
thoroughness according to the complexity or difficulty of the case, the actual composition of 
                                                          
17
 Hyperides says in his Against Diondas that many Thebans were in the courtroom, though he wishes they were 
not – see Carey et al. 2008: 8, 12. 
18
 Or at least experienced, as in the case of Apollodorus – see section 5.1. 
19
 Ober 1989: 44. 
20
 Dover 1968. 
21
 Usher 1976: 31. 
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the speech was done by the speechwriter in his own words and with the exact degree of 
emphasis and emotional appeal that he considered necessary.’ 22  Usher’s arguments have 
apparently convinced most,
23
 and it would be wrong to revive the idea of full collaboration. 
The ‘consultation’, however, could have had considerable influence on the themes and 
argument in general of a speech, if not on the actual words themselves, though this is 
impossible to determine in any individual case. Again, this is not necessarily a problem for 
our purposes, as a professional logographer will have known through experience which 
strategies, arguments and ways of presenting his client are likely to have worked; as long as 
we use the speeches as evidence for what was likely to appeal to Athenian jurors, rather than 
for what litigants honestly thought, we can be fairly confident in them. 
 
Similarly, while the versions of speeches which we have may have been rewritten for 
publication or circulation, the aim of the logographer must still have been to present a good 
speech, which was likely to convince a jury, and so should not affect its use as evidence for 
social attitudes and values. 
 
In sum, any speech that we wish to use for evidence of Athenian attitudes will need to be 
analysed carefully; when an argument or appeal crops up time and again, however, it is safe 
to assume that it did indeed hit a chord with typical Athenian jurors. Litigants are, after all, 
hardly likely to use tactics that had been tried many times before if they had not been 
successful. It does not necessarily follow, however, that this means we have discovered ‘the 
                                                          
22
 Usher 1976: 36. He also cites Plut. Mor. 504c and Theophrastus Char. 17.8 as examples where there is no 
collaboration, but in the former the client complains about his speech before it is delivered, presumably with the 
aim of getting it changed. Lavency 2007 [1964]: 7 had reached similar conclusions to Usher’s, noting that while 
clients would have made suggestions, these would often have been obstacles to overcome rather than helpful 
contributions. Worthington 1993: 70 suggests that the client may have been authorised to make extemporaneous 
comments. On supposedly extemporaneous comments in written speeches see Dorjahn 1957. 
23
 Carawan 2007b: xiii. 
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Athenian view’ on a particular matter; it was one possible, attractive and potentially 
persuasive take on matters, but alternative strategies might also have been possible and had 
considerable appeal. We must also remember that the law court was only one, public, context, 
and in other spheres different values might apply. 
 
3. Theoretical Background – Identity and the Past 
 
My analysis of the Athenians’ society, behaviour and attitudes depends on understanding 
them as a group, with an identity which they believed bound them together. The boundary 
which the Athenians attempted to create and maintain between themselves and the metics is 
thus a key element of this thesis. Such boundaries have received a great deal of attention in a 
number of scholarly disciplines, particularly since Fredrik Barth’s introduction to the 1969 
volume Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Barth made the case for the boundary between 
groups being more important than the ‘cultural stuff’ which it contains. 24  As regards 
boundary crossing, he made it clear that ‘boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel 
across them. In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of 
mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and 
incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and 
membership in the course of individual life histories’.25 
 
Effectively, then, the fact that the boundary between citizen and metic was crossed, and 
therefore in a sense ineffective,
26
 does not mean that it ceased to exist, or undermined 
                                                          
24
 Barth 1969b: 15 and passim. 
25
 Barth 1969b: 9-10. 
26
 See chapters four and five. 
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Athenian identity; they simply had to come up with strategies to deal with this fact. I do not, 
then, accept that scholars are faced with a dichotomy between metics as on the one hand 
disadvantaged and oppressed, or on the other valued and integrated. The fact, for example, 
that restrictions on metics appear to get more strict in the fourth century does not necessarily 
mean that in other respects their position worsened, and may be a response to concerns that 
the boundary was becoming increasingly blurred in everyday life.
27
 
 
It is tempting to apply the label of ‘ethnic’ to the Athenian group. The difficulties with this 
term have been examined most fully by Marcus Banks, who went as far as to remark that 
‘Unfortunately… it is too late to kill it off or pronounce ethnicity dead; the discourse on 
ethnicity has escaped from the academy and into the field’.28 His argument is that ‘ethnicity’ 
as an academic term is better seen as a tool for analysis rather than a phenomenon to be 
analysed, and that it should be used ‘only if the approach taken recognizes that to study it is 
to bring it continually into being.’29 It is presumably warnings such as this that led Susan 
Lape to title her recent work Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy, 
and begin it with the caveat that ‘nothing in this project hangs on the use of the term “racial” 
per se. One might read this entire study substituting “ethnic” or some other less controversial 
term for “racial”.’30 However it is termed, Lape is keen to stress that it is merely one type of 
social identity, but one with specific features which make it worthy of study in its own right. 
 
                                                          
27
 See chapter two; cf. B. Cohen 2001: 242 on how ‘ethnic exclusivity in Athenian art was a response to 
encounters with diversity in Athenian life’. 
28
 Banks 1996: 189. 
29
 Banks 1996: 189. 
30
 Lape 2010: ix. 
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Banks, in his analysis of the various approaches to ethnicity used by scholars, determined that 
they fall somewhere on a spectrum between what he called ‘instrumentalist’ positions (in 
which ethnicity is seen as being used by groups to achieve goals) and ‘primordialist’ 
positions (in which ethnicity is treated as ‘an innate aspect of human identity’).31 It must be 
noted, however, that while some theorists have adopted positions on the extremes of the 
spectrum, such as Abner Cohen, who advanced the idea of ‘political ethnicity’, summarised 
by Banks as ‘ethnicity not so much as a form of identity as ethnicity as a strategy for 
corporate action’, 32  the two poles are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There is no 
objection in principle to ethnicity (or indeed any other form of identity) as a phenomenon that 
comes from a natural human tendency to categorise but which can also be manipulated to 
achieve goals. This may well be in response to changing circumstances or competition for 
resources. 
 
To take an Athenian example, there are a number of conceivable motives for the Periclean 
citizenship law of 451/450 BC. Even if we accept the claim in the Ath. Pol. that it was passed 
διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν (and take that as meaning ‘because there were too many citizens’), 
there are still various possible explanations as to why the citizen body was thought to be too 
large.
33
 A primordialist position could be that the Athenians were following a natural 
tendency to mark themselves out from other groups, and keep their own ethnic identity pure. 
At the other extreme, an instrumentalist might suppose that it was about citizens maximising 
their own group (and hence individual) privileges and access to the benefits of citizenship by 
excluding others. 
                                                          
31
 Banks 1996: 39. 
32
 Banks 1996: 34. 
33
 Manville 1994: 26-27. 
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It is evident that the one explanation does not exclude the other. On the contrary, both would 
have been reasons for taking such action. Given the open and wide-ranging nature of 
Athenian political debates, it is possible, and perhaps likely, that both were advanced as 
arguments in favour of the legislation. There is no particular reason to suppose that the 
Athenians were any less inventive or prone to speculation than are modern scholars. Thus the 
modern suggestion that the law was intended to discourage aristocratic inter-polis 
marriages,
34
 for example, is perfectly plausible as one reason. The question of whether it was 
a vital enough issue to be the major or overriding motivation is much more difficult to answer. 
 
This is not merely due to the lack of evidence. There is also the fundamental difficulty that 
any group decision is difficult to explain, since each decision-maker’s motives may have 
been different. Equally, voters may choose a position based on an instinctive reaction rather 
than a reasoned opinion, or simply follow their peers without considering the options for 
themselves. The result is that even when we are able to ask decision-makers why they chose 
as they did, we are often unable to give a full or coherent explanation. 
 
As will be seen, there was an apparent division between Athenians and non-Athenians, at 
least in the minds of the former, which gave them a group identity; and since this was 
supposedly based on descent,
35
 it would be reasonable to describe them as an ethnic group in 
analytical terms. I have generally avoided the term, however, because it seems unnecessary; 
simply speaking of them as a group, or ‘the Athenians’, is sufficient and avoids the 
connotations of ethnicity. 
                                                          
34
 See Lape 2010: 23-24 with references. 
35
 See chapter three. 
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Research in the field of social psychology is also informative when it comes to groups and 
identity. It has found that often those whose status as group members is felt to be insecure 
tend to be the ones who are most conscious of group boundaries and most keen to maintain 
them.
36
 They are also the most likely to show bias against non-members and adhere to the 
standards by which a group defines itself.
37
 These standards may be represented by a 
‘prototypical’ figure (or stereotype) that is thought to act in a way which typifies how a group 
member should (ideally) act.
38
 Those whose status within a group is marginal may actually 
opt ‘to alter the self to become more prototypical’, changing their behaviour or self-image in 
order to conform.
39
 
 
These findings, however, are not entirely unproblematic. They are largely based on studies of 
small groups, in which subjects are assigned identities; members have nevertheless been 
found to form groups based on these arbitrary distinctions and discriminate against those 
outside of their group. These distinctions may be as arbitrary as which Impressionist 
paintings a subject prefers, or even tossing a coin. The aim is to create for each participant an 
‘in-group’, which he or she identifies as being a member of, and an ‘out-group’, which he or 
she does not. In experiments which feature rewards, grouped subjects have been found to 
prefer strategies which maximise the difference in outcomes between groups to strategies 
which lead to the maximum profit for all; participants would apparently rather have a more 
decisive ‘win’ than an equal result even when the latter would give them a higher reward.40  
                                                          
36
 Pickett and Brewer 2005: 97. 
37
 Pickett and Brewer 2005: 89. 
38
 See Huddy 2001: 133-134. 
39
 Pickett and Brewer 2005: 93. 
40
 Tajfel 1981: 269-271. 
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While this is valuable information, especially when considering how groups form and how 
new identities may be reinforced by group members, it essentially concerns artificial 
situations. Participants who are thrown together, for example, may wish to form bonds 
rapidly with others to dispel feelings of uncertainty and disorientation in an unfamiliar 
environment.
41
 Furthermore, the arbitrary and temporary nature of these identities makes 
them different from the identities people adopt in the real world; as the political psychologist 
Huddy put it, social identity theory can be ‘faulted for ignoring… powerful identities’.42 
Equally, it has not shed much light on questions of why some individuals identify with a 
group more than others, and has not allowed for identity choice.
43
 
 
Social psychologists are, of course, aware of such drawbacks, and have attempted to avoid 
them in some experiments. Some have replicated the format of these arbitrary group 
experiments with groups with strong, real life identities, for example English and Welsh 
people. Others have manipulated subjects’ existing identities, often by telling some subjects 
that they are deviant from the norm in some way. In one experiment, for example, some male 
participants were told that they had a low score on a ‘masculinity index’.44 These experiments 
have supported the key findings listed above, both in terms of in-group bias and the 
behaviour of insecure or marginal group members.
45
 
 
                                                          
41
 Huddy 2005: 136. 
42
 Huddy 2005: 137. 
43
 Huddy 2005: 138-139. 
44
 Schmitt and Branscombe 2001. 
45
 Pickett and Brewer 2005: 98-100. 
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Nevertheless, it cannot simply be assumed that the findings of experimental social 
psychology will be replicated in the real world. Even when real identities are used, the 
conditions of the experiment are fundamentally artificial. Social psychology can, however, 
provide a framework for understanding identity in conjunction with disciplines such as 
sociology and social anthropology, which examine real societies. It remains true, of course, 
that these cannot be extended into the past automatically or uncritically,
46
 but they can 
provide insight into the workings of the minds behind the ancient evidence. These can then 
provide explanations for why the Athenians acted as they did, and found some aspects of 
their identity troubling. 
 
There is one particularly important difference between real world and experimental 
conditions which is worth noting at this point. In an experiment, identities are generally 
assigned clearly and accepted by participants. A group will identify itself as an in-group, and 
this in-group is in turn seen as an out-group by others. All participants agree on who is in 
which group. In real societies, because it is only in-groups that are self-defined, sometimes 
there will be a disagreement over how groups are constituted. In other words, the people 
whom an in-group defines as an out-group will not always agree that they are a group at all. 
In democratic Athens, this can be seen in the way metics were grouped. The Athenians might 
speak of ‘the metics’ as a group, but the metics themselves appear to have rejected this as an 
identity. They preferred their own self-defined and constituted group identities as citizens of 
other poleis.
47
 They thus formed an out-group when seen from the perspective of the 
Athenians, but not an in-group, because they did not define themselves as such. In 
                                                          
46
 Pálsson 1993: 5. 
47
 See chapter one. 
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anthropology, this has been termed a ‘hollow category’;48 it only has meaning as an identity 
when viewed from the outside. It can, on the other hand, have meaning as a label, possibly 
with a degree of stigma attached. 
 
Identity, then, can both have a powerful impact on individuals and their behaviour, and be 
used and manipulated for their advantage. It is in this light that my investigation of the metics 
and identity in Athens will proceed. 
                                                          
48
 Banks 1996: 133. Cf. Turner and Bourhis 1996 on ‘groups’ and ‘categories’. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DEFINITIONS ANCIENT AND MODERN 
 
The usual definition of the Athenian metic derives from David Whitehead’s The Ideology of 
the Athenian Metic, published in 1977 and still invariably cited as the standard reference 
work on the subject. Before this, the metics were usually seen as a privileged group, of higher 
status than other foreigners; Whitehead, however, produced a comprehensive argument for a 
very different definition, in which metic status was an obligation rather than a privilege, 
automatically acquired by anyone staying in Athens for more than a short time, and came 
with responsibilities which were for the most part disadvantages; in short, it was not a status 
which anyone would have desired, but rather one which people were obliged to endure.
1
 
 
Under this definition, the metics as a group consisted of everyone who lived in Athens who 
was not a citizen or a slave – the traditional translation is ‘resident aliens’, and a simple and 
accurate definition would be ‘free non-citizens living in Athens’. This group could be 
subdivided into the following categories: immigrants;
2
 Athenians who had lost their citizen 
status; freed slaves;
3
 and the descendants of any of those. One further group, whose status has 
always been controversial, is the illegitimate children of two Athenian parents. Scholars have 
recently tended to suppose that they were not citizens;
4
 unfortunately, certainty about them is 
not possible given the state of our evidence;
5
 personally, on balance I believe that they were 
permitted to be citizens, rather than included with the metics.
6
 
                                                          
1
 Whitehead’s work and its background is described in detail in section 1.3 below. 
2
 There is now near-universal agreement that immigrants became metics simply by residing in Athens for a time, 
though Lévy has questioned whether this was an automatic process in the fifth century; this is discussed in 
section 1.3. 
3
 Whether all freed slaves became metics has fairly recently been doubted by Zelnick-Abramovitz, whose 
argument will also be discussed, in section 1.5. 
4
 Scafuro 2011: 13 n.15. 
5
 Blok 2005: 17 n.60 describes the question as ‘unsolved and insoluble’, though elsewhere she states that she 
believes they were not citizens (2009a: 145 n.12). 
6
 The most comprehensive treatment of the question is Ogden 1996; it covers the Greek world during the 
Classical and Hellenistic periods but roughly half of it concerns Athens. Ogden argues that Athenian bastards 
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The last group, comprising the descendants of metics, requires a little more explanation. After 
451/0 and the introduction of Pericles’ citizenship law, legally speaking Athenian citizens 
had to have two Athenian parents.
7
 This meant that in theory there was no way for a metic’s 
descendants to become Athenians after this time, other than by naturalisation, which required 
a decree to be passed by the assembly.
8
 Whether, how, and when this was actually enforced 
in practice is the subject of chapter four; in this chapter I will deal with how the theoretical, 
legal situation affected matters. Edward Cohen has challenged the usual understanding of this 
point in his book The Athenian Nation, with the radical theory that the children of metics 
would ordinarily become citizens, in exactly the same way as those born of two Athenians. 
His view on this point has not found favour with many scholars (or with me) and is discussed 
in section 1.4 below. When the metic system ended is uncertain, but it must have been 
between c. 300 and the late third century.
9
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
could not be citizens, and his position is supported by numerous scholars (e.g. Rhodes 1997: 100, who had 
already stated his view at Rhodes 1981: 496-497; others with the same view include Humphreys 1974, Carlier 
1992). The problem is that there is no decisive statement which says so, despite there being situations in which 
we would expect clarity (e.g. Ath. Pol. 42.1, 55.3, Dem. 57.17). When legitimacy (or phratry membership, 
which does seem to have required it) is brought up in court cases it is as supporting evidence of status, not 
something which was a requirement – see MacDowell 1976. Sealey 1984 also argues that illegitimate Athenian 
were citizens; Patterson 1990: 60 argues that it is a ‘red herring’ to focus on this group – the nothoi as usually 
thought of would be children with a foreign mother who were recognised by their Athenian father. It is still 
interesting, however, to assess whether or not the children of two unmarried Athenians could be citizens, even if 
this does not address all the issues concerning nothoi. 
7
 On this legislation and its impact see section 4.1 (a). 
8
 For cases of mass grants of citizenship see section 4.2; for individual naturalised citizens in court see section 
5.1. 
9
 In 1977, Whitehead argued that it ended around 300 BC, because after that time there are no more epigraphic 
references to metoikoi or the metoikion, and there are no more oikôn en formulas (Whitehead 1977: 164-165).  
By 1986, however, he had revised his opinion, and was no longer confident in this; he suggested a date of 
abolition of 262/1, under Antigonus Gonatas (1986c: 150-153). References to isoteleia continue for most of the 
third century; Whitehead argued that these could have been purely honorary, and/or hereditary, whereas Niku 
has taken them as indicating that the metoikion, and therefore metic status, continued to exist until 229/8 (Niku 
2007: 29-32, 50-51). I agree with Whitehead that the isoteleia inscriptions prove nothing about whether or not 
the system continued to operate; an honour can easily, and often does, keep an obsolete name for tradition’s 
sake. Niku also argues that there would have been no reason to abolish the system before 229/8 (2007: 24, 32-33, 
41), but I fail to see how we are in a position to know that. I would therefore leave the question open. 
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1.1 Metics as Immigrants, and the ‘Ideal Metic’ 
 
Metoikos and metoikein had two senses in the classical period; they applied in general terms 
to any person who was dwelling in a city different from his own, and more specifically to 
those with a particular legal status, as at Athens.
10
 Until the 1970s, the standard etymological 
explanation of metoikos was that it come from meta and oikein, and signifying ‘dweller 
with’.11 Whitehead challenged this, arguing for the alternative sense of meta as implying a 
change, and hence for metoikos as a ‘home-changer’ or ‘immigrant’; in his view, the ‘burden 
of proof’ rested on those who denied this implication.12 This ‘immigrant’ meaning must be 
understood, however, in the sense of referring to a metic’s family origin, and not necessarily 
to his place of birth, since the children of metics, even those born in Athens, retained the 
status of their parents. This usage has obvious parallels in the way some English speakers use 
the word ‘immigrant’, as is also the case in the French language.13 
 
In any case, it is clear that the word took on a ‘life of its own’ in Athens, regardless of its 
origins.
14
 In its general, widely applicable sense we see it used in tragedy,
15
 as for example in 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, where Teiresias says of Laius’ murderer that he is ξένος λόγῳ 
μέτοικος, εἶτα δ᾽ ἐγγενὴς / φανήσεται Θηβαῖος.16 This appears to be a simple description of 
his situation, and it is notable that there is no opposition between the xenos and the metoikos 
as categories; rather, the one expands on the other. Oedipus appears as a foreigner who is 
                                                          
10
 Clerc 1893: 13; Harrison 1968: 187; Gauthier 1972: 108. 
11
 See e.g. Clerc 1893: 9 (‘étymologiquement, il désigne simplement un homme qui habite avec d’autres’). 
12
 Whitehead 1977: 6-7. Lévy has since examined the question, concurring with Whitehead on the grounds of its 
use with prepositions (Lévy 1988: 47-50), and the fact that it is never applied to indigenous people, unlike for 
example perioikoi (1988: 50). It can be used as an apparent synonym for sunoikein in classical literature, but 
Lévy concludes that it is the idea of a change of residence which predominates (1988: 50-53). 
13
 Gauthier 1988: 28. 
14
 Whitehead 1977: 7. 
15
 Vidal-Naquet 1992: 297. 
16
 Soph. Oed. Tyr. 452-453: ‘Supposedly a foreign metic, but soon to be revealed as a native-born Theban’. 
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living as a metic.
17
 The opposite is the engenês Thêbaios, the native of the city; the 
opposition is matched in the following lines by those between seeing and blindness, and the 
rich man and the beggar. 
 
There are some differences, however, in that these other transformations involve real, 
physical changes to his condition, whereas his change of identity is a matter of revealing 
something that was always there. Also significant is the fact that the metic-native revelation 
would usually be a positive thing, since under normal circumstances this would be a rise in 
status. Such devices would become typical plot resolutions in New Comedy,
18
 but there is 
also one in Euripides’ Ion of c. 413,19 where the revelation of the title character’s birth averts 
catastrophe rather than spurring it on. As Sophocles’ play seems to predate this20 we should 
probably not see his choice of words as an ironic reversal of a dramatic tradition, but they 
could certainly be a response to the social situation at Athens, in which elevation from metic 
to citizen would involve a marked increase in rights and status. The irony would depend, 
however, on a relatively straightforward understanding of the meaning of metoikos. 
 
Sophocles’ depiction of Antigone adds another level of meaning. She declares herself to be 
μέτοικος οὐ ζῶσιν, οὐ θανοῦσιν, 21  which Whitehead translates as ‘a metic, [belonging] 
neither with the living nor the dead’.22 But as her point is that she has no home with either 
group – the preceding line reads βροτοῖς οὔτε νεκροῖς κυροῦσα23-  the meaning seems to be 
that she is ‘a metic neither among the living nor the dead’; if she were a metic, she could find 
some home with them.  It is true that Antigone later says that πρὸς οὓς ἀραῖος ἄγαμος ἅδ᾽ 
                                                          
17
 Whitehead 1977: 36. 
18
 Mossé 1992: 276. 
19
 Discussed in detail in section 3.3 (a). 
20
 BNP s.v. Sophocles suggests 436-433 as likely dates. 
21
 Soph. Ant. 851. 
22
 Whitehead 1977: 36. 
23
 Soph. Ant. 850. 
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ἐγὼ μέτοικος ἔρχομαι,24 but shortly afterwards Creon says that μετοικίας δ᾽ οὖν τῆς ἄνω 
στερήσεται.25 The metic status, then, is something which she has but of which Creon will 
deprive her. Whitehead’s interpretation was that ‘pathos is the keynote of this cluster of three 
metic metaphors’,26 but as Citti has argued the word metoikos itself does not have such 
connotations here.
27
 It is true that key elements are her dislocation and the absence of any 
social or familial support, but those are the result of her particular circumstances rather than a 
result of being a metic per se. Certainly in the case of Creon’s words her metoikia is what she 
is being deprived of, and does not seem to be meant as a state to be pitied; and in the first 
reference it is her prospective lack of (metaphorical) metic status which seems the cause of 
her distress. 
 
Nevertheless, Antigone is both a metic and cut off from any network of support. Patterson, 
seeing parallels with the metic’s social and legal position in Athens, went as far as to describe 
Antigone as ‘the quintessential metic’.28 Such an interpretation obviously depends on one’s 
view of metics in the real world; and it is not at all evident that this was how the metic was 
usually thought of. They may have been outsiders, and lacked recourse to the structures and 
institutions of the polis in the same way as they were offered to citizens,
29
 but it does not 
follow that they were seen as lacking family contacts, or support networks formed within 
their own communities. Antigone lacks these things, but it is clearly a stretch to use this as 
evidence, by itself, for connotations of the word metoikos. Sophocles drew on the concept of 
the metic to illustrate his ideas about Antigone’s character, but it is much more difficult to 
establish the extent to which this drove the characterisation. On balance, it seems rather more 
                                                          
24
 Soph. Ant. 867-868: ‘I go to them [my dead parents] accursed, unmarried, a metic’. 
25
 Soph. Ant. 890: ‘She will be deprived of home as a metic above’ – she will either die or live entombed. 
26
 Whitehead 1977: 36. 
27
 Citti 1988: 459. 
28
 Patterson 2000: 96-97. 
29
 See chapter two. 
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likely that the myth determined the character, and that the metic concept merely met 
Sophocles’ requirements. Nevertheless, for it to do so it must have been easy, at least to an 
audience of Athenian citizens, to fit the character and their concept of what it meant to be a 
metic together. Presumably, then, they could easily imagine a metic being isolated and 
lacking security and support, like Antigone; but it was not necessarily the case that this was 
their view of the ‘typical’ or ‘quintessential’ metic. What such a depiction suggested to 
metics themselves must remain a mystery. 
 
Euripides provides another insight in his Suppliants, when he has Adrastus give this idealised 
description of Parthenopaeus, the Arcadian who grew up in Argos: 
Ἀρκὰς μὲν ἦν, ἐλθὼν δ’ ἐπ’ Ἰνάχου ῥοὰς 
παιδεύεται κατ’ Ἄργος. ἐκτραφεὶς δ᾽ ἐκεῖ 
πρῶτον μέν, ὡς χρὴ τοὺς μετοικοῦντας ξένους, 
λυπηρὸς οὐκ ἦν οὐδ᾽ ἐπίφθονος πόλει 
οὐδ᾽ ἐξεριστὴς τῶν λόγων, ὅθεν βαρὺς 
μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη δημότης τε καὶ ξένος. 
λόχοις δ᾽ ἐνεστὼς ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖος γεγὼς 
ἤμυνε χώρᾳ, χὡπότ᾽ εὖ πράσσοι πόλις, 
ἔχαιρε, λυπρῶς δ᾽ ἔφερεν, εἴ τι δυστυχοῖ. 
πολλοὺς δ᾽ ἐραστὰς κἀπὸ θηλειῶν ὅσας 
ἔχων ἐφρούρει μηδὲν ἐξαμαρτάνειν.30 
 
 
Here we have a clear description of how to act ὡς χρὴ τοὺς μετοικοῦντας ξένους, which 
Whitehead called ‘explicitly a blueprint for the ideal metic’.31 But there is actually little sense 
of a barrier between citizen and metic being set up here. The actions which Parthenopaeus is 
praised for avoiding are in themselves negative; no citizen would be praised for being 
λυπηρὸς, ἐπίφθονος or especially ἐξεριστὴς τῶν λόγων, as the text makes clear in line 893. 
                                                          
30
 Eur. Supp. 889-900: ‘He was an Arcadian, but came to Inachus’ streams, and was educated in Argos. Brought 
up there, in the first place, as foreigners living as metics should be, he was not troublesome, or a source of envy 
in the city, or a stubborn arguer, by which both citizen and foreigner make themselves most troublesome. He 
stood in the ranks just like a native Argive and defended the land, and whenever the city was doing well he 
rejoiced, but took it hard whenever misfortune struck. Many men, and many women, loved him, but he took care 
to do no wrong.’ 
31
 Whitehead 1977: 37. 
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The desire appears to be for assimilation above all, as he identifies with his new city to the 
point where his own happiness reflects its fortune. His modesty and willing subjugation to the 
good of the city are mirrored in the descriptions Adrastus gives of his non-metic counterparts 
among the Seven; Hippomedon devotes himself to the hunt and the military arts πόλει 
παρασχεῖν σῶμα χρήσιμον θέλων,32 and Capaneus is a man ἄκραντον οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἐς οἰκέτας 
ἔχων οὔτ᾽ ἐς πολίτας.33 But the specific qualities that each is said to possess, while desirable 
in any man, do reflect a particular status. Capaneus, a wealthy man, does not put himself 
above his poorer neighbours; the poor man Eteoclus does not allow himself to become 
dependent on his rich friends; and Parthenopaeus, as a metic, is careful to live a private life 
and avoid involving himself in any disputes.
34
 That is the particular type of hubris
35
 which 
Adrastus’ speech sets him up as avoiding, and this presumably reflects the boundary which it 
was least acceptable for a metic to cross. 
 
Having said that, it is also true that Parthenopaeus does not fit the immigrant template as well 
as he might, because he came to Argos as a child and was brought up there. He was thus 
brought up in accordance with his new city’s ways, unlike the first generation immigrant who 
would come as an adult to make his or her life in a new city. Parthenopaeus is characterised 
by his total loyalty to his new city, and therefore implicitly his rejection of that of his birth; 
this is made easy because his upbringing, we are told, was in Argos and not in Arcadia. The 
ideal metic, it would seem, must lose every trace of his home city, and the best way to do this 
is to be brought up in his new one. Ironically, then, the ‘immigrant’ character of the metic is 
actually lost, and the ‘ideal’ metic would logically be a second generation one. Crucially, 
                                                          
32
 Eur. Supp. 887: ‘wishing to make his body useful to the city’. 
33
 Eur. Supp. 870-871: ‘that left no promise unperformed either towards his own household or his fellow-
citizens’, tr. Coleridge. 
34
 Michelini 1994: 242-243. 
35
 A theme which Michelini sees as being interwoven throughout the play, though the exact term is not used 
here.  
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however, in the case of Parthenopaeus he remains ever-aware of the boundary which 
separates him from the citizens. 
 
As part of this idealised devotion to a new city there is the idea of the metic as a permanent 
home-changer, rather than a temporary visitor or sojourner, which can be seen in Euripides’ 
Hippolytus, where a distraught Theseus says τὸ κατὰ γᾶς θέλω, τὸ κατὰ γᾶς κνέφας μετοικεῖν 
σκότῳ θανών,36 and in his Heracleidae: καὶ σοὶ μὲν εὔνους καὶ πόλει σωτήριος μέτοικος αἰεὶ 
κείσομαι κατὰ χθονός.37 Here the metic status extends into death; it is not merely a condition 
limited by a resident’s life span.38 Lévy argues that this image could not have been ‘imposed’ 
if metics had been seen as mere temporary residents,
39
 but it is perfectly possible for the term 
to cover both permanent and temporary migrants, as shall be seen. It has already been shown 
that in tragedy a ‘metic’ could be isolated, like Antigone, or integrated like Parthenopaeus. 
We may say, however, that metics do not appear in tragedy as characters who intend to return 
to their original homes.  
 
Aristophanes’ Acharnians also shows the metics as an integral, though inferior, part of the 
city.
40
 With the ξένοι and ξύμμαχοι absent Dicaeopolis declares that ἀλλ᾽ ἐσμὲν αὐτοὶ νῦν γε 
περιεπτισμένοι: τοὺς γὰρ μετοίκους ἄχυρα τῶν ἀστῶν λέγω.41 This passage must be seen in 
context, however. Dicaeopolis, at least within the comic conceit, is arguing that οὐ γάρ με 
νῦν γε διαβαλεῖ Κλέων ὅτι ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν κακῶς λέγω.42 To make this case, he 
                                                          
36
 Eur. Hipp. 836-837: ‘Under the earth, to the darkness under the earth I wish to change my dwelling, after 
dying in darkness’. 
37
 Eur. Heracl. 1032-1033: ‘Friendly to you, and providing protection to the city, a metic I will always lie 
beneath the earth’. 
38
 Lévy 1988: 53. 
39
 Lévy 1988: 54. 
40
 Whitehead 1977: 39. 
41
 Ar. Ach. 507-508: ‘for we ourselves are winnowed clean – for the metics I call the bran of the citizens’, tr. 
Whitehead. 
42
 Ar. Ach. 502-503: ‘For Cleon will not attack me now because I speak ill of the city with strangers present’. 
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must show that metics do not count as xenoi; there is no particular reason to believe that what 
he says was considered to be correct, or even that it was meant to be taken seriously. 
 
Athenian drama, then, while it does not explicitly set out to define the metic, gives us a 
flavour of the range of meanings it could take. Attic oratory similarly fails provide us with an 
explicit definition, but it also suggests some things which characterised the metic. These are 
rather more concrete than the somewhat esoteric ideas found in tragedy. When Lycurgus 
attacks Leocrates for fleeing Athens
43
 he says ᾤκει ἐν Μεγάροις πλείω ἢ πέντε ἔτη 
προστάτην ἔχων Μεγαρέα,44 and reiterates that he lived ἐν Μεγάροις ἐπὶ προστάτου.45 Every 
metic was required to have a prostatês, perhaps best defined as a ‘patron,’ and their role and 
importance will be examined in the next chapter.
46
 Isocrates also stresses their importance, 
saying that τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιούτους εἶναι νομίζομεν, οἵους περ ἂν τοὺς προστάτας 
νέμωσιν.47 The metic’s worth is determined by his reliance on another. In Demosthenes’ third 
speech against Aphobus it is the payment of the metoikion which singles out a metic: 
Μέγαράδ᾽ ἐξῴκηκεν κἀκεῖ μετοίκιον τέθηκεν.48 A speech of Lysias brings these two ideas 
together: ἐνθένδε εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἐξῴκησε, καὶ ἐν Ὠρωπῷ μετοίκιον κατατιθεὶς ἐπὶ 
προστάτου ᾤκει, βουληθεὶς παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις μετοικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν πολίτης εἶναι.49 The 
link with a prostatês and the payment of the metoikion are the two tangible qualities which 
the Athenians associate with being a metic. 
 
                                                          
43
 Discussed in detail in section 5.2 (b). 
44
 Lyc. 1.21: ‘he lived in Megara for over five years, having a Megaran prostates.’ 
45
 Lyc. 1.145: ‘in Megara under a prostatês’. 
46
 Section 2.1 (b). 
47
 Isoc. 8.53: ‘we judge the metics by the prostatai they choose’. 
48
 Dem. 29.3: ‘he emigrated to Megara and has paid the metoikion there’. 
49
 Lys. 31.9: ‘he emigrated from here to beyond the border, and paying the metoikion in Oropus lived under a 
prostatês, wishing more to live as a metic among them than to be a citizen with us.’ 
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In each case there is also a clear contemptuous connotation to the description. It should be 
remembered, however, that the men being discussed in these speeches were Athenian citizens 
who had left their city. The Athenians had a rather chauvinistic attitude towards their city and 
its relation to others; it will suffice for now to note that while the Athenians might consider it 
a disgrace for one of their own to leave his city voluntarily, it does not necessarily follow that 
they viewed the decision of foreigners to come to Athens in the same way. In other words, if 
Athens was a great city it might be reprehensible to wish to leave it, but entirely 
understandable to wish to move there. 
 
1.2 Metics as Non-Citizens 
 
For Aristotle, citizenship was defined by participation in the political life of the city – its 
decision making bodies, magistracies, and law courts. Thus his starting definition of a true 
citizen is as follows: πολίτης δ᾽ ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν 
κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.50 This naturally provides us with a simple way of defining the metic, as 
someone who is not able to participate in such things. The problem, however, was that the 
Greeks referred to lots of people as citizens (politai, though at least at Athens the word astoi 
was also used – see below) who did not have access to such offices; Aristotle’s definition 
excluded many people who were ordinarily thought of as citizens. This was of course most 
common in oligarchic poleis. The philosopher, who was himself a metic at Athens, argued 
therefore that there were different kinds of citizen: ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερὸν 
ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος 
                                                          
50
 Arist. Pol. 1275a23-25: ‘A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to 
participate in judicial functions and in office’, tr. Rackham. For Aristotle’s other definitions of the citizen see 
Johnson 1984. 
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ἐποίησεν “ὡς εἴ τιν᾽ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην·” ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ 
μετέχων.51 
 
The metic does not share in the ‘honours’ of citizenship, but in this he is no different from a 
certain kind of (so-called) politês. Under a politeia such as Athens’ during the years of the 
democracy there would be little difficulty here – so long as we disregard for a moment the 
question of women – as all male citizens were able to take part in the running of the polis, 
with the exception of those suffering from atimia. The difficulty would be stark, however, 
when examining the regimes of the oligarchies in 411 and 403, and particularly the rule of 
Demetrius of Phaleron, when property qualifications applied.
52
 Presumably those who did not 
meet the qualifications were still citizens in the sense that they were not subject to the 
obligations owed by metics, and could theoretically become fully participating citizens if they 
were able to acquire enough property. A distinction between these two groups is sometimes 
made by describing them as ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens.53 
 
To classify these groups in rigid terminology, one might call all of them astoi, and reserve the 
title of politai for the ‘actives’; but such terminological issues did not seem to bother most 
Greeks. The oligarchy of 411 appears to have used the term politai for its ‘passive’ citizens, 
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who could not participate in the running of the polis but were still citizens by descent;
54
 
Thucydides says the oligarchs publicly urged οὔτε μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων πλέοσιν ἢ 
πεντακισχιλίοις,55 rather than expel those outside the 5000 from the citizen body, and is 
happy to refer to those who were not in the 5000 as politai.
56
 Similarly, Xenophon’s account 
of the rule of the Thirty Tyrants and the civil war contains no hint that the Thirty intended to 
reclassify those who were to be excluded from government in any way.  
 
The straightforward definition of the metic as a resident who cannot participate in 
government, then, is problematic. Aristotle does, however, make it clear that for him a barrier 
does and should exist between citizen and metic, as he warns that in populous states ἔτι δὲ 
ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥᾴδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας.57 This is presented in and of itself 
as a negative thing, and a reason for states to limit their size. In the Eudemian Ethics he 
approaches this barrier in a different way, stating that what is fitting for a metic is not 
necessarily fitting for others: οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ 
ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπείκει· ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.58 Whitehead 
glosses εὐγενὴς as ‘citizen’,59 which would perhaps be justified if Aristotle were specifically 
speaking about Athens, where eugeneia could be said to be held by all citizens,
60
 but this is 
not supported by the general ethical context of the passage. I would therefore prefer to 
translate it as ‘well-born’, as Aristotle seems to have in mind someone aristocratic.61 It is 
notable that when Aristotle looks for the opposite of the politically active, well-born citizen 
he chooses the metic as his example. As in Adrastus’ speech in the Suppliants, we see that 
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what is appropriate behaviour for a metic is defined by his status, and it is again non-
interference in public matters that is the key quality. 
 
So for Aristotle the metics were characterised by their inability to participate in the rights of 
citizenship, and keeping them out was somehow desirable. But he does not define exactly 
how the metic is to be differentiated from what we might call the non-political citizen – at 
Athens, the astos in the sense of ‘native’. The astoi, at least at Athens, were all those who 
were Athenians (whether ‘active’ or ‘passive’), including women.  Under the Aristotelian 
scheme the astai, which one might think could be translated as ‘female citizens,’ would be 
completely excluded from citizenship. Certain modern scholars have agreed that this was the 
case, notably Nicole Loraux, for whom ‘there were no female citizens, only Athenian women 
who were daughters and wives of citizens’.62 This position stresses the exclusionary nature of 
citizenship, which included a misogyny that denied women any place in the imagined polis at 
all. 
 
This model has, however, come under sustained criticism, particularly from Cynthia 
Patterson and more recently Josine Blok, arguing that by focusing purely on the political 
aspect of citizenship we have ignored its other, more varied and inclusive aspects. Certainly, 
after 451, Athenian women, as astai, had a claim to some form of citizenship inasmuch as 
only they could be the mothers of politai; the Ath. Pol. explicitly says that οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων 
γεγονότες ἀστῶν share in the politeia. They were thus part of the descent group, if nothing 
else.
63
 Beyond this, Patterson argued that as astai or Attikai female Athenians, just like their 
male astoi or Attikoi counterparts, had ‘an inherited, communal and familial connection with 
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the Athenian polis’.64 The astê may have lacked connotations of political involvement which 
often went with the word politês – the feminine equivalent politis occurs only very rarely65 – 
but, like the masculine astos, it ‘retained a more communal meaning of “insider” – especially 
as viewed against the xenos or “outsider”’.66  These two categories, astoi and xenoi, are 
regularly opposed, and when used together appear to cover everyone who was free.
67
 
 
Blok, and David Cohen, have argued that women were also citizens in a religious sense, 
through their participation in cult, sacrifices and festivals.
 68
  There was the specifically 
female Thesmophoria, where women lived on the Pnyx (the place of the specifically 
Athenian and political ecclesia) for three days, completely separated from the men, and under 
their own control and organisation.
69
 This was mirrored in five of the other major festivals;
70
 
these must have, as Cohen puts it, formed ‘an ongoing, central, and persistent feature of 
public life at Athens… [and] an important structuring element in the life course of girls, 
young women and adults’.71 The key point, when we come to consider metics, is that this 
participation ‘fundamentally and irrevocably demarcate[d] citizen women from the slaves, 
foreigners and children with whom they are so often grouped’.72 
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Athenian women also had a role in the important, public and mixed-gender festivals, most 
notably the Panathenaic procession, which was by definition Athens on public display.
73
 The 
evidence from art on pottery also suggests that women were often involved in sacrifices, 
often separately from men but sometimes together with them.
74
 Certain priesthoods also had 
to be filled by Athenian women, and the wife of the basileus had religious functions to 
perform.
75
 
 
These roles are arguably bound up in the expression hiera kai hosia, which is sometimes used 
in connection with citizenship – the ephebic oath featured a promise that ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ 
ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, 76  and Demosthenes in his speech Against Aristocrates refers to the 
naturalisation of Charidemus as follows: διὰ τῆς δωρειᾶς ταύτης μετεδώκαμεν αὐτῷ καὶ 
ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ νομίμων καὶ πάντων ὅσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν ἡμῖν.77 For Blok, this is 
enough to conclude that being Athenian, male or female, meant participating in these hiera 
and hosia.
78
 She defines them as ‘participation in cult [hiera] and in human practices pleasing 
to the gods or sanctioned by divine law [hosia]’,79 and argues that ‘every member of the 
community had a part in maintaining this relationship; in this sense, the polis comprised a 
covenant between all its human members and the gods’.80 
 
The ephebic oath, however, was written in archaic language, which may well reflect an early 
date;
81
 we should not therefore take it at face value as a description of a fourth-century 
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‘definition’ of citizenship. Equally, while Demosthenes does say that a citizen will share in 
the hiera and hosia, he also adds the nomima, which could cover ‘customs’ but also ‘legal 
rights’, and indeed ‘everything’ in which the Athenians themselves shared. Blok’s conclusion 
therefore seems reductive, though it is surely fair to say that participation in religious rites 
was one of the ingredients in the mixture of associations which made up Athenian citizenship. 
 
Things become trickier with Blok’s claim that ‘every member of the community’ was 
involved. For this to work, this must mean ‘citizen community’, and indeed she goes on to 
define being a citizen as meaning being part of the community, which included both women 
and men.
82
 But the word ‘community’ can of course have wider meanings than that, and 
could potentially include everyone living in Attica (slaves and metics as well as Athenians); 
alternatively, if all the Athenian oikoi were meant, slaves belonging to (and living with) 
Athenian citizens would be included. Blok’s ‘community’, then, which she also describes as 
‘the socio-polis’,83 has to be limited by the word ‘citizen’, which naturally makes it somewhat 
problematic if it used as a definition – we would effectively be saying that the citizens were 
everyone in the citizen community, which is not particularly helpful. There is also the 
problem that metics had a role in at least some of the Athenian festivals, albeit one different 
from that of the Athenians themselves, so were in some sense part of this religious 
community; yet they are evidently not citizens.
84
 
 
The problem is that there does not seem to have been a definition of Athenian citizens which 
is wholly satisfying, and did not depend to some degree on circularity – thus the Periclean 
citizenship law defined an Athenian as the child of two Athenians. In practice, any 
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individual’s status as a citizen came to be determined by the other citizens.85 Citizenship both 
gave access to, and was demonstrated by participation in, certain institutions and events – 
these included religious rites and ceremonies for everyone, and political institutions for adult 
males, either at polis, deme or tribe level, as well as informal public and private acts. While 
these could demonstrate citizenship, however, they did not bestow or define it – it was still 
possible to question someone’s citizenship on the basis of descent (either by casting doubt on 
the identity of someone’s parents or their status) even if they had carried out all of the usual 
citizen activities. These activities could, however, be produced as evidence that an individual 
was, in fact, a citizen.
86
  
 
‘Non-citizen’, then, is an apt definition for the metics because they were outsiders – the 
Athenians, as a group, did not consider them to be citizens, and so they were not. Their 
exclusion from the activities which went along with citizenship is both a result and a 
determinant of this; they were excluded because they were not citizens, and their exclusion in 
turn demonstrated and justified that fact. It remains, however, to discuss what actively 
defined the metic, alongside the negative description of them as non-citizens; what were the 
defining attributes were which separated them from both the Athenians and the pure xenoi, 
non-Athenians who were also not metics? 
 
1.3 Legal Definitions and the Lexicographers 
 
This is a question which has vexed scholars both ancient and modern; they had to reconstruct 
the legal meaning of a term which described a defunct institution. The earliest extant example 
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is Aristophanes of Byzantium,
87
 who defined the metic as follows: Μέτοικος δέ ἐστιν ὁπόταν 
τις ἀπὸ ξένης ἐλθὼν ἐνοικῇ τῇ πόλει, τέλος τελῶν εἰς ἀποτεταγμένας τινὰς χρείας τῆς 
πόλεως· ἕως μὲν οὖν ποσῶν ἡμερῶν παρεπίδημος καλεῖται καὶ ἀτελής ἐστιν· ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβῇ 
τὸν ὡρισμένον χρόνον, μέτοικος ἤδη γίνεται καὶ ὑποτελής· παραπλησίως δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ 
ἰσοτελής.88 
 
This is the only definition which indicates a time frame for becoming a metic: the ‘certain 
number of days’, which were apparently a specified period. The fragment does not make it 
clear whether this is a reference to Athens or is purely generic;
89
 Aristophanes’ failure to 
specify a time presumably means that he had the systems of a number of cities in mind.
90
 
Furthermore, while the term isotelês is certainly present at Athens, the parepidêmos is not 
found in the fourth- and fifth-century sources;
91
 and the ἀποτεταγμένας τινὰς χρείας τῆς 
πόλεως do not appear to reflect any arrangement at Athens. 
 
Harpocration, who focused on the vocabulary of Attic oratory and is usually more accurate 
than most ancient scholars,
92
 defines the metic when he discusses the tax they paid (the 
metoikion): μέτοικος μέν ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ ἑτέρας πόλεως μετοικῶν ἐν ἑτέρᾳ καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὀλίγον ὡς 
ξένος ἐπιδημῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἴκησιν αὐτόθι καταστησάμενος.93 The μὴ πρὸς ὀλίγον does not in 
itself contradict Aristophanes’ ποσῶν ἡμερῶν, and any interpretation which would put an 
implication of a permanent move on τὴν οἴκησιν αὐτόθι καταστησάμενος is, as Whitehead 
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argued, contradicted by a fourth-century decree giving exemption from the metoikion to 
Sidonians staying in Athens for trade, as long as they still ‘live’ in Sidon (ὁπόσοι δ’ ἂν 
Σιδωνίων οἰκο ντες ἐς Σιδῶνι καὶ πολιτευόμενοι ἐπιδημῶσιν κατ’ ἐμπορίαν Ἀθήνησι).94 A 
detailed examination of this tax and its implications for metic status will be carried out in 
section 2.1 (c). We have already seen its connection with the status in passages from the 
orators,
95
 and can add that Pollux states simply μέτοικος ὁ τὸ μετοίκιον συντελῶν. 96 
Hesychius gives this definition: μέτοικοι· οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ξένοι ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τελοῦντες ἀνὰ 
δραχμὰς δώδεκα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰς τὸ δημόσιον.97 
 
These definitions bring in a number of other terms, and use them inconsistently. For 
Hesychius, a metic was a xenos living in the city, whereas for Harpocration metics were 
partially defined by their not living like xenoi; this is similar to the idea behind the statement 
in the Acharnians quoted above. The lexicon attributed to Ammonius tackles this issue head 
on: 
ἰσοτελὴς καὶ μέτοικος διαφέρει. ἰσοτελὴς μὲν γὰρ ὁ τετιμημένος μέτοικος ἐν τῷ 
ἴσῳ τάγματι τοῖς πολίταις καὶ τὸ μὲν μετοίκιον μὴ τελῶν, πάντα δὲ ἔχων τὰ αὐτὰ 
τοῖς πολίταις πλὴν τοῦ ἄρχειν. μέτοικος δὲ ὁ μετοικήσας εἰς ἑτέραν πόλιν ἐκ τῆς 
ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ μὲν ξένου πλέον τι ἔχων, τοῦ δὲ πολίτου ἔλαττον. ἐτέλει δὲ ὁ 
μέτοικος κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν δραχμὰς δέκα,98 καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πομπῇ σκάφην 
ἔφερε κηρία ἔχουσαν. ὅθεν καὶ σκαφηφόρους ἔλεγον τοὺς μετοίκους. πολλάκις 
δὲ καὶ συνεστράτευον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.99 
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This intermediate status, between xenos and politês, is perhaps the most accurate definition 
we have encountered so far, since, as shall be seen in the next chapter, metics had access to 
certain rights that were denied to xenoi who were merely visiting Athens, but were denied 
those of the citizen. This does not, however, mean that we can accurately speak of the status 
as a ‘privilege’. This was indeed the orthodox opinion of scholars until the 1970s, set out 
most fully by Clerc;
100
 Harrison later used it as a guiding principle of his discussion of the 
metic’s status. 101  Gauthier partially dissented, accepting Aristophanes of Byzantium’s 
definition for the fourth century;
102
 drawing on the apparent prejudice against metic 
barbarians displayed in Xenophon’s Poroi, he argued that the acceptance of metics as part of 
the community in the fifth century was not shared by the Athenians of the later fourth.
103
 
 
MacDowell also doubted the privilege model, asking why the Athenians would allow some 
foreigners to avoid paying tax by not registering as metics.
104
 But Whitehead first produced a 
comprehensive redefinition of the metic. He argued that it was not a privilege that was earned, 
but a status that was simply automatically acquired, as in Aristophanes of Byzantium’s 
definition, and that it did not carry with it any connotations of honour. In support of this, he 
demonstrated that the term μέτοικος was only rarely used by the Athenians when honouring 
metics, with the usual designation being name, patronymic and ethnicity; the ethnic 
component recorded their status as citizens elsewhere, which was evidently felt to be more 
worthy of recording than their metic status at Athens. 
105
 When the term μέτοικος does appear, 
it is in what Whitehead termed ‘business’ or ‘neutral’ contexts, with euphemisms used in 
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other situations.
106
 Similarly, in catalogues and lists the terminology is an οἰκῶν ἐν formula, 
reflecting the deme in which a metic lived, except when a metic has been made an isotelês; 
clearly this was an honour worth recording, whereas metic status alone was not.
107
 The 
clearest indication for Whitehead, however, was the inscriptions which metics themselves 
erected. These were tombstones, in which the formula is always name, patronymic, and then 
home city, except, again, when the man concerned was an isotelês. This, apparently, was seen 
as more worthy of record than a metic’s citizen status elsewhere.108 
 
Whitehead’s work has become the standard text on the subject,109 and largely accepted by 
scholars as far as it goes, although Lévy has attempted to revive the privilege model on the 
basis of epigraphy and fifth-century tragedy. He pointed to the scenes in Aeschylus’ 
Suppliants where the Argives vote to allow the suppliants to stay under their protection, using 
the language of the Athenian assembly (ἔδοξεν Ἀργείοισιν etc.) 110 , and to the king’s 
description of himself and his fellow citizens as their prostatês: προστάτης δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀστοί τε 
πάντες, ὧνπερ ἥδε κραίνεται ψῆφος.111 Similarly, in Oedipus at Colonus he saw the local 
demesmen deciding on whether Oedipus should remain with them.
112
 This led him to 
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conclude that foreigners were required to undergo a similar procedure in order to become 
metics.
113
 
 
Lévy admitted that these incidents as presented were exceptional, but argued that they seem 
too precise to be pure poetic imagination.
114
 This is hardly convincing. The dramatists drew 
on institutions and procedures from real life in their plays, and particularly in the case of 
Aeschylus’ Suppliants this may well reflect a concern with and interest in a status which was 
a recent legal development;
115
 it does not follow, however, that they reproduced them exactly. 
Lévy’s theory finds no confirmation in oratory, political writings or the lexica, and is 
contradicted by the decree granting exception from the metoikion to the Sidonian merchants 
mentioned above. It could be argued that these are all either from the fourth century, or derive 
from fourth-century sources. Lévy’s evidence is not strong enough, however, to demonstrate 
that the system was any different in the earlier period. 
 
1.4 Metoikoi, Astoi and Xenoi – Redefinition in Cohen’s Athenian Nation 
 
Others have accepted Whitehead’s definition of the metics but questioned their relation to 
other categories of inhabitants of Athens. The most radical challenge was Edward Cohen’s, 
who argued in The Athenian Nation that some metics were also considered to be astoi; on his 
view, the astoi were all the residents of Attica.
116
 This in turn would mean that their children 
became politai according to the Periclean citizenship law, which as we have seen established 
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that the children of two astoi would ‘share in the politeia’; the politai themselves were thus a 
subsection of the astoi.
117
 
 
This would mean that the children of those metics who were considered astoi became fully 
integrated into the citizen body. Cohen’s argument is based on the regular opposition between 
xenoi and astoi which is found in many texts
118
 and some examples where he claims metics 
are counted as astoi. The main one is from Thucydides, who describes Hippocrates’ 
ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεί, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν.119 
While the metics are separated from the xenoi here, the natural interpretation would be that 
Thucydides was specifying that all foreigners, even those who were not metics (and therefore 
only staying in Athens briefly), were called up. Alternatively, it has been argued that here 
xenoi means ‘allies’, and thus that Hippocrates’ force included any allies who happened to be 
in Athens at that time.
120
 A few passages later, however, Thucydides refers to this same force 
as ξένων τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἀστῶν,121 which Cohen argues means he is including the metics 
as astoi, though not as Athênaioi.
122
 Cohen also cites the passage from Aristophanes’ 
Acharnians discussed above.
123
 On the basis that this evidence has established that metics 
could be astoi, he presents evidence which makes the uncontroversial point that to be a 
politês required having parents who were astoi.
124
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Robin Osborne’s review, while praising elements of the book, pointed out that Cohen’s 
evidence is not incompatible with the orthodox view of astos and politês as synonyms.
125
 The 
regular opposition between xenoi and astoi, rather than politai, can be explained as a standard 
pairing of words rather than a result of formal categorisation. Osborne also points out that 
when it comes to Thucydides, the historian is not necessarily using xenoi in the same sense in 
both passages.
126
 Thucydides appears to have been stressing the point that even non-resident 
foreigners were being called up in the first passage; that having been done, there was no 
reason why he could not revert to the usual terminology in the second. With the Acharnians 
passage, if Cohen is right then it becomes very hard to see what Dicaeopolis’ argument is 
supposed to be – if the metics were ordinarily considered to be astoi, why is it necessary to 
‘prove’ it in this way? 
 
Dem. 57 also furnishes evidence that makes Cohen’s theory hard to agree with. He cites 
section 30 as proof that in order to be a politês, a man must be descended from astoi (on one 
side only in this case, according to the speaker, since his father was born before the 
archonship of Eucleides in 403).
127
 This, of course, is true, but the passage does not suggest 
that there is any difference between the terms astos and politês. The speaker does not say that 
he must show his father was ‘born’ of an astos, but that he was an astos, in order to be rightly 
a politês – εἰ καὶ κατὰ θάτερ’ ἀστὸς ἦν, εἶναι πολίτην προσήκειν αὐτόν.128 If Cohen’s model 
had been in operation we would surely expect the difference between the categories to be 
pointed out here. 
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Even more clearly, in section 24 the speaker explicitly says that τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπὸ τῶν 
συγγενῶν καὶ φρατέρων καὶ δημοτῶν καὶ γεννητῶν, ὧν προσήκει, μαρτυρούμεν’ ἀκηκόατε. 
ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ὑμῖν εἰδέναι, πότερόν ποτ’ ἀστὸς ἢ ξένος ἦν ᾧ ταῦθ’ ὑπῆρχεν.129 According to 
Cohen’s theory, none of these things would be needed as evidence that someone was an astos, 
which was supposedly a simple matter of residence. In this case xenos clearly covered metics, 
and indeed anyone who was not a citizen, and there is no difference between an astos and a 
politês as far as the speaker is concerned. As the speech is about citizenship, and the 
speaker’s being deprived of it, it is inconceivable that he would have spoken as he did if 
Cohen’s theory were correct. 
 
Osborne also argued that Cohen’s theory would make the Periclean citizenship law 
‘incomprehensible’, since what it was intended to prevent becomes very unclear if Cohen is 
right, and that there is no evidence in the sources for there being two types of metic, one of 
which was considered to be an astos.
130
 This would have to be the case for Cohen’s argument 
to work, as Neaera, prosecuted by Apollodorus in Dem. 59, is presented as being a metic but 
not an astê. Cohen argues that Neaera’s extensive travels meant she would not count as an 
astê, since that required having a connection with the territory of Athens.
131
 This, however, 
would require a set of rules governing which metics counted as astoi; there is no evidence for 
any such rules, and as Osborne noted there is no evidence for there being two such categories 
of metic at all.  
 
I would add that Cohen’s theory depends on a rigid distinction in terminology that is not 
mentioned in Attic oratory and has not been transmitted to the lexicographers. Neither does 
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Aristotle seem to be aware of it. As Cohen notes,
132
 he writes in the Politics that in some 
cities citizenship was limited to children of two politai,
133
 but later uses the term astoi for 
others: τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν.134 In the latter case, however, 
Aristotle is referring to the final (telos) stage of a city’s restrictions. He would surely use the 
most restrictive definition of which he was aware, yet he uses the term astoi rather than 
politai. This can only mean that there was no difference between the two as far as Aristotle 
was concerned; and since, as a metic at Athens, he must have been familiar with the 
arrangements there we can safely conclude that legally speaking the categories of politês and 
astos were one and the same.
135
 
 
1.5 Other Categories: Isoteleis and Freedmen 
 
There are also questions over other categories, and whether their members were considered 
metics. The isoteleis, mentioned above, are a case in point; since they did not pay the 
metoikion they would not, under Pollux’s definition, be metics. Hesychius, however, is 
satisfied to define them as μέτοικοι ἴσα τοῖς ἀστοῖς τέλη διδόντες,136 in spite of the close link 
between metics and the metoikion in his definition of μέτοικοι. The discrepancy, however, is 
not a problem if we accept that metoikos had various shades of meaning. An isotelês, to judge 
from Whitehead’s tombstone evidence, might have preferred not to be called a metic; and 
when the writer of the Athênaiôn Politeia discusses the responsibilities of the polemarch he 
says that δίκαι δὲ λαγχάνονται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἴδιαι μόνον αἵ τε τοῖς μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς ἰσοτελέσι 
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καὶ τοῖς προξένοις γιγνόμεναι.137 The reason the three categories are listed is presumably to 
show clearly that those honoured with isoteleia and the more common proxenia were still 
dealt with by the polemarch; as the text is describing how the system worked, the author 
evidently wished to make it clear that their privileges did not extend to being treated in the 
same way as Athenians when it came to legal matters. Similarly, a law quoted by 
Demosthenes proclaims μηδένα μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων εἶναι 
ἀτελῆ.138 Here there was a particular reason to list them separately, as the writer of the law 
would have wanted to clarify that all categories were liable to the tax without exception. 
 
When specificity was required, then, it was considered worthwhile to list the isoteleis 
separately from the ordinary metics. In more general contexts, however, they are absorbed 
into the wider metic category; thus a litigant discusses the status of a foreigner not living at 
Athens, who had received an honorary grant of citizenship, in terms of πότερα ξένος ἢ 
μέτοικος ἢ πολίτης ἐστίν.139 μέτοικος in this sense must refer to all resident foreigners at 
Athens. As non-Athenians, the isoteleis must in any case have qualified as metics in the 
‘immigrant’ sense, since their family origin lay elsewhere. 
 
The metics themselves could also be treated as part of a wider category, namely that of the 
xenos.
140
 The word’s ambiguities are numerous; it can refer to a stranger, a guest-friend, an 
ally, or indeed any foreigner in an imprecise sense.
141
 As in Demosthenes 23, it could refer 
specifically to non-resident foreigners. Elsewhere, as in Demosthenes 20, it embraces metics 
as well. The speaker of Demosthenes 57, who is appealing against his disfranchisement, asks 
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εἶτ᾽ ἐγὼ ξένος; ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς; 142 and is concerned that ἐμὲ ψηφίσαισθ᾽ εἶναι 
ξένον.143 The term could therefore be used in a very broad sense, which led Harrison to rule 
that ‘it would perhaps be safe to say that in a legal context the word ξένος will be held to 
include metics unless they are specifically excluded.’144 This seems like a fair interpretation, 
but it should be noted that where the law was not specific there would always be room for 
litigants to argue over what the words used meant.
145
 
 
Included among the metics were another group: the freedmen. We know this because of the 
testimony of Harpocration: ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι ἀφεθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐτέλουν τὸ 
μετοίκιον ἄλλοι τε τῶν κωμικῶν δεδηλώκασι καὶ Ἀριστομένης. Μένανδρος δ’ ἐν 
Ἀνατιθεμένῃ καὶ ἐν Διδύμαις πρὸς ταῖς ιβʹ δραχμαῖς καὶ τριώβολόν φησι τούτους τελεῖν, 
ἴσως τῷ τελώνῃ.146 The three obol additional charge remains a mystery; we have no idea 
whether it was a single payment or an annual fee.
147
 My suspicion is that it derives from a 
joke about the rapaciousness of the tax collectors, who will be discussed in section 2.1(c). 
There is also evidence for freedmen and metics paying the eisphora together; Androtion’s 
prosecutor claims that he abused a citizen when δοῦλον ἔφη καὶ ἐκ δούλων εἶναι καὶ 
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προσήκειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἕκτον μέρος εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.148 Again, we do not know 
exactly what this ‘sixth part’ was, but it is apparent that both freedmen and metics were 
required to pay it. 
 
Harpocration defines the apostasiou lawsuit as follows: δίκη τίς ἐστι κατὰ τῶν 
ἀπελευθερωθέντων δεδομένη τοῖς ἀπελευθερώσασιν, ἐὰν ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ ἕτερον 
ἐπιγράφωνται προστάτην, καὶ ἃ κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι μὴ ποιῶσιν.149 The freedmen therefore 
possessed the two characteristic qualities of the metic: they paid the metoikion and they had a 
prostatês. 
 
Zelnick-Abramovitz, however, has argued against the idea that all former slaves were metics. 
Her case is that Harpocration’s evidence for their paying the metoikion is only available to us 
out of context, and not supported by anything earlier; that Aristophanes of Byzantium and 
Harpocration define a metic as an immigrant coming from another city, which would exclude 
freedmen; and that a metic was one who was settled, prepared to pay taxes and permitted to 
register in a deme – it was only when these conditions had been fulfilled that an ex-slave 
would become a metic.
150
 
 
The first point is not a problem, since Harpocration cites a number of comic playwrights, two 
of them by name. His own late date is irrelevant, because his sources are fourth- and fifth-
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century.
151
  He is not relying on an isolated or ambiguous source, and we have no grounds for 
overruling his interpretation. It could be objected, however, that his evidence shows only that 
some freedmen paid it, and not that all were subject to it. 
 
As concerns Zelnick-Abramovitz’s second point, we have already seen that the children of 
metics held the same status as their parents, even if they were born in Athens and not 
themselves migrants. Aristophanes of Byzantium does not mention them; either his definition 
is not comprehensive, or he uses the word ἐλθών in a very broad sense, referring to a metic’s 
ancestral origin. Under either interpretation, we have no reason to exclude either them or 
freedmen from the category of metics. Zelnick-Abramovitz’s remark that ‘clearly 
manumitted slaves are not included in these definitions, although they, too, may be regarded 
(especially according to Aristophanes’ wording) as coming from another country’ 152  is 
puzzling, and appears to be self-contradictory; if the second clause is true, her first point 
cannot be ‘clear’. She also fails to note that, under Hesychius’ definition, freedmen, as non-
Athenian xenoi rather than astoi, would count as metics, and she accepts Pollux’s definition 
of the metic as one who pays the metoikion, which would imply the same.
153
 Her third 
argument depends on the assumption (no positive evidence is offered) that ‘gaining metic 
status depended not only on a decision by the polis, but also on a non-citizen’s intention to 
settle in Athens’.154 In fact, as Whitehead showed, the evidence strongly suggests that it 
depended on neither. 
 
The difficulties with the definitions are instructive, however, as they throw light on an 
important point. The ancient lexicographers were in a position similar to our own, in that they 
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had to create definitions based on evidence that was incomplete and sometimes confusing. A 
fifth- or fourth-century Athenian, as we have seen, could speak of a metic in a number of 
senses, and no doubt if asked to produce a comprehensive definition they too would have 
struggled. This chapter has shown, however, that it is Whitehead who has most convincingly 
defined metic status as something acquired automatically, if anything a burden rather than a 
privilege. We can confidently say that all free non-citizens who were resident in Athens could 
be described as falling within the category of metics. The isoteleis may not have liked that, 
and perhaps argued that they were not ‘really’ metics because they did not pay the metoikion; 
possibly some Athenians, in some contexts, would have agreed with them. In others, however, 
they would have automatically put them in the metic group, and the evidence suggests that in 
no sense could they have been considered to be Athenian citizens, whether the term used was 
politai, astoi or Athênaioi. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LIVING AS A METIC 
 
In this chapter I shall look at the various facets of life as a metic. Obviously many aspects of 
their lives would have been largely, if not entirely, separate from their metic status; there 
were, however, certain times and conditions when their status had a significant effect on their 
lives. First, I shall examine what effect the key defining features of the metic had – as we saw 
in the last chapter, having a prostatês and paying the metoikion were the characteristics which 
Athenians brought up when discussing someone’s status as a metic, when referring both to 
metics in Athens and Athenians who were living as metics elsewhere. Then I shall turn to the 
rights and restrictions which applied to metics in the fields of marriage, religion and the law, 
and what these can tell us about their place in society. Finally, I shall examine the evidence 
for metics’ everyday, and especially economic, integration in Athens, and how this relates to 
the restrictions and limitations already discussed. 
 
2.1 The Metic’s Defining Features 
 
2.1 (a) Registration 
 
Besides the prostatês and the metoikion, our sources give us glimpses of another defining 
feature: registration. For new arrivals in Athens this was supposed to take place shortly after 
arrival; for metics who had been living in Athens as children it must surely have been when 
they came of age.
1
 The evidence for this act comes only from ancient scholarly works,
2
 and 
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 Pollux (3.57) mentions those μὴ ἐγγεγραμμένοι εἰς τοὺς μετοίκους δέον (‘not registered in the metics, as is 
necessary’), and there are also two possibly relevant scholia on Aristophanes – τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ξένων γράφεται 
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ἐγγράφεσθαι. (Frogs 416 schol: ‘for the law was that those from a foreign (city) wishing to settle at Athens as 
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does little more than tell us that registration was required; there is no hint of how it worked.
3
 
The registration may well have taken place at deme level, however, since a Scambonid deme 
decree
4
 would apply only to metics living in that deme; it seems likely, therefore, that there 
was some kind of record of who they were,
5
 although it is possible that the demesmen relied 
on personal knowledge of the local metics. The oikôn en formulas would also seem to 
indicate that there was some kind of formal link between metic and deme, and also that this 
was dependent on where the metic resided. This in turn has been used as evidence that demes 
had a geographically defined territory.
6
 If the register was public, it would be of assistance to 
the collectors of the metoikion, but we do not know if that was the case. 
 
We have no evidence for this registration’s actual use in practice in oratory or literary texts. It 
is not mentioned as a defining feature of the metics in the way that the prostatês and the 
metoikion are. From this we may conclude that it was probably not felt to be a prominent fact 
of metic life, and neither a burden nor a stigma; its obvious parallel to the registration of 
citizens makes this conclusion even more likely. It was most likely a neutral administrative 
act. Some scholars have seen a metic’s registration as a matter of choice, with the individual 
registering when he or she decided to stay in Athens permanently.
7
 But this ignores the 
automatic and compulsory nature of becoming a metic. Registration was an obligation, 
something to be done within a specified time of arriving in the city; the motive for doing so 
was to avoid becoming subject to legal action or seizure by the tax collectors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
citizens were registered after spending a short time there’). The Birds example is probably a reference to allies 
or metic soldiers, however, as the scholiast is explaining a variant reading of the line which ends εἰς τοὺς 
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2.1 (b) The Prostatês 
 
The registration procedure must have involved naming a prostatês, since that was a 
compulsory requirement which went with metic status. A failure to do so could be punished 
through a graphê called the aprostasiou, which Harpocration defines as follows: εἶδος δίκης 
κατὰ τῶν προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων μετοίκων· ᾑρεῖτο γὰρ ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ 
προστησόμενον περὶ πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν. Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀρισταγόρας 
ἀπροστασίου β’.8 
 
The Hyperides speech has not survived; but the punishment in such a case, according to the 
Suda, was confiscation and sale of property by the pôlêtai.
9
 It is possible that this penalty also 
involved the convicted metic being sold into slavery.
10
 That was the penalty for failing to pay 
the metoikion, as is shown by Demosthenes’ first speech against Aristogeiton:  λαβὼν αὐτὸς 
αὐτοχειρίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πωλητηρίον τοῦ μετοικίου ἀπήγαγεν: καὶ εἰ μὴ κείμενον αὐτῇ τὸ 
μετοίκιον ἔτυχεν, ἐπέπρατ᾽ ἂν διὰ τοῦτον.11 That, however, was the summary penalty dealt 
out by the pôlêtai rather than a result of a court case (see further section 2.1(c) below). The 
Athenians, then, seem to have seen something appropriate in using slavery as a punishment 
for metics; it marked a substantial difference between them and citizens, and made a metic’s 
status at least theoretically precarious.
12
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The most common occasion when someone would become liable to this graphê was 
presumably when he or she overstayed the limit without registering as a metic (and therefore 
with a prostatês).
13
 The prosecutor would have to demonstrate to the jury that his opponent 
had been in Athens for a sufficient time without registering. Possible defences might include 
claiming not to have been in Athens for a long enough time; claiming to have registered, and 
providing witnesses to this fact; or claiming to be exempt from the need to register. This 
latter defence could involve being covered by a treaty such as that which concerned the 
Sidonian merchants, or claiming to be an Athenian citizen (though if that was feasible it 
seems unlikely that the case would have got so far).
14
 
 
It is undisputed that it was necessary for a metic to have a prostatês; beyond this, however, 
the relationship between metic and prostatês has been the subject of a degree of controversy 
in the past. The key debate has been over whether the relationship existed solely for the 
purposes of registration, or whether it was a lasting connection in which the prostatês served 
as his metic’s legal representative.15 Todd has rightly called this a ‘false dichotomy’, since 
there is clearly scope for a relationship that was in between the two.
16
 Gauthier, for example, 
suggested a subtler role, in which the prostatês was ‘une sorte de garant du métèque’ but not 
a representative on whom the metic had to rely in court.
17
 It is apparent that, ideologically 
speaking, the prostatês had a vitally important role in defining and limiting the status of the 
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utterly in the dark as to whether such circumstances were dealt with in the law; if they were not, it would of 
course be possible for the metic to plead that there were extenuating circumstances (such as that he was not 
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metic. We have already seen that it was one of the two features mentioned in the context of 
Athenians living as metics elsewhere. To this can be added the testimony of Aristotle, who 
says that in many places (πολλαχοῦ) for a metic to go to law νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην.18 But 
this stops short of saying that the metic was required to produce the prostatês to speak for 
him in court. Such interpretations are, however, found in the lexicographers, who drew on a 
larger body of evidence than is available to us now. Harpocration claimed that the prostatês 
managed all public and private matters for the metic,
19
 and the Suda that τῶν γὰρ μετοίκων 
ἕκαστος μετὰ προστάτου τῶν ἀστῶν τινος τὰ πράγματα αὑτοῦ συνῴκει καὶ τὸ μετοίκιον 
κατετίθει.20 
 
Such strong interpretations are contradicted by the evidence of Attic oratory, however, where 
we see a number of cases involving metics without any sign of a prostatês.
21
 Lysias’ 
fragmentary speech Against Hippotherses was certainly delivered by someone representing 
Lysias, but it is not clear whether it was his prostatês or simply a sunêgoros.
22
 Even if it was 
his prostatês, that would not in itself prove that there was any legal requirement; a prostatês 
would most likely be a friend in any case, so might step in to represent a metic even if the law 
did not require it. The only proven example of a prostatês representing a metic is from 
Demosthenes’ first speech against Aristogeiton, where Zobia’s prostatês is called as a 
witness,
23
 but this cannot be held to prove anything about legal requirements or practice in 
general. 
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 Arist. Pol. 1275a: ‘it is necessary to have a prostatês’. 
19
 s.v. Aprostasiou. 
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As Whitehead has noted, the apparent contradiction has usually been resolved by arguing that 
a role which was very strong in the fifth century gradually lost importance and became ‘a 
virtual dead letter by the fourth century’.24 Harrison, for example, argues that the prostatês 
was required to speak in court for a metic until the early fourth century,
25
 when, rather 
conveniently perhaps, our evidence from relevant forensic speeches begins. But there are 
practical reasons for doubting that things were substantially different in the fifth century, 
though it is impossible to prove. 
 
In the first place, there are the simple practical difficulties inherent in demanding the 
presence of a particular person in court, who could be incapacitated through sickness or 
unavailable through business or absence from central Athens at any time; it would be an 
inconvenience to both the prostatês and the legal system to enforce such a rule. Second, any 
rule demanding the presence of a prostatês rather than any Athenian citizen could be made 
meaningless by the simple expedient of a metic changing his prostatês; there is no evidence 
for any restriction on this other than for freedmen, who would be subject to a dikê apostasiou 
if they did so without permission.
26
 The existence of this law, specifically targeting freedmen, 
surely indicates that other metics were not subject to a similar restriction. Thirdly, the 
evidence for the ‘strong’ prostatês comes from lexicographers, but when they name their 
sources they refer to fourth-century speeches.
27
 Whitehead speculated that by the time they 
were writing ‘lexicographers could only guess at [the prostatês’] original duties’;28 we cannot, 
however, eliminate the possibility that they confused statements about the ideal role of the 
prostatês with the actual legal situation. If, for example, a speech had described what a 
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 Harpocration s.v. Apostasiou. 
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 E.g. Harpocration s.v. Aprostasiou and Suda s.v. Nemein Prostatên (Adler ν 166), both citing Hyperides; 
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prostatês ought to do, or what one particular prostatês had done, rather than what was legally 
required, the lexicographers might have extrapolated a general rule from what was actually 
desirable, but not required, behaviour. Alternatively, they may have quoted laws that were 
technically in force but had fallen into disuse. In any case, there is no positive evidence to 
suggest that they were enforced any more rigorously in the fifth century than in the fourth. 
 
Since there is no compelling evidence for a compulsory role for the prostatês in the Athenian 
legal process, the question becomes one of what exactly the prostatês did do, and why the 
institution survived if it was merely a dead letter. It might be supposed that the prostatês was 
obliged to aid the metic in some way, or under certain circumstances, but again we have no 
evidence for this actually happening, other than Zobia’s prostatês appearing as a witness. 
Lysias makes no mention of his prostatês when describing the dangers and outrages he was 
exposed to in his speech Against Eratosthenes. When Xenophon proposed means of 
attracting more metics to Athens in his Poroi he suggested setting up a board of ‘guardians of 
metics’ (metoikophulakes), like the ‘guardians of orphans’.29 It is unfortunate that we have no 
idea what the role of the orphanophulakes who served as Xenophon’s model actually was.30 
But whatever he imagined these metoikophulakes doing, it is significant that he felt the need 
to invent a new institution rather than discuss the existing prostatês. The idea that a metic 
looked to a prostatês for protection, or that being a prostatês was a source of honour or 
advantage, seems alien to Xenophon here. 
 
If we examine the ancient vocabulary, we see that the terminology used to describe the 
relationship was νέμειν προστάτην.31 The Suda glosses the verb as ἔχειν;32 presumably the 
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 Xen. Poroi 2.7. 
30
 Gauthier 1976: 68-71. Doty 2003: 31 notes that such officers did exist at Naupactus. 
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 See e.g. Hesychius s.v. Prostatou (Schmidt Π 3896); Harpocration s.v. Prostatês. 
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 Suda s.v. Nemein Prostatên (Adler ν 166). 
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word was used often enough and in general enough contexts for the compiler to conclude that 
it meant nothing more specific than ‘to have’.33 If we accept this, it is possible that the 
purpose of the prostatês was nothing more than to exist; perhaps a metic was required to have 
one for no other reason than to mark him or her as a metic. This is not to suggest that having 
a prostatês was a trivial matter; the harsh penalties of the graphê aprostasiou show that it 
remained an important matter to the Athenian citizens. 
 
Todd has suggested that ‘the prostatês had a primarily symbolic function: failure to have a 
prostatês was to insult the citizen community by attempting unilaterally to blur the 
distinctiveness of your subordinate status’.34 This seems plausible, but it ignores the negative 
connotations which Attic orators put on the condition in and of itself. There was a shame 
involved that made them use it as ammunition in their attacks on their opponents; Lysias 
stresses that not only did his opponent live as a metic, but he also ἐπὶ προστάτου ᾤκει.35 It is 
true that the main thrust of the case is that Philon, the opponent, was disloyal, but the fact that 
this could be used against him indicates that the condition of having a prostatês in and of 
itself was negative.
36
 It was the shame that this involved, at least in the mind of a citizen, 
which the Athenian orators could exploit as being so disgraceful rather than any more 
tangible or material associations having a prostatês might have had. 
 
While living under a prostatês was necessarily a bad thing, it does not follow that all 
prostatai were as bad as each other. Isocrates said that τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιούτους εἶναι 
νομίζομεν, οἵους περ ἂν τοὺς προστάτας νέμωσιν,37 which suggests that having a respected or 
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 Lyc. Leoc. 21 also uses the term echein when describing a metic’s relationship with his prostates. 
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 Todd 1993: 198. Kapparis 2005: 108 similarly describes it as an ‘implicit acknowledgment on behalf of the 
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 Lys. 31.9. 
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 This speech is discussed in detail in section 5.2 (a). 
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illustrious prostatês was far preferable to making do with a common citizen. Those most able 
to take a wealthy prostatês would of course be those metics who were wealthy themselves; 
indeed, Isocrates’ statement implies that he imagined a prostatês would be of ‘such a kind’ as 
the metic he was connected to. There is no evidence for metics actually taking pride in their 
prostatês, however, so having a wealthy one might be better phrased as ‘less shameful’. 
 
2.1 (c) The Metoikion 
 
The picture is a little different when we come to the payment of the metoikion, since all 
metics apart from the privileged isoteleis were subject to it; unless he had received that 
honour the richest metic would be on a level with the poorest. According to Harpocration, it 
was set at twelve drachmas a year for men and six for women who did not have sons who 
were paying it;
38
 presumably this means that married women were also excluded from the 
obligation, since their husbands would have been paying the tax.
39
 Harpocration cites Isaeus, 
so he was evidently describing the situation of the later fourth century. The only evidence for 
this amount having ever been different is Ammonius’ figure of 10 drachmas, which is likely 
to be a corruption;
40
 the level, then, seems to have remained the same in spite of the apparent 
rise in wages during the classical period.
41
 Gauthier theorised that the figure was set at twelve 
drachmas because it was paid in monthly instalments,
42
 which is a plausible suggestion. 
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The tax was unique in Athens in that it was a poll tax, but in another respect it was 
conventional, as it was farmed out in the same way as most other Athenian taxes.
43
 This is a 
point which often escapes modern scholars who write on the subject,
44
 but which has 
important implications for how the tax was collected and how it fit into the metic system. The 
key point is that the collectors took on the tax with the sole purpose of making money from it. 
They collected and kept the actual money which was paid by those individuals subject to it.
45
 
The collectors themselves paid money directly to the treasury, and they paid only the amount 
which was agreed when they made the contract with the polis. The difference between the 
two figures was their profit margin, and they will only have agreed contracts if they believed 
it would be healthy.
46
 The metics paid their metoikion to tax collectors, not to polis officials.
47
 
 
The Athênaiôn Politeia describes the process by which taxes were farmed out. It does not 
specifically list the metoikion, referring only to ta telê, but an inscription recording the failure 
of a collector to pay his contract on time proves that it was one of them.
48
 There were ten 
pôlêtai who sold (misthousi) the taxes; the names of the successful bidders and the price they 
agreed to pay were written on leleukômena grammateia, whitened tablets which were handed 
over to the boulê. As each payment was made, once per prytany in the case of the metoikion, 
the relevant tablets were taken down and erased by the ten apodektai. Those collectors who 
failed to pay on time were noted, and liable to pay double the original agreed amount as a 
penalty.
49
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A tax auction is described in Andocides’ speech On the Mysteries. Andocides alleges that the 
bidders for the customs tax colluded in keeping down the price they paid to thirty talents, and 
that he stepped in with his partners (metaschontes) to offer thirty six, on which he made a 
small profit.
50
 Leaving aside the question of how accurately Andocides recorded a real event, 
the anecdote shows how serious a business the tax farming system was. Another auction is 
recorded in Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades, where the telônai are induced to bribe a rival bidder 
with a talent in order to preserve their profit margin.
51
 
 
Such a system is inevitably at risk of corruption, although as Jones has noted it had a number 
of advantages as well: it gave the Athenians a predictable level of income, it avoided the need 
for auditing the accounts of magistrates collecting the tax, and as long as there were 
competing syndicates the auction system would lead to a reasonable price being contracted.
52
 
It also guaranteed a certain level of efficiency in the tax’s collection, because the successful 
bidders had to maximise their income to ensure that they were able to pay the contracted 
sums on time and obtain the largest possible profit for themselves. The consequences of 
failing to do this are recorded in the inscription mentioned above, which records the 
confiscation of property belonging to a certain Meixidemus: ὀφείλοντος τῶι δημοσίωι τῶι 
Ἀθηναίων ἐγγύην [ἣ]ν ἐνεγυήσατο Φιλιστίδην: Φιλιστίδου: Αἰξ: μεταρχόντα τέλους 
μετοικίου ἐπὶ Πυθοδότου ἄρχοντος ἕκτην καὶ ἑβδόμην καὶ ὀγδόην καὶ ἐνάτην τέτταρας 
ταύτας ἑκάστην τὴν καταβολήν: Η: δραχμὰς.53 
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This rate of one hundred drachmas per prytany means he agreed to pay one thousand 
drachmas over the year (assuming, as seems reasonable, that his contract extended over the 
whole year). To break even, he would have had to collect the metoikion from a minimum of 
eighty four (male) metics paying twelve drachmas each. The logical supposition is that his 
allocation was decided on the basis of demes,
54
 or possibly subdivisions of demes, since some 
urban demes must have had very high concentrations of metics. If there was a public register 
of metics, this would naturally be of invaluable assistance to the tax collectors. There is, 
however, no evidence to confirm that demes were the basis of dividing up jurisdictions. In 
any case, this was probably left up to the successfully bidding syndicate to arrange, as there is 
nothing to suggest that the Athenians sold this tax in a sub-divided form.
55
 
 
In practice, all this would mean that the collectors would have a powerful incentive to make a 
positive effort to collect the tax, and to exact punishment from those who failed to pay it. 
When an individual bid to collect a tax he was gambling on his being able to extract enough 
money to meet what he was contracted to pay to the polis, plus enough extra to cover his 
costs, with enough profit left after that to make the effort worthwhile. So it was in the 
interests of the telônai to get as many people as possible registered as metics, so that they 
became subject to the metoikion. Equally, they would have a clear incentive to prosecute 
those foreigners who failed to register or take a prostatês, and their familiarity with those 
metics living in the area they covered would enable them to identify any unregistered 
newcomers with greater ease than a citizen not involved in collecting the metoikion. The risk 
was that they over-estimated the number of metics from whom they could collect the tax, or 
that metic numbers fell for some reason – as might occur if a significant number of metics 
                                                          
54
 Meyer 2010: 41. 
55
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left Athens, or the deme which a certain telônês had the rights to collect from, if that was 
indeed how the tax was subdivided.
56
 
 
With the metoikion, the difference was that the speculation was about metic numbers and the 
collector’s ability to get money out of them. It should be noted that the grain tax law says 
nothing about the collectors making a profit, which was evidently considered to be their ‘own 
concern’.57 The law makers must, however, have been aware that this was how the system 
worked. There would have been the obvious question about what would motivate the 
collectors to bid if there was nothing in it for them; and in the case of the grain tax, the law 
was proposed by Agurrius of Collytus, the same man who had led the allegedly profiteering 
tax syndicate which Andocides claimed he had outbid for the benefit of the polis.
58
 He will 
have drawn on his own experience in drafting the law, and no doubt in the discussions which 
went on about it before the nomothetai.
59
 These presumably involved an explanation and 
justification of each of the law’s provisions. The profit-making of the metoikion collectors 
was not something which was unknown to Athenians; on the contrary, it was the basis of 
their system, and anyone involved in polis administration can hardly have been unaware of 
that fact. 
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There are two examples of metics falling foul of this system. The first involves Aristogeiton, 
who attempted to have Zobia sold into slavery.
60
 The second concerns the philosopher 
Xenocrates, and is recorded in a Life of the orator Lycurgus: τελώνου δέ ποτ’ ἐπιβαλόντος 
Ξενοκράτει τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τὰς χεῖρας καὶ πρὸς τὸ μετοίκιον αὐτὸν ἀπάγοντος, ἀπαντήσας 
ῥάβδῳ τε κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ τελώνου κατήνεγκε, καὶ τὸν μὲν Ξενοκράτην ἀπέλυσε, τὸν δ’ 
ὡς οὐ τὰ πρέποντα δράσαντα εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον κατέκλεισεν.61 
 
In both cases we have metics who are unjustly taken by apparently unscrupulous individuals. 
These examples have been seen as illustrating the isolated and risky position which they held 
in Athenian society.
62
 But the Zobia story indicates that there was some way of proving that a 
metoikion had been paid; the speaker claims that she would have been sold had her metoikion 
not been κείμενον.63 One would assume either that some token was given on payment, or that 
witnesses were present. The Xenocrates story can be interpreted as showing that a metic 
depended on his citizen friends in such situations, but is surely an example of this working to 
the metic’s benefit. 
 
On the other hand, both anecdotes suggest that the burden of proof rested on the metic rather 
than on his or her accuser, unless by τὰ πρέποντα we are to understand that some evidence 
had to be provided in advance. The word could mean something like ‘the clearly visible 
things’ or ‘the suitable things’; we can therefore infer either that some sort of public 
announcement(s) had to be made, or that there were some specific procedures which ought to 
be followed. I incline to the former option because it fits better with what happened in the 
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Zobia story, and because if the latter were the case we might expect a wording (ta deonta, for 
example) which made it clearer that these were requirements which had to be fulfilled. If this 
is right, the system allowed for the friends of metics to intervene if they felt there was a case 
to be made; alternatively, they could ensure they were at the sale of the metic into slavery, 
and by out bidding others pay what would effectively be a ransom. It would probably be 
easier simply to pay off the tax collector, of course. 
 
Both of those anecdotes ended happily for the metics concerned; for those who had genuinely 
failed to pay their tax, or get themselves registered and take a prostatês, it would be a 
different matter. If a tax collector seized a metic and took him or her to be sold, after 
publicising the fact in some specified way, the possible defences would be (1) that the metic 
had, in fact paid their metoikion, or (2) that they were not required to pay it. This did not, 
according to the Zobia anecdote, take place in court, but before the body which did the selling. 
In other words, no dikê or graphê had yet been brought.  
 
The first defence, as with Zobia, would be employed through providing evidence that the tax 
and been paid, and presumably that would be the end of it as long as the officers concerned 
were convinced.
64
 The second might be rather more complicated. The accused could claim to 
be exempt through having isoteleia, which would be relatively straightforward to demonstrate, 
or through a treaty like that covering Sidonian merchants, which might be more difficult if 
the terms of the treaty were complex. Alternatively they could claim to be an Athenian citizen, 
or exempt because they had not been in Athens for long enough to be required to pay the tax. 
In the case of any of these defences, the decision was probably taken on the spot whether to 
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proceed with the sale or release the accused. In the latter case, the tax collector could pursue 
the metic through the courts if they so desired.
65
 
 
There may not, then, have been a suit which specifically targeted those who had not paid their 
metoikion; it was perhaps only targeted indirectly, with the formal suit attacking the basis of 
whatever defence was claimed. The law may simply have specified that non-payment was to 
be punished by sale into slavery, and set out how this was to be done. Otherwise it is hard to 
make sense of what happened in the case of Zobia, since she should surely have been 
prosecuted if there was such a suit. Since the speaker is attacking Aristogeiton, if he was 
doing anything that was procedurally invalid we would expect some sort of attack on that 
basis; but it is not the action of dragging someone before the pôlêtêrion which is criticised, 
but his doing it to someone he knew and who had helped him in the past. 
 
On the other hand, a specifically targeted suit would have made it easier for the telônai to get 
their money in cases where the metic concerned was better able to defend himself; and Pollux 
states that κατὰ δὲ τῶν οὐ τελούντων τὸ μετοίκιον ἢ προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων ἀπροστασίου 
δίκη. 66  Elsewhere, in what Meyer calls the ‘shorter version’, Pollux claims only that 
ἀπροστασίου δὲ κατὰ τῶν οὐ νεμόντων προστάτην μετοίκων, in a passage in which he is 
differentiating it from the apostasiou.
67
 One could naturally say that having a prostatês was 
the primary association, with the metoikion connection being subordinate, to explain this 
discrepancy, but it is worrying that none of the other lexica mention it. Pollux gives no source 
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for this information; it might, then, simply be the writer’s inference that the graphê covered 
the metoikion as well. It is in a passage very shortly after this that Pollux refers to metics as 
‘defaulters’ who are not registered, do not pay the metoikion, or do not ‘carry the tray’; the 
ascription of the term to the last group at least seems to be derived from comedy, so we might 
well wonder if the use of such sources has misled Pollux here. 
 
Meyer has proposed that cases of failure to pay the metoikion came under the graphê 
aprostasiou, as part of her study of the phialai or ‘silver bowl’ inscriptions, in which she 
argued that they were the result of aprostasiou suits, rather than apostasiou suits as is usually 
concluded;
68
 however, as we have seen, this does not fit with the anecdotes as described. If 
the metoikion was not covered by the graphê aprostasiou, there may still have been another 
suit which did target non-payment of the tax, but as it is not mentioned anywhere this does 
not seem particularly likely; and the anecdotes about Zobia and Xenocrates suggest that the 
legal recourse in such a situation was simply to attempt to exact the penalty of sale into 
slavery by persuading the pôlêtai that no payment had been made, and the accused was liable 
to the tax.
69
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Debrunner Hall 1996: 81-82. Lanni 2006: 137 wonders ‘why anyone would confess in such circumstances’; 
perhaps the right to appeal to a court was simply ignored in practice in cases where the accused’s guilt was 
obvious (and they were relatively powerless), or confessions were gained by violence. 
66 
 
 
In practice, however, the tax collectors probably used the possibility of a metic’s being seized 
and sold as a threat more often than as an actual course of action. It would have been an 
effective way of encouraging them to pay up, especially since the actual financial burden of 
the metoikion was not particularly great, especially if paid in instalments. For a poor metic it 
would hardly be negligible, however. The inscriptions recording payments made to workers 
on the Erechtheon
70
 indicate that a worker on the project received one drachma a day, so such 
a metic would have to part with a full day’s wage each month.71 As Loomis has shown, 
however, this cannot reasonably be taken as a standard or ‘average wage’,72 since although all 
workers were paid the same, whether citizen or metic, it was a public and religious project 
which we cannot assume was representative of conditions in the private sector.
73
 
 
For the project to have attracted free workers, then, it must have paid wages that were 
reasonable, if not rather high. The amount perceived as being required for subsistence in the 
fourth century seems to have been somewhat less than a drachma a day, since Xenophon 
proposed paying Athenian citizens three obols per day in order to relieve them of the need to 
work for a living,
74
 while at the time of the Ath. Pol. the ephebes’ provisions were bought 
from a pool of four obols each.
75
 So one drachma a month would have been a noticeable and 
at the least irritating, if not necessarily hardship-inducing, burden. In any case, those metics 
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most at risk of failing to pay the tax would be those who could not find work, or were 
incapacitated through age or illness. Unlike citizens, they could not rely on state support
76
 or 
the income provided by attendance at the assembly or law courts, and the risk which this put 
them under should not be ignored. 
 
Auctioning off the metoikion must have earned the polis a considerable number of talents, 
even with the profit margin of the telônai to consider.
77
 How financially significant this was 
would depend on the state of Athens’ total sources of income at any particular time.78 We 
should not, however, assume that its perceived importance was related to the proportion of 
income which it made up, or even to its absolute level; it was very likely tied up with ideas 
about what metics ‘should’ be contributing to the polis, and it is perfectly possible that this 
was conceived in individual, moralistic terms rather than on a large scale.
79
 Similarly, in the 
law courts at least, the Athenians appear to have had a great deal of time for arguments which 
claimed there were wide, social consequences to be derived from individual misbehaviour 
and juries’ treatment of it.80 
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So the practical burden on the individual metic was not always insignificant, and neither was 
the contribution of the tax as perceived by the Athenians. The other significance of the 
metoikion was symbolic, since, as has long been recognised, it marked the one paying it as a 
non-citizen and an inferior.
81
 That is not the whole story, however, since the system also 
placed metics in positions that were anathema to Athenians, as they had to pay a compulsory 
tax, and they were placed in the power of the telônai. A useful illustration of this antipathy is 
to be found in Demosthenes’ speech Against Androtion. The speaker accuses his opponent of 
abusing his powers as a collector of the eisphora, and calls his methods worse than those of 
the Thirty Tyrants, since they merely arrested men in the agora, whereas Androtion turned 
their homes into prisons by bringing in the Eleven.
82
 He asks the jury a question: 
καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τί οἴεσθ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἄνθρωπος πένης ἢ καὶ πλούσιος, 
πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀνηλωκὼς καί τιν᾽ ἴσως τρόπον εἰκότως οὐκ εὐπορῶν ἀργυρίου, ἢ τέγος 
ὡς τοὺς γείτονας ὑπερβαίνοι, ἢ ὑποδύοιθ᾽ ὑπὸ κλίνην ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ σῶμ᾽ ἁλοὺς 
εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἕλκεσθαι, ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἀσχημονοίη ἃ δούλων, οὐκ ἐλευθέρων ἐστὶν 
ἔργα, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ γυναικὸς ὁρῷτο ποιῶν, ἣν ὡς ἐλεύθερος 
ἠγγυήσατο καὶ τῆς πόλεως πολίτης[;]83 
 
This disgrace is little more than what the metic was potentially exposed to on a regular basis. 
The disgust at being forced to act more like a slave than a free man is paralleled in the risk a 
metic ran of being sold into slavery for failing to pay the tax. Later, the speaker clarifies what 
it was that was particularly galling about his opponent’s methods: τίνος οὖν εἵνεκ᾽ ἀφεὶς τὸ 
τὰ χωρία δημεύειν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἀπογράφειν, ἔδεις καὶ ὕβριζες πολίτας ἀνθρώπους 
καὶ τοὺς ταλαιπώρους μετοίκους, οἷς ὑβριστικώτερον ἢ τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς σαυτοῦ κέχρησαι;84 
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There is, as Whitehead noted, a degree of pathos in the ταλαιπώρους μετοίκους, but the 
terminology is hardly flattering.
85
 There is an element of solidarity, perhaps, in that both 
metics and citizens are treated more hubristically even than slaves, but another implication is 
that Androtion has reduced citizens to the level of the ταλαιπώρους metics. Later, he says that 
Androtion κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ὕβριζεν ὁμοῦ μετοίκους, Ἀθηναίους: δῶν, ἀπάγων, βοῶν ἐν ταῖς 
ἐκκλησίαις ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος.86 Perhaps the speaker felt it necessary to mention the metics in 
front of a jury of citizens purely to present them with more of Androtion’s victims, but the 
intention may also have been to imply that treating citizens and metics alike was crossing a 
boundary in a way that was unacceptable. 
 
The speaker’s main point, however, is that it is the punishment of the body as opposed to the 
confiscation of goods that is worst of all. He continues: 
καὶ μὴν εἰ θέλετε σκέψασθαι τί δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι διαφέρει, τοῦτο 
μέγιστον ἂν εὕροιτε, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν δούλοις τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἁπάντων 
ὑπεύθυνόν ἐστιν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐλευθέροις, κἂν τὰ μέγιστ᾽ ἀτυχῶσιν, τοῦτό γ᾽ ἔνεστι 
σῶσαι: εἰς χρήματα γὰρ τὴν δίκην περὶ τῶν πλείστων παρὰ τούτων προσήκει 
λαμβάνειν. ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ ἀνδραπόδοις, ἐποιήσατο τὰς 
τιμωρίας.87 
 
This divide is apparently crucial, but the metics were on the wrong side of it when it came to 
taxation, since if they failed to pay the metoikion they were condemned to slavery. 
 
Androtion was at least operating as an official magistrate.
88
 The eisphora was a tax 
administered by the Athenians themselves rather than farmed out,
89
 and it was one which 
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even a metic could claim credit for having paid; Lysias lists it as one of the contributions he 
and his brother made to the city along with providing a dramatic chorus.
90
 Unsurprisingly, he 
does not mention the metoikion.
91
 
 
The telônai proper and their activities were, as one might expect, disliked,
92
 and they were 
subject to a variety of abuse.
93
 These were the men in whose hands the metics could find 
themselves, and since all metics apart from the isoteleis had to pay the metoikion there was 
no escape from them other than to leave Athens altogether. It is in the light of this degrading 
fact that the preference for recording one’s status as an isotelês above even citizenship 
elsewhere, which we saw in metic tombstones, must be understood. 
 
Among the unprivileged metics there was clearly a distinction between the poor and the 
better off when it came to paying tax, in that the richer would obviously be far less likely to 
be unable to make a payment. We might also reasonably imagine that the telônai would treat 
them with rather more respect than they would an impoverished metic. So in terms of 
practical disadvantage the metoikion would not have been terrible for well-off metics, but 
they would still have shared the ideological and emotional disadvantage; and in the eyes of 
the citizens they would have been marked, at least in this sense, as inferiors. There is no 
evidence that the Athenians ever questioned the morality of this; as Kyrtatas puts it, the tax 
was considered ‘normal and justified’.94 
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2.2 Restrictions 
 
2.2 (a) Landowning Rights 
 
The wealthy metics could at least hope to achieve the privileged status of the isotelês, and 
there was an honour which could exempt them from another restriction put on metics. The 
inability to own land has been described as ‘worrisome’,95 but actually it was unlikely to be a 
practical concern for a poor metic, since buying property would have been beyond their 
financial means. In this they must have had something in common with the poorer citizens, 
whose political equality, when considered in opposition to their inequality in terms of 
landholding, has been described as a ‘paradox’ by Foxhall; she has suggested that it was 
instead the ‘right’ to own land that was key at Athens.96  Another element might have been 
the idea of ‘keeping Attica for the Athenians’, but the wealthy metics could hope for enktêsis, 
which is recorded as both gês kai oikias and oikias alone;
97
 it was also granted to some 
foreign communities for religious purposes.
98
 The attractiveness of enktêsis was recognised 
by Xenophon, who made this proposal in his Poroi: εἶτα ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά 
ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα, εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν 
αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι, πολὺ ἂν οἴομαι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους 
ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως.99 
 
He does not specify how these metics would prove themselves to be ‘worthy,’ but as 
Whitehead has pointed out the beneficiaries would be those who applied and were judged 
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deserving; in effect, Xenophon was arguing for a more systematic extension of the existing 
haphazard granting of property rights.
100
 The idea of a foreigner requesting a privilege 
(through a citizen intermediary) has been explored by Zelnick-Abramovitz,
101
 who recorded 
examples such as this from Lysias’ speech For Polystratus: καὶ εἰ μὲν ξένος τις ἐλθὼν ὑμᾶς ἢ 
χρήματα ᾔτει ἢ εὐεργέτης ἀναγραφῆναι ἠξίου, ἔδοτε ἂν αὐτῷ.102 The ‘benefactor’ could hope 
to be rewarded with honours later on; this quid pro quo is shown in Demosthenes’ speech 
Against Leptines, when he opposes τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀφελέσθαι τὰ δοθέντα.103 These honours 
were inscribed, thus recording and displaying them publicly.
104
 The ultimate reward for a 
metic benefactor was of course naturalisation, which I shall examine in chapter five. It will 
suffice to say for now that even in that case the new citizen’s assimilation was far from 
complete, but it was at least something which a rich metic could hope for. 
 
2.2 (b) Marriage 
 
We have already seen that the Periclean citizenship law prevented the children of metics from 
becoming citizens. At some point prior to the delivery of Apollodorus’ speech Against 
Neaera (around 340) this restriction was tightened to forbid metics and citizens from 
intermarrying at all.
105
 The law, as preserved, is extremely strict; the harsher punishment 
meted out to metics is worth noting, although even the thousand drachma fine applied to 
citizens would be ruinous to an ordinary Athenian: ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἀστῇ συνοικῇ τέχνῃ ἢ 
μηχανῇ ᾑτινιοῦν, γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας Ἀθηναίων ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν 
δὲ ἁλῷ, πεπράσθω καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἔστω τοῦ ἑλόντος. ἔστω 
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δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἡ ξένη τῷ ἀστῷ συνοικῇ κατὰ ταὐτά, καὶ ὁ συνοικῶν τῇ ξένῃ τῇ ἁλούσῃ ὀφειλέτω 
χιλίας δραχμάς.106 
 
Whether this is preserved from the original text or a reconstruction based on Apollodorus’ 
very similar summary of it in the subsequent section, it is apparent from the rest of the speech 
that here sunoikein refers only to marriage.
107
 To demonstrate this, as Patterson argues, 
Apollodorus attempts to show that Neaera ‘formed a household with Stephanos… 
participating as a wife in the productive and reproductive, as well as the social and religious, 
activities of an Athenian household’.108 That there were alternative types of relationship is 
indicated by Apollodorus when he discusses the defences which Stephanus might use, listing 
the possibilities as being that she was actually an astê; that she was not his wife but his 
pallakê; or that she was his hetaira.
109
 Clearly having a relationship with these latter two 
‘types’ does not fit within the legal definition of sunoikein as he sees it, and in any case it is 
hard to believe that the Athenians would pass a law that criminalised such behaviour. He goes 
on: τὸ γὰρ συνοικεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὃς ἂν παιδοποιῆται καὶ εἰσάγῃ εἴς τε τοὺς φράτερας καὶ 
δημότας τοὺς υἱεῖς, καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐκδιδῷ ὡς αὑτοῦ οὔσας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ 
ἑταίρας ἡδονῆς ἕνεκ᾽ ἔχομεν, τὰς δὲ παλλακὰς τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμέραν θεραπείας τοῦ σώματος, τὰς 
δὲ γυναῖκας τοῦ παιδοποιεῖσθαι γνησίως καὶ τῶν ἔνδον φύλακα πιστὴν ἔχειν.110 
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We should of course be wary of taking a litigant’s interpretation of the law as the absolute 
truth, but in this case it is difficult to see what else, other than marriage, the law could be 
prohibiting. Apollodorus would hardly have discussed the potential defences had they not 
been perceived as valid, and if a cohabiting relationship with a pallakê or hetaira was 
permitted then clearly the law cannot have been intended to prevent the birth of children of 
mixed Athenian and metic parentage; the homicide law preserved in Demosthenes’ Against 
Aristocrates makes it clear that there was a kind of pallakê ἣν ἂν ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθέροις παισὶν 
ἔχῃ.111 The concern was that these children might be passed off as Athenian citizens.112 
Bakewell, however, has suggested that it would have been impossible for this to occur, as the 
repeated and public nature of the affirmations of citizenship which took place throughout an 
Athenian’s life would have made in unfeasible for a metic to later claim to be a citizen.113 
The Athenians, however, evidently did not believe that it was impossible, as they had legal 
mechanisms to prevent and punish it, and even carried out a scrutiny of all citizens’ claims to 
be Athenian.
114
 
 
While this could have been one concern behind the law, it was not necessarily the only one. 
Bakewell proposed that one aim could have been to discourage Athenian men from ‘marrying 
irresponsibly’ with metics,115 who as foreign women may have had a particular exoticism and 
‘erotic potential’.116 There may well be truth in this, but we should be careful not to assume 
that there was a single ‘metic stereotype’ coming into play here; they were a disparate group, 
and there may have been a number of stereotypes which went with different constituent types 
of people within it. Neaera, as Bakewell argues, would certainly fit the bill of an exotic and 
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seductive foreign woman, and we also see many foreign courtesans in New Comedy;
117
 but it 
does not follow that they typified ‘the metic woman’.118 
 
A significant consequence, and perhaps motive, of the law would be that while a relationship 
between a metic and an Athenian was possible, it could not gain the legitimacy of a true 
marriage; to avoid the risk of prosecution the man could not, presumably, call his partner his 
wife, or his children legitimate. The qualitative difference between a wife and a pallakê is 
shown by Lysias, who notes that the ‘lawgiver’ ἐπὶ ταῖς παλλακαῖς ταῖς ἐλάττονος ἀξίαις τὴν 
αὐτὴν δίκην ἐπέθηκε119 as he did in cases concerning wives. A key principle at work in the 
law was thus a concern to preserve a strict status barrier between citizens and metics, and 
stigmatise those who seek to blur it. The arm of the law, of course, had a limited reach, and 
no doubt in private and among friends the relationship could be referred to as a marriage; 
equally, in practice a ceremony could probably be carried out as long as it took place before 
people who were trusted. There was, however, the risk of the relationship’s being discovered 
and used by enemies for their advantage.
120
 
 
Practically speaking, then, this law may not have impinged on metics’ everyday life – they 
could enter into relationships with whomever they liked, as long as they did not openly claim 
that it was a marriage
121
 – but it made their subordinate position in Athenian society clear, at 
least in public contexts. We have also seen this principle at work in the requirement to have a 
prostatês and to pay the metoikion, and the extremely harsh penalties faced by metics who 
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transgressed in these areas; the consequence of not acting as a metic should was potentially to 
lose one’s status as a free man or woman altogether. 
 
2.2 (c) Religious Activities 
 
This barrier was also shown in the Athenian religious festivals. A tolerance for foreign cults 
and freedom for metics to pursue their own religious activities
122
 was balanced by exclusion 
or limited participation in the specifically Athenian festivities. Demosthenes tells us that 
metics could not hold priesthoods,
123
 and this prohibition even extended to naturalised 
citizens.
124
 Metics must also have been excluded from at least some of the activities that took 
place within citizen-only groups such as the phratries and tribes.
125
 These started young, and 
included an adolescent ‘ritual of maturation’ for boys known as the koureion, which included 
sacrifices.
126
 The phratries and their rituals could thus serve as rites of passage.
127
 It should be 
noted, however, that membership of a phratry was not a formal requirement for citizenship,
128
 
so there will presumably have been Athenians who did not go through these rituals. The 
culminating rite of passage ritual, however, of the ephebic oath, will have been taken by all 
male citizens, and will have been intended to constitute something of a transformative 
event.
129
 Athenian girls do not seem to have had any place in the phratries,
130
 but could 
participate in religious rites of passage such as the arcteia, related to the cult of Artemis at 
Brauron.
131
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The lexicographers record that in the Panathenaea the metics had the role of carrying bowls, 
and that this led Athenian writers to dub them skaphêphoroi. Harpocration gives the fullest 
explanation: Σκαφηφόροι: Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ κατὰ Ἀγασικλέους φησὶν “οἳ ἀντὶ σκαφηφόρων 
ἔφηβοι εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀναβήσονται, οὐχ ὑμῖν ἔχοντες χάριν τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ τῷ 
τούτου ἀργυρίῳ,” ἀντὶ τοῦ μέτοικοι· οὗτοι γὰρ ἐσκαφηφόρουν Ἀθήνησι.132 
 
There seems to be a degree of contempt in the Dinarchus quote, though we have it out of 
context. Again, however, the rules relating to metics marked them out and gave them a role 
that was specifically non-citizen. The old idea that the system was designed to humiliate them 
has rightly been rejected,
133
 and it is reasonable to suppose that among metics it was 
considered an honour, but it was honour in which only a subordinate group could share.
134
 
 
There was thus some recognition for the role which metics could play in religious festivities, 
which in turn must have reflected an attitude that they were in some sense part of a 
community, albeit an inferior part. Participation, of any kind, will also have given them some 
sense of involvement, and access to a degree of common knowledge and experience; and 
there were a great many festivals for them to get involved with.
135
 The polis also, as Wijma 
has emphasised, sometimes gave official recognition to foreign cults, and sanctioned metics 
and Athenians participating in them. An example is the cult of Bendis, the acceptance of 
which into the polis serves as the event which attracted Socrates to the Piraeus in Plato’s 
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Republic. A public shrine to Bendis is recorded in a list dating to 429/8;
136
 as a third-century 
inscription records the earlier granting τοῖς Θραιξὶ μόνοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν τὴν ἔγκτησιν καὶ 
τὴν ἵδρυσιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ,137 Wijma argues that they must have received enktêsis for the shrine 
before the time of the earlier inscription.
138
 She further argues that ‘by granting them enktêsis 
the Athenians opened the door to the Thracians to be part of the community, even though 
they could never become full members, as citizens, by descent’.139 
 
It can certainly be said that it gave them a connection with the polis, and a degree of 
recognition and honour; from a practical point of view it will have enabled the Thracians to 
build a permanent centre for their god, on land which belonged to them. The sanctuary 
presumably also served as something of a centre and gathering point for the Thracian 
community in Athens. This will not, however, have led to their assimilation, as even though 
the polis was giving them recognition, they remained visibly and notably separate; they were 
recognised and honoured, but as outsiders. The stressing of their difference is something 
which Wijma accepts, as according to the description in the Republic the Athenians and 
Thracians in the festival ‘were publicly, visibly separated. It is not the question whether the 
separation of the Thracians was emphasised or the communal participation; both were.’140 
The participation, however, involved the two groups doing different things. A particularly 
Thracian quality was brought out by having a horseback torch race, which as Wijma puts it 
‘demonstrate[d] their ethnic identity at the gaze of the Athenians’.141  
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It seems, then, that being part of the community went along with stressing their difference 
from the Athenians. This may have made the exhibition more palatable to Athenians who 
were worried about foreigners infiltrating the citizen body, or getting ideas above their station, 
by stressing that they fundamentally remained apart, or alternatively riled some up by 
showing how cosmopolitan and, in some respects, non-Athenian Athens actually was. We 
should not, however, neglect the Thracians’ own experience of the events; for them, there is 
likely to have been something of a tension between a willingness to conform with and 
perhaps even assimilate to Athenian norms and a desire to remain connected to their roots 
and the wider Thracian communities outside of Athens. The festival may have been their way 
of negotiating this. It was not necessarily the case, however, that it was always a happy 
compromise. 
 
There is evidence that other groups had similar arrangements. A decree from 333/2 gives 
enktêsis to merchants from Citium in Cyprus to build a sanctuary of Aphrodite, καθάπερ καὶ 
οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸ τῆς Ἴσιδος ἱερὸν ἵδρυνται.142 The Citian decree was proposed by the leading 
Athenian statesman and orator Lycurgus, and Simms has argued that the Egyptian decree is 
likely to stem from the same source, and to date to shortly before our inscription, on the 
grounds that otherwise its terms would not have been so easily recalled.
143
 This seems likely, 
though an alternative would be that the Isis sanctuary was particularly famous for some 
reason. At any rate, to refer to it in this way surely suggests that it was prominent and well-
known at the time. Simms is on rather shakier ground when arguing that ‘the grants of 
enktesis to the Citians and the Egyptians had a purely economic motive’,144 on the basis that 
they were aimed at merchants, and Lycurgus was interested in trade but not in religion other 
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than in its public, official form – ‘Lycurgus supported her [i.e. Isis’] entrance into the Piraeus 
in spite of his interest in religious matters’.145 
 
This does not seem to be a reasonable inference to make; we do not know what Lycurgus’ 
motives were, and an interest in polis religion is certainly not incompatible with an interest in 
other types of religious activity as well. He, and the Athenians who voted his proposal 
through, must have thought through the implications of what they were doing, and must, 
therefore, have considered how it would affect the religious landscape as well as its economic 
impact. This is not to suggest that there was no economic motive at all.
146
 That the Athenians 
then went on to grant the same right to the Citians, however, indicates that the Egyptians’ 
permanent, religious presence was not seen as a problem; evidently relations between polis 
and community remained strong. In the later fourth and third centuries we find references in 
inscriptions to ‘communities’ (koina) of foreigners, as gathered and analysed by Baslez; these 
appear to have had a religious character.
147
 There seems to have continued to be the capacity, 
then, for foreign groups to gain recognition in some way. 
 
Athens was also home to one of the great Panhellenic festivals in the form of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries.
148
 Participation in this would depend on the home city of a metic, and of course on 
whether or not they had been initiated;
149
 it would thus serve as an opportunity to be involved 
on an equal basis with Athenians, yet also divide the metics between those who were part of 
the festival and those who were not. It would also have been a convenient and enjoyable 
opportunity for Greek metics to meet with fellow members of their home polis who did not 
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live in Athens. The celebration and promotion of the Mysteries appears to have reached its 
height in the second quarter of the fourth century, and included the Athenian issue of a 
special bronze coinage for use at the festival.
150
 
 
2.2 (d) Metics in Court 
 
When it comes to the legal system, there is a certain pattern in the way metics were treated 
which is similar to the recognised, but separate and inferior, status which they appear to have 
had in the major Athenian festivals. The difference between them and the citizens which must 
have been most readily apparent was that cases in which they were concerned went through 
the office of the polemarch rather than the other officials, as is made clear by the Athênaiôn 
Politeia.
151
 This is partially confirmed by Pancleon’s prosecutor when, believing him to be a 
metic, he goes to the polemarch.
152
 There are no clear examples, however, of a prosecution 
brought by a metic against a citizen being dealt with by the polemarch, although the wording 
of the Athênaiôn Politeia does not rule this out.
153
 In any case, this was no doubt a matter of 
bureaucracy rather than of any great significance, as the case was passed on to a jury 
regardless of whether the archon or the polemarch brought it. The only disadvantage to which 
a metic was subject was the possibility of his prosecutor demanding that he provide sureties 
at this point;
154
 again, this was an area where the richer and better connected a metic was, the 
less the impact this disadvantage would have. It could have been a serious blow to a poor 
metic. 
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The substance and procedure of the law did mark the metics out as lacking a certain degree of 
standing. There were at least some graphai which metics could not bring, as the formula ὁ 
βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων in the cases of graphai hubreôs and xenias suggests.155 In the former 
case, the law apparently read ἐάν τις ὑβρίζῃ εἴς τινα, ἢ παῖδα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄνδρα, τῶν 
ἐλευθέρων ἢ τῶν δούλων, ἢ παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ εἰς τούτων τινά, γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς 
θεσμοθέτας ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν.156 
 
What is particularly interesting here is that the law gives protection to all, but a penalty can 
be exacted only through a citizen’s intervention. Even when the Athenians are granting what 
the speaker claims to be an exceptionally generous privilege to metics (and slaves),
157
 their 
inferior status is marked out. The metic had to rely on a citizen’s intervention, and in the case 
of this law he or she was no better off than a slave; and as Todd has suggested, in Athenian 
law it was procedure that took priority over substance.
158
 The metic, deprived of the ability to 
initiate such a procedure himself, was here denied access to the law in his own person, even 
when it offered him protection. We can only speculate on how difficult it might have been to 
engage a citizen to act on one’s behalf in such a case, and this must have varied greatly 
depending on who was involved. But the essential point is that metics were required to act 
through another. In this respect male metics were put on a level with women, since both had 
to rely on the intercession of an Athenian male for justice to be done. They were denied the 
ability to perform the archetypal masculine role of defending themselves and their oikos 
through their own action. 
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I should also be noted that here hubris had the same meaning (or range of meanings) as in 
‘ordinary speech’. 159  This gave the law a good degree of flexibility, and meant that 
definitions could be established and re-established by litigants and jurors. As Edward Cohen 
notes, in this example hubris itself is not actually defined in law – ‘the meaning of hybris in 
any specific legal context would depend on a decision-maker’s conclusion in that particular 
matter’.160 This meant that any aggressive action against a person could count as hubris, as 
long as the jury was convinced. 
 
It also opened the door for the jury to make decisions based on the status and standing of the 
victim. An action which was hubristic when carried out against an adult Athenian might be 
perfectly acceptable when committed against a child or a slave – particularly if the slave was 
the property of the one who carried it out. Similarly, it would have been at least conceivable, 
if risky, to adopt a strategy of arguing that it was acceptable to do something to a metic which 
admittedly would have been hubris if done to a citizen.
161
 In support, one could point to the 
differences in legal standing which are currently being discussed.
162
 
 
While metics were thus limited in the types of suit they could bring, they could, on the other 
hand, appear as witnesses.
163
 A restriction on the extent of this is implied by Harpocration’s 
citation of Isaeus, from a speech which concerned an apostasiou case, ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε 
διαμαρτυρεῖν ξένους.164 A diamarturia was a sworn statement of fact, given to object to a 
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suit’s being brought; 165  unfortunately we do not know which contexts Isaeus’ statement 
applied to, or even if what he was saying was true.
166
 If metics were, however, unable to 
swear a diamarturia then this must be another situation in which they had to find an 
amenable citizen to do it on their behalf; again, they were denied the agency to act on their 
own behalf. 
 
There is also a suggestion that they could be subject to torture in Lysias’ speech Against 
Simon, where the speaker mentions the risk of a Plataean boy (Theodotus) convicting him by 
information βασανιζόμενον. 167  This is problematic, however, because there is some 
confusion over the boy’s status; many of the Plataeans had been naturalised at this point,168 
which would have given him the same rights as a citizen. If his father had not been 
naturalised, however, because he was not in Athens when the decree was passed in 427, 
Theodotus would be a metic.
169
 Of course, his ‘Plataean’ identity could be fabricated, and he 
could be a slave (whether Plataean or not). Cohen has pointed out that the Greek can refer to 
a test or examination as well as to torture;
170
 in this case, especially given the boy’s youth and 
inexperience, it is conceivable that this is what the speaker meant, and he was merely 
implicitly exaggerating the ordeal which questioning would put him through. That seems 
something of a stretch, however, as in a courtroom context we would expect the usual, legal 
terminology to be understood. The answer may have been in Simon’s, our speaker’s 
opponent’s, arguments – if he had claimed that Theodotus was a slave then it would have 
made sense for the speaker to raise torture as a possibility. In any event, the situation is too 
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confused for the speech to demonstrate that metics could be subject to torture. Elsewhere the 
use of torture is explicitly linked to slaves, with a Demosthenic speech notoriously claiming: 
Ὑμεῖς τοίνυν καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ βάσανον ἀκριβεστάτην πασῶν πίστεων 
νομίζετε, καὶ ὅπου ἂν δοῦλοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι παραγένωνται, δέῃ δ’ εὑρεθῆναι τὸ 
ζητούμενον, οὐ χρῆσθε ταῖς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μαρτυρίαις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δούλους 
βασανίζοντες, οὕτω ζητεῖτε τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν. εἰκότως, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί·τῶν 
μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρησάντων ἤδη τινὲς οὐ τἀληθῆ μαρτυρῆσαι ἔδοξαν· τῶν δὲ 
βασανισθέντων οὐδένες πώποτ’ ἐξηλέγχθησαν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἐκ τῆς βασάνου 
εἶπον.171 
 
This is obviously said with the intention of turning the jury against his opponent, who had 
refused to hand a slave over to torture; it evidently draws, however, on what were thought to 
be the jury’s prejudices.172 The justification for torture seems to be that it was fitting, usual 
and acceptable for slaves; the opposition is with the free, which would imply that the 
justification would not hold for metics.
173
 Indeed, in Lysias 4 the speaker claims that his 
opponent refused to allow a woman to be tortured on the grounds that she was free, i.e. that 
she was a metic (if the argument had been that she was an astê we would have expected 
Lysias to say so).
174
 Unfortunately for our understanding of the law, however, this does not 
prove that there was a legal impediment to torturing any free people, only that in this case it 
was used as a moral justification for refusing the challenge; the likelihood, however, is that it 
was prohibited.
175
 
                                                          
171
 Dem. 30.37: ‘Therefore you believe that in private and in public torture is the most accurate of all proofs, and 
when both slaves and free men are present, and it is necessary to find out what is being investigated, you don’t 
use the testimony of the free men, but torture the slaves in order to discover the truth.  And rightly so, men of 
the jury. For in the past some witnesses seem not to have sworn truthfully, whereas none of those who have 
been tortured have ever been convicted of not speaking the truth under torture’. Cited with discussion by 
MacDowell 1978: 245-246. 
172
 E. Cohen 1994: 149, however, points out that slaves are never actually tortured in any of the cases which we 
have. 
173
 Cf. Dem. 22.55, quoted in section 3.1 (c) above. 
174
 Hunter 2000: 17 n.30. Lys. 4.12, 14. 
175
 There are examples of foreigners being tortured, but only in unusual circumstances or as what seems to be 
part of the punishment – see MacDowell 1978: 247 and 274 n.562, citing Dem. 18.132-133; Aesch. 3.224; Ant. 
1.20; and the anecdote reported at both Plut. Nic. 30.2, and Mor. 509b (de Garr. 13). In the last case, however, 
there is nothing to indicate that the victim is not an Athenian. None of these gives a clear indication that 
foreigners would have reason to fear torture under ordinary circumstances; they do, however, suggest that 
metics who were found guilty, or suspected of conspiring against the polis, could expect short shrift from the 
Athenian legal system. 
86 
 
 
A further sign of metics’ status is to be seen in their treatment in cases of homicide. The 
murderer of a metic was subject to a dikê phonou, but in the case of a premeditated killing the 
court which heard the case was the Palladion; in the case of a citizen victim this would have 
been the Areopagus.
176
 The substantive difference was that the Palladion, which dealt with 
unpremeditated killings of citizens, could only decree a punishment of exile rather than of 
death.
177
  The murderer of a metic could still be punished severely, but the message was clear: 
the life of a citizen was of more value.
178
 This, along with their other legal disadvantages, 
marked metics as lacking the equality before the law which was a key element of 
democracy.
179
 As we have seen, in many areas the protection of the law extended to metics, 
but it did not always treat them as equals. 
 
One area where equality was given, from c. 350 onwards,
180
 is in the dikai emporikai, cases 
involving trade where the rules of contract seem to have been pre-eminent
181
 – only cases 
where there was a written contract were permitted.
182
 They were open to anyone trading in 
Athens, whether citizen, metic or non-resident foreigner, and perhaps even to slaves;
183
 they 
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thus offered ‘rapid justice’ and ‘procedural equality to all free men’.184 These have been seen 
as evidence for a more cosmopolitan, open and fair Athens, and a mercantile community ‘in 
which the old distinctions of citizenship and nationality were unimportant’.185 But it is worth 
wondering why such cases were needed. Their ‘monthly’ character meant they were handled 
quickly, which was clearly to the benefit of merchants (especially ones not normally resident 
in Attica); as with giving metics access to the courts in general, there was clearly a need 
which was being met.
186
 But this does not seem to have gone along with a minimisation of 
the importance of status in other spheres; and we might well wonder why equality was only 
given on this basis to cases where there was a contract. 
 
Presumably it was because cases without a contract were likely to be far harder to resolve 
quickly (and indeed at all). There would also have been a substantial, built in advantage for 
Athenians who were disputing with foreigners in that they would usually be able to find 
witnesses and supporters more easily; insisting on contracts would minimise this advantage. 
This does not, however, mean that it ceased to exist. There is evidence that Athenian juries 
were perceived as having a tendency to ignore contracts if they felt the justice of the matter 
lay elsewhere.
187
 We have an example of a contract case (which was not covered by the rules 
of the dikai emporikai, as it did not concern trade into or out of Athens, though it dates to 
330-324,
188
 so is contemporary with them) in Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes. According to 
the speaker,
189
 he was tricked into assuming large debts by Athenogenes, an Egyptian 
perfume-seller – supposedly he desired to buy the freedom of a slave and his family, but 
Athenogenes persuaded him to buy them as property instead, along with the perfumery, 
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which would involve taking on their (ostensibly small) debts.
190
 As it transpired, however, 
one of the slaves owed large debts which had not been enumerated in the contract: τὰ δὲ 
πολλὰ τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα οὐκ ἐνεγέγραπτο ἐπ᾽ ὀνομάτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν προσθήκης μέρει 
ὡς οὐδὲν ὄντα, ‘καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὀφείλει τι Μίδας.’191  
 
Edward Cohen has argued that this speech gives us an insight into the disadvantages of being 
a citizen, in the sense that one was bound by an ideology which discouraged business practice 
and could therefore lead to losing out, financially.
192
 In this case, he argues, Athenogenes and 
his ally, a hetaira named Antigone, were able to exploit the speaker to their own advantage, 
drawing on his inexperience (and lack of interest) in business affairs.
193
 From the Athenian 
viewpoint, this material disadvantage might be imperceptible – Cohen cites the famous 
remark of Hippocleides, οὐ φροντὶς Ἱπποκλείδῃ, after dancing away his engagement as an 
example of such thinking.
194
 
 
The speech also demonstrates, however, how an Athenian citizen could attempt to get out of 
his contract by using his superior standing and playing on the jury’s sympathies. Cohen 
accepts that the speaker is effectively creating personae here;
195
 it is not necessarily the case 
that they reflect the real situation, though of course they are playing on the perceived attitudes 
of the jurors. The speaker describes his opponent in terms which can only really be 
characterised as ‘overtly racist’,196 stating that he is ἄνθρωπον λογογράφον τε καὶ ἀγοραῖον, 
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 Hyp. 3.5-7. 
191
 Hyp. 3.10: ‘Many, and the greatest, of the debts were not recorded by name, but set out in part of a 
supplement which seemed like nothing: “and whatever Midas might owe to anyone else”.’ 
192
 E. Cohen 2002: 100. See also, however, E. Cohen 2005, in which he argues that the Athenian tax system 
encouraged rich citizens (and metics) to ‘hide’ their money by investing it in ‘invisible markets’, implying a 
rather greater understanding of business practice. 
193
 E. Cohen 2002: 107. 
194
 E. Cohen 2002: 107, translating ‘Who gives a damn?’ (Hdt. 6.129). 
195
 E. Cohen 2002b: 107. 
196
 Whitehead 2000: 270. 
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τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, Αἰγύπτιον. 197  This draws on stereotypes about Egyptians as cheats and 
liars;
198
 the speaker actually places this above his apparently reprehensible personal roles as a 
logographer and ‘man of the agora’. In context, the speaker is making the point that 
associating with this type of man would naturally make the behaviour of his accomplice, 
Antigone, even worse – and he has already described her as γυναικὸς ἣ δεινοτάτη μὲν τῶν 
ἑταιρῶν, ὥς φασιν, ἐφ᾽ ἡλικίας ἐγένετο.199 
 
The obvious strategy for Athenogenes to pursue in this case was to insist on the terms of the 
contract, according to which his opponent was liable for the debts which he took on. The 
speaker acknowledges this, saying that ἐρεῖ δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτίκα μάλα Ἀθηνογένης ὡς ὁ 
νόμος λέγει, ὅσα ἂν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ὁμολογήσῃ κύρια εἶναι. τά γε δίκαια, ὦ βέλτιστε: τὰ δὲ μὴ 
τοὐναντίον ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κύρια εἶναι.200 He follows this with what seems a rather desperate 
collection of laws, which he claims imply that this agreement was invalid.
201
 He then goes on 
to attack Athenogenes’ personal character and history;202 essentially, his argument is that 
contracts do not hold if entered into dishonestly, and that Athenogenes was a dishonest man, 
and one likely to cheat someone. As Whitehead puts it, ‘it was more by dint of who he was 
than what he had (allegedly) done that Athenogenes could so readily be made to alienate an 
Athenian citizen jury’.203 If the speaker can be believed, this alienation had already been 
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 Hyp. 3.3: ‘A speechwriter, a man of the agora, and, above all, an Egyptian.’ 
198
 Whitehead 2000: 287. Isaac 2004: 326 cites Plato Rep. 435e-436a, Laws 747c for the Egyptians (and 
Phoenicians) having a reputation for avarice. 
199
 Hyp. 3.3: ‘a woman who was the cleverest of hetairai, so they say, of her time’. 
200
 Hyp. 3.13: ‘Athenogenes will immediately tell you that the law says that whatever one person agrees with 
another shall be valid. With fair agreements, that’s true, my friend – but with agreements that are not fair, it’s 
the opposite, and the law forbids that they be valid.’ 
201
 Hyp. 3.13-18. Lanni 2006: 163 argues that this demonstrates that there was no law which specifically 
invalidated fraudulent or unfair contracts. 
202
 Hyp. 3.19, 29-32, 35 
203
 Whitehead 2000: 269. 
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demonstrated – when the two parties were arguing over the matter in the agora the onlookers 
supposedly abused Athenogenes.
204
 
 
The speaker must still, of course, ward off the caveat emptor response that he ought to have 
checked what the debts were, as the contract made it perfectly plain that any extra debts 
would have to be covered by the speaker; alternatively, Athenogenes could have argued that 
the speaker was well aware of them and was simply now trying to weasel his way out of 
paying. If the latter was the case, however, there is no anticipation or refutation of it in the 
speech. 
 
In any case, the speaker takes pains to present himself as a farmer who had no interest in or 
knowledge of business: οὔτε μυροπώλης εἰμὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλην τέχνην ἐργάζομαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ὁ 
πατήρ μοι ἔδωκεν χωρία ... ταῦτα γεωργῶ, πρὸς δὲ τούτων εἰς τὴν ὠνὴν ἐνεσείσθην. πότερα 
γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, ἐμὲ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἐπιθυμῆσαι, ἧς οὐκ ἤμην ἔμπειρος, ἤ σε 
καὶ τὴν ἑταίραν τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐπιβουλεῦσαι;205 We are dealing with a presentation in which 
certain personae are created; the speaker casts himself as ‘a naïve farmer ripe for financial 
plucking’ as opposed to the cowardly but sly and ‘market-savvy’ Athenogenes.206 Rather 
amusingly, in order to explain how this persona could fit with an apparent degree of 
familiarity with the laws, which he had cited at length, he had claimed to have spent his time 
searching through them, day and night, so afraid was he of Athenogenes’ cleverness.207 This, 
of course, is clearly a lie, since the speech was paid for and written by a logographer,
208
 and 
                                                          
204
 Hyp. 3.12. 
205
 Hyp. 3.26: ‘I am no perfume seller, and nor do I earn my living in any other trade, but by the lands which my 
father left me… I farm them, and I was driven into buying by these people. Which is likely, Athenogenes? That 
I desired your trade, of which I had no experience, or that you and the hetaira had designs on my property?’ 
206
 Cohen 2002b: 107. 
207
 Hyp. 3.13. 
208
 As we have seen, the speaker attacks Athenogenes for being a logographer while employing one himself, an 
ironic but common enough tactic (Carawan 2007b: xi, Mirhady 2000: 182). 
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was, one would think, itself quite obviously not the product of someone as supposedly foolish 
as the speaker.
209
 Apparently, however, it was supposed to convince the jury, and allow him 
to set up an opposition between himself as a stereotypical Athenian farmer and Athenogenes 
as a shifty businessman, which was apparently exemplified by his being Egyptian.
210
 Once 
done, he could ask the jury whether it was likelier that he, the solid, traditional Athenian, 
would want to enter into some trade, or if an Egyptian was up to his usual dishonest tricks. 
 
So far, so straightforward – there were negative stereotypes about foreigners which could be 
drawn on by Athenians when it suited them, and these were clearly felt to be likely to hit a 
chord with jurors.
211
 But there are hints that Athenogenes was not really as definitely 
Egyptian as we might have thought. Elsewhere in the speech he is described as ὁ ἐκ τριγονίας 
ὢν μυροπώλης.212 Unless the speaker was claiming some knowledge of a family background 
in Egypt, he presumably meant that his family had been established in Athens for that many 
generations.
213
 This makes it likely that Athenogenes was born and raised in Athens, as does 
his name; and the fact that he could be characterised as a ‘logographer’ surely implies that he 
was a native Greek speaker.
214
 People descended of immigrants would still be metics, unless 
they had been naturalised or managed to infiltrate the citizen body; what we might call a third 
or fourth generation immigrant would not, ordinarily, be an Athenian citizen, but remain a 
metic.
215
 Athenogenes, then, was a ‘foreigner’ who probably spoke like an Athenian.216 In 
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 Whitehead 2000: 271. 
210
 Isaac 2004: 355. 
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 For common stereotypes of various groups, including certain groups of Greeks, see Hodot 1992; for the 
representation of their language in Old Comedy see Colvin 2000. 
212
 Hyp. 3.19: ‘being a third generation perfume seller’. Whitehead 2000: 319-320 suggests that this reflects the 
importance given in Athenian oratory and law to three generations, as for example in Ath. Pol. 55.3. Here, 
Whitehead argues, focusing on three generations of trading ‘is plainly designed to be prejudicial’. 
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 Patterson 2000: 106. 
214
 Interestingly, in Dem. 35, another speech attacking ‘dishonest’ foreigners (see below), the non-Athenian 
Greek Lacritus is attacked for teaching rhetorical tricks (Dem. 35.41); see Mirhady 2000: 182. 
215
 Whitehead 2000: 266. In Athenogenes’ case, however, even Whitehead does not seem to give enough weight 
to this point, describing him as an ‘immigrant… of Egyptian origin’ (Whitehead 2000: 287), and wondering 
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spite of this, he could be characterised as an ‘Egyptian’ apparently without qualification. As 
we have seen, the Egyptians seem to have been a prominent community at Athens, with their 
own sanctuary,
217
 and Athenogenes presumably had connections with it. It is also possible 
that, as a perfume seller, he played on his ethnic origins to give his business and wares an 
exotic quality. 
 
In spite of what seems to have been a long-standing connection with the Athenian people and 
polis, however, Hyperides and his client evidently thought it an effective strategy to attack 
him in racist terms, playing on what they believed to be the jurors’ prejudices. An even more 
blatant example of this type of appeal comes from a case which was actually related to the 
dikai emporikai. Interestingly, it is aimed against a Greek group, namely the inhabitants of 
Phaselis, a Greek city in what is now southern Turkey.
218
 In the Demosthenic Against 
Lacritus our speaker begins his speech with a tirade against these people, the group of which 
his opponent was a part: 
Οὐδὲν καινὸν διαπράττονται οἱ Φασηλῖται, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ 
εἰώθασιν. οὗτοι γὰρ δεινότατοι μέν εἰσιν δανείσασθαι χρήματα ἐν τῷ ἐμπορίῳ, 
ἐπειδὰν δὲ λάβωσιν καὶ συγγραφὴν συγγράψωνται ναυτικήν, εὐθὺς ἐπελάθοντο 
καὶ τῶν συγγραφῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι αὐτοὺς ἃ ἔλαβον, καὶ 
οἴονται, ἐὰν ἀποδῶσιν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἰδίων τι τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολωλεκέναι, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ 
τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι σοφίσματα εὑρίσκουσιν καὶ παραγραφὰς καὶ προφάσεις, καὶ εἰσὶν 
πονηρότατοι ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδικώτατοι. τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· πολλῶν γὰρ 
ἀφικνουμένων εἰς τὸ ὑμέτερον ἐμπόριον καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, πλείους 
δίκαι εἰσὶν ἑκάστοτε αὐτῶν τῶν Φασηλιτῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν 
τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν·219 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
how he might have ‘acquired’ his name, noting that his ‘actual ethnic origin’ would have been open to visual 
assessment by the jurors (Whitehead 2000: 287). 
216
 And for all we know may have had some Greek ancestry as well – there is no particular reason to suppose 
that both his parents were Egyptian. 
217
 See section 2.2 (c). 
218
 BNP s.v. Phaselis. 
219
 Dem. 35.1-2: ‘The Phaselites are doing nothing new, men of the jury, but exactly what they usually do. For 
they are the most skilled at borrowing money in the exchange, but when they get it and have signed a written 
maritime contract they immediately forget about contracts, and the laws, and that they should pay back what 
they have received – they think that if they pay something back it’s as though they have lost some of their own 
private property, so instead of paying it back they come up with cunning and dishonest tricks, counterpleas and 
false pretexts. They are the most villainous and criminal of men. There’s proof of this – many come to your 
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This, to reiterate, is how our speaker opens his case – a naked appeal to the jurors to indulge 
in prejudice. Interestingly, the fact that he feels he has to ‘prove’ that the Phaselites are so 
dishonest implies that actually this was not a group that had a particularly bad reputation; 
nevertheless, the speaker was evidently confident that there was enough there for him to work 
with. In this case, unlike the Athenogenes speech, the speaker is arguing for what he presents 
as a strict interpretation of the contract; his point is that the Phaselites are notorious for 
ignoring them when it is to their advantage. It is not, then, simply a matter of drawing on 
anti-trading prejudice (given the fact that the speaker was a money-lender this would hardly 
have been an unproblematic strategy), but rather of attacking the honesty and trustworthiness 
of individuals, and in this case of an entire group. MacDowell minimises the importance of 
this, comparing the speaker’s words to the way ‘the English sometimes say rude things about 
the Welsh or vice versa’.220 If this were a comic play, he might have a point; but to make 
such statements in a law court, especially as the introduction to a case, surely indicates that 
there was a greater significance. 
 
This material indicates that even when the law was deliberately designed to treat metics (and 
other foreigners) equally with citizens, Athenians still found ways to take advantage of their 
privileged status by bringing in arguments based on prejudice and the difference of their 
opponents. They also evidently had no particular desire to extend legal equality beyond 
mercantile cases (where there was a pressing need for it), or limit the jury’s scope in other 
types of case to the rules of contract alone.
221
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exchange, both Greeks and barbarians, yet each time there are court cases the Phaselites have more of them than 
all the others.’ 
220
 MacDowell 1978: 234. 
221
 Lanni 2006: 173-174. 
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2.3 Social and Economic Integration 
 
It remains to examine what we might call the everyday integration of metics into Athenian 
society. A crucial element of this is the economic aspect; as metics could not ordinarily own 
land they will have to have laboured or traded for a living, or lived as a tenant farmer and 
paid rent to an Athenian landlord.
222
 The nature of the evidence I have examined so far, 
which essentially derives largely from forensic oratory, naturally leads us to look at legal 
matters and ideological attitudes towards status. How these differences added up to form a 
theoretical and practical barrier between citizens and metics, and the extent to which it could 
actually be policed, will be discussed in chapters three and four. The everyday aspect, 
however, is rather different. 
 
As Cohen and especially Vlassopoulos have demonstrated in recent years, there were many 
aspects of daily life that were untouched by any of the formal restrictions and obligations 
under which metics lived. There were also alternative, non-official forums for interaction 
such as the working, trading and gossiping space that was the agora, or the cosmopolitan 
Piraeus. Vlassopoulos has pointed out that even at a political level matters were not merely 
carried out through the formal institutions – Dinarchus says of Demosthenes that περιιὼν 
οὗτος κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐλογοποίει καὶ τῶν πραττομένων εἰσεποίει κοινωνὸν αὑτόν,223 and 
Aeschines rhetorically asked what Demosthenes would have done had he gone against the 
                                                          
222
 That some metics did the latter is indicated by IG ii
2 
10, which records foreigners who fought for Athens in 
the civil war – some five individuals are listed as farmers. Some scholars, however, seem to have simply 
assumed that tenant farming could not take place – Gauthier 1972: 115, for example, asserted that the restriction 
on land-ownership ‘condemned’ the metics to pursue crafts or trades. Németh 2001: 335-336, looking at sixth- 
and fifth-century evidence, found no record of metics working in agriculture, however. 
223
 Din. 1.32: ‘Going about the agora he made speeches and thrust himself into the projects as a partner.’ 
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wishes of the people: οὐκ ἐνέπλησας βοῆς καὶ κραυγῆς τὴν ἀγοράν [;]224 This sort of public 
interaction could involve anyone in Athens, though we cannot know how a known metic’s 
getting involved would have gone down. It is true that here such behaviour is being criticised, 
but that does not mean that it was not common or effective. 
 
We can also see the importance of places like the koureia, the barber shops such as the one 
παρὰ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς, οἷ Δεκελειεῖς προσφοιτῶσιν 225  where Pancleon’s opponent went to 
ascertain if he was really a demesman of Decelea; in the same speech he is advised to go εἰς 
τὸν χλωρὸν τυρὸν τῇ ἕνῃ καὶ νέα: ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ μηνὸς ἑκάστου ἐκεῖσε 
συλλέγεσθαι τοὺς Πλαταιέας.226 Our evidence only affords us glimpses of these places and 
the people who frequented them, but we should not forget the unofficial support networks 
which they represented. Metic communities might have lacked official recognition in that 
they had no formal equivalent to the deme structures, but there was nothing to stop them from 
gathering informally but regularly. The example of the Plataeans is a good one – large 
numbers had been naturalised early in the Peloponnesian War, and distributed among the 
demes, so as a single community they were not recognised as a formal group within the 
polis.
227
 Evidently, however, they kept a community going in spite of this. Its unofficial 
quality may well have enabled it to cut across the citizen-metic divide in that those Plataeans 
who had not been naturalised, having moved to Athens after the passing of the relevant 
decree, could still attend these informal gatherings. Other groups must have had similar 
arrangements, as well as in some cases more official ones – there were the religious centres, 
and if metics originating in other Greek poleis wished to continue to have some claim to 
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 Aeschines 2.86: ‘Would you not have filled the agora with your shouts and screams?’ Vlassopoulos 2007: 40. 
225
 Lys. 23.3: ‘by the Herms, which the Deceleans frequent.’ 
226
 Lys. 23.6: ‘to the fresh cheese market on the last day of the month, for on that day of each month the 
Plataeans gather there.’ Cf. Plutarch’s comments on the general notoriety of barbers and their shops as places for 
talking in Mor. 509b = de Garr. 13. 
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citizenship there they may have operated their own, small scale initiations and rites of 
passage in Athens. The difficulty is that evidence of such things would not have survived in 
our sources. 
 
We do, then, have hints that metics operated networks as an alternative to the Athenian ones, 
about which we are relatively well informed. It is not safe to conclude, then, as does 
Patterson, that the typical metic was isolated and unsupported because they lacked access to 
the tribe and deme.
228
 The extent to which we suppose metics and Athenians were integrated 
into shared networks depends on our conception of Athenian society and its economy in 
general at the time. The economic debate has essentially focused on whether Athens was a 
‘primitive’ economy, in which custom and social status largely determined economic 
relations such as contracts, prices and wages, and a ‘modernist’ view which sees supply and 
demand as the vital factors; as Cohen has observed, the persistent strength of these two 
approaches was demonstrated by the appearance of two ‘voluminous but seemingly 
contradictory interpretations of Athenian credit’, in the form of books by Millett and Cohen 
himself at the beginning of the 1990s.
229
 One view is that Athens in the classical period saw a 
transition between the two; Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas has interpreted the metics, inasmuch 
as they constituted part of the ‘new poor’ of the fourth century, as a key factor in this. Since 
they lacked ties with each other and the citizens, there was a need for ‘real contracts’ to 
replace the trust-based relations between citizens of an earlier time.
230
 Such arguments had 
already received short shrift from Edward Cohen, who described the idea of an ‘evolutionary 
pattern’ from status to contract as ‘irrelevant and unconfirmable’, since the evidence for 
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 Patterson 2000: 101. 
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 Cohen 2002a: 1 with n.4, referring to Millett 1991 and Cohen 1992. The classic primitivist text is Finley’s 
The Ancient Economy, which Edward Harris amusingly and rather dramatically described as having cast a ‘dark 
shadow’ over subsequent interpretations at the Beyond Self-Sufficiency conference in Durham in 2011. Akrigg 
2007: 36 described the primitivist-modernist debate as a ‘sterile argument’, though it seems to me to have 
produced a significant amount of interesting work. 
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 Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas 2002: 132-134. 
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contracts prior to the fourth century is so slim.
231
 This seems a fair point – we should not 
simply assume that things were radically different in the fifth century. At any rate, there is 
still plenty of evidence suggesting that status remained conceptually very important in the 
fourth century,
232
 and in the Athenian legal system a jury’s conception of events and 
personalities was clearly of vital importance.  
 
If the primitivist view is correct, the metics, and particularly those who were first generation 
immigrants, would suffer because they lacked the bonds that connected citizens to each other. 
This would be a far less significant problem if the modernists are right.  It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to enter into all the aspects of this debate, but it will be useful to discuss 
briefly its relevance to the agora, where economic relations would have been most visible and 
had the most direct impact on metics. Millett has argued that the ‘established price’ 
(kathestêkuia timê) of grain attested by Demosthenes
233
 shows that while that particular 
commodity was evidently subject to supply issues, the Athenians thought of prices as 
essentially customary.
234
 He also pointed to the Athenians’ habit of gathering in certain 
places in the agora.
235
 He also stressed the importance of personal relations between traders 
and their customers, as shown in Theophrastus’ Characters, when the ‘shameless’ man 
reminds his butcher of the favours he has done him in the past, and when the ‘rustic’ knows 
from which trader he will buy his produce.
236
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 E. Cohen 1994: 142. 
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 Todd 1994: 135 argues that, if anything, status seems to have become more important in the fourth century.  
233
 Dem. 34.39. 
234
 Millett 2002 [1990]: 193. 
235
 In Lys. 24.20 we hear that ἕκαστος γὰρ ὑμῶν εἴθισται προσφοιτᾶν ὁ μὲν πρὸς μυροπώλιον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς 
κουρεῖον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοτομεῖον, ὁ δ᾽ ὅποι ἂν τύχῃ, καὶ πλεῖστοι μὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω τῆς ἀγορᾶς 
κατεσκευασμένους… ἅπαντες γὰρ εἴθισθε προσφοιτᾶν καὶ διατρίβειν ἁμοῦ γέ που. (‘for each of you is 
accustomed to visit  a regular haunt, one to a perfume shop, one to a barber’s, one to a shoemaker’s, or wherever 
he happens to go, and in most cases to the ones which have been set up nearest the agora… for you are all 
accustomed to visit regularly and spend time somewhere’). Millett 2002 [1990]: 190-191, also citing Xen. Mem. 
4.2.1. 
236
 Theophrastus Char. 9.4, 4.14; Millett 2002 [1990]: 190-191. 
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Harris argued against Millett’s interpretations and conclusions, gathering a substantial body 
of evidence for price fluctuation and awareness of supply and demand,
237
 and that a personal 
relationship between a trader and his or customers is nothing more than good business 
practice.
238
 I would add that any examples drawn from Theophrastus must be seen in context; 
he is describing behaviour that in some sense is seen as deviant or reprehensible, particularly 
in the case of the ‘shameless’ man, so it would be unwise to extrapolate a general tendency 
from his sketches. Millett’s conclusion regarding the ‘rustic’ is also suspect, since just before 
he decides to go to his usual trader he is described as asking the passers-by what price items 
are selling for.
239
 The joke is presumably based on the contradictory nature of his actions. 
 
In spite of Harris’ objections, however, it is reasonable to say that there is evidence for 
Athenians making use of personal ties in the agora, gathering at certain places and favouring 
certain shops over others; indeed it would be rather surprising were that not the case. The 
immigrant metic trader setting up his business must therefore have been at a certain 
disadvantage when compared to his citizen counterparts; but he was also disadvantaged as 
opposed to established metics. An example of such an established trader, as we have seen, 
was Athenogenes; and, at least according to the story as presented by his opponent, he was 
only in a position to fool the speaker because he trusted him enough to sign an agreement 
without, quite literally, reading the small print.
240
 If the metic had not been an accepted part 
of the Athenian agora he would not have had the opportunity to make such deals. 
 
Established metics, then, will have had friends and acquaintances, both citizens and 
foreigners, with whom they did business, and could come to for help; in the cases of at least 
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 E.g. Ar. Peace 1198-1202, 1212-1213; Knights 644-645; Xen. Poroi 4.6. Harris 2002: 76-77. 
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 Harris 2002: 87 n.12. 
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 Theophrastus Char. 4.12. 
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 Hyp. 3.10-11. 
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some metic communities, such as the Egyptians, there were religious sanctuaries which could 
perhaps serve as centres for support and making contacts. If they were born and raised in 
Attica they will have had personal experiences of their home area which even Athenians from 
other demes will have lacked. Robin Osborne has recently written on the physical locality of 
the demes Rhamnous and Thorikos, arguing that they affected their citizen inhabitants’ 
experience of what Athens was, and their relation to it, as well as having a strong influence 
on their experience of the astu when they visited it.
241
 Their inhabitants will have had a 
different conception of what Attica, as a homeland, was like. 
 
The same will have applied to Athenian-raised metics; even though they were not Athenians, 
and were not therefore included in many of the local, deme-based institutions, they will have 
had a connection with and particular conception of their home area. They would naturally be 
more familiar and at home there than Athenian citizens who were merely visiting. Since a 
significant number of metics, because of the nature of their work, are likely to have lived in 
the town or the Piraeus,
242
 this will have created a situation in which metics could have felt 
more connection to the most important and prominent parts of the polis than many Athenians 
did themselves. Indeed, in many respects the Athenian inhabitants of the city demes and 
Piraeus will have had more in common with metics raised in the same area than with 
Athenian citizens from other areas. As we have seen, however, the defining features of the 
metic seem to have involved a great deal of marking the metics out as different from citizens; 
while there will have been much in common between them, the polis system ensured that 
there were also differences, which were particularly noticeable on a symbolic level. 
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 R. Osborne 2011. Thorikos was a deme with a rich history, apparently one of Athens’ original towns, and 
was an important site in the silver mining industry (2011: 29-32); Rhamnous was dominated by its fort and the 
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An example of what appears to be an integrated community is to be found in Plato’s 
dialogues, and most notably in the Republic, which is set in the house of the wealthy metic 
family of Cephalus and Polemarchus, the father and brother of Lysias; the relations between 
the group seem to be those of equals, with no social differentiation to be seen.
243
 It is notable, 
however, that in spite of this setting, the subject of metics as immigrants and non-natives is 
not dealt with when describing the ideal polis;
244
 their most memorable appearance in the 
main body of the dialogue is when Socrates complains that in the democratic city they will 
feel themselves to be equal to the astoi.
245
 Németh notes that on this occasion it seems as if 
Plato has simply forgotten the dialogue’s setting, and argues that this demonstrates that ‘the 
metics were, as a social group, treated with the contempt reserved for all non-citizens’.246  
Similarly, in the Laws Plato was keen to stress the importance of keeping the metics apart 
from the citizens, restricting them to working in trades and preventing long-standing 
communities from developing, or individuals ‘putting down roots’247 by limiting the amount 
of time they could spend in the polis to twenty years.
248
 He also seems to have been worried 
about foreign visitors’ having a corrupting effect on the citizens.249 It would seem that, when 
conceived of as a group, the metics were seen as problematic by Plato. 
 
The strong relationships which he depicts between Socrates and certain metics, however, are 
illustrative of the fact that, irrespective of what one’s opinions might be about foreigners or 
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outsiders in the abstract or in general, it was still possible and natural to form close, friendly 
relationships with individuals – particularly with those of one’s own social class and level of 
education. That such ties could and did exist, however, does not negate the impact which the 
material disadvantages and ideological connotations which went with being a metic could 
have on other relationships. Nor, as Plato’s characters’ remarks on the inferiority of metics 
demonstrate, did they mean that a strong personal relationship with one or more metics 
automatically went along with a similar opinion about metics in general. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
The evidence examined in this chapter has demonstrated that the legal requirements and 
markers of metic status were not especially onerous, but they did place metics in situations 
and relationships which were undesirable, and put them at risk of suffering very serious 
consequences if they did not comply with them. The system therefore does not seem 
particularly likely to have been designed to humiliate or denigrate metics as such – even 
though that was probably often a consequence of the metoikion system, due to the power 
which it gave to the tax collectors – but rather to stress that they remained inferior to the 
citizens and, perhaps even more importantly, separate from them: the overriding concern was 
with establishing a clear difference between citizens and metics. The penalties for 
transgression were so extreme, presumably, to act as a deterrent and to make the point that 
attempting to cross the boundary between citizen and metic was unacceptable.
250
 
 
It is difficult to reconstruct the metic experience of all this. The restrictions and obligations 
under which they were placed tended towards depriving the male metics, at least 
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symbolically, of autonomy and masculine agency. Females, on the other hand, had a certain 
degree of legal ‘personality’, albeit through having to pay a tax, which was denied their 
citizen counterparts. This meant that the difference between male and female metics could be 
seen as less ‘clear cut’ than that between male and female Athenians.251 We should not 
suppose, however, that these unusual and transgressive positions came to dominate or define 
their lives in a simple way. They still had the option to conform with standard social norms in 
their private lives and within their own communities. If anything, their inferior and 
undesirable situation in the public sphere might have encouraged overcompensation outside 
of it – Foxhall points out that ‘“subaltern” males virtually always collude with the ideals of 
hegemonic masculinity at least in the suppression of women’.252 Similarly, while metics were 
denied a role in polis decision-making and competition, they could make up for this lack 
within their own associations or through the channels that were open to them, such as success 
in business. 
 
As to the question of metic integration into the polis, it can and has been argued that the 
formal restrictions were not matched by reality. Edward Cohen, for example, has argued that 
there is a difference in this case between tradition, in which citizen difference and superiority 
were seen as very important, and practice, in which they were becoming increasingly 
irrelevant – the legal measures and restrictions were ways of negotiating between these two 
poles.
253
 This, however, seems to ignore the real consequences that went along with them. In 
a personal crisis, such as a court case, there were evidently prejudices which could be played 
on to the metic’s disadvantage. The nature of these would vary with the group, of course; and 
their impact would depend on the individual metic’s situation. Patterson has argued that 
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typically, the metic would be isolated and lack support, particularly in court situations. She 
pointed to the metic corn dealers of Lysias 22, who are presented as ‘the enemy within’.254 
But is always dangerous to look only at one side of an argument; we do not know what kind 
of support they may have had. The point is that this would vary; a metic could be isolated and 
unimportant or honoured and have powerful connections in Athens. As we have seen, 
however, their status as inferiors to the Athenian citizens was reinforced in many symbolic 
ways, regardless of how prosperous and well-connected they might have been. The attitudes 
which these reflect, and which were played on in court, cannot but have had effects in 
everyday life as well. Thus a metic might live his or her life ordinarily enough, but there was 
always the potential for their status to be held against them, whether with materially 
significant consequences or merely emotional ones. The Athenian social system cannot but 
have affected their self-esteem, as well as their material prosperity. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE BOUNDARY IN THEORY – AUTOCHTHONY 
 
In this chapter I shall turn to the theoretical basis for the division between citizen and metic, 
which explained and legitimised the erection and maintenance of the boundary between them; 
in the next chapter I will examine how this boundary was enacted in the real polis, through 
the laws which aimed at keeping the Athenian citizen body pure and the measures taken both 
to encourage compliance with them and deal with the uncomfortable fact that they were often 
ineffective or ignored. 
 
This theoretical boundary was rooted in what the Athenians believed – or at least professed to 
believe – about their origins. They claimed to be autochthonous, i.e. that they were the pure-
bred descendants of people born of the earth of Attica itself. This, at least, was the official, or 
public, version which was expressed most noticeably in the genre of the funeral oration. The 
purity of the group was supposed to be maintained by citizenship laws which, after 451/450, 
limited Athenian citizenship to those born of two Athenian parents; the earth-born origin was 
established by myth and reiterated by oratorical performance. It also featured in tragedy, as 
best preserved in Euripides’ Ion.1 In that play, Erechthonius is said by his granddaughter to 
have ‘grown from the earth’ (ἐκ γῆς... ἔβλαστεν),2 and references are made to autochthony 
and its noble connotations.
3
 
 
I shall begin this chapter by discussing the myth and the reasons for its apparent popularity; 
then I shall examine its performance in the public ritual of the funeral oration; then the 
concept’s exploration by Euripides in his Ion; and finally the critical treatment of the myth 
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and its attendant ideology by Herodotus, Thucydides and most importantly Plato in his 
Menexenus. 
 
3.1 Autochthony as Myth and Theory 
 
The idea of autochthony appears to have developed during the fifth century,
4
 and was not 
universally accepted. Both Thucydides and Herodotus suggested alternatives, and as 
Rosivach suggests, there are hints that the ordinary Athenians of that time may not have 
bought into it; in the Knights, for example, when Cleon calls Demos Erechtheidê he has no 
idea what he is talking about.
5
 The earth-born element, which became very important, may 
not have come to predominate until the fourth century.
6
 The actual events which took place in 
democratic Athens also appear to contradict at least the notion of Athenian purity, if not 
origin;
7
 there were times when the citizenship laws appear to have been relaxed or 
disregarded and some individuals acknowledged that they were imperfect and inadequate, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Turning first to the myth itself, one important question is why the Athenians believed (or 
professed to believe) it; or to put it another way, what benefit, if any, did it bring them?
8
 
Scholars have made various suggestions, such as that it gave them a greater age and thus 
nobility than other peoples.
9
 Two of the most important explanations appear to be that it gave 
them a sense of unity and equality
10
 – if all had a common descent, all were in a sense equal, 
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and had a share in eugeneia
11
 – and that it served as an effective way of distinguishing them 
from non-citizens, who would always lack it. It could also distract from and mask 
uncomfortable truths about individual Athenians’ origins,12 which as the next chapter will 
demonstrate were numerous and hard to avoid. It thus raised the Athenians above, and kept 
them separate from, others on an ideological level, just as the restrictions on metics did. This 
myth-based ideology, however, applied both to those foreigners who lived elsewhere, and 
were mostly experienced in the imagination of Athenians, and those who were encountered 
regularly in real life: metics and slaves. 
 
Where Athenian women fit into this has been a disputed question. For Loraux, autochthony 
excluded them – ‘there were no female citizens, only Athenian women who were daughters 
and wives of citizens’13 – whereas others have seen it as giving them a stronger identity as 
citizens, since they too were part of the exclusive descent group and, after 451, an Athenian 
was not supposed to be a citizen unless his mother was as well. Women thus acquired an 
important role, through reproduction, in the creation of the racial citizen group; they had a 
place in the concept of even male citizenship, albeit as an unintended consequence of 
mythmaking and legislation that was aimed at a different goal.
14
 This role is not elaborated on 
in the treatments of the myth contained in the funeral orations, where Athenian citizen 
identity remains closely connected to classically male and military ideals. When it comes to 
tragedy, there is a more nuanced picture; Calame has pointed to the key role played by 
women in the myth of Praxithea as presented by Euripides in his Erechtheus, who urged her 
husband (Erechtheus) to sacrifice their daughter for the sake of the city’s victory.15 This, he 
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argues, makes autochthony ‘also a woman’s concern’, and the sacrificed daughter ‘replaces 
the son who gives his life for Athens by dying a heroic death’, her mother saying to the 
citizens χρῆσθ’, ὦ πολῖται, τοῖς ἐμοῖς λοχεύμασιν, / σῴζεσθε, νικᾶτ’.16 Euripides’ Ion also 
involves women, with Creousa treated as an object of wonder by Ion due to her noble 
Athenian origin.
17
 In any case, the fact that the dominant citizen ideology which we can see 
in our sources is largely masculine does not mean that alternative models were not available, 
or that a female conception of Athenian identity did not exist. On the contrary, there were 
ample opportunities for such ideas to develop and be enacted, particularly in the religious 
field. Unfortunately, we can only partially reconstruct them.
18
 
 
Lape’s analysis of the Athenians’ ‘racial’ citizenship suggests that autochthony and the racial 
concept of citizenship which accompanied it served the purpose of justifying citizen privilege 
– it ‘provided a rationale for pre-existing practices and norms’.19 It could also be used to 
justify the actions of the Athenians, for example when it came to their imperial policy; as 
autochthones, the Athenians were unique and favoured by the gods, which could justify their 
ruling other peoples.
20
 Autochthony thus had an intellectual and emotional effect, easing the 
anxieties that Athenian citizens might have about their place in the polis and the wider world, 
and the morality of their actions. As an explanation this seems persuasive, but certainly does 
not rule out or replace the idea that it boosted unity and excluded others; on the contrary, the 
explanations seem complementary. The justification of Athenian citizen privilege could not 
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happen if it was not also clear that the others were being excluded from something. Lape’s 
explanation does, however, allow for a broader conception of the polis than would Loraux’s; 
the Athenians are justifying their superior position within a community which in some sense 
at least involves the ‘outsiders’, whereas Loraux’s argument would suggest that they were 
totally excluded. There was no need to justify privilege at all, as the outsiders were simply 
irrelevant. 
 
So whichever view we prefer, autochthony was a myth which had a strong exclusionary 
element. It also took its place in the repeated, public iteration of  Athenian ideals which was 
the funeral oration; it was presented, publicly, as the official origin story of Athens,  and as 
one of the things that made Athens and the Athenian dêmos special and worthy of praise. 
 
3.2 (a) Performing Autochthony – the Funeral Oration and its Context 
 
We have six examples of funeral orations from classical Athens: the ones I will be examining 
are those of Lysias, Demosthenes and Hyperides, plus Thucydides’ version of one delivered 
by Pericles and Plato’s Menexenus.21 The latter is a dialogue which contains a funeral oration 
recited from memory by Socrates, but which was composed, according to Plato’s conceit, by 
Aspasia for delivery by Pericles. Hyperides’ oration was delivered in 322, 22  and its 
authenticity is not in doubt;
23
 it is, however, fragmentary since it survives on a partially 
damaged papyrus roll.
24
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Demosthenes’ oration was supposedly delivered in 338 after the battle of Chaeronea, but its 
authenticity has been doubted. We know that Demosthenes did deliver a funeral oration on 
that occasion, as he refers to his being chosen in his speech On the Crown,
25
 but it has been 
suggested that what we have is a ‘poor imitation’, since ‘it is certainly a very disjointed and 
rambling speech, and one unworthy of Demosthenes for such a sober and important 
occasion’.26 Quality will always have some bearing on whether a text is deemed authentic, 
but in this case it does not, alone, seem a good enough reason to reject it, and in other 
respects there is no proof of forgery.
27
 While other speeches in the corpus could be genuine 
products of the fourth century even if mistakenly ascribed to Demosthenes,
28
 if the orator did 
not write this one it must be a later forgery; yet there are no anachronisms.
29
 Worthington has 
raised the possibility that certain passages might have a particular resonance with 
Demosthenes’ own background and policy,30  though of course a knowledgeable imitator 
could have added them himself. The key point, however, and one made in particular by 
Loraux, is that given the ‘constraints of a formal genre’ we should not expect funeral 
speeches to conform to an orator’s usual style.31 We do not, therefore, have good reason to 
reject its authenticity. 
 
The same would apply to objections made against the authenticity of Lysias’ funeral speech 
on stylistic grounds. Doubts were expressed in the nineteenth century, using what Loraux 
calls ‘arguments so feeble that they invalidated the thesis they sought to establish’,32 though 
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others have found objections more persuasive.
33
 Todd has noted a positive reason to believe 
Lysias was behind it in the reference it makes to the dead xenoi who fought for Athens, 
something which no other extant example of the genre does; this would fit well with Lysias’ 
metic status and background.
34
 It thus seems likely that the speech is correctly attributed. 
Lysias, however, being a metic, cannot have delivered the speech himself. It is true, as 
Frangeskou points out, that ‘we have no clear evidence that metics were barred from this 
duty’,35 but it still seems fundamentally unlikely that such an important and citizen-focused 
role would be given to a foreigner.
36
 If the idea was unthinkable, we would not expect to find 
any specific prohibition.  
 
In the case of Lysias, this general point is compounded by the text of the speech itself, in 
which there is no hint that the man delivering it (as opposed to writing it) was an outsider; 
indeed, the speaker specifically refers to the Athenians of former generations as ‘our 
ancestors’.37 If we accept its attribution to Lysias we must then suppose either that it was 
written for delivery by someone else, or that it was written as a model, exercise or pamphlet. 
Herrman is happy to conclude that it was never delivered because, speechwriting being ‘not 
well regarded in Athens… It is unlikely that any prominent citizen who was given the honor 
of delivering the funeral oration would have used a speech written by a professional 
speechwriter’.38 This argument is not compelling. On the contrary, a major public occasion 
such as the public funeral is exactly the kind of circumstance where a speaker would want the 
best speech possible, and any stigma about using a speech written by another would only 
develop if the fact was revealed. 
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Todd also doubts that it was actually delivered, on the grounds that whoever was chosen to 
give the oration would have been selected ‘at least partly on the basis of his ability to produce 
an appropriate speech’. 39  This does not necessarily mean he would not have used a 
logographer, however. In Apollodorus, the son of Pasion, we have one example of a well-
known public speaker, who normally wrote his own speeches, using a professional writer for 
what he evidently felt was a particularly important case.
40
  The same could have happened 
with the Lysianic funeral speech. Even if not actually delivered, however, it would still stand 
as an example of the genre.
41
 
 
Thucydides’ version of Pericles’ oration, delivered in 431 after the first year of the 
Peloponnesian War, throws up a rather different set of problems. The key question is to what 
extent it represents what Pericles actually said, and to what extent it is the historian’s own 
invention, composed to serve his literary and historical purposes. Scholars have tended to 
regard it as a more-or-less faithful reproduction, at least in its themes and essential points; 
Loraux argues that ‘Thucydides’ mark is to be sought… in the register of expression 
accorded to the work as a whole, rather than in the context and strategy of the oration’.42 For 
the purposes of this chapter it is not necessary to discuss this issue in detail,
43
 as the Periclean 
oration does not mention autochthony; this may be ascribed to the opinions of Thucydides, 
the speech’s fifth-century context (in which the concept of autochthony was still in 
development), or simply the choice of either the orator or the historian. 
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Plato’s Menexenus is yet another very different text. The speech which it presents is a parody 
which has, nevertheless, been used as an example of the genre, on the grounds that, as Lape 
puts it, ‘the speaker is under the spell of the very ideology he presumes to parody’.44 It 
contains many of the tropes common in the other extant orations, and it may well be 
parodying elements of still others, performed but not necessarily recorded, which would be 
otherwise unavailable to us. In such cases, however, it is impossible to tell how exaggerated 
the examples are, and the distorted versions of themes which we do recognise from the real 
orations require careful analysis. They cannot be taken as simple expressions of the 
epitaphios genre. I will thus examine the Menexenus separately, after discussing the other 
examples. 
 
What we have, then, is only a tiny proportion of the actual genre. The majority of the funeral 
orations which were delivered are lost to us, and were performed by individuals about whom 
we know nothing.
45
 It is thus very difficult to make generalisations about the genre; we have 
little idea of how far from the norm an oration would usually stray, for example. Equally, our 
texts may be responding to previous orations that are now lost, and indeed were never 
circulated in written form. There are, however, tropes which come up time and again in our 
texts, and it is reasonable to suppose that we can use these to talk about standard features.
46
 
With the exception of Thucydides’ oration and the fragmentary one by Gorgias, all of the 
funeral speeches refer to the Athenians’ autochthonous origins. This, it would seem, was a 
standard feature which was regularly visited (though we can hardly say that it was required to 
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talk about it). As we shall see, there is some degree of variance in how it was employed by 
the orators. But before going into the detail of what the speeches say on this theme, it will be 
useful to describe the context of the oration as ceremony and a literary genre. 
 
The oration was only one part of a larger ritual, namely the funeral itself.
47
 This was 
performed for those who had died in battle for Athens. According to Thucydides, the bones 
were laid out for two
48
 days in a tent, so that people could make offerings to ‘their own’ 
dead;
49
 they were then buried in the Kerameikos following a public procession.
50
 It was here 
that the oration took place, delivered by an ἀνὴρ ᾑρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε 
δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκῃ. 51  When Demosthenes describes his own 
selection as funeral orator he suggests that there was a strong competitive element, boasting 
that he was chosen by the dêmos over Aeschines (his opponent in the case), Demades and 
Hegemon, in spite of a complaint by Aeschines and Pythocles.
52
 In the Menexenus, it is the 
boulê which makes the choice.
53
 It was thus an honour and privilege to deliver the oration, 
and no doubt an occasion heavy with expectation. 
 
The audience present at the grave would include acquaintances, personal friends and relatives 
of the dead, as well as a broader section of society for whom they must have had a 
representational importance. To judge from the examples which we possess, it was to this 
latter (and presumably larger) section of the audience that the oration was primarily 
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addressed; with the exception of Hyperides’ speech, which focuses on the general Leosthenes, 
there is no singling out of individuals.
54
 It is as a group that the Athenians are praised.
55
 The 
friends and relatives of the dead were not forgotten, but their experience too was represented 
through communal, non-individuated praise that treated the dead as representatives of the 
best of Athens as a whole; Demosthenes says that the surviving relatives are to be pitied for 
their loss, but not only because of the personal sorrow caused – they will also feel bereaved 
because of the damage done to their fatherland.
56
 There had already been an opportunity for 
private grief and offerings during the two-day display of the bones; now, while relatives will 
naturally have continued to experience their own personal relationship, the focus was on the 
communal and transcendent. 
 
The audience, however, was not made up solely of Athenians. On the contrary, we know 
from Thucydides that anyone who happened to be in the city could attend – ξυνεκφέρει δὲ ὁ 
βουλόμενος καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, καὶ γυναῖκες πάρεισιν αἱ προσήκουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον 
ὀλοφυρόμεναι.57 These would include metics but also other foreigners, i.e. short-term visitors 
or traders who were in Athens.
58
 Plato also refers to foreigners in attendance, when he has 
Socrates remark that usually foreigners come and listen with him.
59
 Both of these references, 
however, are in the build-up to the speech as presented, and are not followed up by addresses 
in the speeches themselves.
60
 It is true, however, that there is a mention of these foreigners in 
the epitaphios of Thucydides, who quotes Pericles as saying νομίζων ἐπί τε τῷ παρόντι οὐκ 
ἂν ἀπρεπῆ λεχθῆναι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν πάντα ὅμιλον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ξύμφορον εἶναι 
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ἐπακοῦσαι αὐτῶν.61 Given that we cannot be sure how closely Thucydides’ version resembles 
the original delivery, it would be dangerous to take too much from this, but the passage does 
seem to reveal an important point about the genre and its occasion. It is useful for everyone to 
hear the speech, in spite of (and possibly even because of) the fact that it is essentially 
addressed to citizens. The position of the foreigners is as outsiders, observers looking on a 
scene in which the participants are citizens. 
 
Demosthenes also acknowledges their presence, and accepts the need to gain their favour if 
the speech is to be successful: ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ διαλαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὰ τοῖσδε  
πεπραγμένα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν δηλοῦν καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὸν τάφον ἠκολουθηκότας  
πρὸς εὔνοιαν παρακαλέσαι.62 This, he says, is because of the need for a speech to persuade; if 
it does not have the goodwill of the audience, it is doomed to fail.
63
 He almost immediately, 
however, moves on to describe the deeds of the dead;
64
 he merely asserts that the foreigners 
should have a positive attitude but does not actually say anything to engender it. Even when 
acknowledging their presence, the focus must swiftly return to the Athenians. The foreigners’ 
presence is important, but they do not get addressed directly, even when an orator claims he 
has to reach them. 
 
In other orations, even when foreign soldiers are mentioned, the foreign part of the audience 
is not addressed. When Lysias refers to the bravery of the fallen xenoi (who must include 
metics as well as, possibly, allies)
65
 he says: 
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ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς ἐνθάδε κειμένους ἐπαινέσαι, οἳ τῷ πλήθει 
βοηθήσαντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας  σωτηρίας μαχόμενοι, πατρίδα τὴν ἀρετὴν 
ἡγησάμενοι, τοιαύτην τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν ἐποιήσαντο· ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἡ πόλις  αὐτοὺς 
καὶ ἐπένθησε καὶ ἔθαψε δημοσίᾳ, καὶ ἔδωκεν ἔχειν αὐτοῖς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον τὰς 
αὐτὰς τιμὰς τοῖς ἀστοῖς.66 
 
There is no move to actually address the allies or their people, some of whom must have been 
in the audience, even though there is an obvious message about ideal behaviour here. 
Foreigners should regard virtue as their homeland, which, naturally enough, becomes 
synonymous with Athens in this case. The allies fought for the salvation of Athens, and serve 
as a model not dissimilar to Parthenopaeus, the ‘ideal metic’ discussed in section 1.1. If the 
speech is correctly attributed, there is a personal connection there, since Lysias supported 
Athens’ democracy and very nearly died at the hands of the Thirty Tyrants.67 Nevertheless, 
the speech is addressed to and ostensibly aimed at the Athenians, even when it contains a 
message for the xenoi as well. Similarly, Hyperides refers to Leosthenes’ command of allied 
troops,
68
 but does not address any allies who might be present. 
 
On this basis, Loraux refers to the Athenians’ ‘narcissism’69 – the funeral oration is of, about 
and addressed to Athens. At one point she speculates that the foreigners could be necessary 
only so that Athens ‘could admire itself in others’ eyes’.70 Later, after establishing that the 
overarching purpose of the funeral oration is unity, she argues that it suppresses ‘internal 
differences, to present to foreigners the image of a unity which no external intervention can 
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 Lys. 2.66: ‘It’s right to praise also the foreigners who lie here, who helped the people and fought for our 
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infringe’.71 The idealised, prototypical Athenian of the funeral oration is the hoplite, and all 
citizens are subsumed into it.
72
 ‘Those “strangers within”, that is, the metics and slaves, are 
ignored by the official oration with a consistency that cannot be accidental’.73 It is true that 
the oration does not address them, but their presence is felt nevertheless. They throw the 
Athenians into relief – each time they are praised the metics and slaves are implicitly 
excluded. They can never join the ranks of the citizens. Even if, as Lysias has it, it is possible 
for them to be honoured in the same way as citizens, they can only do this after death, and 
they remain separate – ideal metics and allies, but still only metics and allies. 
 
Loraux argues that what the funeral oration is displaying is an ‘imaginary’ Athens; in the 
speeches there is a difference between ‘the Athenians’ (i.e. the dead, including the Athenians 
of the distant past), ‘us’ (the living audience of the oration) and ‘the city’, ‘constituted by 
these two groups and transcending both’.74 This imaginary, idealised city serves as a ‘model 
that inspires action’.75 One of its aims, then, is to exhort the audience to emulate the heroic 
forebears whose exploits are described. Flattery alone is not the aim.
76
 But beyond this is the 
oration’s unifying effect, which is best achieved by concealing and suppressing differences 
within its (for Loraux) exclusively male, citizen audience.
77
 In tandem with its removal of 
differences within, the imagined city ‘has no periphery’ – no metics, slaves or women.78 It 
serves as a kind of dream from which, presumably, the audience awake when they return to 
their everyday lives. But this does not account for the aspects of the ritual which stretch 
beyond the exclusive citizen group. The fact that an oration only ‘tacitly conveys an idea of 
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exclusion’79 actually makes it more effective – by only implicitly telling the non-citizens that 
they have no role in the occasion, it refuses to acknowledge them as even an inferior part of 
the polis. 
 
Work focusing on this ritual aspect of the occasion has stressed the unifying power which it 
could exert on citizens. Carter, for example, has described epideictic-oratory-as-ritual’s 
ability to connect ‘participants to the cosmos or a transcendent principle[,] take the 
participants out of time’80 and ‘generate a sense of harmony by unifying the contraries that 
one finds in life’.81  Carter also states that ‘another crucial function of ritual is creating and 
enhancing a sense of community among its participants’.82 On the face of it, the funeral and 
its oration would appear to fit with this straightforwardly, with Athenian unity and 
community bolstered. The picture, however, is more complicated, since the Athenians did not 
make up the entire audience. A vital part of the ritual is precisely that foreigners witness it – 
it is a performance of narcissism and unity that, for sure, could have a simple effect on its 
Athenian audience members but which also reminded them of those who were excluded, even 
when they lived in the polis. It thus has both a unifying effect on the citizens as a group and a 
divisive effect on the audience as a whole. For the visitor, this would be of little importance; 
but for the metic, who had made his or her home in the Athenian polis, the meaning would be 
clear and powerful. This is our occasion, says the orator; what is left unsaid, but clear 
nonetheless, is that the metic can only be an onlooker. His or her connection with and 
contribution to the polis is limited (or even non-existent) and can never match that of the 
citizens. Even when Lysias mentions the fallen allies and the fact that they have been 
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honoured just like the citizens, he inescapably stresses their difference as well. They and the 
people like them are not included in the address the speaker is making. 
 
One further point should be made about the ritual and its context. As a funeral occasion, there 
was a certain solemnity and respect which had to be given. It was not an occasion for 
disputation. In a sense, this gave the orator leeway to say things which could be challenged in 
another context, but in return a need does seem to have been felt to justify the approach taken, 
and the introduction of certain themes. Thus Hyperides takes the time to explain why he is 
focusing on an individual, and is careful to stress that this does not mean he wants to 
denigrate or minimise the role of the rest of the fallen:  
καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ με τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν μηδένα λόγον ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ 
Λεωσθένη μόνον ἐγκωμιάζειν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸν Λεωσθένους ἔπαινον ἐπὶ ταῖς  
μάχαις ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν εἶναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς ὁ 
στρατηγὸς αἴτιος, τοῦ δὲ νικᾶν μαχομένους οἱ κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες τοῖς 
σώμασιν· ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινῶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν νίκην, ἅμα τῇ Λεωσθένους ἡγεμονίᾳ  
καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάσω.83 
 
Such a justification may have been needed if the speech was to be remembered well, but 
while it was taking place it must have remained above challenge. Unlike the agonistic context 
of the lawcourt or assembly, where interruptions from the audience appear to have been an 
accepted part of the process, the solemnity of the funeral will have excluded disrespect or 
interventions from those who were not chosen to contribute. There will also have been a 
receptive audience that wanted the speaker to succeed; as it was a ritual devoted to the dead, 
the audience will have wanted everything to go smoothly, and positively desired to be moved 
by the oratory. This made it the perfect context to recite and talk about ideological ‘truths’, 
especially those which were, when looked at rationally, dubious or difficult to support. 
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 Hyp. 6.15: ‘And let no one imagine that in making this speech I am ignoring the other citizens, and praising 
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Mythology could be narrated in an uncomplicated manner, in which all praise was due to 
Athens, and an intellectually questionable official ideology such as autochthony could be 
used to both prove and demonstrate the Athenians’ purity, nobility and unity.84 
 
3.2 (b) Autochthony in the Funeral Orations 
 
This is the context, then, in which we should read the funeral orations. I shall now turn to 
how they deal with the idea of autochthony, the myth which most completely excluded the 
possibility of outsiders joining the Athenian dêmos. Lysias refers to it as follows: 
Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἡμετέροις προγόνοις μιᾷ γνώμῃ χρωμένοις περὶ τοῦ 
δικαίου διαμάχεσθαι. ἥ τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βίου δικαία· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, 
πανταχόθεν συνειλεγμένοι καὶ ἑτέρους ἐκβαλόντες τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ᾤκησαν, ἀλλ’ 
αὐτόχθονες ὄντες τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκέκτηντο μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα.85 
 
The idea of Athenian unity is clearly stressed – their ancestors were of one mind, and by 
referring to them Lysias draws a connection between current Athenians and previous 
generations, an essential requirement to achieve the timeless quality of the performance as 
interpreted by Loraux and Carter. There is also an explicit contrast between the Athenians 
and all other peoples, which is given a moral aspect. As an autochthonous people, the 
Athenians did not have to expel other inhabitants from their place of dwelling,
86
 which 
resembles and explains the righteous conduct of later generations, who fought for justice. It is 
in argument which, on reflection, does not seem compelling, and no doubt benefited from the 
privileged, sacred context of the funeral. The argument is returned to when Lysias discusses 
the xenoi who have died for Athens – they regarded virtue as their fatherland, and therefore 
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came as close as possible to the Athenians. Justice, virtue and autochthony are linked; others 
might achieve the first two, but the third is the exclusive property of Athenians. 
 
Lape argues that Lysias is saying that virtue and justice are qualities that are actually 
inherited,
87
 citing as an example the passage which reads καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ φύντες καλῶς καὶ 
γνόντες ὅμοια, πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ οἱ πρόγονοι τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμένων 
εἰργάσαντο.88 This seems an overstatement; the possibility is certainly there, but Lysias does 
not argue for it explicitly. He puts forth the evidence (which amounts to a collection of stories 
of great Athenian deeds) but does not articulate a full explanation. The idea is certainly there 
implicitly, however, and could naturally be read into the words. An advantage of leaving it at 
that implicit level could be that it avoided a sense of complacency; the standard of the dead 
was one that the living should strive to emulate, to prove that they are worthy of their 
ancestors. A simple statement of belief in inherited virtue could make it seem as though it did 
not have to be earned in this way. 
 
Similar themes are deployed by Demosthenes, who discusses the topic this way: 
Ἡ γὰρ εὐγένεια τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκ πλείστου χρόνου παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις 
ἀνωμολόγηται. οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἰς πατέρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἄνω προγόνων κατ’ ἄνδρ’ 
ἀνενεγκεῖν ἑκάστῳ τὴν φύσιν ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ὅλην κοινῇ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πατρίδα, 
ἧς αὐτόχθονες ὁμολογοῦνται εἶναι. μόνοι γὰρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἐξ ἧσπερ 
ἔφυσαν, ταύτην ᾤκησαν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὑτῶν παρέδωκαν, ὥστε δικαίως ἄν τις 
ὑπολάβοι τοὺς μὲν ἐπήλυδας ἐλθόντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ τούτων πολίτας 
προσαγορευομένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς εἰσποιητοῖς τῶν παίδων, τούτους δὲ 
γνησίους γόνῳ τῆς πατρίδος πολίτας εἶναι.89 
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The purity of the Athenian people is given a special emphasis – each individual can trace 
back his genealogy to the fatherland itself, establishing an unbroken, timeless chain reaching 
back, a chain whose existence has apparently been acknowledged by everyone since time 
immemorial. Just as in Lysias’ speech, Athenian exceptionalism is also stressed, as they alone 
possess their original land, and have passed it down the generations; this gives them a true 
legitimacy to the point where all other peoples are like adopted children only. The effect is 
not only to set Athens and the Athenians apart from other peoples and poleis; it is also to 
lump together all foreigners as an undistinguished mass, a conception which parallels the 
status of the metic, which does not privilege or differentiate between different nations, poleis 
or peoples. 
 
Demosthenes uses the term eugeneia, which goes together with autochthony; in Loraux’s 
view, the terms are in effect synonymous, and used ‘interchangeably’.90 The rationale for this 
appears to have been multifaceted; Lysias stressed the moral aspect of autochthony, and 
Demosthenes the age and legitimacy which it brought, which are also key concepts in the 
idea of ‘good birth’. In the context of a ritual and speech which draws so heavily on tradition, 
the fit is natural. Most attendees will have been there precisely because they wished to 
witness a ceremony that was illustrious due to its age, tradition and links to the past; the 
supposed great age and unbroken character of the Athenian dêmos will therefore 
automatically have become a positive attribute. 
 
Autochthonous eugeneia cuts across social classes, since all Athenians possess it. This is a 
point made clear by Hyperides in his funeral oration, in which he claims that Athenian 
eugeneia is unrivalled: 
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νῦν δὲ πόθεν ἄρξωμαι λέγων , ἢ τίνος πρῶτον μνησθῶ; πότερα περὶ τοῦ γένους 
αὐτῶν ἑκάστου διεξέλθω; ἀλλ’ εὔηθες εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους 
τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ἐγκωμιάζοντα, οἳ πολλαχόθεν εἰς μίαν πόλιν συνεληλυθότες 
οἰκοῦσι γένος ἴδιον ἕκαστος συνεισενεγκάμενος, τοῦτον μὲν δεῖ κατ’ ἄ νδρα 
γενεαλογεῖν ἕκαστον· περὶ δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενος , οἷς ἡ 
κοινὴ γένεσις αὐτόχθ οσιν οὖσιν ἀνυπέρβλητον τ ὴν εὐγένειαν ἔχει, περίεργον 
ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι ἰδίαι τὰ γένη ἐγκωμιάζειν.91 
 
There is something of a difference between Hyperides’ treatment of the idea and 
Demosthenes’, who described each individual’s having both a personal ancestry and a greater 
connection to the land itself. For Hyperides, the latter completely removes the need for the 
former.
92
 In spite of certain differences, however, the idea of autochthony retains its 
connection with eugeneia and unity – autochthony is the common genesis of the Athenians. 
 
Taking these passages together, one thing which will be noticed is that while all three orators 
use autochthony to make significant points, the actual time they spend on the myth is very 
short. It seems to be something which is acknowledged, performed and then swiftly moved 
on from. This may be because, ultimately, there is not that much to say about it – it is 
certainly a less intrinsically interesting topic than a tale of military exploits. But it is also true 
that, intellectually, autochthony was a problematic concept if given thought. While, as Lape 
argues, it could be used to justify actions, privileges and social norms, it was unsatisfactory 
when examined closely. Edward Cohen went as far as to deride its presentation in the funeral 
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orations as ‘platitudinous banalities’,93 and his is a view which inspires a degree of sympathy 
– the story seems so absurd that it can be hard to imagine how it was taken seriously. But as 
we have seen, its context protected it, even when it did not accord with the reality of actual 
life in Athens, or its history. The social, historical and political facts which blatantly 
contradicted it, and their implications, will be discussed in the next chapter; first, I shall 
examine some of the complexities which went with it, and then the evidence for doubts held 
about its truth, and the possibility that its effectiveness was not as great as might be imagined. 
 
3.3 (a) Exploring Autochthony – Euripides’ Ion 
 
Euripides’ Ion, performed during the 410s94 has been said by Lape to ‘recapitulate Athenian 
racial ideology as a family romance’.95 In accordance with its relatively early date, however, 
the myth as portrayed in the play does not precisely resemble the theme as described in the 
funeral orations. In Ion, autochthony is focused on the individual royal house descended from 
Erichthonius; looked at logically, it is hard to see how it can have extended to the rest of the 
Athenians (represented in the play by the chorus of therapainides and the presbutês), unless 
we imagine that their descent comes from the earlier, and also autochthonous, Cecrops.
96
 This 
difficulty, however, may be merely an unfortunate plot-hole, an inevitable result of setting a 
story in the time of the origins of peoples and poleis. It seems to be ignored in the play; 
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any other Athenians, as obviously the Athenians they intermarried with had not been bound by the same rules. 
More importantly, the Athenians never said anything of the kind, at least in the evidence which we have. 
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certainly the chorus and the Old Man speak and act as though autochthony were bound up 
with being Athenian. 
 
Euripides treats the idea of autochthony realistically and with some sense of irony. The play 
is not necessarily a critique of it, but it does raise some interesting questions about what it 
would mean if treated seriously.
97
 This is done through manipulating the knowledge which 
characters have at various points, while the audience knows the real story throughout thanks 
to Hermes’ introduction.98 The clearest example comes towards the end of the play: Ion and 
Creousa set out to kill each other – Creousa because of her outrage at what she sees as Ion’s 
duplicitous plan to worm his way into control of Athens, and Ion when he discovers her 
murderous scheme – but when the truth is revealed all is resolved happily. In the words of 
Creousa, ἄπαιδες οὐκέτ’ ἐσμὲν οὐδ’ ἄτεκνοι· / δῶμ’ ἑστιοῦται, γᾶ δ’ ἔχει τυράννους, / ἀνηβᾶι 
δ’ Ἐρεχθεύς· / ὅ τε γηγενέτας δόμος οὐκέτι νύκτα δέρκεται, / ἀελίου δ’ ἀναβλέπει 
λαμπάσιν. 99  The happy ending, which resembles the plot resolutions of the later New 
Comedy,
100
 depends on coincidences and revelations that would not happen in real life; the 
knowledge that Ion is ‘really’ an Athenian defuses the tension which had built up. As Lee 
notes, it also ‘requires no change to the xenophobia expressed earlier’.101  The anxieties 
which the characters reflected, however, continue to exist in the audience’s world, where 
there is no simple divine intervention or revelation. 
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These anxieties include fear and resentment of outsiders, as articulated by the Old Man, who 
is appalled that μεμηχανημένως / ὑβριζόμεσθα δωμάτων τ’ Ἐρεχθέως / ἐκβαλλόμεσθα.102 He 
describes Xouthus as ὅστις σε γήμας ξένος ἐπεισελθὼν πόλιν καὶ δῶμα καὶ σὴν παραλαβὼν 
παγκληρίαν. 103  Such a foreigner is an ‘alien threat’, 104  which would be a relatively 
straightforward concern were it not for the fact that Xouthus has been established as a 
valuable ally of the polis, who was given Creousa as a reward for his services – and is 
himself a grandson of Zeus.
105
 Indeed, the very purpose of the couple’s visit to Delphi is their 
desire to have children.
106
 This conflicts with the desire to keep the ruling house of Athens 
pure,
107
 which is also expressed by the chorus – μηδέ ποτ’ ἄλλος ἥκων πόλεως ἀνάσσοι πλὴν 
τῶν εὐγενετᾶν Ἐρεχθειδᾶν.108 Creousa comes down on the side of the chorus when angrily 
discussing the matter with Ion while under the protection of the altar, her murderous plan 
having been exposed. At this point, Ion believes that Xouthus is his father and claims that this 
gives him the right to rule Athens: πατρός γε γῆν διδόντος ἣν ἐκτήσατο… ὅπλοισιν αὐτήν οὐ 
λόγοις ἐρρύσατο.109 Creousa’s response is that ἐπίκουρος οἰκήτωρ γ’ ἂν οὐκ εἴη χθονός,110 
denying that his services give him any right to be part of the city. This sentiment has been 
seen as demonstrating the fact that an ‘autochthonous society… must also be xenophobic and 
aristocratic’.111 
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The ultimate revelation about Ion’s true identity thus leaves us with the potentially awkward 
conclusion that it is not action or service which entitles one to a share in the city, but simple 
descent
112
 – there is no morality in what the Old Man, the chorus, and Creousa believe and 
are defending. The Old Man, in particular, is an advocate of immorality, although 
Saxonhouse goes too far when describing him as ‘a mindless instigator of evil actions’.113 He 
is hardly mindless, since his motive is loyalty to the Athenian royal house and this provides a 
rationale for his actions, however evil they may be. Lee goes to the other extreme in 
describing him as ‘not evil but the effective tool of a plot which, for purposes of dramatic 
tension, must be as truly threatening as it is wrong-headed’.114 This assessment seems to deny 
the significance of the words he speaks, which appear to reflect a very believable concern 
over the infiltration of the polis by outsiders, albeit one put in extreme terms. 
 
The character of Ion and his happy ending also raise some intriguing moral questions. He is 
still the same man, and has done the same things, when the Athenians wish to kill him and 
when they happily welcome him into their ruling house at the end of the play. Similarly, Ion 
is reconciled with a woman who has attempted to murder him and his supposed father simply 
because, as it turns out, she is really his mother. He had earlier called for her to be thrown 
from the heights of Parnassus,
115
 and described her as a viper with the nature of Gorgon’s 
blood.
116
 The happy ending thus only imperfectly masks some interesting moral questions 
about the basis of Athenian citizenship and the implications of their autochthony ideology. 
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Earlier, Euripides uses the character of Ion to express the anxiety of the outsider. When 
Xouthus has (mistakenly) recognised Ion as his son, and invited him to return to Athens with 
him,
117
 the younger man is worried: εἶναί φασι τὰς αὐτόχθονας / κλεινὰς Ἀθήνας οὐκ 
ἐπείσακτον γένος, / ἵν’ ἐσπεσοῦμαι δύο νόσω κεκτημένος, / πατρός τ’ ἐπακτοῦ καὐτὸς 
νοθαγενής.118  He hopes that through his mother, at this time unknown to both him and 
Xouthus, he will discover that he has a connection with Athens through descent: εἰ δ’ 
ἐπεύξασθαι χρεών, / ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν μ’ ἡ τεκοῦσ’ εἴη γυνή, / ὥς μοι γένηται μητρόθεν 
παρρησία. / καθαρὰν γὰρ ἤν τις ἐς πόλιν πέσῃ ξένος, / κἂν τοῖς λόγοισιν ἀστὸς ᾖ, τό γε στόμα 
/ δοῦλον πέπαται κοὐκ ἔχει παρρησίαν.119 This imagined position of the xenos is similar to 
that of the metics, particularly the immigrants to Athens and their descendants, who, as we 
have seen, also lived with restricted rights.
120
 
 
By using the character of Ion as the mouthpiece for these views, Euripides encouraged the 
audience to sympathise with them, by means both of the unfortunate circumstances of his 
birth and his real status as a key figure in Athens and its mythology. The fact that he is really 
an Athenian may have encouraged them to take this further – a citizen audience member 
could reflect on the fact that his own position depended, to an extent, on chance and 
recognition by others. There is a parallel for this in the play in the character of Xouthus, who 
is completely fooled about his connection to Ion. Proceeding from this ignorance, his actions 
ultimately end up contributing to the happy resolution, but of course this only applies in the 
world of the play. Saxonhouse suggests that his ignorance ‘is parallel to the ignorance and 
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susceptibility to deception with which all men must function, the uncertainty of paternity, the 
uncertainty of who it is who fathered the children they think to be their own’.121 It is true that 
he is deceived, and that his simple faith is proven to be misplaced, but there is no hint of any 
anxiety in him over this issue – he is certain, once the god’s message has reached him, that it 
is true. This would seem to parallel the confident way in which autochthony could be asserted 
by the Athenians, even if there were numerous problems with it when looked at rationally.  
 
Euripides’ implication appears to be that the assumptions we have about our identities can be 
wrong and lead us to do immoral things, but he does not offer any answers to deal with this. 
We are left to decide whether we should accept the stories we tell about our origins without 
examination, though the message that we should not act on their basis unthinkingly is 
supported by the play. It is difficult to see, then, how the play can amount to an actual 
critique of autochthony as a concept. It is true, as Farrington points out, that the Athenians 
often act appallingly in the play.
122
 The violent xenophobia of the Athenians, however, is not 
presented as an inevitable consequence of the ideology, but as a possible one. Equally, for all 
the difficulties with the concept which Euripides points out, the opportunity is not taken to 
elaborate on them; they are raised and then left hanging, ostensibly resolved by the revelation 
and reconciliation. When it comes to the treatment of outsiders, the Athenian audience 
member might sympathise with Ion’s plight, and feel for him as an individual, but not 
necessarily conclude that this meant the system was wrong, or the position of foreigners 
unjust. Autochthony can still be used to justify ‘keeping immigrants in an inferior status’,123 
even if taking this logic to violent extremes is implicitly criticised. The play is thus an 
exploration of a concept rather than an attack on it. 
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3.3 (b) Alternatives, Doubts and Dissent 
 
When it comes to the funeral orations, it has been fairly straightforward to examine what the 
performance of autochthony as ideology was intended to achieve, and what its potential effect 
and influence on the audience was. It is much more difficult to establish the extent to which 
the performance actually reached this potential. The continuation of the genre, and its ability 
to attract orators of reputation and importance, suggests that the ritual was hitting some kind 
of chord with its audience. But was the content actually reaching the citizens and foreigners 
who attended and heard it, or did they simply take it as a fine-sounding but essentially hollow 
part of the ritual? 
 
Obviously, different audience members will have taken it in different ways,
124
 and we cannot 
expect to be able to recreate audience reactions in anything like a representative manner. 
There is, however, evidence that the autochthony myth was not accepted by some, and did 
not go unchallenged outside of its ritual context. First I shall examine the histories of 
Thucydides and Herodotus, with the proviso that their early dates make them of only limited 
use; it is unclear how developed and prevalent the autochthony myth was in the fifth century. 
I shall then move onto the more relevant (but also more difficult) case of Plato’s Menexenus. 
 
Thucydides’ account of Pericles’ oration is the only one which does not mention autochthony. 
He does, however, stress the same ideas of unity and succession, discussing the ancestors as 
follows: 
Ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἅμα ἐν 
τῷ τοιῷδε τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης δίδοσθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ 
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οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι’ ἀρετὴν 
παρέδοσαν.125 
 
In this conception the Athenians are indigenous – they have always inhabited the same land – 
but no mention is made of any earth-born origin.
126
 The special mystical connection with the 
land is thus absent. Loraux attempts to explain Thucydides’ avoidance of the term in general 
by suggesting that ‘it is too rhetorical’.127 He only uses it once, with irony, to describe the 
pretentions of the Sicanians, who claimed to be the original, ‘autochthonous’ inhabitants of 
Sicily but were really displaced Iberians.
128
 But presumably there was a conscious decision to 
avoid using it in his version of Pericles’ oration, and it is hard to see how its being ‘too 
rhetorical’ would have been a problem, given that Thucydides was writing a version of a 
speech. He decided not to have Pericles use the term. The reason could simply be that 
Pericles did not use it in his actual speech, which would support the idea that autochthony as 
an official myth developed late. But if we look at what Thucydides himself says about the 
origins of the Athenians the matter becomes clearer. When describing the condition of Attica 
at the start of his history he says the following: 
τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν 
ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί. καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν 
ἐστι διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης 
Ἑλλάδος οἱ πολέμῳ ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους οἱ δυνατώτατοι ὡς 
βέβαιον ὂν ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ πολῖται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἔτι 
ἐποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε καὶ ἐς Ἰωνίαν ὕστερον ὡς οὐχ 
ἱκανῆς οὔσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψαν.129 
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In this passage the historian appears to reject the key elements of the autochthony 
hypothesis.
130
 He is happy to assert that Attica has always been inhabited by the same people, 
and that it had avoided civil strife – a statement which may well have turned out to contain 
some irony had the histories been completed, and extended up until the civil war of 403. But 
he adds that this is because of the poverty of the land’s soil, and makes no mention of its 
imparting any intrinsic virtue into the inhabitants. Furthermore, and significantly, any 
suggestion of ethnic purity is immediately countered by his statement that Athens had always 
been a place for refugees, who later became citizens and swelled its population.
131
 It is 
reasonable to ask, then, what exactly he means when he says that the same people always 
lived there. Presumably he means there is some connection of descent between his 
contemporary Athenians and their remote ancestors, albeit not one that remained unmixed.
132
 
As to the first origin of the Athenians, he offers no opinion. If he believed that they were in 
fact born form the earth he makes no mention of it; presumably he regarded it as unknowable. 
 
Thucydides does seem to have had considerable doubts about the ideas of inherent group 
characteristics and national character. As Lape has demonstrated, while some characters in 
the history make claims about national character these are undercut by the events which then 
take place – for example, the Athenians’ supposed tendency towards decisiveness is proved 
to be a sham by the events of the Sicilian expedition.
133
 He is also prepared to let his 
characters doubt or deny such a view, as he does when he has the Spartan king Archidamus 
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say πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς 
ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται.134 There is no idea of inborn nobility here. 
 
To return to the Periclean funeral speech, there is also, when compared to the treatment in the 
other orations, a notable absence of differentiation from other peoples when it comes to 
discussing origins. Pericles does not claim that the Athenians have an exclusive claim to the 
honour of constant occupation of a land; he does not use it to suggest that there is a 
qualitative difference between them and others, as later did Lysias, Demosthenes and 
Hyperides. Nor does he use it as an explanation for the greatness of the Athenians and their 
polis, which is naturally the oration’s theme. The Athenians are certainly portrayed as 
superior to others, but this is because of their actions and the organisation of their polis, not 
their origin. Culture is what counts, not nature.
135
 Whether this difference is to be attributed 
to Pericles, Thucydides, or simply the date of the oration, is impossible to tell. 
 
As noted above, there are problems with how far to take what Thucydides says on this matter; 
he was hardly a typical Athenian. Herodotus, not being Athenian at all, and in terms of date 
even further removed from the fourth-century orations which we possess, is a similar case. 
His rejection of the autochthony myth, or at least the connotations which go with it, is simpler 
and more blatant than is Thucydides’. He states that the Athenians were originally Pelasgians, 
instantly throwing out the idea of eugeneia as presented in the myth; the Athenians are not, 
by descent, even Greeks at all.
136
 This does leave open the possibility that the Athenians’ 
ancestors, even if they were not Greek, were still autochthonous and born of the Attic earth, 
but Herodotus does not say as much. Since he is willing to claim that other peoples were 
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autochthonous
137
 the implication of his silence is that the Athenians were not. As with 
Thucydides, it is unclear exactly what he means by the term, which he could be using simply 
to mean something like ‘indigenous’ or ‘the first to settle’. 
 
Even when he has an Athenian messenger describe his people’s own origins, he does not use 
the term ‘autochthonous’, but says ἀρχαιότατον μὲν ἔθνος παρεχόμενοι, μοῦνοι δὲ ἐόντες οὐ 
μετανάσται Ἑλλήνων.138 Blok argues that ‘Herodotus does not use the word autochthones 
here but clearly does mean it’,139 but in that case why does he avoid it? It must be either 
because the word was not yet commonly used by the Athenians or because he did not want to 
endorse its connotations. When coupled with his earlier subversion of Athenian origin stories, 
and use of autochthony when referring to others, the latter option seems more likely – 
Herodotus’ aim when talking about Athenian origins is, as Lape argues, ‘to demolish once 
and for all Athenian racial pretensions’.140 With his belief in the overarching power of nomos 
it is unsurprising that he has little time for Athenian autochthony’s grand claims.141 
 
3.3 (c) Autochthony and Plato’s Menexenus 
 
It is Plato, however, who gives us the best evidence for sceptical and hostile reactions to 
autochthony, as he produced the Menexenus as a direct response to the ideology’s classic and 
repeated ritual context – the funeral oration. The text has been interpreted in various ways by 
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scholars, and there is no consensus on which, if any, parts of it are meant to be taken 
seriously. 
 
The text’s authenticity at least is no longer doubted.142 Most scholars have seen a strong 
parodic strain to it. Loraux rejects ‘all the serious readings of the Menexenus’,143 suggesting 
that Plato ‘wanted to dissipate the mirage of the funeral oration by turning the speech against 
itself’.144 The history of Athens it gives is so obviously false and distorted, and the praise of 
Athens so exaggerated, that others have reached similar conclusions, such as Bloedow,
145
 
who argued that it was aimed at sophistic rhetoric generally.
146
 Others have reached entirely 
different conclusions. Kahn is most diametrically opposed, interpreting it as a deliberate 
response to the Periclean oration of Thucydides.
147
 For Kahn, ‘Plato is not interested in 
parodying the Thucydidean oration, but in answering it’ by ‘praising Athens as she should be 
praised’ (original emphasis);148 he offers an alternative Athens which acts as Athens should 
have acted.
149
 The final part of the oration, in which the dead address their living sons, shows 
‘unmistakeable earnestness’;150 Kahn goes as far as to call the text ‘perhaps the finest work of 
Greek oratory before Demosthenes’.151 
 
Salkever does not go as far, seeing it as a mixture of the comic and the serious which serves 
as ‘a Socratic critique of Athenian self-understanding’ and ‘an alternative to that self-
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understanding’. 152 Specifically, he sees the section where the living are exhorted to exceed 
the achievements of the dead by focusing on their eudaimonia (247e5-248c2) as ‘thoroughly 
Platonic’, the point being that the audience should focus on themselves and not on glory.153 
Collins and Stauffer are less convinced that there is a relatively straightforward message to be 
found, arguing that the dialogue provides no easy answers, but urges the audience to question 
and doubt simple models like that of the funeral oration, turning to philosophy instead.
154
 
They agree with Kahn in seeing it as a specific response, at least in part, to the Periclean 
funeral oration of Thucydides, and to Periclean politics in general.
155
 Henderson, on the other 
hand, considers the parallels to be overdrawn, being too general to be convincing;
156
 there are 
closer parallels with Lysias’ speech, but ‘even if Lysias was one of Plato’s targets he was not 
the only one’.157 He sees the majority of the speech as a ‘reductio ad absurdum’, ‘destroying 
the clichés and tricks of rhetoric by overdoing them’,158 but does see some ‘genuine Socratic 
and Platonic ideas’ in the address of the dead at the end of the speech.159 
 
There is thus a great deal of subjectivity in analysing the meaning of the text and individual 
passages in it. One reader’s over-the-top parody is another’s heartfelt exhortation. Whatever 
its original meaning, it was, according to Cicero, interpreted by later Athenians as a great 
patriotic effort, being read out annually.
160
 My own view is that the text is, indeed, a parody 
throughout. My conclusion is not dissimilar from that of Collins and Stauffer, in that I 
interpret Plato as attacking the uncritical acceptance of the funeral speech and the ideas it 
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contains. This acceptance is fostered by the privileged and ritual nature of the funeral 
occasion. My focus, however, is on the theme of autochthony as presented in the speech, 
rather than on Plato’s critique of Athenian politics and policy. Plato attacks the specific idea 
of autochthony as imagined and employed by the Athenians as well as the context which 
encourages its uncritical acceptance. I shall also examine the hints which the dialogue gives 
about the sincerity of composition and audience response. 
 
The dialogue opens with Menexenus, having just left the Bouleuterion, meeting Socrates and 
telling him the news that the councillors are about to choose the orator for the public funeral. 
Socrates replies by describing the style and effects of the orations: 
Καὶ μήν, ὦ Μενέξενε, πολλαχῇ κινδυνεύει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐν πολέμῳ 
ἀποθνῄσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ταφῆς καλῆς τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς τυγχάνει, καὶ ἐὰν πένης 
τις ὢν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ ἐπαίνου αὖ ἔτυχεν, καὶ ἐὰν φαῦλος ᾖ, ὑπ’ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν τε 
καὶ οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐπαινούντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου λόγους παρεσκευασμένων, οἳ 
οὕτως καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγοντες, 
κάλλιστά πως τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες, γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, καὶ τὴν 
πόλιν ἐγκωμιάζοντες κατὰ πάντας τρόπους καὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐν τῷ 
πολέμῳ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς τοὺς 
ἔτι ζῶντας ἐπαινοῦντες, ὥστ’ ἔγωγε, ὦ Μενέξενε, γενναίως πάνυ διατίθεμαι 
ἐπαινούμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἑκάστοτε ἐξέστηκα ἀκροώμενος καὶ κηλούμενος, 
ἡγούμενος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα μείζων καὶ γενναιότερος καὶ καλλίων γεγονέναι.161 
 
 The sentiment is obviously sarcastic – Plato will hardly have approved of false praise, or 
praise given indiscriminately, as when the city is praised ‘in every way’, and ‘all’ the 
ancestors are praised. This would still, of course, leave the door open for the speech which 
Socrates recites to be an example of the sort of things an orator should say, either in whole or 
                                                          
161
 Plato Menex. 234c-235b: ‘Well, Menexenus, it may well be that to die in battle, in many ways, is an excellent 
thing. For the dead man gets a magnificent burial, even if he’s poor when he dies, and furthermore he gets praise, 
even if he’s actually useless, from wise men who don’t give praise off the cuff, but with words prepared long in 
advance. And they give praise so well, by describing in the case of each man both the qualities which he has and 
those which he has not, and somehow adorning them so beautifully with their phrases, that they bewitch our 
souls. And they praise the city in every way possible, as well as praising those who have died in battle, and our 
ancestors, all of them, of former times, and we ourselves as well, who are still living – so that, Menexenus, 
when I am praised by them, I myself feel greatly ennobled. And every time, I am beside myself as I listen and 
am enchanted, imagining on the spot that I have become greater, and nobler, and finer’. My translation follows 
Tsitsiridis in reading ἐξέστηκα; others prefer ἕστηκα, ‘I stand listening, enchanted’. See discussion at Tsitsiridis 
1998: 150-151. 
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in part. There is more of a question when we come to the effects of the orations as Socrates 
describes them. His remarks on the brilliance and efficacy of the orators’ words in terms of 
their ability to ‘bewitch’ the audience could be meant sarcastically as well, and certainly 
seem to be in the case of their effect on Socrates himself. There could, however, be a genuine 
concern that the other citizens are enchanted and fooled by them. The next passage sheds 
some further light: 
καὶ οἷα δὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐμοῦ ξένοι τινὲς ἕπονται καὶ συνακροῶνται πρὸς οὓς 
ἐγὼ σεμνότερος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα γίγνομαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα δοκοῦσί 
μοι πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, θαυμασιωτέραν αὐτὴν 
ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ πρότερον, ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος ἀναπειθόμενοι. καί μοι αὕτη ἡ 
σεμνότης παραμένει ἡμέρας πλείω ἢ τρεῖς· οὕτως ἔναυλος ὁ λόγος τε καὶ ὁ 
φθόγγος παρὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ἐνδύεται εἰς τὰ ὦτα, ὥστε μόγις τετάρτῃ ἢ πέμπτῃ 
ἡμέρᾳ ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι οὗ γῆς εἰμι, τέως δὲ οἶμαι μόνον 
οὐκ ἐν μακάρων νήσοις οἰκεῖν· οὕτως ἡμῖν οἱ ῥήτορες δεξιοί εἰσιν.162 
 
This makes the hyperbole and irony yet clearer, and is underlined by Menexenus’ reply: Ἀεὶ 
σὺ προσπαίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ῥήτορας.163 Wickkisser argues that while the effects of the 
orators are described ‘in humorous detail’, they are nevertheless supposed to be taken 
seriously: ‘irony by nature cradles at its basis a kernel of truth. Socrates’ humour depends 
upon a recognition of the very real effects of speech’.164 This, however, depends on the target 
of the irony. Wickkisser suggests that Socrates has a real concern with the corrupting effects 
of the funeral oration; if, however, he is targeting the quality of the speeches, and the 
speakers’ pretentions, then we can take his description of their effects as pure exaggeration.  
 
                                                          
162
 Plato Menex. 235b-c: ‘And usually foreigners follow and listen with me, and I instantly become more 
majestic in relation to them – and they seem to have the same feelings as I do as regards both me and the rest of 
the city, thinking it to be more wonderful than before, as they are persuaded by the speaker. And the same 
majesty remains in me for more than three days – the meaning and tone of the speaker ring in my ears in such a 
way that it is scarcely on the fourth or fifth day that I remember myself, and realise that I am on the earth, 
thinking until then that I almost lived in the Isles of the Blessed. That’s how skilful our speakers are.’ 
163
 Plato Menex. 235c: ‘You’re always mocking the orators, Socrates’. 
164
 Wickkisser 1999: 69. 
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This is at least partly supported by the fact that Socrates also brings in the matter of 
foreigners in the audience. He claims that they too are overcome with wonder at the words 
and delivery of the speakers, after remarking that he himself seems far superior to them when 
the speech is made. Here at least, as with the supposed effects on Socrates himself, the tone 
seems sarcastic. The idea that such a speech would actually prove convincing to non-
Athenians is absurd, particularly in the light of the content of the oration which follows in the 
dialogue. This is underlined by the equally absurd suggestion that hearing these words makes 
the foreigners marvel at Socrates himself, thinking him far greater than before.  The question 
then becomes one of whether we can extend this absurdity to the alleged reaction of the 
Athenian audience in general.  
 
This is an extremely difficult question to answer. The actual purpose of the irony is hard to 
discern – is it aimed at the pretensions of the orators, and/or of the Athenian audiences who 
like to believe that the words spoken are so impressive to foreigners, or is it supposed to 
mock by exaggeration the speeches’ actual ineffectiveness? The first does not preclude the 
second, and perhaps both are involved. Even the citizen part of the audience was not in reality 
homogenous, and we would naturally expect a variety of opinions to be held and reactions to 
be experienced. The funeral occasion and ritual context, however, must have made it difficult 
to articulate criticism or dissent publicly, even if the speech delivered was deemed to be of 
poor quality. In private discussion, it would of course be a different matter. 
 
It is possible, then, that sometimes the illusion was created not so much by the words of the 
speaker as by the occasion, and a willing desire on the part of the audience to pretend that 
what they were hearing was rather more moving than they honestly believed. Just as the 
speaker heaped indiscriminate praise on the dead, whether it was deserved or not, so the 
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audience publicly praised the speaker and the power of his speech, whether it was good, bad 
or indifferent.
165
 This would certainly add to the untruthful and hypocritical nature of the 
occasion, which appears to be a major part of Plato’s criticism. It can hardly be the whole 
point of the dialogue, however, since it cannot be the case that no speeches were genuinely 
effective, or that the whole audience remained unmoved at heart. Furthermore, Socrates goes 
on to say how easy it is to win the crowd’s (presumably heartfelt) approval when praising 
their own polis in front of them. I would therefore regard this as a possible and attractive 
reading, but not one which should necessarily supplant others. 
 
In the main, the target appears to be the orators themselves, as suggested by Menexenus’ 
reply. He goes on to remark that, in this case, as the appointment is to be made at such short 
notice, the speaker cannot rely on prepared material, and will have to improvise. Socrates’ 
reply is instructive: 
Πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; εἰσὶν ἑκάστοις τούτων λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι, καὶ ἅμα οὐδὲ 
αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τά γε τοιαῦτα χαλεπόν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δέοι Ἀθηναίους ἐν 
Πελοποννησίοις εὖ λέγειν ἢ Πελοποννησίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος 
δέοι τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκιμήσοντος· ὅταν δέ τις ἐν τούτοις ἀγωνίζηται 
οὕσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ, οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν.166 
 
Socrates underlines further the insincere nature of the praise given in the oration, which does 
not amount to more than a stock speech which can be delivered on any funeral occasion – the 
actual deeds or qualities of the dead are irrelevant. The crowd is the easiest imaginable, being 
the very objects of the praise that is to be given (this, of course, ignores the foreigners whom 
he has just mentioned – presumably they are envisaged as a silent minority). It is thus an 
empty achievement to win them over. 
                                                          
165
 This provides an interesting contrast to those modern readers who deal with the alleged substandard quality 
of the Lysianic and Demosthenic speeches by rejecting their authenticity. 
166
 Plato Menex. 235d: ‘What for, my good man? Each of them has pre-prepared speeches, and anyway, it’s not 
really a difficult task to improvise such things. If it were a case of speaking well about the Athenians before an 
audience of Peloponnesians, or Peloponnesians before Athenians, then you’d need a great orator to win them 
over and gain their esteem – but when someone’s contending in front of the very people he’s praising, it’s 
hardly a great thing to be thought of as speaking well’. 
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Menexenus challenges Socrates over this claim, asking if he, then, could deliver a speech if 
he were chosen. Socrates replies that he could, because of his teacher – διδάσκαλος οὖσα οὐ 
πάνυ φαύλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλ’ ἥπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, 
ἕνα δὲ καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου.167 This teacher is Pericles’ 
hetaira Aspasia, who, according to Socrates, not only taught the orator but wrote the funeral 
speech which he delivered. ‘Yesterday’ Socrates heard her composing the sort of speech 
which the present orator should deliver, made up partly of material recycled from Pericles’ 
speech, and learned it from her.
168
 After a little persuasion, he agrees to recite it for 
Menexenus.
169
 
 
Salkever appreciates Plato’s ascription of the speech to Aspasia, enjoying the irony of a 
‘female foreigner’ writing patriotic speeches,170  but seeing its real point lying in Plato’s 
urging of his readers to focus on the private life, traditionally the women’s sphere.171 Todd 
notes that in ascribing to her the authorship, Plato could be aiming a subtle attack at Lysias, 
an outsider who wrote a funeral oration in which he praised the Athenians of the past as ‘our’ 
ancestors; there could also be the implication that ‘his activity as an orator is itself a form of 
prostitution’.172 
 
                                                          
167
 Plato Menex. 235e: ‘a teacher who is no slouch when it comes to rhetoric, but rather one who has made many 
and fine orators, including one who surpasses all Greeks, Pericles son of Xanthippus’. 
168
 Plato Menex. 236b. 
169
 Plato Menex. 236d. 
170
 Salkever 1993: 135. 
171
 Salkever 1993: 140. 
172
 Todd 2007: 156. More precisely, however, in that case the attack would be against his profession as a 
logographer rather than as an orator. Richter 2011: 94 and n.30 makes the broader point that what Plato may be 
getting at is that an orator gives pleasure, just like a courtesan. 
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Bloedow sees Aspasia as the key to understanding the dialogue, pointing out that she is 
mentioned at both the beginning and the end of the speech,
173
 and suggesting that she is thus 
given too much importance to be ignored when interpreting the text.
174
 The reference to her at 
the end does seem to indicate her importance, which must go beyond what Loraux grants her; 
she regards Aspasia as a comic element, but ‘of course, as Socrates is delivering the 
epitaphios Aspasia is completely forgotten’.175 We would not, however, expect any overt 
reference to her during the speech, which was supposed to be written for someone else to 
deliver, and as soon as Plato can mention her outside of it, he does – in the first sentence after 
the speech.
176
 More significantly, given the exaggeratedly patriotic nature of the content of 
the speech, the fact that the putative author was actually a foreign woman is always relevant – 
it gives a particular irony to what is being said,
177
 but underlines as well how insincere it is. 
The one who actually wrote the words was outside of the group, in terms of nationality and 
gender, which was being praised, and can hardly have actually believed them. 
 
The point Plato was making was that the rhetoric of the funeral oration was hollow and not 
necessarily believed by those producing it. Additionally, the speaker did not necessarily live 
up to the ideals being espoused. Aspasia served as a particularly striking example of this, but 
it is a point that relates to what Demosthenes says about his own appointment as funeral 
speaker. Attacking Aeschines, he explains that the Athenians preferred him to his opponent 
because the speaker had to be loyal; but Aeschines and his friends were traitors.
178
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 Bloedow 1975: 33. 
174
 Bloedow 1975: 43-44. 
175
 Loraux 1986: 323. 
176
 Plato Menex. 249d: Οὗτός σοι ὁ λόγος, ὦ Μενέξενε, Ἀσπασίας τῆς Μιλησίας ἐστίν (‘There you have the 
speech, Menexenus, of Aspasia the Milesian’). 
177
 Gruen 2011: 238. 
178
 Dem. 18.286-287. 
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This extreme example reflects the fact that not all orators will have been irreproachable, or 
will not have gone on to be disgraced (Demosthenes himself being a good example). We are 
familiar with somewhat contradictory views of Athens’ leading citizens being displayed in 
different contexts, for example in the case of Cleon in the fifth century, who was savagely 
lambasted in the theatre and yet able to win support for his policies and leadership in the 
assembly. In the case of the funeral oration, however, the ritual elements appear to have 
demanded a particularly blameless speaker – something difficult to achieve in a city where 
such attention seems to have been paid to the leaders, and individuals were not shy of 
spreading scurrilous rumours about their enemies. The simple way around this problem is to 
privilege the speaker by suspending knowledge of their individuality and character, and 
treating them as the neutral voice of the people. Clearly, however, this did not reflect the truth, 
and Plato’s use of Aspasia flags this up strongly. The speakers were fallible, and perhaps 
dishonest and incompetent, and yet they were treated as beyond criticism, at least for the 
duration of the speech. Again, this resembles the one-eyed, uncritical praise of the dead and 
the polis served up by the speaker himself; it also precluded the questioning which 
underpinned philosophy. 
 
Plato, then, had his reasons for depicting Aspasia as the author of the oration;
179
 the framing 
of the epitaphios gives us good reason to suppose that the speech itself will contain much 
irony. As Richter points out, however, this is not necessarily the case; the speech could still 
                                                          
179
 It is true, as Coventry 1989: 5 suggests, that there is some ambiguity about this, as expressed by Menexenus 
at 236c and 249d. This has led some to claim that Aspasia is not the ‘real’ author of the speech – thus Loraux 
claims that Aspasia ‘was content to repeat Pericles’ epitaphios’ (Loraux 1986: 323). This seems to give too 
much weight to Menexenus’ words, which could be there to represent the delusion of an audience that cannot 
help but ascribe a noble-sounding speech to a noble sounding author, judging him by his words and therefore 
being misled about his character. Be that as it may, Socrates’ ascription of the speech to Aspasia still makes the 
points which I have outlined, and is part of Plato’s design. Even if Menexenus’ comments are supposed to 
suggest that this was a fiction (within, of course, the broader fiction of the dialogue), and that Socrates ‘really’ 
wrote it, the points still stand, albeit at a remove – they would become the character of Socrates’ design rather 
than Plato’s directly. In this dialogue, I do not think that it makes much of a difference. 
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be meant seriously, even within an ironic frame.
180
 Nevertheless, an examination of key 
passages will demonstrate that an ironic reading should extend to the content of the oration 
itself. Autochthony has a very important role – more so, in fact, than in any of the other 
funeral orations which we possess. The importance of ancestry is introduced early on, with 
the priority of birth made clear – it is from this that everything flows. 181  It is the 
autochthonous nature of this birth which is most important, and on which everything comes 
to depend:
182
 
τῆς δ’ εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξε τοῖσδε ἡ τῶν προγόνων γένεσις οὐκ ἔπηλυς οὖσα, 
οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτους ἀποφηναμένη μετοικοῦντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἄλλοθεν 
σφῶν ἡκόντων, ἀλλ’ αὐτόχθονας καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν πατρίδι οἰκοῦντας καὶ ζῶντας, 
καὶ τρεφομένους οὐχ ὑπὸ μητρυιᾶς ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ μητρὸς τῆς χώρας ἐν ᾗ 
ᾤκουν, καὶ νῦν κεῖσθαι τελευτήσαντας ἐν οἰκείοις τόποις τῆς τεκούσης καὶ 
θρεψάσης καὶ ὑποδεξαμένης. δικαιότατον δὴ κοσμῆσαι πρῶτον τὴν μητέρα 
αὐτήν· οὕτω γὰρ συμβαίνει ἅμα καὶ ἡ τῶνδε εὐγένεια κοσμουμένη.183 
 
The theme clearly resembles that of the other orations, with a particular connection to the 
land of Attica. As before, there is a strong contrast between the Athenians and others, whose 
legitimacy is inferior and like that of step-children – there is a particular and overt contrast 
between them and metics. It is in the next section that the elements of parody become strong, 
as the topos of the earth-as-mother is actually explored and argued for, rather than simply 
asserted. A selection of flattering myths about Attica is given, which do not prove anything 
about Attica or the Athenians.
 184
  It may be objected that Plato himself was not above telling 
‘noble lies,’ and backing them up with spurious mythology. As Coventry points out, however, 
the difference is that Plato’s noble lie was supposed to justify inequality that was based on 
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 Richter 2011: 95. An apt example would be Byron’s Isles of Greece, which was embedded in his Don Juan 
and delivered, according to the poem’s conceit, by an unscrupulous speaker for hire, but nevertheless appears to 
express the author’s  genuine feelings. When the poem is anthologised the frame is invariably dispensed with. 
181
 Plato Menex. 237a. 
182
 Henderson 1975: 36. 
183
 Plato Menex. 237b-c: ‘To begin first with their noble birth, the genesis of their ancestors was not that of 
immigrants, and it did not produce these men, their descendants, to be metics in the land, born of people who 
came from elsewhere – they are autochthonous, and live and inhabit their true fatherland. They were not brought 
up by a stepmother, as are other men, but by the true mother that is the land in which they live, which bore them 
and raised them and, now that they have died, receives them to rest in the places of their own family. It is right, 
then, to honour first this mother herself, for in doing so their noble birth will be honoured as well’. 
184
 Plato Menex. 237c-e. 
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real, innate differences in ability and virtue;
185
 the autochthony myth, on the other hand, is 
used to justify an equality of birth (among Athenians) that is not real, and a superiority over 
other nations that in turn can be used to justify immoral political action. 
 
This is a point which is developed as the speech goes on. Socrates turns next to the Athenian 
politeia, which he describes as a true aristocracy, since it is government of the best with the 
support of the many. The Athenians’ equal birth is the basis of their government – αἰτία δὲ 
ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης ἡ ἐξ ἴσου γένεσις.186 Other cities are divided, as they are made up 
of people of different sorts, and therefore succumb to tyranny or oligarchy, whereas the 
Athenians are each other’s brothers, and thus seek equality, seeing superiority only in arête 
and phronêsis.
187
 The irony of such a conception is obvious, when the actual nature of some 
of Athens’ leaders is considered, particularly in terms of Plato’s view of them. The irony is 
not targeted purely at the ‘new’ politicians; Socrates also says that οὔτε ἀσθενείᾳ  οὔτε πενίᾳ 
οὔτ’ ἀγνωσίᾳ πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλαις 
πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ εἷς ὅρος, ὁ δόξας σοφὸς ἢ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει.188 It is hard to square 
this with the prominence of the aristocratic citizens in Athens, including Pericles himself. 
 
The divisions which had played out in living memory also make the words of the speech 
seem highly ironic. Athens’ civil war had taken place less than twenty years before the 
dramatic date of the dialogue, and of course Socrates, the man reciting the speech, had in 
reality been put to death by his Athenian ‘brothers’. The amnesty which followed the civil 
                                                          
185
 Coventry 1989: 12. 
186
 Plato Menex. 238d: ‘The cause of this, our politeia, is equality of origin’. 
187
 Plato Menex. 238e-239a. 
188
 Plato Menex. 238d: ‘No one is excluded for his weakness or poverty or obscure parentage, or esteemed for 
the opposite reasons, as in other cities – there is rather one standard, that he who seems to be wise or good rules 
and holds office’. 
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war came to be remembered as a uniquely successful reconciliation,
189
 but the terms in which 
Socrates describes it in the speech are so effusive that, again, the irony is clear: 
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἡσυχίας γενομένης καὶ εἰρήνης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὁ οἰκεῖος ἡμῖν 
πόλεμος οὕτως ἐπολεμήθη, ὥστε εἴπερ εἱμαρμένον εἴη ἀνθρώποις στασιάσαι, μὴ 
ἂν ἄλλως εὔξασθαι μηδένα πόλιν ἑαυτοῦ νοσῆσαι. ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ 
τοῦ ἄστεως ὡς ἁσμένως καὶ οἰκείως ἀλλήλοις συνέμειξαν οἱ πολῖται καὶ παρ’ 
ἐλπίδα τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, τόν τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλευσῖνι πόλεμον ὡς μετρίως 
ἔθεντο· καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ αἴτιον ἢ ἡ τῷ ὄντι συγγένεια, φιλίαν 
βέβαιον καὶ ὁμόφυλον οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ παρεχομένη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτῳ 
τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτησάντων ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων μνείαν ἔχειν καὶ διαλλάττειν αὐτοὺς ᾧ 
δυνάμεθα, εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις, ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, τοῖς κρατοῦσιν αὐτῶν εὐχομένους, 
ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς διηλλάγμεθα. οὐ γὰρ κακίᾳ ἀλλήλων ἥψαντο οὐδ’ ἔχθρᾳ ἀλλὰ 
δυστυχίᾳ. μάρτυρες δὲ ἡμεῖς αὐτοί ἐσμεν τούτων οἱ ζῶντες· οἱ αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὄντες 
ἐκείνοις γένει συγγνώμην ἀλλήλοις ἔχομεν ὧν τ’ ἐποιήσαμεν ὧν τ’ ἐπάθομεν.190 
 
Again, the vital importance of shared origin is stressed, explaining the alleged friendliness 
with which the war and reconciliation were carried out and justifying the current generation’s 
ability to forgive wrongs that were done in the past. The unbroken chain of descent and 
commonality of birth makes this possible. The interpretation which Socrates recites, however, 
is very different from what we find in other sources, where the evil of the Thirty Tyrants 
(who are not even mentioned by Socrates)
191
 is invariably stressed as well as the tolerance of 
the democrats in the aftermath.
192
 
 
                                                          
189
 See Wolpert 2002a, 2002b. 
190
 Plato Menex. 243d-244b: ‘After this, when our foreign affairs were quiet and peaceful, our civil war was 
fought in such a way that, if people are destined to enter into civil strife, no one would pray for his own city to 
suffer it differently from ours. The citizens from both the Piraeus and the city conversed so gladly and 
affectionately with each other, and – as was beyond hope – even with the other Greeks, and so moderately did 
they carry out the war against those in Eleusis! And there was no other cause for all this than their genuine 
kinship, which gave them a friendship which was firm and based on their common race, not in word but in fact. 
We must remember those who died in that war at each other’s hands, and reconcile them in such a way as we 
can in these circumstances, with prayers and sacrifices, praying to those who have power over them, since we 
too have been reconciled. For they did not struggle against each other because of wickedness or enmity, but 
because of misfortune. We ourselves, the living, are witnesses of this – for we who are the same as them by 
birth forgive each other both for what we have done and what we have suffered.’ 
191
 Richter 2011: 97. 
192
 Lyc. 1.124, for example, claims that the victorious democrats passed a law that allowed the pre-emptive 
punishment of those conspiring against the democracy πεπονθότες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, οἷα οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων ἠξίωσε (‘having suffered from citizens things which none of the Greeks had ever yet thought 
acceptable’); when praising the forgiveness of the Athenians after the war, Aeschines 3.208 acknowledges also 
the evils which had been perpetrated by the oligarchs (μεγάλων κακῶν συμβάντων). 
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In Plato’s own time there were many people who had suffered at the hands of the oligarchs, 
including Lysias,
193
 and numerous forensic speeches from the early fourth century touch on 
behaviour allegedly carried out by litigants during the war, or how those who remained in the 
city ought to be treated.
194
 This passage of the Menexenus, then, ironically deflates both the 
pretensions to a special, autochthony-derived unity which Plato has been satirising and the 
tendency of the funeral orators to exaggerate and distort the truth. The reference to Eleusis 
may be a particular case of the latter – it was where the supporters of the oligarchs were 
allowed to live separately from the other Athenians by the terms of the original peace 
agreement, but it was marched on by the democrats shortly afterwards, who killed the 
opposing generals when they came for a conference.
195
 For Plato to describe this as metriôs is, 
at first glance, a simple irony, but since it was apparently only the generals who were killed, 
with the rest invited to come to terms peacefully, it has a kind of grim validity as well
196
 – the 
attack was carried out ‘moderately’ since it only involved murdering a few people. 
 
Socrates also describes the historical events of the Persian wars and afterwards, down to the 
present day. These actions are introduced and explained as follows: 
Ὅθεν δὴ ἐν πάσῃ ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθραμμένοι οἱ τῶνδέ γε πατέρες καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καὶ 
αὐτοὶ οὗτοι, καὶ καλῶς φύντες, πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφήναντο εἰς πάντας 
ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, οἰόμενοι δεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ Ἕλλησιν 
ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων μάχεσθαι καὶ βαρβάροις ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων.197 
 
Noble birth combines with a totally free upbringing to explain that it is freedom that the 
Athenians have always fought for. This has sometimes required fighting against Greeks and 
sometimes against barbarians, but freedom was always the beneficiary; a sophistic way 
                                                          
193
 See Lys. 12, esp. §§21, 52. 
194
 Lys. 12, 13, 16, 25, 26, Isoc. 18. Plato himself has Socrates remark on the many injustices which were 
carried out by the Thirty in his Apology (32c-d). 
195
 Xen. Hell. 2.4.43. 
196
 Tsitsiridis 1998: 332. 
197
 Plato Menex. 239a-b: ‘From which, having been brought up in total freedom and nobly born, the forefathers 
of these men and of us, and these men themselves, demonstrated their many and great deeds to other people, 
individually and publicly, thinking that they should  fight for freedom both against Greeks on behalf of Greeks 
and against barbarians on behalf of all the Greeks.’ 
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around the problem of explaining all the Athenians’ wars against other Greek states. Socrates 
discusses the Persian wars, praising first those Athenians who fought at Marathon and then 
those at Salamis, whose influence he sums up with this description: ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων δὴ 
ξυμβαίνει, τῶν τε Μαραθῶνι μαχεσαμένων καὶ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησάντων, 
παιδευθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν κατὰ γῆν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν 
μαθόντας καὶ ἐθισθέντας μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους.198 In this case it is difficult to see 
irony, and it seems likely that the praise was meant sincerely, although it is followed by a 
rather chauvinistic reference to the battle of Plataea, which the orator places third in 
importance, adding the remark that κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων199 – 
only then, the Spartans shared in the achievement with the Athenians. 
 
Similarly, when discussing Marathon, the orator says that only the Spartans were willing to 
help, but turned up too late to do so, and οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκπεπληγμένοι, ἀγαπῶντες τὴν ἐν 
τῶ παρόντι σωτηρίαν, ἠσυχίαν ἦγον.200 In Plato’s version of the funeral speech, it seems that 
often Athens cannot be praised without denigrating others. In this he goes beyond what we 
find in the speech of Lysias, who is happy to give credit to the Spartans and Tegeans at 
Plataea, although he too denigrates the rest of the allies,
201
 and takes the opportunity to point 
out the cowardice of the Peloponnesians’ original plan to defend only the Isthmus.202 One 
striking and significant difference between the two orations is that Plato’s completely ignores 
the battle of Thermopylae, whereas Lysias’ mentions it and praises the bravery of the fallen, 
                                                          
198
 Plato Menex. 241b-c: ‘So it happened that the other Greeks were educated by both those who fought at 
Marathon and those who fought at sea at Salamis – they learned and became accustomed not to fear the 
barbarians on land or on sea.’ 
199
 Plato Menex. 241c. 
200
 Plato Menex. 240c: ‘All the others were panic-stricken and, being satisfied with their present safety, kept 
quiet.’ Tsitsiridis 1998: 276 notes that a rather different perspective is given in Plato’s Laws, where the Athenian 
says the news of the Persian capture of the Eretrians τούς τε ἄλλους  Ἕλληνας καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐξέπληττεν 
(698d). 
201
 Lys. 2.46. 
202
 Lys. 2.44-45. Todd 2007: 246 says of §§ 44-47 that ‘the key theme of this passage is cowardice on the part of 
the other Greeks’. 
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blaming their defeat on bad fortune.
203
 Even then, however, he gives first place to the action 
of the Athenians at Artemision.
204
 
 
In this part of the speech, then, Plato satirises the tendency of the Athenians to emphasise 
their own achievements while ignoring and diminishing those of others – it is not enough for 
the orators to praise Athens, they must criticise its rivals as well. This seems to be a problem 
for those (e.g. Kahn and Richter) who suppose that Plato is depicting what an ideal Athens 
would have done – their theory does not explain why the other Greeks are (sometimes falsely) 
denigrated. It does not, however, contradict Loraux’s argument that Plato is parodying the 
tendency of the orators to create idealised versions of Athens which, on closer inspection, are 
not ideal at all. 
 
As the historical narrative moves on to the more recent past, the distortions become more 
flagrant and obviously biased.
205
 The Athenians’ battles with other Greek states are explained 
by envy,
206
 the Sicilian expedition described as a fight for freedom defeated by misfortune.
207
 
The speech’s hypocrisy is apparent when it savagely criticises the city’s enemies’ appeal to 
the Persian king for help, then goes on to describe the assistance the Athenians later gave to 
him as proof of their great mercy.
208
 Indeed, the orator sums it up like this: καὶ δὴ καὶ εἴ τις 
βούλοιτο τῆς πόλεως κατηγορῆσαι δικαίως, τοῦτ’ ἂν μόνον λέγων ὀρθῶς ἂν κατηγοροῖ, ὡς 
                                                          
203
 Lys. 2.31-32. 
204
 Todd 2007: 237-237. 
205
 See Henderson 1975: 36-44, Hariman 2008: 252-253. 
206
 Plato Menex. 242a. 
207
 Plato Menex. 243a. Kahn 1963: 225 argues that Plato’s point is that this is the motive the Athenians should 
have had. 
208
 Plato Menex. 243b, 244d. The apologia for assisting the king would be unnecessary if the speech were 
describing the policy of an ‘idealised Athens’, as the fact could simply be ignored; Plato evidently chose to 
mention it to demonstrate the hypocrisy of funeral oratory. Similarly, when the orator says (244c) διανοουμένη 
δὲ ἡ πόλις μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀμῦναι μήτε Ἕλλησι πρὸς ἀλλήλων δουλουμένοις μήτε ὐπὸ Βαρβάρων, ὅυτως ᾤκει (‘The 
polis intended not to continue aiding Greeks who were being enslaved, either at the hands of each other or by 
barbarians, and went on in that way’) it is hard to see how this could be viewed as an ‘ideal’ course of action, 
particularly as the next sentence explains that because of it the Spartans went on to enslave the other Greeks. 
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ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοικτίρμων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπίς.209 Given the total lack of any reference 
to the Athenian empire in the speech,
210
 the irony is obvious. Here Plato is not merely 
attacking the tendency of the orators to omit difficult or embarrassing details, or of the 
Athenians in general to gloss over such matters, but also ‘condemning by silence’ their 
actions in recent history.
211
 His description of the Athenians’ pity for and tendency to help the 
weak is, however, supported if mythology is used as evidence, and was a well-known 
theme.
212
 This highlights both the difference between the myth and the reality and the 
dishonesty of judging the Athenians by what their myths alone say – a criticism which 
mirrors Plato’s treatment of autochthony in the speech. 
 
After this distorted historical account, Socrates returns to the reasons for the Athenians’ 
greatness. This is his explanation: 
οὕτω δή τοι τό γε τῆς πόλεως γενναῖον καὶ ἐλεύθερον βέβαιόν τε καὶ ὑγιές ἐστιν 
καὶ φύσει μισοβάρβαρον, διὰ τὸ εἰλικρινῶς εἶναι Ἕλληνας καὶ ἀμιγεῖς βαρβάρων. 
οὐ γὰρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κάδμοι οὐδὲ Αἴγυπτοί τε καὶ Δαναοὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ 
φύσει μὲν βάρβαροι ὄντες, νόμῳ δὲ Ἕλληνες, συνοικοῦσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ 
Ἕλληνες, οὐ μειξοβάρβαροι οἰκοῦμεν, ὅθεν καθαρὸν τὸ μῖσος ἐντέτηκε τῇ πόλει 
τῆς ἀλλοτρίας φύσεως.213 
 
Purity is once again stressed as the key element – it is the pure Greekness of the Athenians 
that makes them so noble and free, and that leads them to an especially pure hatred of 
barbarians. That this latter point can be a good thing is somewhat surprising. It is true, as 
Tsitsiridis points out, that later Plato would have Socrates say that when Greeks and 
                                                          
209
 Plato Menex. 244e: ‘And in fact, if someone wished to accuse our city justly, he could do so only by saying 
this, that it is always too prone to pity, and favouring the weak.’ 
210
 Collins and Stauffer 1999: 99. 
211
 Collins and Stauffer 1999: 101. 
212
 Tsitsiridis 1998: 341-342. 
213
 Plato Menex. 245c-d: ‘The nobility and freedom of our city is so firm and healthy, and by nature barbarian-
hating, because we are purely Greeks, and unmixed with barbarians. For none of Pelops’ kind, no Cadmeans, no 
Egyptians or Danaans, nor any of the many others who are barbarians by nature, though Greeks by custom, live 
with us. We are only Greeks, not half-barbarians, who live here, from which a pure hatred of foreign nature has 
been sunk deep into our city.’ Others translate αὐτοί as ‘pure’; see Tsitsiridis 1998: 360. 
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barbarians fight φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι.214 There does seem, however, to be a 
qualitative difference between natural enmity and actual hatred. Is the point that the belief in 
autochthony, as articulated by the Athenians’ orators, leads ultimately to hatred rather than to 
good? The fact that it is hatred of barbarians might give reason to doubt this, but the second 
part of the passage heavily implies that, really, the other Greeks are so by convention only. 
As they are not true Greeks, they are half-barbarians at best, which of course opens the door 
for the Athenians’ hatred to extend even to them. Athenian chauvinism is such that it can lead 
them to hate anyone outside of their own group, and their autochthonous origin can be used 
to support it. 
 
Plato, then, demonstrates how a false and unjust belief like the Athenian version of 
autochthony can be used to justify immoral action. That Athenian autochthony is false is 
made clear by the inaccuracy of at least one of its premises. The actual origin of the first 
people in Attica could hardly have been commented on, but the claim to purity certainly 
could be. It depends on the claim that the Athenians do not συνοικεῖν with others. This is 
clearly false if taken simply to mean ‘live with’ – Athens of course contained many metics, 
both Greek and barbarian. It is also false if given the more specific connotation of ‘marry’;215 
we should in that case take it to mean something like ‘intermarry with’ or ‘interbreed with’. If 
so, the claim is disproved by the legal introduction of the Plataeans into the Athenian citizen 
body, let alone the fraudulent intrusions by foreigners and the apparent breakdown of the 
Periclean citizenship law during the Peloponnesian war.
216
 Not only is the premise untrue, but 
it also fails to serve a good purpose, since it is used to claim that the Athenians are both 
qualitatively equal with each other and superior to other peoples, including the other Greeks. 
                                                          
214
 Plato Rep. 470c, Tsitsiridis 1998: 357, also citing for comparison Isoc. 4.158, 184, 12.163 and later texts.  
215
 See section 2.2 (b). 
216
 See section 4.1 (b). 
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The cause of the ‘nobility’ of the Athenians, ironically, leads to and justifies their basest 
actions. 
 
If this is Plato’s critique of autochthony, there still remains his critique of the form in which it 
is couched, the funeral oration as genre. To the extent that it is actually persuasive, it is of 
course a corrupting influence if what it contains is incorrect or immoral. But the broader point 
is that its privileged position does not allow whatever it contains to be challenged. We can 
see this in the speeches-within-the-speech towards the end, when the orator claims to be 
reciting the last words of the dead:  
ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν ἃ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῖν ἐπέσκηπτον ἀπαγγέλλειν 
τοῖς ἀεὶ λειπομένοις, εἴ τι πάσχοιεν, ἡνίκα κινδυνεύσειν ἔμελλον. φράσω δὲ ὑμῖν 
ἅ τε αὐτῶν ἤκουσα ἐκείνων καὶ οἷα νῦν ἡδέως ἂν εἴποιεν ὑμῖν λαβόντες δύναμιν, 
τεκμαιρόμενος ἐξ ὧν τότε ἔλεγον. ἀλλὰ νομίζειν χρὴ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν ἐκείνων ἃ ἂν 
ἀπαγγέλλω· ἔλεγον δὲ τάδε…217 
 
Whether Aspasia or Socrates is supposed to be the author, neither would have been there to 
hear these words. The speech was in any case supposed to be made up of fragments and 
leftovers of another, written for Pericles.
218
 The authority which the words of the dead have, 
then, is spurious; the speaker falsely claims to be reporting words that are, in fact, his own. 
The point can be extended to apply to the oration as a whole. Simply because someone has 
been selected by the people, it does not follow that what they say will be beneficial. Crucially, 
what they say should not be privileged to the extent that it is beyond criticism. In the case of 
the speech of the dead, because the words are supposedly those of the fallen, they are 
removed from the realms of criticism; there is no place to argue with them, either in favour or 
against. Similarly, as the funeral orator becomes the voice of the city, he too is removed from 
                                                          
217
 Plato Menex. 246c: ‘On the present occasion I am right to say what your fathers commanded us to tell the 
survivors, if something happened, when they were about to risk their lives. I will tell you both what I heard from 
them personally, and what, judging by what they said then, they would gladly say to you now if they were able. 
But you must imagine that you are hearing what I say from the men themselves. What they said was this…’ 
218
 Plato Menex. 236b. 
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criticism, and whatever he says is accepted. Regardless of the content of what he says, this 
cannot be a good thing. 
 
Plato thus criticises most of all the unthinking acceptance of doctrines which is encouraged 
by the funeral oration. He also seems to disapprove of the specific doctrine of autochthony, at 
least as the Athenians employed it, since it is both untrue and has negative consequences – it 
is a lie that is not even noble. It is not simply the persuasive power that he is criticising, but 
also the context which puts it above dissent. It is very difficult to interpret what he says about 
its reception by the Athenian audience. The sarcastic remarks which he has Socrates make at 
the beginning of the dialogue, however, imply that it was not necessarily as powerful and 
persuasive as we might expect. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
Autochthony’s position as the official and public ideology of Athenian identity was recreated 
and reinforced through the funeral oration. The ritual context in which the orations took place 
added authority to the concept, protected it from criticism and rational analysis at least during 
the ritual itself, and gave it a receptive audience that wanted to believe in it. This does not 
mean, however, that outside of this context it went unchallenged or was believed 
wholeheartedly. On the contrary, there is some evidence for scepticism, at least from 
intellectuals such as Thucydides and Plato. Euripides’ Ion and Plato’s Menexenus explore the 
potential dangerous consequences of belief in autochthony (and acting on those beliefs), and 
Plato comes down heavily against both it and the funeral oration as they were formulated by 
his fellow Athenians. His dialogue also suggests that the audience response was less genuine 
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and heartfelt than we might otherwise suppose, although this is very difficult to be sure about 
due to the text’s complex layers of irony. 
 
With these provisos, however, autochthony-as-ritual functioned as an ideology which united 
the Athenians and made clear the inferior and excluded position of outsiders, such as the 
metics. It gave to the Athenians a conception that they were purer and more noble than other 
peoples. Those metics who attended the ritual were thus effectively and publicly put in their 
place; those Athenian citizens who attended were likewise given reassurance about their own 
superiority. How this compared to the actual events and circumstances of real life will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BOUNDARY IN PRACTICE 
 
4.1 (a) Athenian Citizenship Law 
 
The Athenians attached great importance to their identity, to the idea of ‘being Athenian’. 
Ideologically this was based on descent and purity, which at least in some contexts they 
imagined gave them a certain nobility and superiority over others. These ideas were 
buttressed by the laws, which set out who could be Athenian. By the time of the Athênaiôn 
Politeia this was considered important enough for the writer to put the qualification for 
citizenship first in his description of the contemporary constitution. He defined it as follows: 
μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς 
δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες.1 
 
This two-Athenian parent formulation, if not perhaps the exact words of the Ath. Pol.,
2
 goes 
back to 451/0, and Pericles’ citizenship law.3 Much of the debate has focused on what the 
intention behind this law was, with suggestions including a desire to prevent aristocratic 
marriage with foreigners, a desire to preserve the purity of the Athenian citizen body, and a 
concern that Athenian women would be left without husbands.
4
 Patterson, however, argued 
that its purpose was to ‘set forth a minimum necessary condition’ for citizenship, which had 
previously been decided on at deme and phratry levels.
5
 It is unnecessary here to examine the 
situation pre-451, and the actual motives for limiting citizenship to those born of two 
                                                          
1
 Ath. Pol. 42.1: ‘Those born of citizens on both sides share in citizenship, and they are registered in the demes 
when they have turned eighteen years old’. 
2
 Blok 2009a: 144-146 argues that μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας is fourth-century terminology and not the original 
form of the Periclean law. 
3
 Described at Ath. Pol. 26.3, Plut. Per. 37.2-5. 
4
 Listed by MacDowell 1978: 67. Cf. Boegehold 1994: 57-59, who considers these explanations insufficient, 
proposing instead that lack of land was a key cause (1994: 60-62), along with the suggestion that it simply gave 
official recognition to what was already being set as a precedent in Athenian courts (1994: 62-65). 
5
 Patterson 1981: 8, 2005: 279. 
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Athenians are unknowable at this remove. The Athênaiôn Politeia says the law was passed 
διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,6  but it is impossible to say whether this was an informed 
assertion or conjecture on the part of the writer or his source.
7
  
 
Patterson is keen to eliminate the possibility that racial purity was involved, seeing it as ‘a 
complete “red herring”’,8 yet concludes that it is ‘probable that this law was both the result of 
the increasing consciousness of an Athenian identity and the cause of further development of 
the belief that being Athenian was a distinct and distinctly valuable status.’9 If we use a 
definition of race based on skin colour, Patterson is right, stressing that it is a ‘modern 
invention’.10 Simply to dismiss the idea of racial purity as a reason for the law on this basis, 
however, seems excessive. A more flexible definition of the term allows us to apply it 
productively. Thus Lape defines the term ‘race’ broadly, preferring it to ‘ethnicity’ because 
                                                          
6
 Ath. Pol. 26.3. 
7
 Any explanation based on physical overcrowding faces the problem that the law did not in any way stop 
people moving to Athens; it simply made it more difficult for them, or their descendants, to become citizens 
(Kapparis 2005: 72-73). A high citizen population, however, would limit the amount of land per citizen, 
resulting in there being a greater number of Athenians without land (Boegehold 1994: 60-62). Patterson 1981: 
70-71 argues that it was the result of a citizen population that had been growing due to immigration since the 
Persian wars; Pericles’ law ended the (legal) opportunity for this to happen, and thus limited the citizen 
population’s growth to natural increase (1981: 102). Rhodes 1981: 333-334 rejects the Ath. Pol.’s explanation 
on the grounds that the law would not have resulted in a fall in the number of legitimate sons fathered by 
Athenian men, instead merely limiting their choice of wife to citizen rather than metic women – Rhodes 
assumes that illegitimate children could not be citizens, and that ‘a foreign man could not become a citizen, 
acquire property in Attica or beget citizen sons, by marrying an Athenian woman’ even before 451 (1981: 332).  
8
 Patterson 1981: 97-98, arguing that that the law would have had practical impact on non-Athenian Greeks 
rather than barbarians, who would not have even tried ‘to become (or pass themselves off as) Athenians’. With 
law, however, perception is likely to be more important than reality, particularly in a context like democratic 
Athens’, where there was no access to relevant statistics; we cannot, therefore, assume that the reasons for 
passing a law were well-founded or based on actual facts (cf. Isaac 2004: 2, who explicitly states that his 
investigation of The Invention of Racism ‘is not concerned with the actual treatment of foreigners in Greece and 
Rome, but with opinions and concepts encountered in the literature’). 
9
 Patterson 1981: 133. Ogden 1996: 66 suggests that the law’s purpose was ‘to assert “autochthonous pride”’, 
but admits that there is very little evidence for the concept before the 420s (169-170), so this seems an 
unjustified inference. The citizenship law and autochthony undoubtedly became linked over time, however. 
10
 Patterson 1981: 123-124. Isaac 2004: 19 points out that in Europe in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries 
racism was usually directed at groups ‘physically largely indistinguishable from the majority’; it was ‘presumed 
physical differences’ rather than visible ones that gave it its basis. 
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of its specificity and what she sees as historical parallels between the development of 
Athenian citizen identity and racial ideologies in the modern world.
11
 
 
In line with her analysis of racial identity as a development over time, Lape does not see it 
only as a motive for the Periclean law, but also as a consequence of it;
12
 the law encouraged 
Athenians to marry within the Athenian group, made it the norm for Athenian citizens to be 
born of two citizen parents, and thus ‘created a context in which ideas about bilateral 
Athenian birth could be developed and annexed for identity-making purposes’.13 Whatever 
the actual reasons for passing the law were, its effect would be both more significant than and, 
possibly, independent of its origins.
14
 
 
4.1 (b) Relaxation and Re-enactment – the Peloponnesian War and Nicomenes’ Decree 
of 403/2 
 
In 445/444 a donation of grain from Egypt was distributed among the Athenian citizens; the 
sources claim that a significant number lost their citizenship as a result of this, but seem to be 
based on a misunderstanding of what occurred – certainly the figure of c.5000 being struck 
off the rolls is worthless.
15
 What later seemed to have been a major incident concerning 
                                                          
11
 Lape 2010: ix-x. See further my review (Kears 2011a). McCoskey’s recent book (2012) takes a stronger line, 
in which she ‘seeks specifically to revive the use of “race” in the study of Greek and Roman antiquity by tracing 
its recurrence throughout ancient thought and practice’ (2012: 32), preferring it to ‘ethnicity’ because of its 
connotations of power (2012: 31). 
12
 Lape 2010: 23-24. 
13
 Lape 2010: 24. 
14
 The search for the reasons behind the law is fundamentally futile – the sources simply do not give us enough 
information to go on – and it also ignores the fact that even at the time there would not have been one reason, or 
even a collection of reasons, that could explain it. As with any democratically-made decision, each voter would 
have had his own reasons for voting as he did, and it would be an impossible task to establish precisely why the 
decision went one way or another. 
15
 Plut. Per. 37.3-4, Philochorus fr.119 (Jacoby) = schol. Wasps 718. Plutarch claims that as a result of the 
distribution, c.5000 fraudulent citizens were discovered, prosecuted under Pericles’ law and sold into slavery 
(ἐπράθησαν… ἁλόντες), leaving a total of 14040 citizens; Philochorus that 14240 received grain, and 4760 were 
found to be παρέγγραφοι. As Jacoby noted in his commentary on the fragment, Plutarch’s idea of their being 
sold is probably based on an erroneous understanding of the law described at Ath. Pol. 42, which says only that 
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citizenship thus seems likely to have been exaggerated out of all proportion. In the next 
instance, however, the opposite seems to be the case – there is something which is reported in 
a matter-of-fact way but which may have serious and important implications. This is the ‘re-
enactment’16 of Pericles’ citizenship law in 403, described in Eumelus’ work on comedy. He 
stated that Νικομένη τινὰ ψήφισμα θέσθαι μηδένα τῶν μετ’ Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντα μετέχειν τῆς 
πόλεως, ἂν μὴ ἄμφω τοὺς γονέας ἀστοὺς ἐπιδείξηται, τοὺς δὲ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου ἀνεξετάστως 
ἀφεῖσθαι.17 
 
The Periclean law had clearly, then, been relaxed in some way during the Peloponnesian 
War.
18
 It is possible that it had been formally repealed at some time, but there is no explicit 
mention of this happening;
19
 the likelihood is therefore that it was simply ignored when it 
became inconvenient to stick to it.
20
 This would have taken place at a deme level and not 
required a decree to be passed, or indeed any central decision-making whatsoever.
21
 It would 
certainly have been inconvenient to stick to the law during the later war years, given the 
extent of the losses the Athenians suffered.
22
 As a result of these losses there must have been 
a gender imbalance in the citizen body, with more women living than men. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
those who appealed against being deprived of their citizenship would suffer this fate, and Philochorus has 
clearly got his figures by subtracting one number from 19000 (possibly because that is what he believed Athens’ 
male citizen population was?) – it is far more likely that the number of recipients was recorded, and so the 4760 
is useless. So we have no idea how many (if any) were deprived of their citizenship. 
16
 Blok 2009a: 143-144 refers to it both as a ‘reinforcement’ and a ‘reenforcement’. 
17
 Eumelus, FrGrHist 77 F2 (=schol. Aeschines 1.39): ‘Nicomenes established a decree that no one, after the 
archonship of Eucleides, should have a share in the polis, unless he could show that both his parents were astoi, 
but that those before Eucleides should be left unexamined’. Eucleides’ archonship was in 403/2. 
18
 Rhodes 2003: 60. Wallace 2011: 41 describes this as a ‘bright spot’ in an otherwise ‘gloomy’ picture for 
foreigners in fifth-century Athens. 
19
 Ogden 1996: 77-78 suggests that the oligarchic regime of 411 revoked it, but this is no more than a guess, 
albeit one that accords with the idea that it is hard to imagine the democratic assembly taking such a decision. 
20
 As argued by e.g. Humphreys 1974: 94. 
21
 Patterson 2005: 284. 
22
 In the long run, however, a reduced population may not have been a bad thing – Akrigg 2007 analyses the 
implications of a large population (c.300000 inhabitants) in Attica around 431 and a subsequent decline, 
suggesting that it would have led to higher wages, an increased standard of living, and a decline in inequality. 
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According to Diogenes Laertius, citing Aristotle, an attempt to counteract this by legal means 
was made: φασὶ γὰρ βουληθέντας Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὸ λειπανδρεῖν συναυξῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος, 
ψηφίσασθαι γαμεῖν μὲν ἀστὴν μίαν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρας.23 The last two words 
must mean ‘by another astê’, though Carawan has argued that actually the law may have 
meant foreign women as well. He suggests that, as the information is given as part of an 
anecdote about Socrates, who apparently had two citizen wives, Diogenes may have 
mistakenly extrapolated a general rule from an example.
24
 This is unconvincing, however, as 
there was no need to bring foreign women into the picture – due to military losses there were 
already more Athenian women than men, so it would make sense to use them to increase the 
population rather than metic women. By παιδοποιεῖσθαι the text must surely mean ‘legitimate 
children’, since there was never a law which forbade an Athenian from simply fathering them 
with an unmarried woman who was not his wife, whatever her status.
25
 Whether the law 
allowed actual, formal bigamy, with a man going through a marriage ceremony while still 
married to another woman, is not clear; according to Diogenes some writers claimed Socrates 
was actually married to two women at the same time, but this may be an assumption on their 
part.
26
 The passing of this law could imply that a number of Athenian women were deciding 
(or having it decided for them) that it was better to enter into marriage with a metic than 
either to have no partner at all or to live as a citizen Athenian’s pallakê,27 either for prestige 
or for any other reason. 
                                                          
23
 Diog. Laert. 2.26: ‘They say that the Athenians, because of their loss of men, wanted to increase their number, 
and so decreed that they could marry one astê but have children by another’. 
24
 Carawan 2008: 400-401. 
25
 Ogden 1996: 74. 
26
 The implications of this change would depend on what the status of illegitimate children of two Athenians 
was under the existing law. Clearly, if such nothoi were ordinarily excluded from citizenship this would be a 
great change, and give a clear incentive to women (and their families) to enter into such relationships. Even if 
this was not the case, however, and nothoi were citizens, there would still be an incentive because these children 
would now be able to inherit their father’s wealth and enter phratries. 
27
 Ogden 1996: 157-159 argues that there were few, if any, citizen pallakai, on the grounds that there would be 
no incentive for them to enter into such relationships, and that there are no genuine examples of them in the 
sources – he points out that when they are mentioned in speeches this is an allegation that may well be untrue. I 
cannot accept this argument, as there clearly could and would have been incentives in individual cases 
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This law is usually dated to c.413, on the basis that it was after the Sicilian disaster that the 
shortage of male citizens would have seemed most acute.
28
 Be that as it may, the passing of 
the ‘re-enactment’ decree in 403 implies that the two Athenian parent citizenship 
qualification system had broken down by that point; otherwise, it is difficult to see why an 
effective amnesty was offered. An amnesty is what it was
29
 – anyone who had got onto the 
deme lists before that time, no matter by what means, would be a legitimate citizen from then 
on. 
 
It is true that in a speech delivered in 346/5,
30
 when discussing his father’s claims to 
citizenship, Euxitheus says that τοῖς χρόνοις τοίνυν οὕτω φαίνεται γεγονώς, ὥστ’ εἰ καὶ κατὰ 
θάτερ’ ἀστος ἦν, εἶναι πολίτην προσήκειν αὐτόν· γέγονεν γὰρ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου.31 This could 
be read as implying that there was still a requirement to prove a one-parent Athenian 
connection, even for those born before 403, but that is not what the law, as Eumelus describes 
it, says; it specifies that citizens from before Eucleides’ archonship should be ‘left 
unexamined’ (ἀνεξετάστως ἀφεῖσθαι). Furthermore, Euxitheus says his father had the ‘right’ 
to be a citizen, not that he would have been required to demonstrate it. Indeed, while the 
speaker trumpets the fact that no one ever accused his father of being a foreigner or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(particularly if the man in question was wealthy), and the accusations in the speeches, even if they are not true, 
depend on the fact that such behaviour was far from unthinkable. There is also one definite case of a citizen 
pallakê in Plangon, Mantias’ erstwhile mistress in Dem. 39 and 40. Even if scholars are right in supposing that 
she had been married to Mantias at an earlier point, the relationship is explicitly stated to have continued while 
he was married to someone else (e.g. Dem. 40.27). Ogden describes this as ‘an effective state of bigamy’ (1996: 
192); I fail to see how that would mean she was not a pallakê. Beyond this, a speech of Isaeus (3.39) refers to 
men who give their daughters to be pallakai with conditions attached; Ogden (1996: 158) discounts this, 
suggesting that it may not refer to citizens and arguing that it does not fit with the picture we see in New 
Comedy. The natural reading, however, would certainly seem to include citizens, and New Comedy is hardly a 
reliable guide to real social behaviour. 
28
 Ogden 1996: 75-76. 
29
 As noted by M.J. Osborne 1981-1983: 56. 
30
 Dem. 57, discussed in section 5.2 (c). 
31
 Dem. 57.30: ‘Well then, it is shown that he was born in those times when, if he was an astos on one side, he 
would rightly be a politês – for he was born before Eucleides’ [archonship]’. 
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fraudulent citizen during his lifetime,
32
 his opponents could have explained this by saying 
that the re-enactment law prevented anyone from doing so. It is interesting, however, that 
Euxitheus presents the period before the law was passed as one in which one Athenian parent 
was required, which may reflect how the Athenians of the next generation came to 
understand it; alternatively, it could accurately reflect the actual situation, if the Periclean law 
had been formally revoked or modified. 
 
Nevertheless, the law did make those who did not match the Periclean definition of citizens 
safe from prosecution. The logical explanation would be that there was an acceptance that 
abuses had gone on over recent years, but that they were too widespread to be satisfactorily 
rectified; the best option, moving forward, would be simply to accept the status quo but insist 
on rigorous application of the criteria in the future. This was no doubt something of a 
compromise measure, as there must have been divisions in opinion about such an important 
and emotive issue. Two other measures may be of relevance here. One was a proposal 
mentioned by Athenaeus:  Ἀριστοφῶν δ’ ὁ ῥητωρ ὁ τὸν νόμον εἰσενεγκὼν ἐπ’ Εὐκλείδου 
ἄρχοντος, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀστῆς γένηται νόθον εἶναι.33 Especially since this derives from a comic 
play,
34
 it is unclear what we should take the word nothos to mean here, but we can speculate 
– could it have been an attempt to disfranchise those of mixed parentage, or prevent them 
from inheriting property? Unlike the Nicomenes decree, there is no indication that it was not 
retroactive; it was simply proposed when Eucleides was archon. We do not know if it was 
passed. 
 
                                                          
32
 Dem. 57.26. 
33
 Carystius Fr. 11 (Müller) = Ath. 577b: ‘The rhetor Aristophon proposed a law in the archonship of Eucleides, 
that whoever was not born of an astê should be a nothos.’ 
34
 Apparently by Calliades (Ath. 577c), a writer of New Comedy active in the late fourth century (BNP s.v. 
Calliades). 
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Another measure certainly did pass, as it is recorded in two speeches as an active law; it reads 
as follows: νόθῳ δὲ μηδὲ νόθῃ μὴ εἶναι ἀγχιστείαν μήθ’ ἱερῶν μήθ’ ὁσίων, ἀπ’ Εὐκλείδου 
ἄρχοντος. 35  In both cases it is cited as part of ordinary inheritance law, with apparent 
reference to property rather than with any connotations of rights to citizenship (or indeed 
cults or religion), but presumably reflects a similar desire to have a clean slate, with previous 
wrongdoings accepted on the proviso that they will be policed in the future. The same could 
be said about the amnesty offered to the supporters of the Thirty Tyrants.
36
 
 
4.2 Mass Enfranchisements 
 
There is evidence for divisions when it comes to other key questions to do with citizenship at 
the time. These are most noticeable in the case of the controversy over rewarding the non-
citizens who had fought on the side of the democrats during the civil war, which should be 
understood with reference to the porous nature of the citizen-foreigner boundary during the 
Peloponnesian War; there had also been cases of mass enfranchisements, where groups of 
non-citizens had been naturalised en masse. The two cases about which we are best informed 
are the naturalisation of the Plataeans, and of the foreigners and even slaves who fought for 
the Athenians at Arginusae. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 Dem. 43.51, Isaeus 6.47: ‘A female or male nothos may not have rights of family inheritance in sacrifices or 
the divine, from the archonship of Eucleides’. It is not at all clear what this actually means; Blok’s view of the 
hiera kai hosia is outlined in section 1.2. 
36
 See Wolpert 2002b, Loening 1987. 
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4.2 (a) Foreign Fighters in the Civil War 
 
The democratic forces in the civil war contained many foreigners as well as Athenians. 
Thrasybulus proposed enfranchising them as citizens,
37
 and apparently his decree passed in 
the assembly, but was struck down as an illegal proposal at the instigation of Archinus; 
according to one source, the jurors fined Thrasybulus a single drachma as his punishment.
38
 
The actual grounds for the proposal’s rejection were technical – it had not been presented 
before the boulê
39
 – but this is generally regarded as a pretext, with the real motive being 
unease at admitting outsiders. According to the author of the Ath. Pol., some of the 
enfranchised individuals were ‘clearly’ slaves (ὧν ἔνιοι φανερῶς ἦσαν δοῦλοι), and it is for 
this reason that he, at least, approved of Archinus’ actions (it was one of three occasions 
which the author flags up as his having seemed to πολιτεύσασθαι καλῶς).40 
 
Thrasybulus, then, was given at least a token punishment for his troubles. It was not the case, 
however, that his opponents disapproved of honouring the democrats’ allies at all – Archinus 
himself proposed and carried a decree which honoured those who fought at Phyle,
41
 in which 
it is likely that at least some foreigners were included.
42
 This did not, however, extend as far 
as citizenship, and indeed the inscription’s epigram said the honours were bestowed by the 
                                                          
37
 Ath. Pol. 40.2, Aesch. 3.195 (w. schol.), [Plut.] Lives of the Ten Orators 835-836, Tod 100. See Rhodes 1981: 
474-477. According to Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.25), the democrats had sworn to grant isoteleia to the foreigners 
who fought with them while they were in the Piraeus; see below. 
38
 Schol. on Aesch. 3.195. 
39
 Presumably because it was passed during what pseudo-Plutarch calls the ‘anarchia’ of the immediate 
aftermath of the civil war (Rhodes 1981: 476). 
40
 Ath. Pol. 40.2. Rhodes 1981: 474 suggests that the author ‘is repeating with his own agreement praise which 
he found in his source, rather than commenting spontaneously on what he found presented as bare fact’. We 
cannot be sure that the text accurately records the reasons for the original decision; there was, however, a speech 
extant in antiquity which purported to be written by Lysias for this trial, in defence of Thrasybulus and his 
proposal ([Plut.], Lives of the Ten Orators 835), and it is therefore possible that the Ath. Pol.’s writer had access 
to it, assuming it was genuine, and was thus relying on first-hand evidence. 
41
 Aesch. 3.187-191; the fragments of the inscription are Agora Inv. I 16, 16b, 17, 18, 93. 
42
 See M.C. Taylor 2002. 
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παλαίχθων δῆμος Ἀθηναίων,43 which may have been a deliberate attempt to show that Athens 
was still pure as ever, even when honouring foreigners alongside its own.
44
 This would, again, 
seem to indicate that the issue was controversial and had to be negotiated carefully. 
 
Other relevant measures of the time include Theozotides’ decree offering support to the 
orphans of those who died in the civil war, as long as their parents were Athenian and they 
were born legitimate,
45
 and the decree (IG ii
2 
10) which finally honoured all of the foreign 
fighters. This latter decree was probably not passed until 401/0,
46
 indicating that the dispute 
over how to honour them went on for a considerable time. Unfortunately the inscription is 
poorly preserved, and any interpretation is heavily reliant on restorations. Three groups are 
mentioned separately, first those who came down from Phyle, then those who fought at 
Munichia, and then those who stayed in the Piraeus with the dêmos.
47
 M.J. Osborne, in what 
is still the most comprehensive work on naturalisation at Athens, argued that the first group 
formed a ‘nucleus’ of supporters of the democracy who received citizenship, with the others 
gaining isoteleia;
48
 Whitehead argued that in fact all of the recipients became citizens;
49
 and 
Krentz that none did.
50
 As the names of the recipients are given tribal affiliations, whatever 
they received must have required registration with a tribe, but it does not really prove any 
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 Aesch. 3.190. 
44
 M.C. Taylor 2002: 396. 
45
 Published with commentary by Stroud 1971, who describes it as ‘a large and impressive monument’ (1971: 
285). Lysias’ fragmentary speech Against Theozotides (delivered before the decree had come into force – 1971: 
297) attacked the proposal for excluding nothoi and poiêtoi from its provisions. Stroud concluded that the 
objection failed, since the inscription proves that the decree was passed, but as Ogden 1996: 79 notes, what 
survives of the inscription itself does not say anything about the exclusion of nothoi and poiêtoi, specifying only 
that they need to be children of an Athenian. It is therefore possible that the final version took account of the 
objections of Lysias’ client. 
46
 Based on restoring the archon as Xenainetos. Only the ‘–os’ survives in the inscription, so it must be him or 
Pythodoros, the archon during the oligarchy of 404/3, who was swiftly struck from the record. Krentz 1980: 
299-300 suggests that it could preserve the demotic of Eucleides, and thus date from 403/2, but this would be a 
very unusual formula. The only reason Krentz gives for doubting [Xenainet]os is that 401/0 seems too late, but 
as the honouring of the allies was evidently controversial this is not really surprising. He does not repeat the 
claim in his follow-up article (Krentz 1986). 
47
 Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 25. 
48
 M.J. Osborne 1981-1983: 32-33. 
49
 Whitehead 1984. 
50
 Krentz 1980, 1986. 
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more than that.
51
 In the case of the first group, their honouring is described in the following, 
partially restored way: ἐ]ψηφίσθαι Ἀθηναίοις· ε  ναι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκγόν[οις πολιτεία]-[ν. Krentz, 
however, has made the point that this ‘formula’ for  naturalisation does not otherwise appear 
before 229 BC, with the classical period exclusively using εἶναι αὐτὸν Ἀθηναῖον.52  The 
restoration of πολιτείαν is not, then, very secure. 
 
As concerns the second group, the crucial reference appears to be the word ἐ]γγύησιν, which 
has been interpreted as a reference to the pledge made to the foreign fighters when they were 
in the Piraeus;
53
 according to Xenophon, they were promised ἰσοτέλειαν ἔσεσθαι. 54 
Whitehead argued that this was metaphorical, meaning equality in all things and therefore 
citizenship.
55
 That is something of a stretch, to say the least, and I agree with Krentz that if 
citizenship had been meant, citizenship is what would have been specified.
56
 I am not, 
however, convinced that Xenophon should be taken uncritically here. My suspicion is that he 
describes the pledge based on what the foreigners eventually received, rather than any 
original or separate information he may have had. As we have seen, Thrasybulus attempted to 
enfranchise them in the aftermath of the democratic victory; it would have been strange for 
him to offer them more than had been promised, or conversely to promise only isoteleia when 
he was happy to make them citizens. Admittedly, the terms of the pledge may not have been 
entirely his decision to make, and his soldiers may not have been prepared to go as far as he 
was. Given the difficult circumstances the democrats were in, however, it seems unlikely that 
they would have quibbled. After the democracy was restored, and it turned out that the 
enfranchisement was controversial, it could well have been the case that arguments arose 
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 Krentz 1986: 203. 
52
 Krentz 1986: 201-202. 
53
 Whitehead 1984: 8-9. 
54
 Xen. Hell. 2.4.25. 
55
 Whitehead 1984: 9. 
56
 Krentz 1986: 202-203. 
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about what had been promised, and whether those who promised it had the right to do so. 
Xenophon, in line with a narrative which at this point was stressing the tolerance of the 
Athenians, and knowing that in the end the foreigners only got isoteleia, may have chosen to 
smooth over the difficulty by preferring a version of the story in which the promise and the 
reward matched. Looked at another way, if they did eventually receive citizenship, it is odd 
that Xenophon did not mention the discrepancy. 
 
In sum, however, it seems most likely that the bulk of the foreign fighters received isoteleia, 
in line with what Xenophon says, though not necessarily because he preserves an accurate 
version of the pledge that was actually given. The first group must have received something 
more; it is possible that this was citizenship, but given Krentz’s objections to the formula 
used this does not seem especially likely. The whole episode, it must be said, does not cast 
the Athenians in a particularly attractive light;
57
 and one can imagine that it must have been 
particularly galling for the recipients given the better treatment meted out to outsiders who 
had fought with the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. 
 
4.2 (b) The Plataeans 
 
It must have been an inescapable fact in the background that the Athenians had, during the 
war years, expanded their citizen body by mass grants of citizenship to the Plataeans and the 
Samians.
58
 The Plataeans were naturalised as Athenians in 427, after the Spartans destroyed 
their city.
59
 Those who had escaped the siege in the winter of 428/7 and reached Athens 
numbered 212, according to Thucydides.
60
 Lape gives the same figure as the number of 
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 As noted e.g. by Wallace 2010: 150. 
58
 Plataeans: Dem. 59.104; Samians: Xen. Hell. 2.2.6, IG ii
2 
1. 
59
 The destruction of Plataea is described at Thuc. 3.52-68. 
60
 Thucydides 3.24. 
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Plataeans naturalised,
61
 but this ignores the likely presence of extra Plataeans already living 
in Athens as metics;
62
 there is thus scope for the figure to be somewhat higher.
63
 
 
According to the decree as preserved in Dem. 59, the Plataeans were distributed among 
various demes, and a specific provision was made that after this distribution no Plataean 
could become Athenian other than by the normal way of a specific decree enfranchising 
them.
64
 The authenticity of the decree as quoted in the text is extremely doubtful,
65
 most 
obviously since in the passages that follow Apollodorus refers to provisions that are not made 
in the text as it stands, but we know from Lysias’ speech Against Pancleon that the Plataeans 
were indeed divided among a number of demes,
66
 and Apollodorus himself says that a time 
limit was placed on registration.
67
 He adds that those who were enfranchised by the decree 
were examined individually as to whether they were a Plataean and one of the ‘friends’ of the 
polis; the names of those so honoured were inscribed and set up near the Acropolis.
68
 
 
Apollodorus says that the motive for both the scrutiny and the cut-off point was concern that 
‘many’ would attempt to use the Plataean naturalisation as a way of getting themselves into 
                                                          
61
 Lape 2010: 254. Lape does not cite Thucydides here, but presumably that is where the figure comes from. 
62
 At Dem. 59.103 Apollodorus also claims that some Plataeans were able to escape to Athens when they saw 
the Spartans approaching at the end of the siege, though Thucydides does not mention them, claiming instead 
that the city was handed over by surrender, induced by the dire straits the defenders found themselves in 
(Trevett 1990: 413-414. Thuc. 3.52). There are a number of discrepancies between the two accounts; notably, 
Apollodorus claims that those attempting to escape in the winter were selected by lot, while Thucydides says 
that those who remained did so because they thought the plan too risky (Trevett 1990: 413. Dem. 59.103 Thuc. 
3.20). Apollodorus seems to have used Thucydides as a source (Trevett 1990: 413-414); it is possible that he 
had access to another, pro-Plataean writer (Trevett 1990: 416 suggests Daimachus of Plataea as a possible 
candidate), that he drew on oral memory, or that he invented the story – it was in his interests to present the 
Plataeans in a positive light. 
63
 Blok 2009a: 166 gives the figure as ‘several hundred’, which is probably vague enough to cover all likely 
eventualities. 
64
 Dem. 59.104. 
65
 Its authenticity is attacked most recently by Canevaro 2010; Kapparis 1995 argues in its favour. 
66
 Lys. 23.2. 
67
 Dem. 59.105-106. 
68
 Dem. 59.105. 
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the citizen body.
69
 This is surely his own spin on the decree (his purpose in bringing it up is 
to show how precious, honourable and exclusive citizenship is, and therefore how outrageous 
was Neaera’s alleged involvement in its usurpation)70 but it is likely to reflect accurately the 
concerns of the time – the Athenians must have been aware that an open-ended naturalisation 
was open to abuse, and the steps they took are consistent with a desire to avoid this.
71
 If this 
is right, it is interesting that the possibility of fraudulent ‘Plataeans’ coming forward was 
considered so early on, and also that latecomers might attempt to get in likewise; it would 
suggest that the problem was perceived and anticipated before it existed, if indeed it ever did 
come to exist in reality. This would mean that the Athenians were aware of and concerned 
with the problem of fraudulent citizens as early as 427. This conclusion can hardly be insisted 
on, however, because we cannot be certain exactly what Apollodorus was quoting; it is 
conceivable that he cited a text which included later additions to the original decree. We can 
be sure, however, that by Apollodorus’ own time these concerns were prevalent enough for 
him to exploit in his speech. 
 
The Plataeans are also mentioned in Lysias’ speeches Against Simon and, in more detail, 
Against Pancleon. In the first speech, the speaker tells the jury that his boyfriend Theodotus 
is a Plataean, and the assumption would therefore be that he was a citizen.
72
 This is hard to 
square, however, with the claim later in the speech that he could have been tortured if he had 
given evidence; this would not be possible for a citizen, and would only be expected in the 
case of a slave.
73
  It is not necessary to go into the question of what his status actually was 
here; it is more important to note that there was evidently a good degree of ambiguity in the 
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 Dem. 59.105, 106. 
70
 Trevett 1990: 408. See Dem. 59.107 and section 5.1 (c). 
71
 Kapparis 1995: 365. 
72
 Todd 2007: 279, who specifies ‘naturalised Athenian citizen’, although given his young age he would 
presumably have been a citizen child from birth. 
73
 Todd 2007: 279-280. See section 2.2 (d). 
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status of someone who was (purportedly) a Plataean. As we have seen, under the terms of the 
decree which granted them citizenship, only those who were registered within a certain space 
of time were to be enfranchised. There will thus have been Plataeans – the survivors of the 
siege and their descendants,
74
 and those Plataeans who had been living in other cities – who 
came to Athens after that time, and would not legally have a claim to citizenship but could 
perhaps lay claim to a kind of morally superior status to the average metic.
75
 We have 
inscriptions from the late fourth century recording honours given to non-citizen Plataeans,
76
 
who would presumably have been part of this group, though it is possible that by that time the 
status of Plataeans in Athens had changed.
77
 
 
We should not rule out the possibility that some Plataeans actually chose not to become 
Athenian citizens – they might have looked on their current circumstances as a temporary 
exile and not wished to risk being subsumed into the Athenian citizen body. This would 
hardly seem to be a rational decision, given the many advantages that came with citizenship, 
but decisions to do with identity are rarely made entirely on the basis of rational assessments 
of costs and benefits. In any case, the existence of this non-citizen Plataean group enabled the 
speaker to portray Theodotus as slightly more respectable than would have been the case if he 
was an ordinary metic or slave. One could claim to be Plataean and thereby gain social 
standing, yet as long as one did not claim to be part of the naturalised group (or their 
descendants) there was no risk of falling subject to a graphê xenias. This shadowy identity 
would naturally have particular appeal to those metics who did not have a claim to citizenship 
elsewhere, particularly freedmen, and who were able to pass as Greeks. 
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 Thuc. 3.68.3 mentions pro-Theban (or pro-Spartan, if the word Θηβαῖοι is deleted) individuals ‘of the 
Plataeans’ who were allowed to remain in their city for a year afterwards. 
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naturalised. 
76
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 351, Agora 16 96. 
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To what extent this possible strategy was acted on, we cannot know. The Plataeans will not 
have been a particularly large group, and it might thus have been difficult to pass oneself off 
as a member of it. That it, or something rather similar, was at least conceivable, however, is 
demonstrated by Lysias’ speech Against Pancleon. The speaker alleges that his opponent 
pretended to be Plataean in order to avoid prosecution on procedural grounds – the speaker 
brought his first suit (the details of which are not clear) before the polemarch, thinking that 
Pancleon was a metic, which in turn enabled his opponent to claim that, as a Plataean and a 
citizen, the prosecution was invalid. After being told that Pancleon’s deme was Decelea, the 
speaker went to a barber’s shop near the agora (παρὰ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς, to be precise) where οἷ 
Δεκελειεῖς προσφοιτῶσιν and asked some of the Deceleans if they had heard of his 
opponent.
78
 These Deceleans he then produced as witnesses.
79
 
 
That this could be considered an acceptable way of pursuing such an investigation is 
surprising, but it should be noted that the deme itself was in the north of Attica, some 
distance from the astu.
80
 In any case, the speaker stresses that he also found witnesses to 
Pancleon’s having been subject to litigation before the polemarch on previous occasions, and 
evidently felt that together the two pieces of evidence were sufficient to prove that he was a 
metic. Acting on this information, he prosecuted Pancleon before the polemarch, and was 
served in turn with an antigraphê denying the court’s jurisdiction. This time, the speaker’s 
response was to speak to the oldest Plataean he knew of, and then all the others, before finally 
going to a cheese market where the Plataeans gathered; from all this he was apparently able 
to establish, at least to his own satisfaction, that Pancleon was a runaway slave who had 
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 Lys. 23.3. 
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 See e.g. the map at Whitehead 1986a: xxiii. 
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belonged to a Plataean.
81
 The story then gets even more complicated, as his purported master 
attempted to seize him; upon this Pancleon claimed to have a brother who would vindicate 
him, but actually a woman turned up claiming that she, in fact, was his owner. Pancleon 
ultimately avoided being taken by either, apparently through the ‘violence’ of his and his 
supporters’ actions.82 
 
What Pancleon’s status actually was is impossible to determine. Presumably he too could 
produce witnesses, who would swear that he was a Plataean and Decelean; it is possible that 
he gained entry to the deme through unscrupulous means of the kind decried in Demosthenes 
57.
83
 His case does show, however, that in practice there was flexibility when it came to 
identity and status, or at least that a jury could be persuaded that there was. This implies that 
there was a degree of doubt and scepticism about the efficacy of the measures which were 
supposed to separate citizens and metics (or even slaves). This was one of the complaints of 
the ‘old oligarch’ a generation or so before.84 He was coming from a different perspective, 
and with different aims, but both he and Lysias aimed to exploit the reality that differences in 
status were not as marked in practice as they were in the theorised, imagined city. 
 
In balance with this, however, the speech also reveals that a community such as the Plataeans 
was felt to have persisted with its own identity, even after naturalisation – the speaker could 
talk of what ‘the Plataeans’ did in the same way as he could about the Deceleans. The 
difference was that the Deceleans, as a deme community, were a constituent part of the 
Athenian dêmos, whereas the Plataeans cut across the demes and formed a kind of separate 
nucleus. As with immigrant groups in other societies, we can imagine that there was a degree 
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of tension between a desire to assimilate and a desire to maintain a separate and distinct 
identity. This may well have extended to the Athenian perspective as well. The original 
decision to split them among the demes was surely mainly intended to prevent their numbers 
‘swamping’ any individual deme,85 but it may also have been partly intended to encourage 
their assimilation by making it harder for them to form their own united community. If so, 
however, it came up against the desire to keep the Athenian citizen body pure, and mark 
naturalised citizens as outsiders even when, formally speaking, they had the status of 
Athenian citizens; individual cases of this are discussed in the next chapter. Leaving 
intentions aside, however, the case of Pancleon seems to suggest that the Plataeans did not 
assimilate, and retained their own separate identity.
86
 This was the case at least (or perhaps 
especially) in the minds of the native Athenian citizens. In practice, the Plataeans’ status 
might have given them considerable scope to choose whether, to what extent, and in what 
circumstances they would assimilate,
87
 but this was always conditional on the acceptance and 
response of the Athenians. 
 
4.2 (c) The Fighters at Arginusae 
 
The Plataeans were free, Greek allies of the Athenians who had lost their city due to their 
loyalty; relatively speaking, they were thus an unproblematic group to admit to the 
citizenship body. Towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, however, the Athenians 
expanded citizenship to a disparate group whose background was very different, although 
Aristophanes drew an overt comparison between the two. The sea battle of Arginusae saw 
citizenship offered to metics and even slaves who would fight for Athens, as reported in the 
play Frogs and by a number of historians. A fragment of the work of the Atthidographer 
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Hellanicus specifies that slaves who fought were enfranchised with the same rights as 
Plataeans;
88
 that their numbers were substantial is indicated by Xenophon;
89
 and Diodorus 
says that they ἐποιήσαντο πολίτας τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων τοὺς βουλομένους 
συναγωνίσασθαι∙ ταχὺ δὲ πολλοῦ πλήθους πολιτογραφηθέντος, οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέγραφον 
τοὺς εὐθέτους εἰς τὴν στρατείαν.90 
 
The bare fact thus seems quite clear
91
 – due to the extremities of the situation, there was a 
mass and indiscriminate naturalisation of any man who was in Athens and fit to take part in 
the battle. How large this group was is not known.
92
 The only source which gives us more 
than a bare-bones description of the event is Aristophanes’ Frogs. There are numerous 
references to this event in the play,
93
 but the most substantial are two speeches made by the 
chorus leader. At this point we are dealing with the play’s second chorus, the titular chorus of 
Frogs having departed relatively early in the play. The second chorus is made up of initiates 
who are now enjoying the benefits of their initiation (which took place while they were alive) 
in the afterlife.
94
 Shortly after they enter, the chorus leader introduces them with a speech 
whose form Dover describes as being ‘modelled on a proclamation debarring the “impure” 
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from a religious ritual, and the choice of words and phrases in its opening and closing lines 
impresses that model upon us’.95 Their exclusive nature is made very clear – the leader calls 
on non-initiates to be silent, and twice to stand aside.
96
 
 
While Dover argues that this characterisation is totally abandoned after lines 440ff., and it 
becomes a stock chorus ‘divested of any distinctive character’,97 it would be strange for 
Aristophanes to set up the chorus in this way and then make references to the question of the 
purity of the Athenian citizen body without any intention of the two being connected. Indeed, 
the first lengthy passage which will be examined is introduced by a reference to τὸν ἱερὸν 
χορὸν.98 While, as Dover argues, it is true that this could be a reference to a chorus’ function 
as a sacred ‘offering’ to the gods,99  it is hard to believe that there was no intention to 
reference the fact that the chorus was representing initiates.
100
 
 
The key part of the speech runs as follows: 
εἶτ’ ἄτιμόν φημι χρῆναι μηδέν’ εἶν’ ἐν τῇ πόλει· 
καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρόν ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ναυμαχήσαντας μίαν 
καὶ Πλαταιᾶς εὐθὺς εἶναι κἀντὶ δούλων δεσπότας— 
κοὐδὲ ταῦτ’ ἔγωγ’ ἔχοιμ’ ἂν μὴ οὐ καλῶς φάσκειν ἔχειν, 
ἀλλ’ ἐπαινῶ· μόνα γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῦν ἔχοντ’ ἐδράσατε. 
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς, οἳ μεθ’ ὑμῶν πολλὰ δὴ 
χοἰ πατέρες ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ προσήκουσιν γένει, 
τὴν μίαν ταύτην παρεῖναι ξυμφορὰν αἰτουμένοις. 
ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνέντες, ὦ σοφώτατοι φύσει, 
πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἑκόντες ξυγγενεῖς κτησώμεθα 
κἀπιτίμους καὶ πολίτας, ὅστις ἂν ξυνναυμαχῇ. 
εἰ δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ὀγκωσόμεσθα κἀποσεμνυνούμεθα, 
τὴν πόλιν καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχοντες κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις, 
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ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ποτ᾽ αὖθις εὖ φρονεῖν οὐ δόξομεν.101 
 
The actual argument being made is that those who were disfranchised for their involvement 
in the oligarchic regime of 411 should be forgiven, and the case of the enfranchised fighters 
at Arginusae is an illustration of this. If they were so honoured, it must be right to restore the 
same privileges to men who gave service to the polis in the past, in spite of their mistake in 
411. That the proposal to restore the rights was meant seriously by Aristophanes has been 
almost universally accepted,
102
 as it is supported by ancient testimony which records the 
poet’s being honoured with an olive wreath103 and the play’s receiving an unprecedented 
second performance because of the parabasis.
104
 
 
Sidwell, however, has argued that the advice was not meant sincerely, and that it was 
Aristophanes’ ‘intention to ridicule the idea that the re-enfranchisement of the oligarchs was 
the answer to the city’s current dilemma’.105 He explains the testimony about the honours the 
poet received as a misunderstanding; Aristophanes was actually honoured for ‘advice’ given 
in the final scene of the play, not in the parabasis.
106
 Sidwell’s views are determined by his 
wider argument that Aristophanes was engaged in an extensive, intertextual ‘poet’s war’ with 
the other comic poets, in which each was associated with a political faction, Aristophanes’ 
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being the radical democrats. His argument is complex and lengthy, but essentially highly 
speculative and in my view unconvincing,
107
 and divorced from it his claims about the 
parabasis in Frogs are not compelling. 
 
In my view, then, there is no reason to suppose that Aristophanes’ proposal was not meant 
sincerely; the terms in which the proposal is couched, however, indicate that he was very 
careful about what he was saying. The passage should not be taken as Aristophanes simply 
speaking his own mind, as it is full of contradictions which imply that a good degree of 
characterisation is taking place, as well as some deliberate challenging of the audience’s 
expectations and assumptions. Thus when discussing the enfranchisement of Arginusae, the 
chorus leader takes a somewhat ambiguous line; he first refers to it as a ‘disgrace’ that those 
fighting in one sea-battle should ‘be Plataeans’, but adds that rather than wanting to say 
anything bad about it, he praises the action, describing it as the only thoughtful thing the 
Athenians had done.
108
 The initial description of the act as a disgrace, however, would seem 
to draw on what would be the usual reaction to such a transgression of the citizen-foreigner 
and, particularly, slave-free boundaries, as is flagged up by the reference to their becoming 
‘masters instead of slaves’. 
 
This was no doubt a paradox with comic intentions, but considerable bite as well, and was 
probably intended to manipulate the audience’s reactions, with an initial disturbance at the 
insult aimed at their policy being followed by a relieved realisation that it was merely a 
relative criticism. But because the initial criticism had some validity, in that it appealed to the 
Athenians’ ordinary prejudices (and had very likely been articulated during the formal and 
informal debate over the enfranchisement proposal), it was therefore particularly challenging 
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to the audience. It also serves to add some character to the role of the chorus leader, who is 
supposed to be giving advice to the audience – he lets slip a harsh criticism of the dêmos’ 
policy which is only imperfectly covered up by his clarification.
109
 
 
Indeed, he arguably goes too far in attempting to get off the hook, and ends up arguing that 
all who had fought for the Athenians should become citizens with full rights and, 
significantly, ξυγγενεῖς, kinsmen. Here he urges that the boundary collapse altogether, and 
the new arrivals be absorbed entirely into the citizen body; the Athenian audience is once 
again potentially left uncomfortable. The chorus leader’s statement does, however, accurately 
describe the legal position of the newcomers, even if in reality considerable prejudice 
remained against them. This would later be further stressed by the ‘re-enactment’ of the 
Periclean citizenship law in 403, since it specifically excluded those who were already 
citizens from its provisions, whether they attained their status by fair means or foul.
110
 Lape’s 
interpretation of this passage is somewhat different, as she argues that the chorus leader ‘is 
speaking from an aristocratic and elitist perspective and is consequently not concerned with 
the racial boundary per se’.111 This does not seem to be borne out by what he says, however, 
particularly when we examine his speech in the next relevant passage, where he builds on the 
line of argument and character already portrayed. He refers to the city’s use of new citizens 
and neglect of the older ones: 
πολλάκις γ’ ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν ἡ πόλις πεπονθέναι 
ταὐτὸν εἴς τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς  
εἴς τε τἀρχαῖον νόμισμα καὶ τὸ καινὸν χρυσίον. 
οὔτε γὰρ τούτοισιν, οὖσιν οὐ κεκιβδηλευμένοις 
ἀλλὰ καλλίστοις ἁπάντων, ὡς δοκεῖ, νομισμάτων 
καὶ μόνοις ὀρθῶς κοπεῖσι καὶ κεκωδωνισμένοις 
ἔν τε τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροισι πανταχοῦ, 
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χρώμεθ’ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις τοῖς πονηροῖς χαλκίοις, 
χθές τε καὶ πρῴην κοπεῖσι, τῷ κακίστῳ κόμματι. 
τῶν πολιτῶν θ’ οὓς μὲν ἴσμεν εὐγενεῖς καὶ σώφρονας 
ἄνδρας ὄντας καὶ δικαίους καὶ καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς 
καὶ τραφέντας ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ χοροῖς καὶ μουσικῇ, 
προυσελοῦμεν, τοῖς δὲ χαλκοῖς καὶ ξένοις καὶ πυρρίαις 
καὶ πονηροῖς κἀκ πονηρῶν εἰς ἅπαντα χρώμεθα, 
ὑστάτοις ἀφιγμένοισιν, οἷσιν ἡ πόλις πρὸ τοῦ 
οὐδὲ φαρμακοῖσιν εἰκῇ ῥᾳδίως ἐχρήσατ’ ἄν.112 
 
This passage is usually taken as referring to the leaders of the polis, with the call being to 
return to the aristocratic, Periclean-style leaders rather than the ‘demagogues’.113 Cleophon 
has already been decried by the chorus as having a ‘Thracian swallow’ on the ‘barbarian leaf’ 
of his lips;
 114
  since then, however, the audience has heard the appeal to forgive the 
oligarchic sympathisers and an insulting song about Cleigenes, evidently a well-known but 
not necessarily political figure.
115
 We should not simply assume that this is a return to the 
attack on Cleophon and his ilk; the language of this passage seems to have a wider 
application than just that, and seems very relevant to the question of disfranchised native 
citizens lacking rights newly acquired by the naturalised fighters at Arginusae. Lape accepts 
that his speech ‘might also seem to target the newly enfranchised slaves’, but concludes that 
actually the chorus leader ‘does not object to including supposed foreigners in the citizen 
body but rather to allowing such men to rise to positions of political leadership’.116 This, 
however, surely underestimates the virulence of the language used; I would argue instead that 
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Aristophanes is deliberately referencing the enfranchisement and drawing a connection 
between the ideology of purity and that of aristocratic superiority. 
 
In his speech the chorus leader takes the rhetoric of purity to extremes, and binds it to an 
aristocratic snobbery that extends beyond the Athenian-foreigner divide. Looking at lines 
727ff., and the reference to the ‘well-born’ (eugeneis), while all Athenians might be able to 
claim eugeneia due to their supposedly common, autochthonous ancestry,
117
 here 
Aristophanes has his speaker add to it first the quality of moderation, then justice and the 
typically aristocratic kaloi kagathoi formula. These might be ironically humorous enough, 
given the sorts of citizens Aristophanes was used to portraying, but he then brings in the 
factors which made up a specifically elite upbringing, i.e. accomplishment in pursuits which 
required leisure time and money.
118
 By doing so he shifts the perspective from that of a put-
upon and disgruntled ordinary citizen to that of an aristocrat resentful at his inferiors’ sway in 
the city. It turns out, of course, that he is referring to the foreigners who have entered the city 
(and presumably the citizen body), although his reference to πονηροῖς κἀκ πονηρῶν may well 
have resembled the sort of elitist sneers which could be applied to poorer Athenians. 
 
It is tempting to suppose that Aristophanes aimed at creating a moment where an aristocratic 
but purportedly democratic individual’s mask slips, and his true thoughts are accidentally 
revealed as his rhetoric carries him away. The real world equivalent would be anti-democratic 
critics who dressed up their crypto-oligarchic views as appeals to the ‘ancestral’ or ‘moderate’ 
form of democracy.
119
 Given that the argument the chorus leader is making is that the 
supporters of the earlier oligarchic regime should be pardoned, this was powerful stuff; it 
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could also be seen as grimly prescient, considering the elitist and xenophobic policies enacted 
by the Thirty and their supporters just a few years after the play’s performance. 
 
While, according to this interpretation, Aristophanes uses the Athenians’ normal prejudices 
against foreigners and slaves becoming citizens for comic effect, setting up a comparison 
which could be seen as undercutting them, the challenge is brief and not sustained or 
articulated seriously. The main target of the joke would essentially be the character of the 
self-righteous but ultimately disingenuous chorus leader, and the jibe at the Athenians’ shared 
pretentions no more than an aside. Likewise, the policy which the chorus leader was urging 
was not necessarily being ridiculed (as we have seen, it apparently won Aristophanes great 
acclaim); on the contrary, a genuinely favoured policy might actually add to the incongruity 
and humour of the situation. It is the motives that some supporters of such a policy might 
have had that are under attack. 
 
It would seem, then, that Aristophanes was very happy to use the enfranchisement for comic 
effect, and even, albeit briefly, to point out some of the contradictions and hypocrisies of the 
Athenians which it revealed. It is hardly safe to conclude much from this about how the 
policy was received or treated afterwards, however; to judge from his earlier plays, the poet 
had evidently never been afraid to attack the fundamental institutions of the democracy. It is 
perhaps telling that he only touches on issues of identity in this tangential way – maybe to 
treat it more extensively would have been a bit too close to home even for an Athenian comic 
audience – but we are not well informed enough about the reception of Old Comedy to say 
for certain. 
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The fact that these enfranchisements had occurred relatively recently makes the controversy 
over granting citizenship to the foreign fighters of the civil war even more remarkable. The 
decisive factor must have been the political and military context in each case; as soon as the 
Athenians felt that their polis was secure, the desire of giving just rewards to their allies, 
consistent with how they had rewarded others when times were more difficult, was 
overmatched by the chauvinistic desire to keep the citizen body as pure as possible. In 
accordance with the clean slate principle represented by the re-enactment of the citizenship 
laws, the polis’ actions taken in wartime were now seen as irrelevant, and preserving citizen 
privilege and exclusivity trumped what seems to have been a straightforward moral question. 
 
It was thus a complex response to the pressures of war and defeat which the Athenians came 
up with. On the one hand, there was a tacit and pragmatic acceptance that the ideal of 
descent-based citizenship had not been achieved in practice, but on the other a refusal to 
abandon or modify the system because of this. On the contrary, the citizenship requirements 
were to be as stringent as ever, and as we saw in the last chapter the ideology of autochthony 
continued to be expressed, unabated, in the form of the funeral oration. In fact, it is perfectly 
possible that it became more prominent after the restoration of the democracy; the breakdown 
of the system in practice may have required a compensatory bolstering of it in theory. 
 
4.3 (a) The Scrutiny of 346/5 
 
If the Athenians wished through re-enacting the Periclean law to wipe the slate clean and 
establish citizenship on a sound and secure basis from then on, however, there are strong 
indications that in the long run they failed. By 346/5 the situation had got so bad – at least in 
their own perception – that they decided to perform a scrutiny of the entire citizen body. The 
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aim was purging fraudulent citizens from the lists. The precise reasons for carrying this out 
are, as usual, difficult to reconstruct, and we are heavily reliant on a speech (Dem. 57) written 
for someone who was rejected by his fellow demesmen during his scrutiny and was appealing 
to a court against their verdict. The implications of this speech for the understanding of what 
citizenship meant (or could mean) are examined in section 5.2 (c). Here, I will look at what it, 
and the general scrutiny of which it was a part, can tell us about how the Athenians felt 
citizenship was operating and holding up as an institution. 
 
The evidence strongly points to grave concerns. In the first place, to take such drastic action – 
which required the assent of the dêmos through a vote in the assembly – must have meant that 
substantial numbers of Athenians were persuaded that there was, at the very least, an 
immediate problem that needed to be rectified.
120
 We can only speculate as to whether the 
scrutiny was inspired by a gradual build-up of concern at abuses of the system and 
resentment at fraudulent individuals, or if a particularly notorious case fired up the dêmos 
enough to take such a course of action.
121
 A question worth considering, however, is whether 
this concern about fraudulent citizens extended to a loss of faith in the robustness of the 
deme-based citizenship system as a whole; but if it did, it did not lead to any reform as far as 
we can tell – the system as described in the Ath. Pol. of the 320s does not differ from what we 
find in speeches of the earlier fourth century. 
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It is possible that this was simply because nothing better was available, but it seems more 
plausible that at least part of the reason was an unwillingness to admit that the system was at 
fault. It is generally easier, and less threatening, to blame individual incompetence and 
dishonesty than to conclude that abuses are endemic in a system. The deme system had 
tradition on its side, and was closely bound up with the idea of democracy, since it dated back 
to Cleisthenes. It also served many other very important functions besides monitoring 
citizenship, and in many cases will have carried them out well.
122
 Many Athenians will have 
served their deme, either as officials at a local level or as representatives on the boulê, and the 
demes will still have served as a community hub in many cases, even if by this time many 
members no longer lived in the territory their deme covered.
123
  
 
The demes will thus have retained a practical and sentimental connection with their members, 
and it will naturally have been difficult to blame them as institutions for the problems which 
were seen, let alone to countenance abolishing or changing the structure which they 
constituted. At any event, the process of the scrutiny was itself entirely dependent on the 
deme system, as it involved each deme meeting and voting on whether each individual was 
rightfully a member; only if someone was rejected was there the possibility of an appeal 
reaching the separate and higher authority of the law courts.
124
 This amounted to charging the 
same people who had overseen whatever abuses had led to the current situation with the task 
of rectifying them – it also relied on the efficacy of the same system which had allowed them 
to occur. As an unintended consequence, it additionally allowed unscrupulous individuals to 
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engineer the expulsion of legitimate citizens who were their enemies, potentially reigniting 
old feuds.
125
 
 
In the speech Against Eubulides the speaker refers to τὸν καιρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ παρωξύνθαι τὴν 
πόλιν πρὸς τὰς ἀποψηφίσεις,126 and the fear which it engenders even in innocent men like 
himself who have wrongly been expelled. There is, naturally, a self-serving element to this, 
but the speaker is also keen to stress that many have ‘justly’ been expelled, and praises the 
harsh treatment (χαλεπαίνειν) meted out against them.127 There is no protest that the scrutiny 
amounted to a witch-hunt, only that in this case an innocent man had been caught up in an 
otherwise admirable action. The claim is not, however, that he was involved inadvertently; on 
the contrary, the speaker claims that it was the result of a deliberate set up on the part of his 
enemies within the deme. He also lists abuses that had been carried out in the past, remarking 
that ἐν οὐδενὶ τοίνυν εὑρήσετε τῶν δήμων δεινότερα γεγενημένα τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν.128 That such 
allegations could be made (and they are simply asserted – no witnesses are provided to them) 
and expected to stick, or at least put a certain impression in the minds of the jurors, is 
unsurprising if the speaker accurately captured the mood among Athenians at the time. If 
there was an assumption that corrupt practices had been in operation in the demes,
129
 he was 
simply pandering to this by offering up his opponents as particularly egregious examples. It 
was, of course, open to his opponents to do the same to him, and indeed his background 
appears to have required some explaining.
130
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Ironically, to judge from this case, the purge of the fraudulent citizens brought to light the 
sometimes sordid and self-interested nature of deme politics, which was clearly wanting 
when compared to the ideal form of honest operation. The practices which the speech, and no 
doubt many others like it
131
 revealed would hardly have engendered greater faith in the 
system, but, again, it would always have been possible to blame individuals rather than 
institutions. I cannot agree with Whitehead that ‘the community as a whole was evidently 
satisfied, thereafter, that any individuals illegally enrolled in the demes could be efficaciously 
caught by a line and hook rather than by a seine’132, since it seems very possible that the 
Athenians were not generally satisfied, but had no other form of action to take. The whole 
episode illustrates quite nicely an interesting paradox: the Athenian citizenship system, which 
was supposed to safeguard the citizen body’s purity, worked best as a purely ideological 
construct; but any concerns about its efficacy in practice were likely to be exacerbated by 
actually acting on them, and would thus in turn undermine the feasibility of the whole 
construct. Any attempt to clean up the system would inevitably risk undermining faith in it. 
 
4.3 (b) The Aftermath of Chaeronea 
 
Less than a decade after this, the battle of Chaeronea threw up another crisis moment, in the 
face of which necessity appeared to compel the Athenians to relax drastically the 
qualifications for citizenship, by offering it to anyone who would fight for the city.
133
 This 
proposal came from Hyperides,
134
 whose later contribution to the literature glorifying Athens’ 
autochthonous glory was examined in the last chapter. He, like Thrasybulus before him, was 
prosecuted once the crisis was over. Unfortunately we possess only fragments of his defence 
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speech, but what we do have is extremely interesting. Apparently his argument was that 
ἐπεσκότει μοι τὰ Μακεδόνων ὅπλα. οὐκ ἐγὼ τὸ ψήφισμα ἔγραψα, ἡ δ’ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχη.135 
We cannot be sure that it represented the thrust of most of the speech; nevertheless, it 
strongly suggests that an argument from pragmatism was heavily employed. 
 
In another fragment
136
 the orator asks and answers the questions which he faced, admitting 
that he freed slaves and made metics citizens, but in each case with the clarification that it 
was done in order to preserve the liberty of the Athenians and their city. Doubtless the orator 
made it clear that enfranchising slaves and foreigners was something that he abhorred, but 
that there was simply no other option at the time. Evidently he was persuasive enough to win 
over the jurors, and as far as we can tell his career suffered no ill consequences in the long 
run. The proposal was, however, brought up by Lycurgus in his prosecution of Leocrates: 
μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ἤλγησε καὶ ἐδάκρυσεν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς, ἡνίχ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἦν τὸν 
δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ᾽ 
ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους.137 
 
Hyperides’ success indicates that there was a good degree of flexibility in how the Athenians 
considered such matters. It will have helped, of course, that a democratic jury was made up of 
citizens who would have remembered the situation and the constraints and fears which it put 
on them. Some of them will have supported Hyperides’ proposal at the time. This pragmatic 
understanding, however, might have extended to making allowances during a crisis, but it did 
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not mean that ideas of what constituted Athenian identity were relaxed in ordinary 
circumstances. 
 
4.4 Setting Athenians Apart 
 
Thus far we have seen that the citizen-metic boundary came under severe pressure during the 
Peloponnesian War, and that during the fourth century there evidently continued to be 
problems with maintaining the boundary, which came to a head with the scrutiny of 346; far 
from clearing things up, however, that process can only have exposed yet more abuses and 
illegal activity that had taken place. There was, and most likely always had been, a problem 
with differentiating between citizens and metics, which no doubt became particularly acute in 
the case of second and third generation immigrants, who had been brought up in Athens and 
in many cases must have been indistinguishable from their citizen counterparts. The solution 
which was adopted during most of the fourth century appears to have been to attempt to shore 
up the boundary through the institutions of the demes, with the hope that the Periclean 
provisions could be enforced more rigorously. There was, however, an alternative; if it was 
difficult tell citizens and metics apart, instead of attempting to look more closely, it was 
theoretically possible to change the citizens. This could be achieved through various means, 
indirectly by encouraging citizen unity and identification with the polis, and more directly 
through education. The first method appears to have focused on the ten tribes of Athens, 
whereas the perfect institution to use for education was the ephêbeia. 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
4.4 (a) The Athenian Tribes 
 
Every adult male Athenian citizen, as well as being a citizen of the polis as a whole and a 
demesman,
138
 was a member of a tribe. These were used for administrative and military 
purposes, yet with this there was considerable ideological weight, as the Athenians were 
invited to use their tribes as identifying markers. Each tribe was represented by an 
eponymous hero,
139
 and at different times two monuments made up of statues of this group of 
ten stood in the agora.
140
 Underneath this monument the polis displayed, by tribe, lawsuits, 
proposed legislation, lists of new ephebes, and the ‘muster rolls’ calling up citizens in times 
of war.
141
 It thus served as hub of polis business; but, notably, it was located in the heart of 
the agora, where the inhabitants of Attica, both citizens and non-citizens, carried out their 
personal and private business.  
 
Julia Shear has argued that from 410 to 390 there was a deliberate attempt to switch the city’s 
imagined centre from the Acropolis to the agora, which ‘suddenly became the focus of 
attention and was remade into the space of the democratic citizen’. 142  This involved a 
construction programme that included a new Bouleuterion,
143
 and the inscribing of key pieces 
of Athenian law such as Draco’s homicide law and Demophantus’ decree, which set out how 
citizens should act in the event of the democracy’s being overthrown.144 Honours bestowed 
on non-citizens seem to have continued to be celebrated by display on the Acropolis, with 
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those inscriptions in the agora being concerned with citizens.
145
 One example was the 
honouring of the citizen democrats who had gathered at Phyle during the civil war, whose 
names were inscribed outside the Bouleuterion.
146
 There were also statues, of the eponymous 
heroes as we have seen, but also of the ‘tyrannicides’,147 who could be seen by people leaving 
the court buildings in the northeast corner of the agora.
148
 
 
There were also statues of the general Conon and Euagoras, the king of Salamis in Cyprus, 
whose (mythical) Athenian lineage is stressed by Pausanias.
149
 J.L. Shear speculates that 
mention of his ‘citizenship’ was recorded on the statue’s base, and that the pair were ‘clearly 
identified as democratic Athenians who had imitated the earlier Tyrannicides and had 
subsequently been suitably honoured. They would then serve as models for future generations 
of (democratic) citizens’.150 This ignores a key difficulty, which is the rather obvious fact that 
Euagoras was neither Athenian nor a democrat; he was, however, an ally.
151
 This 
demonstrates that the Athenians did not let worries about the ideological message being 
displayed in the agora prevent them from giving prominence to non-Athenians when it was 
diplomatically beneficial. Shear also, by claiming that during the fifth century the agora was 
merely ‘default public space’,152 overstates her case somewhat;  as T.L. Shear had earlier 
pointed out, the laws had been displayed in the agora since the time of Ephialtes,
153
 and 
already contained ‘the stone’ (ὁ λίθος) on which the archons, arbitrators and witnesses 
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swore.
154
 There was thus already a certain degree of an overtly Athenian and democratic 
presence in the agora. 
 
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that around the end of the fifth century, and afterwards, the 
agora was specifically claimed as democratic, polis space. Shear is keen to stress that this was 
in response to the oligarchic regimes of 411 and 404, which had demonstrated that the 
democracy needed better defending; prior to this time, the agora had been ‘associated with no 
single ideology’.155 She is surely right about the influence of the oligarchies, but Athenian 
ethnic, as well as political, identity had come under pressure during the war years, and may 
also have been a factor. The agora was being marked as Athenian space; this was important 
because, as a trading area, it would have been frequented by individuals of all types who 
lived in the city, citizens, metics, and slaves, plus visitors. Many of the traders would have 
been metics themselves. It was thus a very public arena, and there was also the risk of it 
becoming cosmopolitan, as opposed to Athenian, space if the polis did not put its stamp on it; 
as Vlassopoulos has demonstrated, the polis seems not to have been entirely successful in 
this.
156
 Shear concludes her study by saying that the message of the monuments in the agora 
‘was simple. Anyone could go shopping, but only Athenian citizens could take part in 
political life in the democratic city’.157 To this we can add that anyone could live in the city, 
and use its markets, but that did not make them Athenian. 
 
This was made most obvious in the case of the statues of the eponymous tribal heroes. No 
description of the monument differentiates between the statues, and early representations of 
them on pottery show them as an undifferentiated group; it is thus thought that were a 
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‘generic type figure’.158 This (apparent) uniformity has often led scholars to think that the 
heroes are represented on the Parthenon by a group of figures on the east frieze.
159
 Referring 
to the monument statues, Mattusch has suggested that ‘the point… was not individuality: on 
the contrary, it was their close resemblance to one another’.160 They can be seen as serving as 
intermediary figures between citizen and polis, with their uniformity ensuring equality and 
unity.  
 
This is not a particularly satisfying conception, however, for two main reasons. First, while 
there was a common monument in the agora, the tribal heroes had their own individual 
shrines as well, two of which were outside Athens.
161
 Each could serve, as Kearns puts it, as 
‘a kind of centre for the whole tribe’,162 and at least in the case of the Pandionidae there was a 
public festival at the shrine.
163
  
 
Second, the tribes were also the basis for a considerable amount of competition between 
citizens. Inter-tribal competitions took place at the Panathenaea, and included the purrhichê 
(a dance in armour), a competition in euandria, a torch race and a competition of ships.
164
 
These would naturally involve ideas of masculinity and individual competition.
165
 Beyond 
this, however, drawing an analogy with modern team sports, which ‘bring out patriotic 
feelings and strong civic identification’, Neils suggests the competitions ‘must have promoted 
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group solidarity and tribal loyalty’.166 While we would certainly expect such competitions to 
encourage tribal identification and loyalty, it is not at all clear (certainly if the modern sports 
analogy is followed) that this would translate into polis unity, though that was surely the 
intention.
167
 Another obvious analogy would be with the house system used in some schools, 
where the subsidiary structure is deliberately created to foster healthy competition and 
cohesion. It should also be noted, however, that similar subdivisions can be generated 
informally and spontaneously in other contexts. The Athenians might have attached certain 
qualities to particular tribes; it would not be unexpected, given the amount of competition 
which went on between them.
168
 
 
We should not, then, suppose that the tribal system necessarily led to the results that it was 
intended to have; in many ways it may actually have divided, rather than united, the Athenian 
citizen body.
169
 It must, however, have served as a visible dividing line between citizens and 
metics, who could not be members of tribes. The competitions will have been obvious 
reminders of the outsider status of non-citizens, and deprived them of the chance to excel in a 
public context. The training, likewise, would presumably have been citizen only, though there 
might not have been a rule specifically preventing anyone from participating.
170
 Some of the 
key aspects of community life in the polis were thus denied to metics, and they will have 
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been deprived of the benefits which participation in such events is supposed to bring – 
physical fitness, discipline, and so on – and which, when done by the young, are often 
regarded as important, formative parts of growing up. There was, however, nothing to stop 
metics from taking part in such activities outside of the official structure, and they could be 
‘supporters’ of any tribe they chose (presumably they would usually select the one to which 
the deme they lived in belonged). Nevertheless, the structure of the Athenian polis, and its 
application through tribal competitions, evidently excluded them. 
 
4.4 (b) The Lycurgan Era and the Reformed Ephêbeia 
 
Lycurgus rose to prominence in the later fourth century, and has generally been seen as 
responsible for a massive upturn in Athens’ economic fortunes, as well as pursuing policies 
aimed at reviving public religion and civic pride.
171
 His programme, if that is the right word 
for it,
172
 included what appear to have been exemplary trials of individuals; his only 
completely surviving speech is targeted at a man who left Athens in the aftermath of 
Chaeronea, only to return a number of years later.
173
 In this section I shall examine the 
ephêbeia as reformed during his time, when it was publicly funded, open to all citizens, and 
included ceremonial and public aspects which stressed Athenian identity. It thus appears to 
have been aimed in part at remaking Athenian citizens and inculcating in them patriotism, 
unity, and hoplite virtues, things which would have separated them from the metics, who 
could all too easily blend in with the citizen body. 
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It is not necessary to place a particular philosophical influence on Lycurgus’ policies;174 that 
such ideas about transforming citizens is current is demonstrated by Xenophon’s Poroi,175 
which overtly aims at real reforms to take place in Athens. Some of them, such as the public 
funding of the ephêbeia,
176
 resemble the Lycurgan reforms even if they did not inspire 
them.
177
 Its aim is to increase Athens’ revenues,178 in order that Athens might support itself 
independently and avoid treating other poleis unjustly.
179
 The plan is, eventually, to turn the 
Athenians into a ‘population of rentiers’180 – state-owned enterprises and investments will 
provide enough income for Athenians to live off, and therefore not be compelled to work for 
a living.
181
 Labouring and trade would be left to the metics (and presumably slaves). 
Xenophon was keen to attract rich ones through enktêsis
182
 and by opening up the cavalry to 
them,
183
 but also wanted to make Athens attractive to all those without a polis,
184
 and to 
remove those atimiai which they suffered which provided no benefit.
185
 He would, however, 
prevent metics from serving as hoplites alongside the citizens, as this would relieve the 
metics of danger and disadvantage, and it would be to the citizens’ credit to rely only on 
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themselves.
186
 Citizenship and how it could be improved were current issues at the time, then, 
at least among elite and educated circles. The reforms and institutions of Lycurgus’ time, 
such as the ephêbeia, should be understood in this light.
187
 
 
The Ath. Pol. describes in detail its contemporary ephêbeia, dating to the 320s. There is no 
equivalent description of it before the period of Lycurgus, and it is thus difficult to establish 
what was an innovation of that time, and when each element was introduced. The ephebic 
oath, preserved in literary sources and in a fourth-century inscription found at Acharnae, 
appears to date back far beyond Lycurgus’ time, possibly even to the Athens of Solon.188 It 
appears not to be the case, however, that the ephêbeia existed as a formalised institution 
before the fourth century.
189
 Xenophon’s indicates that in the 350s the ephêbeia was limited 
to those who could afford their own equipment and pay their own way, as he introduces as a 
new proposal that the ephebes be kept at public expense.
190
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A reform of some kind must have taken place shortly before 335, since from that date the 
‘ephebic inscriptions’ appear; since Lycurgus mentioned a law ‘about the ephebes’ 191 
introduced by a man named Epicrates it seems likely that these inscriptions reflect some of its 
provisions.
192
 The inscriptions cover a range of purposes, and are united only in that they 
feature lists of the ephebes in a single year-group of a certain tribe.
193
 The key element of the 
reforms, however, appears to be that, in line with Xenophon’s proposals even if not inspired 
by them, the polis took responsibility for funding the ephebes’ living expenses and provided 
them with equipment, which opened the institution up to all citizens, no matter their financial 
situation. This surely indicates that one of the intentions behind the reform was to extend the 
ephêbeia to those who were below the traditional hoplite status.
194
 
 
There was an obvious military reason for reform, given the disaster of Chaeronea, but Burke 
has pointed to the ‘contradiction between a constructed political ideology, vigorous in 
democratic ideal and bristling with military display, and an economic reality that demanded 
accommodation to the Macedonian peace’; 195  the development of military training and 
bolstering of civic ethos may actually have been in part to compensate for the declining 
power and influence of Athens in foreign affairs. In any case, alongside the military aspect 
there was a civic and educational element which was also of considerable significance.  
 
The Ath. Pol.’s description goes as follows: 
ἐπὰν δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν κατὰ φυλάς, 
ὀμόσαντες αἱροῦνται τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη 
γεγονότων, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 
τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἕνα τῆς φυλῆς ἑκάστης χειροτονεῖ 
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σωφρονιστήν, καὶ κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας. συλλαβόντες δ’ 
οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον, εἶτ’ εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, 
καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτήν. χειροτονεῖ δὲ καὶ 
παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους, οἵτινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ 
ἀκοντίζειν καὶ καταπάλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν. δίδωσι  δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφὴν τοῖς 
μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν αʹ ἑκάστῳ, τοῖς δ’ ἐφήβοις τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς 
ἑκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ἕκαστος 
ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλάς), καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων. καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι· τὸν δ’ 
ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς 
τάξεις, καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν 
καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη χλαμύδας 
ἔχοντες, καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσι πάντων· καὶ δίκην οὔτε διδόασιν οὔτε λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα 
μὴ πρόφασις ᾖ τοῦ ἀπιέναι, πλὴν περὶ κλήρου καὶ ἐπικλήρου, κἄν τινι κατὰ τὸ 
γένος ἱερωσύνη γένηται. διεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων 
εἰσίν.196 
 
The first question to be addressed is who these ephebes were. Rhodes notes that the text’s 
implication is that ‘all newly registered citizens’ became ephebes, yet believes that in fact the 
thetes were excluded, as well as those not physically fit for the training.
197
 His reasoning is 
that, as there is a clear hoplite element to the training, and no mention of any practice in sea 
warfare or rowing, they would not have been ‘required to take part in this course of 
training’.198 Rhodes does not explicitly say whether he believes they could have been entered 
as ephebes if they so desired, but surely this was possible. 
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Aside from the general point that education includes ideological elements as well as practical 
ones – if the desire was to inculcate hoplite virtues then hoplite training is what would have 
been given, even if it was not actually to be employed by all the ephebes – Rhodes’ argument 
ignores a number of specific details. First, the reference to their receiving a shield and spear 
from the polis suggests that equipment was, or could be, provided for them by the city; even 
if this was returned at the end of their service, more equipment could be issued to poorer 
citizens in the future when needed, and they would still (hopefully) have the ability to use it. 
Second, the training included practice in archery, suggesting that the ephebes would be 
expected to include individuals who would not necessarily fight as fully-armed hoplites.
199
 
Third, it must be remembered that after Chaeronea even slaves had been called upon to fight; 
the possibility that another crisis might arise must have been considered, and in such a 
situation it would be to the polis’ advantage to have as many citizens as possible trained in all 
types of fighting. As noted above, it seems likely that the polis’ provision of equipment for 
those undergoing the ephêbeia was brought in as part of Lycurgus’ programme after 338, 
which would fit well with this consideration. 
 
Fourth, elsewhere in the Ath. Pol. the author mentions the still technically current status 
requirements for certain offices, which excluded thetes. We are told that διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὰν 
ἔρηται τὸν μέλλοντα κληροῦσθαί τιν’ ἀρχὴν ποῖον τέλος τελεῖ, οὐδ’ ἂν εἷς εἴποι θητικόν.200 
This evidently means that in such cases the law had not been changed, but was a ‘dead 
letter’.201 Similarly, when explaining the selection by lot of the treasurers of Athena he says 
that they are chosen ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων κατὰ τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον – ἔτι γὰρ ὁ νόμος 
                                                          
199
 Van Wees 2004: 94-95. 
200
 Ath. Pol. 7.4: ‘On account of this, nowadays when someone who is going to enter the lottery for an office is 
asked what tax rate he pays, no one would say he paid at the thete’s level’. 
201
 Rhodes 1981: 146. 
199 
 
κύριός ἐστιν, yet ἄρχει δ’ ὁ λαχὼν κἂν πάνυ πένης ᾖ.202  Given that in those cases the 
exclusion is mentioned and then shown to be non-binding in practice, it would be strange for 
the text not to mention any restriction that applied to the ephêbeia. Indeed, the natural 
conclusion is that by the time of the Ath. Pol. the formal property classes had become 
irrelevant in practice.
203
 Fifth and finally, there is no reference to poverty as an excuse for not 
serving, and the state provision of food and lodgings would mean that a lack of finances 
would be no impediment to completing the term of service. 
 
It is possible to make an objection to this on demographic grounds, since the ephebic 
inscriptions contain tribal contingents which, arguably, are too small to be drawn from the 
entire Athenian citizen body.
204
 There are some serious problems here, however, because our 
overall population figures are in part drawn from these very inscriptions, with certain 
assumptions having been made – one being that the four tribes for which we have figures are 
representative of the total of ten.
205
 We are probably better off, then, to rely on the textual 
evidence which we have, from which it seems likely that all of the newly of age citizens were 
supposed to enrol and serve their term; at least at first, to judge from the inscriptions, they did 
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not all do it, but  the uptake increased over time.
206
 It is true that the text of the Ath. Pol. does 
not explicitly say ‘even the poor are required to serve’, but we should hardly expect it to; the 
implication is clear enough. 
 
The question is of considerable importance, since if only certain classes went through the 
process we would expect it to have a divisive effect on the citizens; if, on the other hand, all 
of the citizens – and only the citizens – went through it, it could serve as a very effective and 
formative divider between citizen and metic in Athens. In the light of how I have presented 
the difficulties of maintaining the barrier between the two groups so far in this chapter, and 
the intellectual background of which Xenophon’s Poroi is an example, I would go as far as to 
say that this was one of the intentions behind the reform of the institution, and not merely one 
of its inevitable consequences. 
 
In any case, looking at the description in the Ath. Pol, there is clearly a strong ritualistic and 
symbolic element in the process, as well as a distinctly public aspect; it was not just military 
training,
207
 and had a moral component as exemplified by the sôpronistês.
208
 As the ephebic 
inscriptions make clear, the tribes were very important when it came to the organisation of 
the trainees, and as ephebes they gained another heroic representative in the form of their 
year-group hero.
209
 There were forty two of these, and when one year reached the age where 
they were no longer liable to be called up
210
 their hero was recycled and given to the first year 
ephebes. 
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The ephebes’ first act was to circle the temples – Steinbock suggests that these included the 
shrines of the tribal heroes, and may have taken a number of days
211
 – and at the end of their 
first year they displayed their skills publicly in the theatre,
212
 before an audience, and 
received spears and shields as markers of their service. These occasions would naturally have 
constituted rites of passage, and thus been important to the individuals concerned, their 
families, and the wider polis community which came to observe them. They were also, 
significantly, exclusively citizen and male rituals. This would apply not only to these specific 
occasions, however; it also held true for the entire period they spent as ephebes. The young 
men went through a lengthy period of living apart from the rest of society – they were even 
excluded from almost all court proceedings
213
 – leading a life that was dedicated to protecting 
the polis and military training, and limited exclusively to male citizens. It gave the ephebes a 
shared experience which was denied metics and others. Even if a metic had been born in 
Athens, and looked, sounded and worked like an Athenian, he could not share in this 
experience, and was thus essentially different. The nature of the experience was also 
important – the ephêbeia embodied many of the essential characteristics which made up 
Greek ideas of masculinity. 
 
It is open to question, of course, whether these effects were borne out in reality. The 
separation was hardly complete or radical; for the first year, the ephebes were stationed 
around the busy area of the Piraeus, which would hardly have constituted a break from the 
rest of society. On the contrary, for ephebes who had grown up in the smaller, rural demes, 
accessing the port’s cosmopolitan atmosphere and opportunities to indulge in sensual 
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pleasures may well have been an eye-opening and mind-broadening experience, albeit 
perhaps not one which accorded well with ideas of moderation and military discipline.
214
 
Likewise in their second year, even if ephebes were posted to more remote areas of Attica, 
they would still most probably have been no more than a day away from home, or the town of 
Athens. 
 
The reality may not have lived up to the ideal experience in other ways, as well. It is likely 
that there was a good degree of cynicism on the part of many ephebes, since their daily 
routine of training was probably rather dull and repetitive most of the time. Besides this, as 
with any form of conscription, their numbers will have included individuals unsuited to the 
role either physically and temperamentally; if exemptions were granted on physical 
grounds
215
 they will presumably have been for extreme cases only. This is not to suggest that 
the term of service was not ever an influential or life-changing one, but merely to point out 
that it will not have been experienced in a uniform way. Equally, there will naturally have 
been divisions between ephebes based on background, ability and the favouritism of their 
overseers. 
 
Things are rather clearer when it comes to the ideology behind the ephêbeia, however. It is 
generally a simple matter to assert that the younger generation needs discipline and patriotism, 
and therefore should do some form of national service (particularly when the ones suggesting 
it are at no risk of having to participate themselves); in the case of Athens, we can add 
concerns about the exclusivity of citizenship and the fragility of the boundary between citizen 
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and foreigner. Another important factor was the cohesion of the citizen body,
216
 which would 
have been fostered (at least in theory) by the habit of messing together and living off equal 
rations – assuming, of course, that all classes entered the ephêbeia. Again, it would be rather 
naïve to suppose that this necessarily worked, and that class distinctions collapsed during the 
term of service,
217
 but the system would at least offer the opportunity to live and train 
together as equals. It is worth remembering that even if many of those who went through it 
did so with a sceptical or cynical eye, the experience would still be a shared one which 
created common ground between young male Athenians and a point of shared reference with 
those in previous year-groups. It would also extend, at least in some degree, to the experience 
of previous generations, though it is unclear precisely how much the institution was altered 
during the Lycurgan period. 
 
Whatever the nature of each young Athenian’s experience, he would return home after the 
two year period of service with memories and a sense of identity which separated him from 
metics whose lives up until that point may have been essentially similar to his own. While 
there were of course a series of exclusively Athenian rites of passage which took place in 
childhood, and opportunities to be involved in festivals, games and the like which were 
denied to non-citizens, these tended to be one-off events,
218
 and in many cases were probably 
paralleled by traditional occasions and rituals celebrated by the various communities which 
made up the metics of Athens. In the absence of civic institutions, these probably had a 
religious flavour, though at least in the case of Greek communities it seems likely that they 
would have wished to emphasise their continuation of the citizenship which they (at least in 
theory) could claim in their polis of origin. 
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The difference with the ephêbeia was that it separated the Athenians for a long (and 
formative) period of time, and featured instruction in the key attributes of male citizenship; 
the aim was to inculcate courage, discipline and skill in battle, all of which were 
characteristics of the prototypical Athenian citizen, the idealised hoplite. That this had a 
certain class bias is unavoidable – all male Athenians went through it, but the alternative 
types of warrior, the cavalryman and the rower in the navy, were not emphasised or trained 
for as far as we can tell. The idea seems to have been to extend hoplite values and identity to 
the whole male citizen population, regardless of economic circumstance, down the social 
scale to the landless labourers and up it to the aristocrats who might have preferred to identify 
with cavalry fighting and its ethos;
219
 this bears certain resemblances to some of the political 
thought which was going on in the fourth century. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
At least from the time of the Peloponnesian War, the boundary between citizen and metic 
came under considerable strain. In times of crisis, it could be simply ignored, either by 
decrees which overtly circumvented it (as in the case of the Plataeans and the fighters at 
Arginusae, and as proposed by Hyperides after Chaeronea) or a general failure to enforce it 
(as seems to have been the case in the latter years of the Peloponnesian War). In more stable 
times there were still individuals who crossed the boundary illegally, sometimes with the aid 
of unscrupulous citizens – we do not know how many, but we can say that their existence was 
a preoccupation for the Athenians which they attempted to counter through legislation 
allowing individual prosecutions (the graphê xenias) and, in the most extreme instance, a 
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scrutiny of the credentials of the entire citizen body. Ironically, however, this latter attempted 
remedy actually made the endemic failings of the Athenian system even more obvious. 
Another strategy to shore up the boundary was to try to create actual differences between 
citizen and metic, which was exemplified by the institution of the ephêbeia as constituted in 
the later fourth century.  
 
As we saw in the last chapter, however, none of this was reflected in the rhetoric used to 
describe and celebrate the Athenians’ unique origins and pure descent. Many of the same 
orators who delivered funeral speeches will have weighed in on the question of what to do 
about the infiltration of the citizen body by fraudulent individuals; Hyperides, as we have 
seen, had himself proposed to enfranchise thousands because under the circumstances he 
thought it necessary, and successfully defended himself on that basis. Such ironies and 
inconsistencies were ignored when it came to the official, public ideology. The tension 
between the theoretically accepted rigid division between citizens and foreigners and the 
messy, porous reality was doubtless one of the reasons the Athenians repeatedly attempted to 
rectify the situation. In the case of the re-enactment of the Periclean citizenship laws, this was 
with a tacit acceptance that abuses had gone on in the past, but also with the hope that with a 
clean slate they could be avoided in the future. 
 
The Athenians, then, dealt with the problem of the boundary with a combination of tacit 
acceptance, and, periodically, extreme action; neither of these, however, seemed to have any 
impact on the utter denial of the problem that the funeral orations represented. It remains to 
investigate how they dealt with individuals who crossed the boundary: metics who became 
citizens, and Athenians who in some sense failed to live up to the Athenian ideal, leaving the 
polis to settle as metics elsewhere or being stripped of their citizenship. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CROSSING THE BOUNDARY 
 
As we have seen, the Athenians do not seem to have been particularly concerned about the 
metic experience, other than as it affected them; they were happy to define them as metics, 
and under normal circumstances were keen to stress their inferiority and separateness by 
erecting and attempting to maintain a theoretical and practical boundary. They were troubled 
by individuals crossing this boundary, and dealt with it either by denial or taking steps to 
rectify the situation; in these ways they attempted to reconcile their exclusive ideology with 
the messy reality. There were cases, however, when things were more complicated. When a 
metic became a citizen legitimately, there was a logical difficulty; quite obviously, a 
naturalised citizen could not be of autochthonous Athenian descent. Equally, the new citizen 
cannot have fit the requirements of descent which being Athenian supposedly required, i.e. 
having two citizen parents. As discussed in the introduction, any group will have to deal with 
such contradictions; what is significant is how this was done. The boundary crossers 
themselves often respond by embracing the group’s values and policing its boundaries even 
more zealously than the less marginal members. 
 
5.1 From Slaves to Citizens – Apollodorus and his family 
 
What is particularly interesting is that rather than claim to be full and uncontroversial 
members of the Athenian group, at least some of these naturalised citizens reminded the 
Athenians of their origins in public contexts. They consciously and publicly positioned 
themselves as marginal or qualified group members, not so much as prototypical insiders as 
outsiders accepted with conditions. This will be seen in two case studies: Apollodorus, the 
son of the freedman and banker Pasion, and Phormion, who was also a former slave who 
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worked in Pasion’s bank. Both were naturalised Athenian citizens – Apollodorus’ father had 
been granted citizenship for his services to the polis, as later was Phormion himself. 
Apollodorus delivered seven of the speeches in the Demosthenic corpus.
1
 The scholarly 
consensus is that one of them (Dem. 45) is a genuine work of Demosthenes, and the others 
were written by one man, most likely Apollodorus himself.
 2
 The most recent full-length 
study of the life and speeches of Apollodorus has endorsed this, and come down firmly on the 
side of Apollodorus himself as author of the six pseudo-Demosthenic speeches which he 
delivered.
3
 Phormion, after he was naturalised, ended up in a feud with Apollodorus, part of 
which is demonstrated by the speech Demosthenes 36. 
 
There is thus a considerable amount of evidence for how these individuals displayed their 
identity in a courtroom context. Before turning to the speeches themselves, I will briefly 
discuss the background of Apollodorus and his family, since it is important to understand as 
much as possible about the personal context of the individuals examined. 
 
5.1 (a) Background and Chronological Issues 
 
The standard reference work on the life and speeches of Apollodorus is Trevett’s Apollodoros 
the Son of Pasion, an extremely useful book in terms of factual data about Apollodorus and 
his family, and questions of authorship and style in the speeches.
4
 The key points which are 
securely attested are as follows: 
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 Pasion was a slave who worked in a bank owned by two Athenians, Antisthenes and 
Archestratus;
5
 the latter manumitted him
6
 and he became a banker in his own right, 
and was evidently well-established by the time of the events described in Isocrates 17, 
i.e. c.394.
7
 His origin is unknown.
8
 
 Pasion was later naturalised as an Athenian citizen, at some point between the time of 
Isocrates 17 (when he was still a metic)
9
 and his retirement in around 371.
10
 He died 
in 370/369.
11
 
 His eldest son, Apollodorus, was twenty four when Pasion died,12 and therefore born 
between 395 and 393,
13
 at a time when his father had either acquired or was about to 
acquire ownership of the bank which had belonged to his former masters.
14
 He would 
therefore have been born and bred in Athens. The same decree which naturalised 
Pasion made his descendants citizens as well.
15
 Unless his father was naturalised very 
shortly after 394, Apollodorus will have been a metic child for at least some time, but 
become an Athenian at some point before his early adulthood. Pasion’s second son, 
Pasicles, was born in 380.
16
 
 Pasion owned a slave, named Phormion, who worked for him in his bank; at some 
point he was manumitted and was eventually naturalised in 361/360.
17
 After Pasion’s 
                                                          
5
 Dem. 36.43. 
6
 Dem. 36.48. 
7
 Davies 1971: 428; Isoc. 17.36. 
8
 The suggestion that he was of Phoenician origin is very uncertain, relying merely on the association he had 
with the Phoenician Pythodorus (Isoc. 17.4). See Diller 107-108, Trevett 1992: 17-18. 
9
 Isoc. 17.33, 41, cited by Davies 1971: 429; see also Trevett 1992: 20-21 n.8. 
10
 Davies 1971: 429-430. 
11
 Dem. 46.13. 
12
 Dem. 36.22. 
13
 Trevett 1992: 19 n.5. 
14
 Trevett 1992: 2, 19.  
15
 Dem. 59.2. The enfranchisement of descendants appears to have become automatic at some point between 
388 and 370 (Osborne 1983: vol. 3 &4, 151-152), and from 369/368 it is regularly stated as part of the decree 
formula (Whitehead 1986b: 110; Osborne 1983: vol. 3 & 4, 150-154). 
16
 Trevett 1992: 6, 38 n.21; Davies 1971: 429. 
17
 Dem. 46.13, Davies 1971: 436. 
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death, according to the terms of his will Phormion married his widow, Archippe, the 
mother of Apollodorus and Pasicles.
18
 
 
The most interesting question for my purposes is the date of Pasion’s (and hence 
Apollodorus’) naturalisation. A number of scholars have attempted to narrow the range down, 
but none has been particularly convincing, as the arguments are necessarily highly 
speculative.
19
 Apollodorus, then, could just about have been born a citizen, if he was born in 
393 and Pasion naturalised very shortly after the events of Isocrates 17. He does frequently 
speak of himself as a naturalised citizen, but this could be more a reference to his father’s 
naturalisation than his own. At the other end of the spectrum, he could have been in his early 
twenties, on the assumption of a birth in 395 and a naturalisation towards the end of Pasion’s 
career. Some point in between is naturally more likely than an extreme, but we have no way 
of determining where this point was. This less-than-helpful conclusion is particularly 
frustrating because it would make a great difference to our understanding of Apollodorus’ 
character if we could be more precise; we would naturally expect an individual’s experience 
of (and attitude towards) his status to vary depending on the age at which he acquired it. 
 
Assuming, however, that the naturalisation took place at least a few years after 391, we are 
faced with the question of whether he grew up with the expectation of being naturalised. 
                                                          
18
 The will is quoted (by Apollodorus) at Dem. 45.28. 
19
 Davies 1971: 430 argues that the most probable date is either before 386 or after 377, on the grounds that it is 
during these periods that Pasion is most likely to have contributed the military and naval epidoseis which Dem. 
45.85 could imply were the reason for his naturalisation. In the speech, however, Apollodorus is simply 
stressing the contribution which his family made to the polis; the specific examples he mentions could have 
taken place at any time and in any context. Trevett 1992: 22 notes that the references in the passage to 
trierarchies could mean Apollodorus was referring to benefactions given after his father’s naturalisation, but 
again this is not certain; and in any case Apollodorus could be using the term loosely, applying it to the 
provision of triremes rather than the role of official commander. Carey 1991 argues for a date before 380, on the 
basis that the decree which naturalised a foreigner extended citizenship to all of his existing legitimate 
descendants; any children who might be born in the future, however, would only be citizens if their mother was 
also. Assuming that Pasion’s wife Archippe was not a citizen, this would mean that his naturalisation must have 
taken place before the birth of their younger son, Pasicles. This, however, is extremely speculative, as Carey 
acknowledged (1994: 181). 
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Certainly his father’s wealth and connections must have made it seem a possibility, but there 
were always the other possibilities that financial reverses might have changed the situation, or 
that Pasion might have died, in which case Apollodorus would have had to acquire his own 
naturalisation decree. Apollodorus’ own comments on the matter would imply that the 
honour was not expected. He presents it very much as a gift which he was still repaying many 
years later, for example in his first speech against Stephanus: οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοῶ τοῦθ’ ὅτι τοῖς μὲν 
γένει πολίταις ὑμῖν ἱκανόν ἐστι λῃτουργεῖν ὡς οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσι, τοὺς δὲ ποιητοὺς ἡμᾶς 
ὡς ἀποδιδόντας χάριν, οὕτω προσήκει φαίνεσθαι λῃτουργοῦντας. 20  This is problematic, 
however, because Apollodorus is clearly saying what he believes the jurors want to hear; we 
cannot take it as evidence for what he actually believed about his naturalisation. The image 
which he puts across is idealised, and not entirely supported by other evidence. Zelnick-
Abramovitz has gathered a body of evidence which points to a very different conception, in 
which naturalisation was a response to a request from the ‘benefactors’ (euergetai) of the 
polis. Thus in Dem. 23 we hear of Python, who πολιτείαν ᾔτησεν. 21  Nevertheless, a 
naturalisation could not be guaranteed, required a lengthy procedure, and could be reversed at 
a second hearing; it therefore seems reasonable to suppose that it was a hope rather than an 
expectation on Apollodorus’ part. 
 
5.1 (b) Phormion and his Presentation in Demosthenes 36 
 
Before discussing Apollodorus’ self-presentation before the Athenian jurors, it will be useful 
to examine another naturalised citizen in court. Phormion, mentioned above, was naturalised 
                                                          
20
 Dem. 45.78: ‘For I’m not unaware that for you who are citizens by birth it is enough to perform liturgies as 
the laws command, whereas we who are made citizens should show that we perform them as grateful 
repayments’. 
21
 Dem. 23.127. Zelnick-Abramovitz 1998: 555. 
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in 361/360.
22
 There are key differences between his position and that of Apollodorus, 
however. Firstly, he was a freedman, and before his manumission had been the property of 
Pasion. He thus had personal experience of working as a slave, whereas Apollodorus merely 
had the taint of servile origins through his father. Secondly, he was of barbarian birth and did 
not speak Greek as a first language – Apollodorus says ὑμεῖς δ’ ἴσως αὐτὸν ὑπειλήφατε, ὅτι 
σολοικίζει τῇ φωνῇ, βάρβαρον καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητον εἶναι,23 and refers to him as a barbarian 
on two other occasions, saying that βάρβαρος γὰρ ἐωνήθης24 and referring to τοὺς Ἕλληνα 
μὲν ἀντὶ βαρβάρου ποιήσαντας.25  Scafuro has suggested that the references to him as a 
barbarian could be mere invective, and that he might therefore have been of Greek origin,
26
 
but this is hard to credit. Firstly, the word σολοικίζει generally refers to mistakes made by 
foreign (i.e. non-native) speakers of Greek.
27
 If he were a native speaker, whatever his family 
origin, there is no reason to suppose that he would have made such errors; and a speaker of a 
different dialect of Greek would hardly be confused with a barbarian. Secondly, the reference 
to Phormion’s having been made ‘a Greek instead of a barbarian’ could hardly have been 
made without some further explanation if he was, in fact, Greek.  The usual interpretation that 
he was a barbarian thus seems secure. 
 
 Unfortunately we cannot be more precise about his origin, but it can be said that he was a 
‘visible’ (or rather ‘audible’) foreigner in a way that Apollodorus was not – whatever 
Pasion’s origins, his son was born and bred in Athens, and therefore we can safely assume 
that Apollodorus spoke Greek as a native language, in the Attic dialect and, whatever such a 
thing may have sounded like, with an Athenian accent. Specifically, given his education, he 
                                                          
22
 Davies 1971: 436, based on Dem. 46.13: ‘ὁ δὲ Φορμίων Ἀθηναῖος ἐγένετο ἐπὶ Νικοφήμου ἄρχοντος’. 
23
 Dem. 45.30, discussed further at p. 225 below: ‘Perhaps you have supposed, because he doesn’t speak the 
language properly, that he’s a barbarian and someone contemptible’. 
24
 Dem. 45.81: ‘for you were bought as a barbarian’. 
25
 Dem. 45.73, discussed further below: ‘those who made him a Greek instead of a barbarian’. 
26
 Scafuro 2011: 220. 
27
 See Sandys’ note on this passage. 
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will presumably have spoken in something of an upper class accent, or at least manner of 
speech; that such a thing existed is indicated by a fragment of Aristophanes, which mentions 
a man διάλεκτον ἔχοντα μέσην πόλεως / οὔτ’ ἀστείαν ὑποθηλυτέραν / οὔτ’ ἀνελεύθερον 
ὑπαγροικοτέραν.28 
 
Phormion’s feud with Apollodorus involved a number of court cases. We have a speech from 
one of these cases which was delivered on his behalf, namely Dem. 36, For Phormion. The 
speech was a response to an attempt by Apollodorus to gain money which, he alleged, had 
been appropriated by Phormion from Pasion’s estate.29 Apollodorus prosecuted Phormion, 
who responded with a paragraphê, arguing that Apollodorus’ suit was inadmissible due to his 
having given up his claims on two prior occasions.
30
 
 
The speech is considered a genuine work of Demosthenes
31
 and was delivered by one of 
Phormion’s friends on his behalf. The speaker says that there were a number of Phormion’s 
epitêdeioi involved,
32
 but he seems to have been the only one who made a speech at the trial, 
to judge from his final request: ἐξέρα τὸ ὕδωρ.33 The question of how much input the litigant 
had into the content of the speech is thus more complex than usual, since there were three 
parties involved: Phormion, as the litigant proper, whose wealth and reputation were on the 
line; his friend, as the one who actually delivered the speech; and Demosthenes, as the 
logographer who wrote it. The question is of particular interest because it will determine 
whether we are dealing with self-presentation (i.e. how Phormion wished to present himself 
                                                          
28
 Aristophanes Fr. K-A 706 = 685 Kock. Cited by Colvin 2000: 290, who translates ‘his is the normal dialect of 
the city, not the fancy high-society accent, nor uneducated, rustic talk’. 
29
 Apollodorus’ version of events is given at Dem. 45.3 ff. 
30
 Dem. 36.23-24. 
31
 The earliest direct evidence is that of Aeschines, who, addressing Demosthenes, claims that ἔγραψας λόγον 
Φορμίωνι τῷ τραπεζίτῃ χρήματα λαβών (2.165); see also Plut. Dem. 15.1. 
32
 Dem. 36.1. 
33
 Dem. 36.62. 
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to an Athenian jury, given his desire to win their sympathy and persuade them of his case) or 
the presentation of another (i.e. how the speaker, Phormion’s other friends, and/or 
Demosthenes wished to present him in order to do the same).  
  
Collaboration in forensic speeches is discussed in general in the introduction. The likelihood 
in this case is that while the words were composed by Demosthenes in isolation from the 
other interested parties, there would have been a good deal of influence on him at the stage of 
consultation (and conceivably revision as well, if Phormion and the speaker were not satisfied 
with the first version). It is hardly conceivable that Phormion would have handed the case in 
its entirety over to others and had no personal say in the content of the speech, in spite of his 
alleged helplessness.
34
 He was shrewd and able enough to have risen to the top of a bank, and 
run it successfully enough to earn and keep a large fortune;
35
 in order to do this he must 
surely have acquired considerable expertise in dealing with (and manipulating) prominent 
and wealthy members of Athenian society. Pasion evidently trusted his abilities enough to 
place him in charge of the bank and make him guardian of his younger son.
36
 
 
The speaker himself, however, would also want some input, since he too was subject to the 
judgement of the jury and spectators, albeit in a social rather than a legal sense. We do not 
know his identity, but it seems safe to assume that he would have been an able and 
experienced speaker, and possibly therefore someone well-known in the legal and perhaps 
political arena. He would have had something to gain or lose from the outcome of the trial in 
terms of his reputation. The probability, then, is that a collaboration of Phormion, the speaker, 
and presumably the other friends referred to in the speech had some influence on the content. 
                                                          
34
 Dem. 36.1. 
35
 See Davies 1971: 435-437, where Phormion the banker is identified with the Phormion of Dem. 35.13-14, IG 
ii
2 
1622 l.472 and IG ii
2 
1623 l.245, which would indicate that his son Archippus was undertaking trierarchies in 
the late 320s.  
36
 Dem. 36.8. 
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The nature and extent of this influence, however, is difficult to pin down. There must have 
been conversations between Phormion, his associates and Demosthenes at an initial stage 
simply to describe the facts – the ‘consultation’, as Usher put it.37 Possible lines of argument 
would naturally also have been raised and discussed at this stage, and perhaps at later stages 
as well. It is impossible to tell whether the ideas of Phormion and his friends were 
incorporated into Demosthenes’ speech. Quite conceivably, Demosthenes could have ignored 
them and produced something completely different – but whatever he came up with must 
have met with their approval. They had the option to veto anything which he produced, and it 
should be noted that Demosthenes was still a relatively young man at this point – he was born 
between 385 and 383
38
 and the speech was delivered c.350,
39
 only a few year after he had 
begun his political career.
40
 He may not, therefore, have had a great enough reputation for 
Phormion and the speaker to accept his speech if they had misgivings about it. 
 
The speech, then, is an attempt to present a naturalised citizen to the jurors in a way that 
would win their sympathy. It is also an attempt to represent the speaker’s relationship with 
Phormion in a way that would bring credit to both, or at least avoid any dishonour. There 
remains the question of how successful it was, but fortunately this is one of the few occasions 
where we are well informed about the outcome. In Dem. 45 Apollodorus describes his utter 
defeat in the previous action: 
προλαβὼν δέ μου ὥστε πρότερος λέγειν διὰ τὸ παραγραφὴν εἶναι καὶ μὴ 
εὐθυδικίᾳ εἰσιέναι, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀναγνοὺς καὶ τἄλλ’ ὡς αὑτῷ συμφέρειν ἡγεῖτο 
ψευσάμενος, οὕτω διέθηκε τοὺς δικαστάς, ὥστε φωνὴν μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν ἐθέλειν 
ἀκούειν ἡμῶν· προσοφλὼν δὲ τὴν ἐπωβελίαν καὶ οὐδὲ λόγου τυχεῖν ἀξιωθείς, 
                                                          
37
 Usher 1976: 36. 
38
 Davies 1971: 125-126. 
39
 Trevett 1992: 48. 
40
 BNP s.v. Demosthenes. 
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ἀλλ’ ὑβρισθεὶς ὡς οὐκ οἶδ’ εἴ τις πώποτ’ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, ἀπῄειν βαρέως, ὦ 
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρων.41 
 
 
The claim that the jurors refused to hear ‘any speech whatsoever’ from Apollodorus may be a 
somewhat self-serving interpretation on the speaker’s part42 – it would certainly be preferable 
to claim that than to admit to having been defeated after a full hearing. Given the 
opportunities provided in the courts for heckling and interrupting speeches it would be easy 
to exaggerate an unfavourable reception into a complete shouting down. It is nevertheless 
clear that Apollodorus was heavily defeated, as his having to pay the epôbelia indicates. It is 
thus reasonable to infer that Dem. 36 struck a powerful chord with the jury. What precisely it 
was that achieved this, however, is more difficult to determine. The speech appears to be 
strong on a number of levels, in terms of its legal and factual arguments as well as its 
emotional appeal.
43
 
 
The strategy adopted was to present Phormion very much as an inferior – in terms of social 
identity, not a member of the Athenian citizen in-group at all. The speech begins with the 
following characterisation of Phormion:  Τὴν μὲν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ λέγειν, καὶ ὡς ἀδυνάτως ἔχει 
Φορμίων, αὐτοὶ πάντες ὁρᾶτ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.44 His apeiria conforms to the familiar 
trope of the inexperienced litigant, which we see, for example, in the proem of Lysias 19, in 
                                                          
41
 Dem. 45.6: ‘He had the advantage of me in that he spoke first, since it was a paragraphê that did not go into 
the real merits of the case, and after reading these documents [i.e. testimony to a release, a lease and a will, all of 
which, according to Apollodorus, were invented or forged by his opponents] and telling other lies which he 
thought would be to his advantage he so affected the jurors that they refused to hear any speech whatsoever 
from us. Having been fined the one-sixth [for gaining less than a fifth of the votes], and thought unworthy of 
having a speech, and humiliated as I do not think anyone else ever was, I went away disgusted, men of Athens, 
and taking it badly.’  
42
 Carey 1994: 177 notes that Apollodorus ‘may be lying’; other scholars are satisfied to take Apollodorus’ 
assertion at face value: see e.g. Murray 1939a: 173, Trevett 1992: 15. 
43
 Its high reputation is endorsed by e.g. Usher 1999: 249, who praises its ‘turning defence into attack’ and 
‘great intensity’, and Scafuro 2011: 8, for whom it ‘brilliantly and mercilessly’ attacks Apollodorus.  
44
 Dem. 36.1: ’Phormion’s inexperience in speaking, and utter helplessness, you can all see for yourselves, men 
of Athens’. 
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which the speaker explains that ἀνάγκη οὖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ δεινὸς πρὸς ταῦτα πέφυκα, βοηθεῖν τῷ 
πατρὶ καὶ ἐμαυτῷ οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι.45  
 
Matthew Christ has described the related practice of litigants’ appealing to the jury for help, 
through ‘advancing a view of themselves as victims’.46 The aim was to draw on the idea of 
the Athenian dêmos as ‘a unified community with common interests and shared values and 
ideals’47 and to cast the speaker as a member of this community who needed its help; this in 
turn drew on ‘the idea that heroic helping was a national trait’, as depicted in myths such as 
the Athenian intervention on behalf of the dead champions in the Seven Against Thebes 
stories.
48
 Christ treats this as a phenomenon connected with citizenship, and stresses that 
‘litigants… appear to take little for granted about this helping community… Community, in 
the context of the courts, was not a pre-existing, static idea, but one that had to be created 
anew by litigants in forging bonds with the strangers before them on the basis of shared social 
norms and common interests’. 49  This recreation of an imagined community involved a 
flexibility that is exploited in Dem. 36 to account for, and take advantage of, Phormion’s 
unusual and anomalous identity as a naturalised citizen of barbarian origin and a former slave. 
Demosthenes could draw on familiar tropes but, because of his client’s position (and that of 
his opponent, Apollodorus), give them a twist which improved his chances of swaying the 
jury. 
 
Phormion’s helplessness and inexperience, then, do not in themselves signify his inferior 
status, as this was a trope often used by citizens as well. The specific reference to his speech, 
                                                          
45
 Lys. 19.1: ‘So it is necessary, even if I am not naturally skilled in these things, to assist my father and myself 
to the extent that I can’. Usher 1999: 95 notes this ‘topos of inexperience’ and points to Carey’s (1989: 9) 
opinion that it is a ‘stock proem’. Other examples of the topos are Lys. 7.1, 17.1. 
46
 Christ 2010: 210. 
47
 Christ 2010: 205. 
48
 Christ 2010: 212. 
49
 Christ 2010: 230. 
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however, would have flagged up his foreign upbringing and accent. This would have been 
obvious to the jury in any case (indeed the speaker actually invites the jurors to look at 
Phormion and see for themselves)
50
, so the issue could hardly have been ignored; but the 
speaker does more than this, and actually turns it to his advantage. He uses Phormion’s 
barbarian origin to link him to Apollodorus’ father, and provide an explanation for the 
behaviour which Apollodorus is apparently claiming was out of character. Thus when 
addressing Pasion’s decision to give his widow to Phormion in marriage he says: 
ὑμῖν μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς γένει πολίταις, οὐδὲ ἓν πλῆθος χρημάτων  
ἀντὶ τοῦ γένους καλόν ἐστιν ἑλέσθαι: τοῖς δὲ τοῦτο μὲν δωρεὰν ἢ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἢ 
παρ᾽ ἄλλων τινῶν λαβοῦσιν, τῇ τύχῃ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ χρηματίσασθαι καὶ  
ἑτέρων πλείω κτήσασθαι καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀξιωθεῖσιν, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν φυλακτέα. 
διόπερ Πασίων ὁ πατὴρ ὁ σὸς οὐ πρῶτος οὐδὲ μόνος, οὐδ᾽ αὑτὸν ὑβρίζων οὐδ᾽  
ὑμᾶς τοὺς υἱεῖς, ἀλλὰ μόνην ὁρῶν σωτηρίαν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πράγμασιν, εἰ τοῦτον  
ἀνάγκῃ ποιήσειεν οἰκεῖον ὑμῖν, ἔδωκε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, μητέρα δ᾽ ὑμετέραν  
τούτῳ.51 
 
The speaker positions Pasion – and therefore Phormion, who was also a citizen ‘by gift’ – on 
a quite different level from that of the genei politai who made up the jury. This, he says, 
makes behaviour that would be reprehensible from a born citizen acceptable and 
understandable from a naturalised one. Apollodorus himself, of course, was also a naturalised 
citizen, albeit one who must have spoken and acted like a native; the speaker deliberately 
stresses this by switching his address from the andres Athênaioi of the jury to Apollodorus 
himself (‘Pasion, your father’) in the second sentence, which one might imagine was 
delivered with particular emphasis. 
 
                                                          
50
 Dem. 36.1, quoted above. 
51
 Dem. 36.30: ‘For you, men of Athens, who are citizens by birth, to choose any amount of money over your 
descent is no good thing; but for those who receive citizenship as a gift, either from you or from any others, and 
who through good fortune were originally considered worthy of the same privileges because of their money-
making and possession of more than others, these advantages are things to be guarded. On this account your 
father Pasion, being neither the first nor the only one to do so, and bringing disgrace neither on himself nor on 
you his sons, saw that the only way to preserve his business was if he made this man part of your household by 
family tie, and gave to him his own wife, and your own mother’. 
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This link to Apollodorus’ origins puts him, Pasion and Phormion on the same level – none of 
them is a member of the citizen in-group. This is not merely a matter of formal status, as it 
supposedly affects their behaviour as well; they are not expected (or required) to conform to 
prototypically Athenian standards or norms. They have gained their position because of their 
ability in making money and the wealth which this has given them, and they must (according 
to the speaker) keep this advantage, to the point where they may act differently from the 
citizens by birth. 
 
This is an interesting strategy to pursue, since it provides a different interpretation from what 
we hear elsewhere about naturalisation and how it should be earned. In theory, the Athenians 
demanded that recipients of citizenship, as well as undergoing a process which gave 
numerous occasions for objections, had to have shown andragathia towards the Athenian 
dêmos. This is actually described by Apollodorus in his speech Against Neaera: πρῶτον μὲν 
γὰρ νόμος ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ κείμενος μὴ ἐξεῖναι ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναῖον, ὃν ἂν μὴ δι᾽ 
ἀνδραγαθίαν εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἄξιον ᾖ γενέσθαι πολίτην.52 This terminology is 
shared in the text of surviving naturalisation decrees.
53
 The speaker of Dem. 36, however, 
limits it to a matter of wealth. He avoids using the term andragathia, merely claiming instead 
that Φορμίων χρήσιμος γεγονὼς καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ πολλοῖς ὑμῶν, καὶ οὐδέν᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἰδίᾳ οὔτε 
δημοσίᾳ κακὸν οὐδὲν εἰργασμένος, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικῶν Ἀπολλόδωρον τουτονί, δεῖται καὶ ἱκετεύει 
καὶ ἀξιοῖ σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνδεόμεθ᾽ οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῶν.54 
 
                                                          
52
 Dem. 59.89: ‘First, the dêmos has a law which establishes that it is forbidden to make anyone Athenian unless 
he is worthy of becoming a citizen on account of his andragathia towards the Athenian dêmos.’ 
53
 Carey 1992: 130. 
54
 Dem. 36.57: ‘Phormion, who has been useful both to the polis and to many of you, and has done no wrong 
either in private or in public, and did Apollodorus no injustice, needs, begs and claims to be protected, and we 
his friends join in begging this of you‘. 
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He has thus been useful to the polis (and, apparently, many of its citizens on an individual 
basis), and has done no wrong to anyone. This naturally brings to mind the ‘ideal’ metic 
behaviour of Parthenopaeus, as described in Euripides’ Suppliants.55 There is no question of 
the naturalised citizen adopting the role or behaviour of the natural born citizens who are now, 
formally speaking, his peers. In the passage the speaker also implicitly demystifies the 
process, stripping it of the ideological significance which is rhetorically attached to it by 
other speakers when it suits their purpose. While naturalisation should still appear καὶ τοῖς 
δοῦσιν ὡς εὐσχημονέστατ᾽… καὶ τοῖς λαβοῦσιν ὑμῖν, 56  it is also a reward for services 
rendered, with limited impact. Its recipients have not demonstrated any great virtue beyond 
that. There is a similar demystification of citizenship ideology in cases of Athenians whose 
citizenship came under threat.
57
 
 
The terms in which the speaker calls on the jurors for aid are also worth considering. It is 
through his Athenian epitêdeioi that Phormion seeks help – they do not simply relay the 
message to the jurors, but join in exhorting them to action. Phormion’s past behaviour has 
proved him worthy of the jurors’ help, but his friends’ intercession is presented as the 
necessary link between him and them. It is because he is a friend and useful benefactor of the 
polis that Phormion is worthy of its assistance, not because he is a part of the citizen 
community. In this way, the speaker can draw on the helping community of the polis without 
running the risk of having Phormion appear as an interloper – he remains outside the 
Athenian group. 
 
                                                          
55
 See section 1.1. 
56
 Dem. 36.47: ‘a most noble thing, both to those who give it and you who receive it’, the ‘you’ referring to 
Apollodorus and his fellow naturalised citizens. 
57
 See section 5.2 (c). 
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Turning again to Phormion’s opponent, the speaker has already identified Apollodorus as a 
member of the same out-group of which Phormion is a part, and goes on to expose his 
hypocrisy explicitly. He attacks the argument which (he claims) Apollodorus will use, as 
follows:  
καὶ  δῆτα  θαυμάζω  πῶς  οὐ λογίζει  πρὸς  σεαυτόν, ὅτι  ἔστιν  Ἀρχεστράτῳ  τῷ 
ποτὲ  τὸν  σὸν  πατέρα  κτησαμένῳ  υἱὸς  ἐνθάδε, Ἀντίμαχος, πράττων  οὐ κατ᾽  
ἀξίαν, ὃς οὐ δικάζεταί  σοι, οὐδὲ  δεινά  φησι  πάσχειν, εἰ σὺ μὲν  χλανίδα  φορεῖς, 
καὶ  τὴν  μὲν  λέλυσαι, τὴν  δ᾽ ἐκδέδωκας  ἑταίραν, καὶ  ταῦτα  γυναῖκ᾽  ἔχων  
ποιεῖς, καὶ  τρεῖς  παῖδας  ἀκολούθους  περιάγει, καὶ  ζῇς  ἀσελγῶς  ὥστε  καὶ  
τοὺς  ἀπαντῶντας  αἰσθάνεσθαι, αὐτὸς  δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος  πολλῶν  ἐνδεής  ἐστιν. οὐδὲ 
τὸν  Φορμίων᾽  ἐκεῖνος  οὐχ  ὁρᾷ. καίτοι  εἰ κατὰ  τοῦτ᾽  οἴει  σοι  προσήκειν  τῶν  
τούτου, ὅτι  τοῦ  πατρός  ποτ᾽  ἐγένετο  τοῦ  σοῦ, ἐκείνῳ  προσήκει  μᾶλλον  ἢ 
σοί· ὁ γὰρ  αὖ σὸς  πατὴρ  ἐκείνων  ἐγένετο, ὥστε  καὶ  σὺ καὶ  οὗτος  ἐκείνου  
γίγνεσθ᾽  ἐκ τούτου  τοῦ  λόγου.58 
 
A contrast is drawn between the lifestyle and behaviour of Apollodorus and Antimachus, the 
son of his father’s erstwhile master. Apollodorus lives so extravagantly that those passing in 
the street notice it, whereas Antimachus lives in want of many things; this has not, however, 
driven Antimachus to prosecute out of envy. The contrast between the two predicts and 
ridicules Apollodorus’ suggestion that Phormion has acted in a way that exceeds his station, 
since it is in fact Apollodorus who has done so. The illogical and hypocritical nature of 
Apollodorus’ argument (as predicted by the speaker) is described in yet stronger terms 
shortly afterwards, when the speaker says that 
εἶτ᾽  εἰς  τοῦθ᾽  ἥκεις  μανίας  (τί γὰρ  ἂν ἄλλο  τις  εἴποι;) ὥστ᾽  οὐκ  αἰσθάνει  
ὅτι  καὶ  νῦν  ἡμεῖς  μὲν  ἀξιοῦντες, ἐπειδήπερ  ἀπηλλάγη  Φορμίων, μηδὲν  
ὑπόλογον  εἶναι  εἴ ποτε  τοῦ  σοῦ  πατρὸς  ἐγένετο, ὑπὲρ  σοῦ  λέγομεν, σὺ δὲ 
μηδέποτ᾽  ἐξ ἴσου  σοι  γενέσθαι  τοῦτον  ἀξιῶν  κατὰ  σαυτοῦ  λέγεις· ἃ γὰρ  ἂν 
                                                          
58
 Dem. 36.45-46: ‘And I’m amazed that you don’t think about yourself, how Archestratus, who once owned 
your father, has a son here, Antimachus, who’s not doing as he deserves, but does not use the law against you, 
nor say that he has suffered terribly because you wear a fine woollen shirt, and have redeemed one hetaira and 
given another away in marriage, and done all this while having a wife of your own, and you lead around three 
attendant slaves, and live so licentiously that anyone who happens to meet you notices it, while he himself is in 
want of many things. And he doesn’t fail to see Phormion, either. And if you think you have a right to 
Phormion’s property on the basis that he once belonged to your father, Antimachus has a yet greater claim than 
you – for your father in turn belonged to those men, so both you and Phormion belong to him according to this 
argument.’ 
221 
 
σὺ δίκαια  σαυτῷ  κατὰ  τούτου  τάξῃς, ταὐτὰ  ταῦθ᾽  ἥξει  κατὰ  σοῦ  παρὰ  τῶν  
τὸν  σὸν  πατέρ᾽  ἐξ ἀρχῆς  κτησαμένων.59 
 
Apollodorus is thus said to have reached the point of mania, a judgement with which scholars 
are inclined to agree – Trevett, for example, remarks that ‘insanity indeed hardly seems too 
strong a word’.60 The speaker makes clear the logical consequence of Apollodorus’ argument 
– if Phormion should always be Apollodorus’ inferior, then Apollodorus himself should 
always be inferior to his father’s former masters.  
 
It is also important to note that the speaker does not make an effort to define Phormion as a 
‘real’ citizen; his point is rather that Apollodorus is no better than the freedman. In both cases 
their servile and foreign origins keep them from being a full part of the citizen body, in spite 
of the great gift they have received. The speaker argues that Apollodorus’ behaviour has 
proved that he is an ungrateful recipient: 
καὶ  ὑβρίζεις  μὲν  σαυτὸν  καὶ  τοὺς  γονέας  τεθνεῶτας, προπηλακίζεις  δὲ τὴν  
πόλιν, καὶ  ἃ τῆς  τουτωνὶ  φιλανθρωπίας  ἀπολαύσας  ηὕρεθ᾽  ὁ σὸς  πατὴρ  καὶ  
μετὰ  ταῦτα  Φορμίων  οὑτοσί, ταῦτ᾽  ἀντὶ  τοῦ  κοσμεῖν  καὶ  περιστέλλειν, ἵνα  
καὶ  τοῖς  δοῦσιν  ὡς εὐσχημονέστατ᾽  ἐφαίνετο  καὶ  τοῖς  λαβοῦσιν  ὑμῖν, ἄγεις  
εἰς  μέσον, δεικνύεις, ἐλέγχεις, μόνον  οὐκ  ὀνειδίζεις  οἷον  ὄντα  σ᾽ ἐποιήσαντ᾽  
Ἀθηναῖον.61 
 
Whereas Phormion has fulfilled the role of the naturalised citizen well, and striven to repay 
the gift, Apollodorus has belittled it through his invective, ironically showing hubris against 
himself and his parents as well as ‘all but taunting’ the Athenians for making someone like 
himself a citizen. He is thus the ungrateful recipient of the gift of citizenship – a 
                                                          
59
 Dem. 36.48: ‘You have reached such a point of madness (for what else could one call it?) that you do not 
realise that now we who claim, since Phormion has been freed, it should not be held against him that he once 
belonged to your father are speaking in your favour, whereas you, claiming that he can never be equal with you, 
are arguing against yourself – for the same argument you would set out as right for yourself against Phormion 
will come back against you from those who originally owned your father.’ 
60
 Trevett 1992: 176. 
61
 Dem. 36.47: ‘You are disgracing yourself and your dead parents, you are dragging the city through the mire, 
and as for what your father gained through the benefit of kindness, as also afterwards did Phormion – instead of 
adorning and cherishing it, so that it might appear the most honourable of benefits both to those who give it and 
you who receive it, you drag it into public, you show it off, you treat it with contempt, you all but taunt them 
that they made a man such as you an Athenian.’ 
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characterisation which ironically mirrors Apollodorus’ own depiction of Phormion as the 
ungrateful freed slave.
62
 
 
This gift, as we have seen, is contrasted with the inborn citizen status of the members of the 
jury, as they are represented and addressed by the speaker. The possibility that some of them 
were naturalised or of foreign origins is not brought up, as it might have been under a 
different strategy; while it is theoretically possible to imagine a litigant arguing that the 
alleged purity of the Athenian citizen body was not borne out in reality, and that therefore 
naturalised citizens have as much honour as any of them, this does not happen. The speaker 
of Dem. 36 instead plays up to the myth, and invites the jury to share in imagining that they 
are a unified and similar body, rather than what must have been the varied and disparate 
reality.
63
 This approach mirrors the treatment of cases concerning the rule of the Thirty 
Tyrants, when litigants routinely speak as though all of the jurors had been on the side of the 
democratic ‘men of Piraeus’, which cannot have been literally true. 64  The point is to 
characterise the opponent as deviant and outside of the normal, idealised citizen group. The 
speaker of Dem. 36 has a particular reason for doing so, since the man he is defending is 
clearly and obviously in many ways an outsider; rather than claim otherwise, he argues that 
Apollodorus is in essentially the same position. Any attempt by Apollodorus to contradict this 
would leave him seeming presumptuous, claiming to have a status and identity as a true 
citizen which he does in fact possess. 
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 See section 5.2 (c). 
63
 On this common tactic see e.g. Wolpert 2003: 545, Blanshard 2004: 37-38. 
64
 E.g. Lys. 12.30, 13.1. 
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5.1 (c) Apollodorus and his Arguments in Demosthenes 45 and 59 
 
Of course, in the case of Dem. 36 we are dealing with what the speaker claims was 
Apollodorus’ argument rather than the argument itself. Fortunately for us, however, this was 
not the end of the matter. The speech was extremely successful, and because he lost so 
heavily Apollodorus was forced to drop the case. His response was to prosecute one of the 
witnesses for giving false testimony in an action from which two speeches have survived in 
the Demosthenic corpus, namely Against Stephanus I and II (Dem. 45 and 46). The first is the 
longer, and the only speech delivered by Apollodorus which is generally considered to be a 
genuine work of Demosthenes.
65
 This is based first on the stylistic differences between it and 
the other speeches delivered by Apollodorus, which indicate that it is the work of a skilled 
(and presumably professional) logographer, and second on stylistic similarities with the 
genuine Demosthenic speeches; it is also attributed to Demosthenes by Plutarch in his Life of 
Demosthenes
66
 and his comparison of the orator with Cicero.
67
 Trevett’s is the fullest 
investigation of the matter, and his conclusion is that ‘Demosthenes almost certainly wrote 
45’.68 
 
If this is so, it raises some fascinating questions concerning Demosthenes’ character, politics 
and literary artistry.
69
 What makes these questions particularly interesting is that in many 
respects Dem. 45 makes the arguments which the speaker of Dem. 36 predicted and ridiculed. 
While not vital for the purposes of the present analysis, it is tempting to imagine 
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 Scafuro 2011: 229. 
66
 Plut. Dem. 15.1. 
67
 Plut. Comp. Cic. & Dem. 3.5. 
68
 Trevett 1992: 73; Usher 1999: 257 agrees that there is a strong probability of this being the case. 
69
 Mirhady 2000: 182. Wolff 2007 [1967]: 112 argues that the Athenians saw no problem with writing speeches 
for both sides, since Aeschines 2.165 accuses Demosthenes ‘of betraying the confidence of his client (Phormio) 
in the first case, but not of composing speeches for both sides’ – if there had been any shame in the latter he 
would have brought that up as well. 
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Demosthenes deliberately rising to the challenge set in his earlier speech, turning what 
appeared to be hypocritical, even ‘insane’ arguments into effective and persuasive rhetoric. 
Scafuro has even speculated that Demosthenes might have agreed to write this speech for 
Apollodorus while still preparing Dem. 36 for Phormion; if Apollodorus came to realise that 
his case was doomed to fail, he might have pre-emptively hired Demosthenes for the planned 
follow-up lawsuit.
70
 Alternatively, of course, it is possible that the main thrust of the 
argument was dictated by Apollodorus. In the discussion that follows I refer to the speech and 
its arguments as Apollodorus’ for the sake of convenience, on the grounds that he approved 
of them even if he did not generate them. In any case, what the later speech shows is that a 
very different interpretation from that produced on Phormion’s behalf could be made. 
 
Dem. 45 presented to the jury a narrative in which there was a clear difference in status and 
quality between someone like Apollodorus and someone like Phormion – but, crucially, this 
is done without putting Apollodorus on an equal footing with the genei politai of the 
idealised citizen body. He remains outside of the Athenian in-group, but is nevertheless not in 
the same category as Phormion. This is a significant reformulation of Trevett’s view that 
Apollodorus sought to be ‘more Athenian than the Athenians’,71 and that this created tension 
with an Athenian desire to put him in his place. This view has recently been expanded on by 
Deene, who argued that ‘his case against both Neaira and the former slave Phormio clearly 
give the impression of a patriotic Athenian defending the highest civic values and sacred laws 
of his ancestral polis’.72 Deene explains this as reflecting a desire of naturalised citizens to 
differentiate themselves from ‘the metic or foreign community to which they previously 
belonged’ through practising archetypal citizen behaviour.73 A close reading of the speeches 
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 Scafuro 2011: 229-230. 
71
 Trevett 1992: 178. 
72
 Deene 2011: 173. 
73
 Deene 2011: 169. 
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from the two cases, however, will demonstrate that this is not accurate. It is relatively easy to 
find statements made by Apollodorus which propagate and endorse exclusive Athenian 
citizen values, but he carefully positions himself as an outsider when he does so. His identity 
as an Athenian is limited and qualified – in fact, he takes pains to demonstrate that he is less 
Athenian than the Athenians. It does not follow, of course, that Apollodorus projected his 
identity in the same way outside of the courtroom – but it is significant that when he was in 
such an environment he chose to present himself with such a qualified type of Athenian 
identity. 
 
Turning to Dem. 45, the key way in which Apollodorus differentiates himself from Phormion 
is by attacking him on the grounds that he was a slave – the clear implication is that this stain 
has not left the freedman (and nor should it), and that he continues to act in a manner 
befitting a slave.  This point is explicitly made when he claims that the purported will of 
Pasion φανήσεται γὰρ οὐ πατρὸς ὡς ὑπὲρ υἱέων γράφοντος ἐοικυῖα διαθήκῃ, ἀλλὰ δούλου 
λελυμασμένου τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, ὅπως μὴ δώσει δίκην σκοποῦντος. 74  Apollodorus also 
attacks Phormion on account of his poor Greek, which he claims will lead the jury to assume 
that he is despicable and a barbarian; and this apparently natural prejudice, Apollodorus 
assures the jury, is backed up in reality: ὑμεῖς δ’ ἴσως αὐτὸν ὑπειλήφατε, ὅτι σολοικίζει τῇ 
φωνῇ, βάρβαρον καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητον εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ βάρβαρος οὗτος τῷ μισεῖν οὓς αὐτῷ 
προσῆκε τιμᾶν· τῷ δὲ κακουργῆσαι καὶ διορύξαι πράγματ’ οὐδενὸς λείπεται.75 
 
Phormion’s lack of speaking skill, which at the beginning of Dem. 36 was used to gain the 
jury’s sympathy by casting him as the familiar inexperienced litigant, is here used as the basis 
                                                          
74
 Dem. 45.27: ‘will seem not like the will of a father writing on behalf of his sons, but of a slave who has 
misused his masters’ property and is now looking how to avoid punishment’. 
75
 Dem. 45.30: ‘Perhaps you have supposed, because he doesn’t speak the language properly, that he’s a 
barbarian and someone contemptible. He is a barbarian in that he hates those he ought to honour – and in 
wrongdoing and ruining matters he comes behind no one.’ 
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for playing on the jury’s xenophobic prejudices, just as (Apollodorus claims) Pasion’s 
purported will betrays its writer’s slavish nature. The passage serves another function, 
however, in that any jurors who do not imagine that his poor Greek necessarily makes him 
contemptible are assured that he does, in fact, live up to the barbarian stereotype, and has 
besides proven himself to be a wrongdoer in an individual capacity as well. 
 
This strategy of attacking his barbarian origin seems to fit very well with what the speaker of 
Dem. 36 claimed would be Apollodorus’ argument; it is therefore at risk of being countered 
by precisely the objections which were raised in that speech. The jury must have been aware 
of Apollodorus’ father’s status, and he could certainly count on his opponent, Stephanus, 
bringing it up as well. Another section of the speech must have virtually invited such 
reflections to be made – while discussing the eleven talents which the will stated were owed 
by Pasion to the bank, he makes the aside ἴστε γὰρ πάντες, καὶ ὅτ’ ἦν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
τραπεζιτεύειν, τοῦτον καθήμενον καὶ διοικοῦντ’ ἐπὶ τῇ τραπέζῃ, ὥστ’ ἐν τῷ μυλῶνι 
προσῆκεν αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κύριον γενέσθαι. 76  Phormion, as merely 
‘managing’ the bank, ought to have remained in such a role, and it would therefore be more 
appropriate for him to be ‘in the mill’ than master of the rest of the property. But the same 
would logically apply to Pasion himself, of course. Later on, Apollodorus says that οἶμαι γὰρ 
ἅπαντας ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι τοῦτον, ἡνίκ’ ὤνιος ἦν, εἰ συνέβη μάγειρον ἤ τινος ἄλλης τέχνης 
δημιουργὸν πρίασθαι, τὴν τοῦ δεσπότου τέχνην ἂν μαθὼν πόρρω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἦν 
ἀγαθῶν.77 This attribution of Phormion’s position to chance (the word tuchê is used in the 
next sentence) would naturally have led the jurors to consider the basis of Apollodorus’ own 
elevated position. 
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 Dem. 45.33: ‘You all know that while my father was in banking, this man sat there and managed the bank, so 
that he ought rather to be in the mill than to become master of the rest of the property’. 
77
 Dem. 45.71: ‘I think you all know that if, when he was for sale, it had happened that a cook or worker in some 
other trade had bought him he would have learned the skill of that master, and be far from his current happy 
situation’. 
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This problem is not something which Apollodorus addresses directly in his speech. He does, 
however, make a deliberate effort to define his social status as far removed from that of 
Phormion, while, significantly, remaining very separate from that of the Athenians. This is 
made explicit towards the end of the speech, when he says that ἐγὼ γάρ, εἰ πάντων τῶν 
ἄλλων ὑμῶν ἔλαττον προσήκει μοι φρονεῖν, τούτου γε μεῖζον οἶμαι, καὶ τούτῳ γ’ εἰ μηδενὸς 
τῶν ἄλλων ἔλαττον, ἐμοῦ γ’ ἔλαττον· ὄντων γὰρ ἡμῶν τοιούτων ὁποίους τινὰς ἂν σὺ 
κατασκευάσῃς τῷ λόγῳ, σὺ δοῦλος ἦσθα.78Apollodorus is thus keen to make it clear that he 
himself is not really a true citizen in the way that the others are. He shores up the boundary 
between citizen and non-citizen, and effectively puts himself on the wrong side of it by 
qualifying his status. He is an ‘adopted’ or ‘made’ Athenian, and thus in all but a technical 
(and legalistic) sense, not really an Athenian at all; he remains effectively a highly honoured 
outsider. What he does have in common with the Athenians, however, is his status as a 
master. He invites them to consider the case as if it were a matter rising within their own 
households:  
ὡς οὖν μάλιστ’ ἂν ἅπαντας ὑμᾶς ἡγοῦμαι γνῶναι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὧν ἠδικήμεθ’ 
ἡμεῖς, φράσω· εἰ σκέψαιτο πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος ὑμῶν τίν’ οἴκοι κατέλιπεν 
οἰκέτην, εἶθ’ ὑπὸ τούτου πεπονθόθ’ ἑαυτὸν θείη ταὔθ’ ἅπερ ἡμεῖς ὑπὸ τούτου. μὴ 
γὰρ εἰ Σύρος ἢ Μάνης ἢ τίς ἕκαστος ἐκείνων, οὗτος δὲ Φορμίων· ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα 
ταὐτό· δοῦλοι μὲν ἐκεῖνοι, δοῦλος δ’ οὗτος ἦν, δεσπόται δ’ ὑμεῖς, δεσπότης δ’ ἦν 
ἐγώ.79 
 
This is an attempt to recast the impression given by Dem. 36, where the intention was to 
place Apollodorus alongside Phormion. In Dem. 45, the aim is to create a vivid illustration of 
                                                          
78
 Dem. 45.82: ‘For if it’s right that I think myself inferior to all of you others, I think at least that I am superior 
to him, and if he is inferior to no one else, he is at least inferior to me – for even if we are such people as you 
made out in the speech, you were a slave.’ 
79
 Dem. 45.86: ‘So I will show how I think you can best find out the extent of the wrongs we have suffered – if 
each of you would consider for himself what slave he has left at home, and then imagine yourself  having 
suffered  from him what we have suffered from Phormion. You must not think that each of them is Syros, or 
Manes or whatever, whereas this is Phormion – the point is the same. They are slaves, and he was a slave; you 
are masters, and I was a master’. 
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the opposite, with Apollodorus at the free end of the spectrum, despotês as opposed to doulos. 
The words would be underscored by the visible and audible differences between the 
Athenian-born and raised Apollodorus and the plainly foreign Phormion. The argument might 
also undercut the attacks made against Apollodorus on the grounds of his extravagant 
lifestyle, since that sort of excess would at least mark him out as a wealthy member of the 
upper classes rather than a humble slave or freedman (although it should be noted that in fact 
Apollodorus claims that his own habits are far less extreme than Phormion’s).80 The crucial 
point of the passage, however, is that it enables Apollodorus to place himself alongside the 
jurors without threatening to exceed his station as a naturalised citizen, or imply that he is a 
member of the Athenian in-group; he can maintain the boundary in that area while claiming 
commonality of interest in another sense. 
 
This still leaves the problem of Apollodorus’ father and his status as a slave, a point which 
must have been felt in the background throughout. Apollodorus deals with it by painting 
Phormion as the very worst kind of slave – the ungrateful one. The desired implication, 
presumably, was that while Pasion had also been a slave, he was at least one who was 
grateful for his freedom and naturalisation, and acted accordingly, unlike Phormion. His 
ingratitude is put in strident terms:  
οὐκοῦν δεινόν, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί, καὶ πέρᾳ δεινοῦ, τοὺς Ἕλληνα μὲν ἀντὶ βαρβάρου 
ποιήσαντας, γνώριμον δ’ ἀντ’ ἀνδραπόδου, τοσούτων δ’ ἀγαθῶν ἡγεμόνας, 
τούτους περιορᾶν ἐν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἀπορίαις ὄντας ἔχοντα καὶ πλουτοῦντα, καὶ εἰς 
τοῦθ’ ἥκειν ἀναιδείας ὥστε, ἧς παρ’ ἡμῶν τύχης μετέσχε, ταύτης ἡμῖν μὴ τολμᾶν 
μεταδοῦναι.81 
 
                                                          
80
 Dem. 45.77. 
81
 Dem. 45.73: ‘So it is terrible, oh earth and gods, and worse than terrible, that he leaves those who made him a 
Greek instead of a barbarian, a man of worth instead of a slave, who brought him to such great advantages, in 
dire straits while he is rich, and has reached such a point of shamelessness that he cannot bear to give a share to 
us of the fortune which we shared with him’. Note the parallel with the ‘point of madness’ which Apollodorus 
was said to have reached in Dem. 36.48. 
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The transformative nature of manumission and naturalisation is ironically undercut by 
Apollodorus’ attack – Phormion has not changed at all in terms of character. He acts rather in 
the way that any master would fear, taking advantage of a change in circumstances to turn the 
tables on his master, a point made clearly by Apollodorus: καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἄν τις ἴδοι 
τοὺς οἰκέτας ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐξεταζομένους· οὗτος δ’ αὖ τοὐναντίον τὸν δεσπότην ὁ 
δοῦλος ἐξετάζει, ὡς δῆτα πονηρὸν καὶ ἄσωτον ἐκ τούτων ἐπιδείξων.82 This type of fear 
manifests itself in general statements about what slaves would do to their masters if only they 
had the chance, as for example in Plato’s Republic, where Glaucon says, with Socrates’ 
approval, that the slave-owners of a polis live without fear ὅτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ 
βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν – without support, however, the master would be terrified.83 Apollodorus 
likewise urges the free men of the city to support him, a fellow master, and show unity 
against a slave who has perverted the social order. This forms the basis of one of his attacks 
on Stephanus, who was the actual man he was prosecuting, and about whom he asks the jury 
the following question: 
εἶθ’ ὃς εὐτυχούντων ἐστὶ κόλαξ, κἂν ἀτυχῶσι, τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων προδότης, καὶ 
τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ὄντων μηδενὶ μηδ’ ἐξ ἴσου 
χρῆται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἐθελοντὴς ὑποπίπτει, καὶ μήτ’ εἴ τινα τῶν οἰκείων 
ἀδικήσει μήτ’ εἰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις φαύλην δόξαν ἕξει ταῦτα ποιῶν μήτ’ ἄλλο 
μηδὲν σκοπεῖ, πλὴν ὅπως τι πλέον ἕξει, τοῦτον οὐ μισεῖν ὡς κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν τῆς 
φύσεως ὅλης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσήκει;84 
 
Stephanus is thus presented as a traitor to his fellow-citizens and, in the context of the master-
slave division which Apollodorus is careful to establish, to the slave-owning class. He 
hupopiptei, cringes and fawns on the likes of Phormion while refusing to treat his fellow 
                                                          
82
 Dem. 45.76: ‘You might see other slaves called to account by their masters, but this man does the opposite – 
the slave calls his master to account, in order, of course, to show from this that the master is a profligate and 
wicked man’. 
83
 Plato, Rep. 578d-e: ‘because the whole polis would aid each one of the private citizens’. 
84
 Dem. 45.65: ‘A man who is a flatterer of the rich, but who would be a traitor to the same men if they fell into 
misfortune, and who does not treat any of the many good and worthy citizens on an equal basis, but willingly 
cringes and fawns on people like Phormion, and does not consider whether by his actions he will wrong any of 
his family, or whether he will acquire a bad reputation among other people, or anything else whatsoever other 
than how he can be richer – isn’t it right to hate this man as the common enemy of the entire human race?’  
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citizens fairly. This attitude, Apollodorus claims, is such an affront that he affects to doubt his 
own brother Pasicles’ legitimacy because of his support for Phormion’s cause: 
Τάχα τοίνυν ἂν ἴσως καὶ τοῦτό τις αὐτῶν εἴποι, ὡς ἀδελφὸς ὢν ἐμὸς Πασικλῆς 
οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτῳ πραγμάτων. ἐγὼ δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ περὶ 
Πασικλέους, παραιτησάμενος καὶ δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν συγγνώμην ἔχειν, εἰ 
προεληλυθὼς εἰς τοῦθ’ ὥσθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ δούλων ὑβρισθεὶς οὐ δύναμαι 
κατασχεῖν, ἃ τέως οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόντων ἀκούειν ἐδόκουν, ἐρῶ καὶ οὐ 
σιωπήσομαι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὁμομήτριον μὲν ἀδελφὸν ἐμαυτοῦ Πασικλέα νομίζω, 
ὁμοπάτριον δ’ οὐκ οἶδα, δέδοικα μέντοι μὴ τῶν Φορμίωνος ἁμαρτημάτων εἰς 
ἡμᾶς ἀρχὴ Πασικλῆς ᾖ. ὅταν γὰρ τῷ δούλῳ συνδικῇ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀτιμῶν, καὶ 
παραπεπτωκὼς  θαυμάζῃ τούτους ὑφ’ ὧν αὐτῷ θαυμάζεσθαι προσῆκεν, τίν’ ἔχει 
δικαίαν ταῦθ’ ὑποψίαν; ἄνελ’ οὖν ἐκ μέσου μοι Πασικλέα, καὶ σὸς μὲν υἱὸς ἀντὶ 
δεσπότου καλείσθω, ἐμὸς δ’ ἀντίδικος (βούλεται γὰρ) ἀντ’ ἀδελφοῦ.85 
 
As the first sentence implies, Apollodorus is compelled to provide some explanation for his 
brother’s support for Phormion (though he does not venture to mention the close ties which 
he himself evidently had with Phormion, who supported him as a witness in his prosecution 
of Timotheus in 362)
86
 – Pasicles’ failure to prosecute Phormion had in fact been used in 
Dem. 36 to argue against Apollodorus.
87
 The one he chooses is interesting because of the 
assumption behind it that the true origins of the illegitimate son will be displayed in his 
behaviour.
88
 Apollodorus’ point, however, is presumably to demonstrate how disloyal and 
unnatural Pasicles’ behaviour is – he is acting as though he were the illegitimate son of 
Phormion – rather than a serious attempt to convince the jurors of a very shaky hypothesis 
which is couched in doubt (e.g. ὁμοπάτριον δ’ οὐκ οἶδα). The final sentence urges him to be 
‘called’ Phormion’s son rather than his master, and Apollodorus’ opponent instead of his 
                                                          
85
 Dem. 45.83-84: ‘Perhaps one of them will say this, that my brother Pasicles brings no charge against him 
[Phormion] in these matters. Men of Athens, about Pasicles as well, after begging and requiring that you pardon 
me if I have reached the point where I cannot restrain myself, since I have been outraged by my own slaves, I 
will speak, and not be silent about what I pretended not to hear from others before now. I myself believe that 
Pasicles is my brother on my mother’s side, but do not know if he is on my father’s side. Indeed, I fear that 
Pasicles was the beginning of Phormion’s crimes against us. For when he dishonours his brother, and acts as an 
advocate of the slave, and fawns before and admires those by whom he ought to be admired, what natural 
suspicion does this lead to? So away with Pasicles, and let him be called your son instead of your master, and 
my opponent (for so he wishes) instead of my brother’. 
86
 Dem. 49.18, 44. 
87
 Dem. 36.22. 
88
 In other contexts it was possible for litigants to argue that blood kinship had nothing to do with affection, 
which was based only on contact and upbringing – this appears to be one of the arguments in Hyperides’ 
fragmentary Against Timandrus, where the opponent’s removal of a young girl from Athens is attacked, it 
would seem, because it alienated her from her family’s affections. See Tchernetska et al. 2005, 2007. 
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brother because that is what Pasicles ‘wishes’. This casts Pasicles as a traitor to his family 
origins and class in the same way as Stephanus was to his Athenian background. 
 
The fact remained, however, that in spite of his earlier life as a slave, Phormion had also been 
‘made’ a citizen. Apollodorus deals with this regrettable reality by comparing the two of 
them, starting with an assessment of his own contribution to the polis: 
τὰ δ’ εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ ὅσ’ εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὡς δύναμαι λαμπρότατα, ὡς ὑμεῖς σύνιστε, 
ποιῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοῶ τοῦθ’ ὅτι τοῖς μὲν γένει πολίταις ὑμῖν ἱκανόν ἐστι λῃτουργεῖν 
ὡς οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσι, τοὺς δὲ ποιητοὺς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἀποδιδόντας χάριν, οὕτω 
προσήκει φαίνεσθαι λῃτουργοῦντας. μὴ οὖν μοι ταῦτ’ ὀνείδιζε, ἐφ’ οἷς ἐπαίνου 
τύχοιμ’ ἂν δικαίως.89 
 
Here he establishes that his own services to the polis are generous, as they should be – ‘made’ 
citizens ought to make contributions as repayments for their debt. The opposition is once 
again made between his ‘made’ status and that of the genei politai; there is no question of his 
placing them on an equal footing, or blurring the boundary between the two. The aim is to 
avoid accusations of arrogance and exceeding his own station; this is achieved by claiming 
that different rules of behaviour apply to natural born and naturalised citizens (a strategy also 
adopted in Dem. 36, as discussed above). Having established this, Apollodorus moves on to 
describe Phormion in contrast to himself: 
ἀλλὰ τίν’, ὦ Φορμίων, τῶν πολιτῶν ἑταιρεῖν, ὥσπερ σύ, μεμίσθωμαι; δεῖξον. τίνα 
τῆς πόλεως, ἧς αὐτὸς ἠξιώθην, καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ παρρησίας ἀπεστέρηκα, ὥσπερ σὺ 
τοῦτον ὃν κατῄσχυνας; τίνος γυναῖκα διέφθαρκα, ὥσπερ σὺ πρὸς πολλαῖς ἄλλαις 
ταύτην, ᾗ τὸ μνῆμ’ ᾠκοδόμησεν ὁ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς οὗτος πλησίον τοῦ τῆς δεσποίνης, 
ἀνηλωκὼς πλέον ἢ τάλαντα δύο; καὶ οὐκ ᾐσθάνετο, ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῦ τάφου μνημεῖον 
ἔσται τὸ οἰκοδόμημα τοιοῦτον ὄν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀδικίας ἧς τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἠδίκηκεν ἐκείνη 
διὰ τοῦτον.90 
                                                          
89
 Dem. 45.78: ‘What concerns the polis and yourselves, as you know, I perform as lavishly as I can – for I’m 
not unaware that for you who are citizens by birth it is enough to perform liturgies as the laws command, 
whereas we who are made citizens should show that we perform them as grateful repayments. So do not 
reproach me with these things, for which I should rightly obtain praise’. 
90
 Dem. 45.79: ‘But which of the citizens, Phormion, have I hired as a prostitute, as you have? Show me. Whom 
have I robbed of the rights of the city, of which I myself was considered worthy, and of free speech within it, as 
you did the man whom you dishonoured? Whose wife have I corrupted, as you have in the case of many women 
– including the one to whom this god-hated man built a memorial near that of his mistress, spending more than 
two talents? And could he not see that a structure of that kind would not be a memorial of her grave, but of the 
injustice which she did to her husband because of him?’ 
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Just as the speaker of Dem. 36 had drawn a contrast between Phormion’s humility and 
Apollodorus’ arrogance, so here Apollodorus himself contrasts Phormion’s outrages with his 
own behaviour. He does not claim that he has shown any particular virtue, but merely lists 
Phormion’s disgraces and challenges his opponent to show that he has done anything so 
reprehensible. He thus presents himself as the quiet and dutiful servant of the polis rather than 
an active participant, and in direct opposition to Phormion. The specific accusations which he 
flings at him are noteworthy: first, that he hired a citizen as a prostitute; second, that he was 
responsible for depriving a citizen of his rights; and third, that he committed adultery with the 
wives of many, and in one case chose to honour her with a monument. 
 
In each case Phormion has crossed unacceptable boundaries, acting in ways that are not only 
intrinsically reprehensible, but are also specifically performed against citizens. Through 
hiring a citizen as a prostitute he has inverted sexual norms; the ‘slave’ has taken the role 
normally enjoyed by the master, and his actions have led to a citizen losing the privileges 
which define him in the democratic city. This, of course, would be a punishment applied by 
the polis, but the point is that Phormion should not be the one behind it. His adultery is an 
attack on the principles of citizenship itself, since it undermines the legitimacy and dual 
descent that are the basis of the Athenian citizenship laws. Again, this is particularly galling 
because of Phormion’s position as a slave, as Apollodorus presents him, and feeds into 
anxieties about what slaves might do when their masters are not around (it is shortly after this 
passage that Apollodorus encourages the jurors to imagine the case as if it occurred within 
their own households, discussed above). Such anxieties are also addressed in the next passage:  
εἶτα τοιαῦτα ποιῶν καὶ τηλικαύτας μαρτυρίας ἐξενηνοχὼς τῆς ὕβρεως τῆς σαυτοῦ 
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σύ, τὸν ἄλλου του βίον ἐξετάζειν τολμᾷς; μεθ’ ἡμέραν εἶ σὺ σώφρων, τὴν δὲ νύκτ’ 
ἐφ’ οἷς θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ταῦτα ποιεῖς. πονηρός, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πονηρὸς 
οὗτος ἄνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀνακείου καὶ ἄδικος.91 
 
The difference is stressed between how Phormion acts by day and by night; he is a dissembler 
who attempts to appear orderly but unleashes his true nature under cover of darkness. The last 
sentence stresses his villainy and its connection with his slavish status and origin.
92
 
 
The attacks on Phormion, then, are predicated on his status as a freedman – or, rather, as a 
‘slave’, since Apollodorus never describes or addresses him as an apeleutheros or 
exeleutheros. This enables him to differentiate his own position from that of Phormion 
without presuming to present himself as on a level with the genei politai. He takes pains to 
show that he believes in the boundary between these citizens and ‘made’ citizens like himself 
(and, of course, Phormion). He attempts to deflect the obvious line of attack that his own 
origins are no better than his adversary’s by characterising Phormion as a particularly 
egregious example of the treacherous, presumptuous and jumped-up slave, in contrast to 
Pasion’s apparently grateful and appropriate behaviour. Similarly, he stresses that Phormion 
is a barbarian by birth and by nature. 
 
One interesting implication of Apollodorus’ argument seems clear, although he never 
articulates it explicitly – it must be nurture rather than nature (or descent) which causes 
someone’s slavish character. Apollodorus may not be a full Athenian, but he certainly depicts 
himself as a real member of the free, slave-owning population, and logically he cannot 
therefore have inherited slavish characteristics from his father. Benjamin Isaac’s work on 
                                                          
91
 Dem. 45.80: ‘Do you then, having done such things – and carried them out before so many witnesses to your 
own hubris – dare to scrutinise the life of another? By day you are temperate, but by night you do things for 
which the penalty is death. A villain, men of Athens, this man is a villain as of old, and a wrongdoer since he 
left the temple of the Anakes’. 
92
  The Anakeion was a place where slaves were sold as well as a temple of the Dioscuri; see Sandys’ note on 
Dem. 45.80 for references. 
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racism (or ‘proto-racism’, as he terms it)93 discusses at length ‘the principle of the heredity of 
acquired characteristics’ and how it ‘is only stated explicitly in relatively few sources, but 
once it is clear that the idea existed, it is obvious that it was, in fact, commonly assumed to 
operate in practice’.94  As regards slavery, this principle amounts to the idea that slaves 
become used to servility, and pass its characteristics onto their children. 
 
The argument which Apollodorus implies contradicts this idea – there is, unsurprisingly, no 
suggestion that any of his father’s slavishness was passed on to him. But the fact that the 
argument is not articulated must have bearing here – he could have made it explicit had he so 
wished, and indeed, if the jury had found it persuasive, it would have aided his case. 
Presumably, then, it was deemed unwise to make such an argument, even if it was a 
necessary condition for the picture which he presented to make sense. It is possible that Isaac 
is right, and that the common view was that slavish characteristics were inherited; if so, 
Apollodorus perhaps simply did not wish to contradict this too plainly. If that was the 
common opinion, however, it seems likelier that he would have had to confront it somehow. 
This may well be a situation where there was no firmly fixed common opinion, and where 
either nurture or nature could be held responsible (or the question not considered at all). This 
would have enabled Apollodorus to make his argument without worrying about entering into 
its potentially controversial implications and underpinnings. 
 
Alternatively, we could accept that the implication of his argument was accepted, and did not 
need to be articulated because it, quite literally in this case, went without saying. The problem 
is that this appears to be contradicted by the evidence for lasting prejudice and genetic 
determinism as gathered by Isaac and demonstrated by the Athenians’ own treatment of the 
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 Isaac 2004: 1. 
94
 Isaac 2004: 81; cf. p.76, where ‘there can be little doubt that it was generally assumed to be a matter of 
course’. 
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autochthony myth. The speech does, however, cast doubt on how widely (or, perhaps more 
relevantly, how consistently) the ‘proto-racist’ ideas described by Isaac were held. 
 
The balance between denigrating an opponent’s status without seeming to overstate his own 
was also of importance to Apollodorus in another of his court cases, represented by the 
speech Against Neaera. The speech was not written by Demosthenes, and is widely 
considered to be the work of Apollodorus himself; the alternative is that it was written by 
another logographer. It has close stylistic similarities to the other speeches delivered by 
Apollodorus (with the exception of Dem. 45, as noted above), which are therefore very likely 
to be the work of one writer. I follow Trevett and others in their conclusion that Apollodorus 
himself is the writer, on the grounds that it is unlikely that Apollodorus would employ a 
single speechwriter over such a great number of years, when he, as an active political figure, 
would presumably have been able to do the job himself; equally, the relatively low quality of 
the speeches would imply that they were not written by a professional.
95
 It is also difficult to 
see why Apollodorus would have hired Demosthenes (or at any rate someone who was a far 
better speechwriter than his usual one) to write Against Stephanus I, and then return to his 
regular logographer, unless the latter was Apollodorus himself. 
 
The speech has been the subject of considerable attention over the last two decades.
96
 Besides 
the identity-based work of Deene and Trevett, already discussed in relation to Apollodorus’ 
Stephanus speeches, more specialised scholarship has tended to focus on the speech’s 
treatment of family, women, gender and status, as demonstrated by Cynthia Patterson and 
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 Trevett 1992: 74. Kapparis 2005: 81 describes Dem. 59 as ‘legally and factually feeble’. 
96
 Carey’s edition was published in 1992 and Kapparis’ in 1999 (both contain Greek texts with translation and 
commentary; see also Carey 2001 and Harris 2001 for reviews of Kapparis). The relevant volume of Dilts’ OCT 
text appeared in 2009. Bers 2003 is an English translation (part of the Univeristy of Texas’ Oratory of Classical 
Greece series), Hamel 2003 examined the case in some depth. 
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David Cohen.
97
 The speech also features heavily in the evidence presented by Kapparis in his 
examination of the legal approach the Athenians took to immigration and citizenship.
98
 The 
focus of what follows will be on how Apollodorus’ statements must be read in terms of his 
own status and identity as a naturalised citizen. 
 
The charge against Neaera was that she, a xenê, had lived as a wife with an Athenian citizen, 
named Stephanus.
99
A substantial portion of the speech, however, is taken up with lurid 
descriptions of her life as a prostitute, at first in Corinth and later in Megara and Athens 
itself;
100
 it is claimed that she hired her body out to anyone who desired her.
101
  The charge 
was formally brought by Theomnestus, who delivered sections 1-16 before Apollodorus 
himself took over. Theomnestus brings up the issue of Apollodorus’ status directly, 
reminding the jury of the decree which naturalised his father on account of his services to the 
polis.
102
 Apollodorus himself chooses to hold forth on the subject of naturalisation (it is in 
fact this speech which gives us a great deal of the information we have about the process), 
using it as a counterpoint to the underhanded way in which, he claims, Stephanus has passed 
off Neaera and her children as citizens:
103
 
ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων κυριώτατος ὢν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἁπάντων, καὶ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ 
ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, οὕτω καλὸν καὶ σεμνὸν ἡγήσατ’ εἶναι δῶρον τὸ 
Ἀθηναῖον γενέσθαι, ὥστε νόμους ἔθετο αὑτῷ καθ’ οὓς ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἐάν τινα 
βούλωνται, πολίτην, οἳ νῦν προπεπηλακισμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ Στεφάνου τουτουὶ καὶ 
τῶν οὕτω γεγαμηκότων.104 
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 Patterson 1994, D. Cohen 2005; see also the response in the same volume of Foxhall 2005. 
98
 Kapparis 2005. 
99
 Dem. 59.16. The law and its implications are discussed in section 2.2 (b). 
100
 Dem. 59.18-49. 
101
 Dem. 59.20. 
102
 Dem. 59.2: ‘When the Athenian dêmos voted that Pasion should be an Athenian, and his descendants, on 
account of his services to the polis…’ 
103
 Carey 1992: 129-130.  
104
 Dem. 59.88: ‘For the Athenian dêmos, which has absolute power over everyone in the polis, and can do 
whatever it wishes, thought this gift of becoming Athenian to be so good and noble that it set up laws governing 
itself, which must be followed if they desire to make anyone a citizen, and which are now being treated with 
contempt by this man Stephanus and those who have married like him.’  
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This general contrast between the attitude of the dêmos and of Stephanus mirrors a more 
tangible comparison made earlier in the speech, when Apollodorus mentions the poet 
Xenocleides. He was apparently one of Neaera’s clients; he was unable to give evidence, 
however, because he had been successfully prosecuted for astrateia by Stephanus
105
 and 
disfranchised. Apollodorus asks the jurors the following rhetorical question: 
καίτοι πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθε δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολίτας καὶ γνησίως 
μετέχοντας τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέρηκε τῆς παρρησίας Στέφανος οὑτοσί, τοὺς δὲ 
μηδὲν προσήκοντας βιάζεται Ἀθηναίους εἶναι παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους;106 
 
Here the terminology is phusei politai; the affront is that while they lose their privileges, 
Stephanus has unlawfully obtained them for those who are not deserving. This idea of the 
‘deserving’ naturalised citizen is something which Apollodorus is eager to bring up. 
Returning to his discussion of the naturalisation laws, he says that πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ νόμος ἐστὶ 
τῷ δήμῳ κείμενος μὴ ἐξεῖναι ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναῖον, ὃν ἂν μὴ δι’ ἀνδραγαθίαν εἰς τὸν δῆμον 
τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἄξιον ᾖ γενέσθαι πολίτην.107 This is a somewhat different formulation from 
that in Dem. 45, where the focus was on naturalisation as a gift to be repaid later. There are 
strategic reasons for this – in the earlier speech Apollodorus would hardly want to stress the 
fact that the dêmos had evidently deemed Phormion to be a worthy recipient of its highest 
honour. In particular he would wish to avoid the subject of the andragathia which the 
freedman had shown, since it would fly in the face of all his claims about Phormion’s base 
and slavish nature and behaviour. 
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 διαβληθεὶς τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ‘having been slandered in court’, according to Apollodorus (Dem. 
59.27). 
106
 Dem. 59.28: ‘So how could you not think it terrible that this man Stephanus has robbed natural born citizens 
who legitimately share in the polis of their freedom of speech, while he forces in as Athenians those who have 
no right, contrary to all the laws?’ 
107
 Dem. 59.89: ‘First, the dêmos has a law which establishes that it is forbidden to make anyone Athenian 
unless he is worthy of becoming a citizen on account of his andragathia towards the Athenian dêmos’. Cf. p.218 
above. 
238 
 
In Dem. 59, however, Apollodorus does not face this problem, and can present a relatively 
simple opposition between the lawfully naturalised and those who have attempted to gain 
citizenship through fraud. What makes these fraudulent citizens an especial affront to the 
Athenians is not merely that they are undeserving, but also that they will purport to be 
citizens by birth. Whereas the naturalised citizens will be known as such, and placed under 
certain restrictions, the fraudulent citizens will pass for Athenians plain and simple, and be 
able to take advantage of opportunities denied their counterparts. 
 
One example of such a situation is brought up in the speech, when Apollodorus describes 
how Neaera’s daughter, Phano,108 was passed off as an astê and married to Theogenes of 
Coironidae, an ἄνθρωπον εὐγενῆ μέν, πένητα δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον πραγμάτων who had drawn the 
position of basileus.
109
 By this point Apollodorus has already described her as having 
followed in her mother’s footsteps in terms of her way of life,110 having passed herself of as 
an Athenian once before,
111
 and having been involved, along with Neaera and Stephanus, in a 
fraudulent and criminal scheme aimed at extorting money from an old friend of Neaera’s.112 
The fraud perpetrated against Theogenes (and, because of his position, against the polis itself), 
however, is criticised in an especially savage way by Apollodorus, who treats Stephanus as 
the author of the deception, and speaks with outrage of what it enabled his purported daughter 
to do: 
οὕτω πολὺ τῶν νόμων καὶ ὑμῶν κατεφρόνησεν. καὶ αὕτη ἡ γυνὴ ὑμῖν ἔθυε τὰ 
ἄρρητα ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ εἶδεν ἃ οὐ προσῆκεν αὐτὴν ὁρᾶν ξένην οὖσαν, 
καὶ τοιαύτη οὖσα εἰσῆλθεν οἷ οὐδεὶς ἄλλος Ἀθηναίων τοσούτων ὄντων 
εἰσέρχεται ἀλλ’ ἢ ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως γυνή, ἐξώρκωσέν τε τὰς γεραρὰς τὰς 
                                                          
108
 Named at Dem. 59.38, 50 and 121. This is one of the examples Schaps (1977: 326) gives of ‘women of low 
repute’ being named to show disrespect. 
109
 Dem. 59.72: ‘A man of good birth, but poor and inexperienced in such matters’. 
110
 Dem. 59.50. 
111
 Dem. 59.50 ff. where she is passed off as Stephanus’ daughter and given in marriage to Phrastor of the deme 
Aegilia. 
112
 Dem. 59.64-65, where Epainetus of Andros is entrapped in adultery with Phano and forced to pay thirty 
minas. 
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ὑπηρετούσας τοῖς  ἱεροῖς, ἐξεδόθη δὲ τῷ Διονύσῳ γυνή, ἔπραξε δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς 
πόλεως τὰ πάτρια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, πολλὰ καὶ ἅγια καὶ ἀπόρρητα. ἃ δὲ μηδ’ 
ἀκοῦσαι πᾶσιν οἷόν τ’ ἐστίν, πῶς ποιῆσαί γε τῇ ἐπιτυχούσῃ εὐσεβῶς ἔχει, ἄλλως 
τε καὶ τοιαύτῃ γυναικὶ καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔργα διαπεπραγμένῃ;113 
 
The aim, of course, is to anger the jurors and get them to share Apollodorus’ sense of 
outrage.
114
 The important role which she took on put her in a position of esteem and great 
symbolic and religious importance – and, as is particularly significant, she acted ὑπὲρ τῆς 
πόλεως in these fields. The alien, the xenê, had usurped a position that went to the heart of 
what the polis did and meant – its ancestry and gods. As Patterson has noted, there is also a 
very strong personal contrast present in the opposition between Phano, who has allegedly 
acted in such a shameless fashion, and ‘the pure Athenian wife’ as represented by the bride of 
the god in this ritual.
115
 This is all, of course, according to Apollodorus, who has a clear 
motive for exaggerating the importance of the role and the consequences of its usurpation. It 
is possible that a less reverent view was taken by other citizens; a parallel could be the ‘dead 
letter’ status of the law which banned thêtes from holding office.116 But that was a matter 
concerning class divisions between citizens, whereas in Neaera’s daughter’s case it was a 
question of the division between citizen and non-citizen. Apollodorus highlights it because it 
shows the extent to which her deception went. In Apollodorus’ formulation the functions 
which she usurped are so important that the Athenians did not allow legally naturalised 
citizens or their descendants to perform them, unless they were born of an astê. In 
Apollodorus’ words: 
οὕτως τοίνυν καλῶς καὶ ἰσχυρῶς τῶν νόμων κειμένων ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας, δι’ ὧν 
δεῖ Ἀθηναῖον γενέσθαι, ἕτερός ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἅπασι τούτοις κυριώτατος νόμος 
                                                          
113
 Dem. 59.72-73: ‘So much did he despise the laws and yourselves. And this woman offered the secret and 
holy sacrifices for you on behalf of the city, and saw what it was not fitting for her to see, since she was a 
foreigner, and being so she entered where no other Athenian whatsoever can enter, other than the wife of the 
basileus, and she administered the oath to the elder women who serve in the sacrifices, and she was given as 
wife to Dionysus, and she performed on behalf of the city the ancestral ceremonies to the gods, which are many, 
sacred and secret. As no one can even hear of them, how can it be right for some random woman to perform 
them, especially a woman like this, who has done such things?’ 
114
 D. Cohen 2005: 39. 
115
 Patterson 1994: 208-209. 
116
 Ath. Pol. 7.4. 
240 
 
κείμενος· οὕτω πολλὴν ὁ δῆμος πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν θεῶν 
ὥστε δι’ εὐσεβείας τὰ ἱερὰ θύεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως. ὅσους γὰρ ἂν ποιήσηται ὁ 
δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων πολίτας, ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει διαρρήδην μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς τῶν 
ἐννέα ἀρχόντων γενέσθαι, μηδὲ ἱερωσύνης μηδεμιᾶς μετασχεῖν· τοῖς δ’ ἐκ 
τούτων μετέδωκεν ἤδη ὁ δῆμος ἁπάντων, καὶ προσέθηκεν ‘ἐὰν ὦσιν ἐκ γυναικὸς 
ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον.’117 
 
The positions which are most tied up with the symbolic and ideological polis – its oldest and 
most revered offices – are thus denied to the naturalised citizen. There is a limit to what the 
gift of citizenship can allow, or to what the worthy recipient deserves. The contrast with the 
actions of the undeserving fraudulent citizen is clear; mentioning these distinctions is also a 
way for Apollodorus implicitly to put limits on his own status, taking a position separate from 
and inferior to that of the jurors. This matches the strategy of self-presentation adopted in the 
first speech Against Stephanus. 
 
As David Cohen has pointed out, there is an irony here – the behaviour which Apollodorus 
castigates is only wrong because it is performed by a fraudulent citizen, but if Phano were an 
astê there would be no problem, and her behaviour could actually be used to support this 
contention. According to Cohen, the argument could have run as follows: ‘is it plausible that 
a woman like Neaera and Phano could have led such notorious life… and no one of the 
Athenians would have objected when they saw her performing these rites?’118 In other words, 
the very outrages which Apollodorus describes could be used as proofs of citizenship by his 
opponents – ‘because of the lack of formal proof of citizenship the argument boils down to a 
catalogue of the base activities that this person has engaged in, followed by the question “Do 
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you want such a person to be an Athenian citizen?”’.119 Foxhall, in her response to Cohen’s 
paper, saw the idea that Neaera and Phano were actually astai as an overlooked but ‘real 
possibility’,120 and the sheer amount of time Apollodorus spends attempting to prove that 
Neaera was a foreigner may imply that his opponent contested his assertion. Alternatively, 
this could simply be a pretext to bring in embarrassing material that would denigrate his 
opponent.  
 
It is also true, however, that the closest the evidence (as opposed to his unsupported 
assertions and innuendo) which he provides comes to attesting directly to Neaera’s being a 
foreigner is the witness statement given by Philostratus that Νέαιραν Νικαρέτης οὖσαν, 
ἧσπερ καὶ Μετάνειρα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατάγεσθαι παρ’ αὑτῷ, ὅτε εἰς τὰ μυστήρια ἐπεδήμησαν 
ἐν Κορίνθῳ οἰκοῦσαι…121, together with the claims that she was later bought by Timanoridas 
and Eucrates αὑτῶν δούλην εἶναι 122  and then manumitted using funds provided by the 
Athenian citizen Phrynion.
123
 The actual testimony which supports the latter two assertions, 
however, merely consists of a statement by Philagrus of Melite that he was present in Corinth 
when Phrynion paid twenty minas for Neaera to Timanoridas and Eucrates.
124
 Whether this 
represents a formal condition of slavery is not made clear, other than by Apollodorus’ self-
serving rhetoric. We cannot rule out the possibility that an Athenian citizen woman worked 
as a prostitute in Corinth, and that the payments to which Apollodorus alludes were informal 
or contractual; equally, it was possible for an Athenian citizen to be reduced to a condition of 
slavery.
125
 Our reasons for rejecting this hypothesis would, presumably, be that we find it 
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unlikely or impossible for an Athenian citizen woman to have behaved in such a way – which 
is precisely what Apollodorus hoped his audience would believe. 
 
As usual, we cannot expect to recover the true circumstances which were behind the case. 
Noy has recently provided an alternative scenario, examining the possibility that the original 
Phano was a daughter of Stephanus who had died in infancy; Neaera’s daughter, originally 
called Strybele,
126
 later usurped her identity in order to pass herself off as a citizen.
127
 Again, 
this is no more than a possibility, but Noy uses it to illustrate the point that identity could 
easily be open to question. Regarding Phano, Noy points out that while Apollodorus’ claims 
about her may be doubtful, ‘he did not invent the underlying point that her identity (and 
therefore her legal status) could be disputed’.128 Ultimately, proving identity came down to 
what the jury would believe – a balance of probabilities based on the behaviour of the 
individual (as presented by themselves and their opponent) and the number and quality of 
witnesses who would  swear to it.
129
 In this case, Apollodorus places great emphasis on 
behaviour, but as we shall see when we come to Demosthenes’ speech Against Eubulides, 
when an individual’s status came under threat a rather different approach could be employed. 
 
Apollodorus returns to the contrast between the lawfully naturalised citizen and the 
fraudulent impostor, with a somewhat different emphasis, when he contrasts Neaera with the 
Plataeans. After a lengthy description of the services the Plataeans had rendered to the 
Athenians, and their loyalty,
130
 he discusses the decree granting them citizenship and the 
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restrictions and safeguards which were placed on it.
131
 The decree as presented in the text has 
usually been considered genuine,
132
 but Canevaro has recently convincingly demonstrated the 
opposite, arguing that it is an interpolation produced by a later ‘forger’.133 Regardless, the 
summary given by Apollodorus in his own voice
134
 is sufficient for the present purposes, 
since it is how he chooses to present the decree that is of importance. He says that the rhêtôr 
who produced the decree insisted that each recipient be examined individually by a court, and 
that the names of those who were accepted be recorded in stone on a stele, and insisted 
further that no-one claiming to be Plataean at a later date was to be covered by the decree’s 
provisions. He also put in place the same restrictions on being appointed one of the nine 
archons and holding a priesthood which were mentioned earlier; according to Apollodorus, 
this was done ὑπέρ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν θεῶν,135 which stresses again how vital he wished 
to make these positions seem. This is followed by another savage comparison in the form of a 
rhetorical question: 
Οὔκουν δεινόν; πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καὶ ὁμολογουμένως ἀρίστους τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὴν πόλιν γεγενημένους οὕτω καλῶς καὶ ἀκριβῶς διωρίσασθε περὶ 
ἑκάστου, ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν δωρεάν, τὴν δὲ περιφανῶς ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι 
πεπορνευμένην οὕτως αἰσχρῶς καὶ ὀλιγώρως ἐάσετε ὑβρίζουσαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν 
καὶ ἀσεβοῦσαν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀτιμώρητον, ἣν οὔτε οἱ πρόγονοι ἀστὴν κατέλιπον 
οὔθ’ ὁ δῆμος πολῖτιν ἐποιήσατο;136 
 
Here the opposition is intensified by the gender of the parties (which would feed in to the 
concept of andragathia already mentioned by Apollodorus), the contrast between the 
honourable military exploits of the Plataeans and Neaera’s prostitution, and the loyalty 
implied in the services specifically rendered to the polis as opposed to Neaera’s prostitution 
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‘in all Greece’; the next section lists some of the locales where she supposedly lived and 
worked. In spite of this, Neaera has conspired to exceed the position of the Plataeans by 
passing off her daughter as an astê. As Patterson put it, ‘Neaira’s behaviour strikes at the 
heart of Athenian privilege… [she and Phano] have taken what even the demos does not 
allow itself to give, the privilege of native birth’.137 
 
In the customary style of Athenian forensic oratory,
138
 Apollodorus goes on to predict dire 
consequences in the event of her acquittal, asking the jury τί δὲ καὶ φήσειεν ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος 
εἰσιὼν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκ’ ἢ θυγατέρα ἢ μητέρα, ἀποψηφισάμενος ταύτης, ἐπειδὰν 
ἔρηται ὑμᾶς ‘ποῦ ἦτε;’139 The tactic of bringing the case directly into homes of the jurors was 
also used in Dem. 45, but as in that case the point being made has wider social implications 
as well. Apollodorus says that once they have told their female relatives of the acquittal the 
following will occur: 
οὐκοῦν ἤδη αἱ μὲν σωφρονέσταται τῶν γυναικῶν ὀργισθήσονται ὑμῖν, διότι 
ὁμοίως αὐταῖς ταύτην κατηξιοῦτε μετέχειν τῶν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν· ὅσαι δ’ 
ἀνόητοι,  φανερῶς ἐπιδείκνυτε ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται, ὡς ἄδειαν ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν 
νόμων δεδωκότων· δόξετε γὰρ ὀλιγώρως καὶ ῥᾳθύμως φέροντες ὁμογνώμονες 
καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶναι τοῖς ταύτης τρόποις. ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐλυσιτέλει μὴ γενέσθαι 
τὸν ἀγῶνα τουτονὶ ἢ γενομένου ἀποψηφίσασθαι ὑμᾶς. κομιδῇ γὰρ ἤδη [παντελῶς] 
ἐξουσία ἔσται ταῖς πόρναις συνοικεῖν οἷς ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας φάσκειν 
οὗ ἂν τύχωσιν εἶναι· καὶ οἱ μὲν νόμοι ἄκυροι ὑμῖν ἔσονται, οἱ δὲ τρόποι τῶν 
ἑταιρῶν κύριοι ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται διαπράττεσθαι.140 
 
This extrapolation, which to modern eyes seems extremely fanciful, has at least a rhetorical 
force, and would remind jurors of their position as upholders of the laws. It suggests that an 
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245 
 
invasion of one oikos is an invasion of ‘the collective identity of all Athenian oikoi’,141 since 
through Neaera the whole city will be corrupted. The polis as a whole is itself brought in, 
alongside the women of Athens, shortly afterwards: 
ὥστε εἷς ἕκαστος ὑμῶν νομιζέτω, ὁ μὲν ὑπὲρ γυναικός, ὁ δ’ ὑπὲρ θυγατρός, ὁ δ’ 
ὑπὲρ μητρός, ὁ δ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τὴν ψῆφον 
φέρειν, τοῦ μὴ ἐξ ἴσου φανῆναι ἐκείνας τιμωμένας ταύτῃ τῇ πόρνῃ, μηδὲ τὰς 
μετὰ πολλῆς καὶ καλῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας τραφείσας ὑπὸ τῶν 
προσηκόντων καὶ ἐκδοθείσας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ταύτας ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ φαίνεσθαι 
μετεχούσας τῇ μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀσελγῶν τρόπων πολλάκις πολλοῖς ἑκάστης 
ἡμέρας συγγεγενημένῃ, ὡς ἕκαστος ἐβούλετο.142  
 
It is thus on behalf of family, polis, the laws and the gods that the jurors must convict Neaera; 
her acquittal would undermine the status differences which, it would seem, underpin the 
social order of the polis. Essentially, the opposition is a relatively simple one; these 
statements could have been made by any citizen, and indeed are what make the idea of 
Apollodorus striving to be ‘more Athenian than the Athenians’ seem plausible. What gives 
the opposition more colour is the status of Apollodorus himself – Patterson, for example, has 
described the irony of a naturalised citizen, the son of a freedman, urging the Athenians to 
preserve the ‘sacred purity’ of the citizen body.143 But as we have seen, Apollodorus has 
already taken pains to describe deserving naturalised citizens, and approved of the restrictions 
placed on them, which keep them separate, in terms of identity, from the genei (or phusei) 
politai. He himself, naturally, would be among this honoured, but still in an ideological sense 
excluded, group of naturalised citizens. There remains, however, always the risk of appearing 
to lecture the citizen jury, which is problematic given the speaker’s own origins and status as 
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a naturalised citizen. This is something which is addressed in the next passage, as he urges 
the jury as follows:   
ἡγεῖσθε δὲ μήτ’ ἐμὲ τὸν λέγοντα εἶναι Ἀπολλόδωρον μήτε τοὺς 
ἀπολογησομένους καὶ συνεροῦντας πολίτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ Νέαιραν 
ταυτηνὶ περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους δικάζεσθαι. καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ 
τῆς κατηγορίας γένησθε, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἀκούετε, δι’ ὧν οἰκεῖται ἡ πόλις καὶ 
καθ’ οὓς ὀμωμόκατε δικάσειν, τί κελεύουσι καὶ τί παραβεβήκασιν· ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ 
τῆς ἀπολογίας ἦτε, μνημονεύοντες τὴν τῶν νόμων κατηγορίαν καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον 
τὸν τῶν εἰρημένων, τήν τε ὄψιν αὐτῆς ἰδόντες, ἐνθυμεῖσθε τοῦτο μόνον, εἰ 
Νέαιρα οὖσα ταῦτα διαπέπρακται.144 
 
The words εἶναι Ἀπολλόδωρον are deleted by some editors, including Dilts in the latest OCT, 
who breaks with the precedent set by Rennie in the 1939 edition. Kapparis also deletes the 
words, translating ‘Consider that the dispute is not between myself, the speaker, and the 
citizens who will defend and support her, but between the laws and Neaira here, concerning 
her actions.’145 The deletion dates back to Herwerden.146 Carey, who in reviewing Kapparis’ 
edition considered the deletion ‘unnecessary in my opinion’147 translates ‘Imagine that the 
speaker is not I, Apollodoros, nor those citizens who will defend and support her, but that it is 
the laws and Neaira here who are in dispute with each other over her actions’. 148  The 
opposition between Ἀπολλόδωρον and πολίτας 149  is given greater strength in the older 
translations of Kennedy (‘Don’t look upon me, the speaker, as Apollodorus, and these who 
will support and plead for the defendant as Athenians…’) 150  and Murray, whose Loeb 
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translation reads ‘Forget that I, the speaker, am Apollodorus, and that those who will support 
and plead for the defendant are citizens of Athens…’151 
 
The deletion does seem unnecessary, and robs the passage of an important aspect, namely the 
difference it creates between Apollodorus and the citizen supporters of Neaera. The 
opposition is a telling one – during a passage in which he apparently urges the jurors to 
disregard the status of the litigants and their supporters, Apollodorus is in fact reminding 
them of his own inferiority to the (real) politai. He can thus combine a conventional plea for 
the jurors to judge in accordance with the laws, countering a possible attack on him on the 
grounds of his own status and background, with a careful positioning of his own identity in a 
way which, he would hope, would produce the best impression on the jury. The aim is to 
achieve a balance, whereby Apollodorus sits between his adversary, whom he attacks 
savagely, and the citizen jurors. 
 
Against Stephanus and Against Neaera are the speeches delivered by Apollodorus in which 
questions of status are most vital, but the subject comes up in others as well. In his speech 
Against Nicostratus (Dem. 53), who was a former friend, he mentions a previous victory 
which he had in court over his opponent’s brother Arethousius. He describes what happened 
next: 
καὶ ἐν τῇ τιμήσει βουλομένων τῶν δικαστῶν θανάτου τιμῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἐδεήθην ἐγὼ 
τῶν δικαστῶν μηδὲν δι’ ἐμοῦ τοιοῦτον πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ συνεχώρησα ὅσουπερ αὐτοὶ 
ἐτιμῶντο, ταλάντου, οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ Ἀρεθούσιος (ἄξια γὰρ αὐτῷ θανάτου 
εἴργαστο  εἰς ἐμέ), ἀλλ’ ἵνα ἐγὼ Πασίωνος ὢν καὶ κατὰ ψήφισμα πολίτης μηδένα 
Ἀθηναίων ἀπεκτονὼς εἴην.152 
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It is not necessary to take his assertion as to his motives at face value; what is important is 
that he tells this story in order to create a positive impression on the jury. Partly he is perhaps 
explaining that his desire for revenge (which he frankly admits is his motive for bringing the 
case to court at the beginning of his speech, opening with the words Ὅτι μὲν οὐ συκοφαντῶν, 
ἀλλ’ ἀδικούμενος καὶ ὑβριζόμενος ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν τιμωρεῖσθαι τὴν 
ἀπογραφὴν ἐποιησάμην)153 is not excessive, but while doing so he also makes the point that 
he regards himself as an inferior who ought only to go so far in causing harm to an Athenian. 
His thinking might be that there is a risk of the jury regarding his prosecution as an affront to 
the citizen body out of a sense of solidarity; it is also possible that his opponent attacked him 
in a similar way to Apollodorus’ own attacks on Phormion in Dem. 45., and he wishes to 
counter accusations of hubris and exceeding his station. 
 
It would appear thus far that Apollodorus’ status as a naturalised citizen was something 
which had always to be carefully handled. He seems acutely aware of the need to position 
himself as someone who is of lower status than the jurors, particularly when making savage 
attacks against his opponents; he must balance this invective with a degree of self-
deprecation. But while these necessities are in a sense constraints upon him, they also give 
him the opportunity to use narratives that are unusual and inaccessible to natural born citizens. 
He can also use his status to elicit sympathy, as he does in his prosecution of Polycles, telling 
the jury of how his opponent laughed at his demands and said ἄρτι μῦς πίττης 
γεύεται· ἐβούλετο γὰρ Ἀθηναῖος εἶναι.154 
 
Apollodorus’ position is thus a complex one; he must take on the persona of a social inferior, 
but this does not mean he cannot use this position to his advantage on occasion. His position 
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outside of the citizen in-group can have advantages, and not just in gaining sympathy for ill-
treatment; behaviour which is not accepted or approved of for citizens may be tolerated (and 
expected) in those outside of the group.
155
 
 
Examination of the speeches delivered by Apollodorus and delivered on behalf of Phormion 
suggests that, in a courtroom setting, these naturalised citizens and their speechwriters felt it 
best to position themselves as outsiders. They were keen to stress the difference between 
themselves and the genei politai of the jury; when they did attempt to show that they shared 
common interests and values with the jurors it was based on social class rather than national 
identity. It is not possible to say to what extent this strategy was shared by other naturalised 
citizens when they came into court, but given that two of the speeches examined were written 
by someone as experienced and skilled as Demosthenes, and Apollodorus was also a very 
experienced litigant, whatever the defects in his composition of speeches, it seems safe to 
assume that this was an effective strategy that was attractive to litigants and likely to appeal 
to the jurors.  
 
This gives rise to the question of whether (or, perhaps more pertinently, to what extent) this 
was replicated outside of the courts, in everyday life. This essentially remains unanswerable, 
but it can be said that if this style of self-presentation was useful in the courts it would have 
been a possible option in other situations. When the special factors affecting courtroom 
scenarios were removed, however, there was less of a need to overtly position oneself in this 
way. Litigation was an activity which involved an unusual examination, given its adversarial 
nature and the vicious personal attacks which it could involve, as we have seen from the 
examples discussed so far – although evidently this did not put off Apollodorus. Litigation 
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was, nevertheless, also an event in which ideology came to the fore; it can therefore be used 
for gaining insight into what the idealised position of naturalised citizens was. On this basis, 
it can be said that on an ideological level naturalised citizens were not regarded as true 
citizens, but remained essentially outside of the Athenian citizen in-group.  
 
Their descendants, however, may have found themselves being assimilated more fully, 
particularly when a number of generations separated them from their naturalised forefathers. 
Any attacks or jibes against them because of their ancestry may have had no more real impact 
than the attacks on Demosthenes for his alleged Scythian origin.
156
 The fate of the 
descendants of naturalised citizens, who logically speaking must have called into question 
ideas of Athenian ‘purity’, is not really addressed by Apollodorus – it suited his purpose 
better to focus on the naturalised citizens themselves, who were easily differentiated from the 
genei politai and did not therefore raise uncomfortable questions about Athenian identity and 
origins. As with the implications of the nature-nurture question when it came to slaves, 
discussed above, he apparently thought it better not to articulate the logical consequences of 
an argument which, in its more limited terms, he hoped the jury would find persuasive. 
 
5.2 Crossing the Other Way – Unworthy, Dubious and Doubtful Citizens 
 
The boundary crossing experienced by naturalised citizens, then, appears to have been 
incomplete and subject to qualifications. But this was not the only direction in which the 
boundary between citizen and metic could be crossed. It was also possible for Athenians to 
lose their status if their parentage was deemed to be doubtful, or effectively give it up by 
leaving Athens and living as a metic elsewhere; in the latter case they would formally retain 
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the status of citizens, and be able to reclaim their privileges if they returned, but during their 
time abroad they would be living as metics. This created something of a difficulty for 
Athenians, since their ideological conceit was that their polis was the best and most attractive 
to live in. This informed the paradoxical difference between what it was acceptable for metics 
from other cities to do (i.e. abandon their home and embrace Athens instead) and how an 
Athenian should behave – an Athenian’s emigration would not be celebrated, but seen as a 
sign of disloyalty.
157
 
 
5.2 (a) Athenian Citizens as Metics Elsewhere – Shorter Absences in Lysias 3 and Lysias 
31 
 
When an Athenian did leave Athens it therefore created a number of challenges to Athenian 
assumptions. First, it suggested that the idea that Athens was the greatest polis, inhabited by 
the greatest people, was not necessarily backed up in fact. Second, the concept of Athenians 
as an autochthonous and unified group of good and loyal men was undermined when 
individuals apparently rejected the polis as a community. Together, these two factors 
challenged the basis of the Athenian citizens’ special status and privileges within the polis, 
for which the theory of autochthony was partly used as a justification.
158
 Again, these 
challenges were not unique or particularly threatening, since such contradictions are dealt 
with all the time in matters of identity. But how such challenges are dealt with can be 
particularly interesting and provide insight into wider concepts of identity. 
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The concept of the ‘ideal metic’, as described in Euripides’ Suppliants, has already been 
discussed in section 1.1. To this we can add the claims made by the speaker of the 
Demosthenic speech Against Aristocrates: 
Ἐγὼ νομίζω, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων 
ἐπιθυμηταὶ γενόμενοι πολῖται γενέσθαι ἐσπούδασαν, ἅμα τ’ αὐτοὺς ἂν τυγχάνειν 
τούτων καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν οἰκεῖν καὶ μετέχειν ὧν ἐπεθύμησαν· ὅσους δὲ τούτων μὲν 
μηδενὸς μήτ’ ἐπιθυμία μήτε ζῆλος εἰσέρχεται, τὴν πλεονεξίαν δ’ ἀγαπῶσιν ἣν διὰ 
τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν τιμᾶσθαι καρποῦνται, τούτους δ’ οἴομαι, μᾶλλον δ’ οἶδα 
σαφῶς, ὅταν ποτὲ μείζονος πλεονεξίας ἑτέρωθεν ἐλπίδ’ ἴδωσιν, οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῶν 
φροντίσαντας ἐκείνην θεραπεύσειν.159 
 
The sentiment is clear – anyone who has been honoured by naturalisation should make his 
home in Athens, and devote himself to it; those who do otherwise are interested only in their 
own advantage. When Athenians have gone abroad, however, they tend to explain it on their 
return in terms that would fit with the ‘disloyal’ immigrant model. Thus when the speaker of 
Lysias’ Against Simon describes his flight from the polis he explains it as follows:  
οὕτω δὲ σφόδρα ἠπορούμην ὅ τι χρησαίμην, ὦ βουλή, τῇ τούτου παρανομίᾳ, 
ὥστε ἔδοξέ μοι κράτιστον εἶναι ἀποδημῆσαι ἐκ  τῆς  πόλεως. λαβὼν δὴ τὸ 
μειράκιον (ἅπαντα γὰρ δεῖ τἀληθῆ λέγειν) ᾠχόμην ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ᾤμην 
ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον Σίμωνι ἐπιλαθέσθαι μὲν τοῦ νεανίσκου, μεταμελῆσαι δὲ 
τῶν πρότερον ἡμαρτημένων, ἀφικνοῦμαι πάλιν.160 
 
The use of another polis as a refuge is stated in a quite matter of fact and unproblematic 
fashion, although the speaker is careful to justify it on the grounds of Simon’s lawlessness; 
this was presumably an attempt to deflect any attempt by his opponent to characterise the 
flight as evidence of guilt. As Carey notes, it seems extreme as a reaction to the events as 
described, suggesting that an ulterior motive may have been involved.
161
 At any rate, the 
passage suggests that such an absence was something that required an explanation, and that 
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an attractive explanation was the use of the foreign polis as a refuge; another possible 
explanation would be trading. There is, understandably, no mention of any loyalty to the 
foreign polis, as this would hardly go down well with a jury of Athenians. The details of what 
occurred abroad are glossed over. This naturally limits the usefulness of such evidence. When 
we examine speeches attacking those who lived abroad, however, the picture is very different, 
since the litigants could bring into play all manner of ideological assumptions and prejudices 
to back up their attacks. 
 
One such example is Lysias’ speech Against Philon, delivered on the occasion of Philon’s 
dokimasia upon being selected to serve as a member of the boulê. The importance of the 
dokimasia has recently been stressed by Todd, who has connected it with ideas of identity – 
in his terms, the formal questions as recorded in the Athênaiôn Politeia ‘represent… an 
ideological construction of what it was to be a citizen, not least in a world where citizenship 
was something to be inherited from your parents’.162 The questions ask the candidate to state 
his father and grandfather’s names and their deme, and his mother and her father and his 
deme, followed by questions about his family gods and tombs, his payment of taxes, and his 
military service, to which witnesses had to be provided.
163
 As Todd says, these are crucial 
questions, and they are evidently designed to test the individual’s right to be a citizen and his 
contribution to the polis. In the case of members of the boulê, an added element is that they 
will themselves be assessing the credentials of prospective officials when they assume office, 
including the members of the following year’s boulê.164 The importance of the role meant it 
could be regarded as sitting at the heart of the polis, which is certainly where Lysias attempts 
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to place it – Philon’s supposedly un-Athenian behaviour is said to disqualify him from 
holding such a vital and significant position. 
 
It is also worth noting that the speaker of Against Philon was himself a member of the 
outgoing boulê,
165
 though not necessarily one who had been an active speaker during his time 
on it; he says that he is οὐδὲ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ εἰωθέναι λέγειν ἐν ὑμῖν ἐπαρθείς.166 Whitehead 
interprets this as a claim to be poor and inexperienced at speaking, and suggests that the 
claim was not yet clichéd, as it would become by the later fourth century;
167
 it is possible, 
however, that the speaker is merely disavowing this as a motive rather than denying any 
proficiency.
168
 Whitehead is certainly right, however, when he describes the speaker’s 
persona as an ‘honest, average Athenian citizen’.169 This, coupled with the moral authority 
which he derived from his position on the boulê, was intended to give his perspective weight 
and legitimacy. 
 
The central argument of the speech is that Philon’s character, and particularly his actions 
during the regime of the Thirty Tyrants, rendered him unsuitable for the position.
170
 He had 
not actually fought against the democrats, however. Rather than siding with the oligarchs, he 
had fled the city and stayed in Oropus during the conflict. The speaker addresses such 
behaviour as follows: 
Ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλους τινάς φημι δίκαιον εἶναι βουλεύειν περὶ ἡμῶν, ἢ τοὺς πρὸς 
τῷ εἶναι πολίτας καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντας τούτου. τούτοις μὲν γὰρ μεγάλα τὰ 
διαφέροντά ἐστιν εὖ τε πράττειν τὴν πόλιν τήνδε καὶ ἀνεπιτηδείως διὰ τὸ 
ἀναγκαῖον σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι μετέχειν τὸ μέρος τῶν δεινῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ 
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τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετέχουσι· ὅσοι δὲ φύσει μὲν πολῖταί εἰσι, γνώμῃ δὲ χρῶνται ὡς 
πᾶσα γῆ πατρὶς αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἐν ᾗ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχωσιν, οὗτοι δῆλοί εἰσιν ὅτι 
κἂν παρέντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἴδιον κέρδος ἔλθοιεν 
διὰ τὸ μὴ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ τὴν οὐσίαν πατρίδα ἑαυτοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι.171 
 
In this conception, it is not sufficient merely to hold citizenship, or to be a phusei politês; one 
must also share in its successes and reversals. Those who leave it prove that their allegiance 
is not really to the polis at all, but to their own advantage; as Lysias puts it, their property, 
and not their polis, is their fatherland. This fits with the idea of disloyal metics, a 
stereotypical group ‘for whom possessions trump polis’, in Bakewell’s words.172 But here the 
implication is that the citizens should never have left Athens; this is a clear contrast to the 
ideal of the metic in Athens, who should embrace his new polis. The speaker also creates a 
difference between how Philon has acted and how Athenians are supposed to behave. The 
speaker explains this by depicting his opponent as a deviant and atypical individual who 
stands in stark contrast to the rest of the citizens: 
Οὗτος γάρ, ὦ βουλή, ὅτε ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἦν (ἧς ἐγώ, καθ’ ὅσον ἀναγκάζομαι, 
κατὰ τοσοῦτον μέμνημαι), ἐκκεκηρυγμένος ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα 
μετὰ τοῦ ἄλλου πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν τέως μὲν ᾤκει ἐν ἀγρῷ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ 
Φυλῆς κατῆλθον εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ οὐ μόνον οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐκ 
τῆς ὑπερορίας οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ οἱ δ’ εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ συνελέγοντο, καὶ καθ’ 
ὅσον ἕκαστος οἷός τ’ ἦν, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἐβοήθει τῇ πατρίδι, τὰ ἐναντία ἅπασι 
τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ἐποίησε· συσκευασάμενος γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς τὴν 
ὑπερορίαν ἐξῴκησε, καὶ ἐν Ὠρωπῷ μετοίκιον κατατιθεὶς ἐπὶ προστάτου ᾤκει, 
βουληθεὶς παρ’ ἐκείνοις μετοικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ’ ἡμῶν πολίτης εἶναι.173 
 
                                                          
171
 Lys. 31.5-6: ‘I say that it is not right for any to be Councillors in our affairs other than those who, in addition 
to being citizens, also have their hearts set upon citizenship. For them it makes a great difference whether the 
city does well or badly, because they think it necessary for them personally to share in its dangers, just as they 
also share in its prosperity. But as for those who are citizens by nature, yet consider every land in which they 
have an interest to be their own fatherland, well, they would clearly disregard the common good of the city and 
turn to their own private gain, because it is not the city, but rather their own property that they regard as their 
fatherland.’ 
172
 Bakewell 1999: 9-10. 
173
 Lys. 31.8-9: ‘For this man, Council, when the disaster befell the city (which I only mention to the extent that 
I am forced to) and he had been banished from the town by the Thirty along with many other citizens, lived for a 
time in the countryside; but when the exiles came down from Phyle to the Piraeus, and not only the people from 
the countryside, but also those from beyond the border gathered together, some in the town and others in the 
Piraeus, and each one aided his fatherland as much as he was able, he did the opposite to what all the other 
citizens did – he packed up all his belongings there and fled across the border, and in Oropus paid the metoikion 
and lived under a prostatês, wishing to live among them as a metic rather than to be a citizen with us.’ 
256 
 
Philon thus behaved in the opposite way to all the rest of the citizens; the speaker marks his 
behaviour as aberrant. The fact that he chose metic status over his life as a citizen is 
reprehensible, and ‘supposed to disgust and alienate [his] fellow citizens’.174 It is emphasised 
by the references to paying the metoikion and living under a prostatês; notably, as Whitehead 
has pointed out, Lysias uses the term ἐπὶ προστάτου ᾤκει rather than the usual prostatên 
echein, nemein or epigraphein. Whitehead argues that Lysias’ terminology, which he appears 
to have coined, was ‘more emotive’ and implied ‘pathetic reliance on someone’.175 All this 
supplements the charge of disloyalty to his polis; but Lysias is also careful to show that 
Philon’s was an extreme and even, if the speech is taken literally, unique decision (τὰ ἐναντία 
ἅπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ἐποίησε). 176  This is done partly to prevent sympathy from 
developing, and also to maintain the myth of Athenian same-mindedness and unity in order to 
make the councillors more likely to reject the candidate, on the grounds that Philon’s 
behaviour is both ‘un-Athenian’ and a threat to the norms of the polis. He has, in fact, acted 
even worse than the metics at Athens, with whose behaviour his is unfavourably compared: 
τίς δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ὑμῖν, εἰ τοὺς μετοίκους μέν, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸ 
προσῆκον ἑαυτοῖς ἐβοήθησαν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐτιμήσατε ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως, τοῦτον δέ, 
ὅτι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ἑαυτῷ προὔδωκε τὴν πόλιν, μὴ κολάσετε, εἰ μή γε ἄλλῳ  
τινὶ μείζονι, τῇ γε παρούσῃ ἀτιμίᾳ;177 
 
Bakewell, accepting that the point is that Philon has acted in an even worse way than the 
metics, argues that ‘the comparisons here also have the effect of ennobling metic 
behaviour’,178 pointing also to the contrast Lysias gives between his family’s behaviour and 
that of the Thirty.
179
 But this is still within the bounds of what is allowed to metics – there is 
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no problem with their serving the polis in any way, as long as they know their place and do 
not attempt to infringe on citizen privileges. Their behaviour, while it apparently goes 
‘beyond their duty’, is thus not a threat to the norms of the polis. Philon’s behaviour, however, 
is, as is made explicit towards the end of the speech, first by an apparently general comment 
on the purpose of honouring and dishonouring citizens: 
ἀναμνήσθητε δὲ δι’ ὅ τι ποτὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γενομένους περὶ τὴν πόλιν 
τιμᾶτε καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἀτιμάζετε. ἐδείχθη γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα οὐ τῶν 
γεγενημένων μᾶλλόν τι ἕνεκα ἢ τῶν γενησομένων, ἵν’ ἀγαθοὶ προθυμῶνται 
γίγνεσθαι ἐκ παρασκευῆς, κακοὶ δὲ μηδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς τρόπου ἐπιχειρῶσιν.180 
 
The council’s decision is thus invested with an importance beyond the parameters of the case 
itself, as it is the character of future generations of Athenians that is at stake. In the light of 
this, the speech is concluded with the following passage: 
Ἱκανά μοι νομίζω εἰρῆσθαι, καίτοι πολλά γε παραλιπών· ἀλλὰ πιστεύω ὑμᾶς καὶ 
ἄνευ τούτων αὐτοὺς τὰ συμφέροντα τῇ πόλει γνώσεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν 
ὑμᾶς δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἀξίων ὄντων βουλεύειν τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι ἢ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, 
ὁποῖοί τινες ὄντες αὐτοὶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐδοκιμάσθητε. ἔστι γὰρ τὰ τούτου 
ἐπιτηδεύματα καινὰ παραδείγματα καὶ πάσης δημοκρατίας ἀλλότρια.181 
 
Philon’s actions are a ‘new standard’ that is foreign to the democracy, a formulation which 
serves to alienate him from the councillors, whom the speaker pressures to show their 
disapproval by voting against him. In urging them to look to the standards of their own 
behaviour he implies that by accepting Philon they will be admitting a degree of commonality 
with him.
182
 He is effectively suggesting that for them to show approval of Philon is to admit 
that they too would have acted as he did in similar circumstances. 
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5.2 (b) A Citizen in Word but not in Deed – Lycurgus Against Leocrates  
 
The context of the Philon case, which is bound up with the civil war, makes it perhaps an 
atypical example. It is also true that his absence was apparently limited to the length of the 
conflict rather than a long-term or permanent emigration. Lycurgus’ prosecution of Leocrates, 
however, concerns a rather different situation, in which the intended permanence of the move 
is treated prominently. It is also, however, connected to ideas of loyalty and behaviour during 
wartime, since Leocrates’ flight from the city took place in the aftermath of the battle of 
Chaeronea. After spending time in Rhodes and then a number of years in Megara, he returned 
to Athens and, shortly afterwards, was prosecuted by Lycurgus for treason (prodosia) through 
the eisangelia process,
183
 though the definition of treason seems somewhat stretched by the 
orator.
184
 This required a hearing before the assembly, which could then order a trial to be 
held before the boulê, or in a regular court; alternatively the trial could be held before the 
assembly itself. There was thus a particularly public aspect to the procedure, and large 
audience,
185
 which in the case of Leocrates accords well with the speech’s context. 
 
Lycurgus’ period of influence had seen the introduction of reforms of institutions such as the 
ephêbeia, which had important implications for Athenian identity.
186
 A counterpart to these 
policies aimed at bolstering Athenian civic and religious identity was his practice of 
prosecuting individuals for behaviour that, he claimed, harmed the polis or set a bad example 
to its citizens. Humphreys has described this (self-appointed) role as ‘the moral voice of the 
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city’, and a sort of ‘public prosecutor’.187 Leocrates was on the receiving end of one such 
prosecution, as was Lycophron, whose defence speech has come down to us as Hyperides 
1,
188
 and the general Lysicles.
189
  
 
Scholars’ views on this policy, and indeed on the quality of the speech against Leocrates, 
have varied widely. For Jebb, writing in the 1870s, the speech is ‘a solemn and earnest 
protest on behalf of public spirit’;190 Dobson, writing in 1919, describes the orator as ‘an 
ardent patriot by conviction, [who] thought it his duty to undertake the ungrateful part of a 
public prosecutor, pursuing all who failed in their sacred duty towards their country’,191 
although he considers the effect of the speech partly ‘spoiled’ by a couple of its rhetorical 
flourishes.
192
 Kennedy takes a quite different view. Initially noting that Lycurgus ‘was clearly 
an Athenian Cato’ whose prosecutions ‘seem to have issued from no personal malice, but to 
have been intended to unite his countrymen against moral weakness or corruption and to 
inflame their love of country’,193 he goes on to catalogue its ‘rhetorical irresponsibility’, 
concluding that ‘Lycurgus’ only basis for prosecution was his own exaggerated indignation, 
and his only weapon his rhetorical ability… The speech… is a fine example of unreasonable 
prosecution encouraged by confidence in rhetorical technique’.194 
 
More recently, Phillips has described the prosecution of Lycophron as ‘a test case for 
Lycurgus’ efforts to transform the impeachment procedure into a quasi-catch-all remedy for 
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“un-Athenian” activities’,195 a phrase which presumably reflects Phillips’ own view of the 
policy. At least two scholars have drawn overt parallels with events and figures of their own 
time. Smith, writing during the Second World War, depicted Lycurgus as part of a 
‘succession of statesmen in the rôle of teacher’196 at Athens that was mirrored by Roosevelt’s 
radio broadcasts;
197
 Humphreys, in the afterword to a new version of an article originally 
published in 1985, states that at the time she ‘saw an analogy between Lycurgus and 
Margaret Thatcher in that both combined a patriotic and ostensibly democratic rhetoric with 
undemocratic practice’.198 
 
We are fortunate enough to have some insight into what the Athenians themselves made of 
the speech against Leocrates, as we know the result – Aeschines reported in his speech 
Against Ctesiphon that ἕτερος δ᾽ ἐκπλεύσας ἰδιώτης εἰς Ῥόδον, ὅτι τὸν φόβον ἀνάνδρως 
ἤνεγκε, πρώην ποτὲ εἰσηγγέλθη, καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο: εἰ δὲ μία ψῆφος μετέπεσεν, 
ὑπερώριστ᾽ ἄν.199 The point which Aeschines was making was that Demosthenes’ betrayal 
far exceeded that of Leocrates, and was therefore even more deserving of punishment; in 
Lycurgus’ speech, however, the significance of his flight from the city is magnified, for the 
obvious purpose of encouraging the jury to convict. A moralising tone prevails throughout – 
Whitehead calls it a ‘moral lecture’ and a ‘sermon’200 – and, interestingly, the length and 
intended permanence of his emigration from the city is treated as an important factor. It 
should be noted, however, that when recalling the speech Aeschines describes Leocrates as a 
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 Smith 1943: 263. 
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 Smith 1943: 265. 
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 Humphreys 2004: 128. 
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 Aesch. 3.252: ‘Another private citizen who had sailed off to Rhodes was prosecuted recently because of his 
cowardice, and the vote was tied – if a single vote had gone the other way he would have been exiled.’  
200
 Whitehead 2006: 147. 
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man who sailed to Rhodes, rather than one who lived in Megara.
201
 The initial abandonment 
of the polis appears to have been what stuck in the mind of at least this one Athenian. 
 
The taint of his abandonment of the polis, and the affront to Athens and its democracy which 
his eventual return and continued presence created, is claimed to be the reason for the 
prosecution: 
ἐγὼ δ’ ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰδὼς Λεωκράτην φυγόντα μὲν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος 
κινδύνους, ἐγκαταλιπόντα δὲ τοὺς αὑτοῦ πολίτας, προδεδωκότα δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν 
ὑμετέραν δύναμιν, ἅπασι δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἔνοχον ὄντα, ταύτην τὴν 
εἰσαγγελίαν ἐποιησάμην, οὔτε δι’ ἔχθραν οὐδεμίαν, οὔτε διὰ φιλονικίαν οὐδ’ 
ἡντινοῦν τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα προελόμενος, ἀλλ’ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίσας τοῦτον 
περιορᾶν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλοντα καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἱερῶν μετέχοντα, τῆς τε 
πατρίδος ὄνειδος καὶ πάντων ὑμῶν γεγενημένον.202 
 
Lycurgus thus claims that it was not a personal enmity or antagonism that induced him to 
bring the prosecution, but rather the shame and disgrace (aischron and oneidos) which his 
involvement in the agora and public sacrifices brought.
203
 This public element is important, 
given the usual legal discourse which we have seen presenting litigants as examples to the 
community, and imagining the potential consequences of a jury’s verdict for the polis’ social 
life and values. In characterising his opponent Lycurgus must therefore show, as did Lysias in 
the speech against Philon, that he is an aberrant citizen who has reneged on his duties to the 
polis. This is brought out in the orator’s references to avoiding the dangers he ought to have 
risked on behalf of the polis, and abandoning his fellow citizens. Lycurgus must also show 
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 Whitehead 2006: 134. 
202
 Lyc. 1.5: ‘I, Athenians, knew that Leocrates had fled his fatherland’s dangers, abandoned his own fellow-
citizens, ignored all of your authority, and was guilty of all charges, and so brought this eisangelia. Not out of 
any enmity, nor through any love of victory, did I undertake this trial, but because I thought it shameful to allow 
this man to push into the agora and share in our common sacrifices when he had been a disgrace to his 
fatherland and to you all.’ 
203
 Allen 2000: 12-17 has regarded this depersonalisation of the prosecution as a novel feature of this speech, 
through which Lycurgus ‘redefines personal interest’ as ‘an interest in the good of the community’ (2000: 17); it 
is not anger that motivates him, but concern for the polis. We are not, however, in a position to comment on how 
new or original the application of these ideas to oratory was, simply because we only have a small selection of 
the speeches delivered in Athens; and, as Allen herself notes (2000: 9), Lycurgus had recently carried out at 
least one other, successful prosecution of an apparently inadequate citizen, namely Autolycus (Lyc. 1.53, [Plut.] 
Lives of the Ten Orators 843e). In the course of that prosecution the same approach may have been used. Also, 
the little we know of his speech against Lysicles appears to fit the idea that there was a strong communal aspect 
to that prosecution (Diod. Sic. 16.88.2). 
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that this behaviour is totally different from the norm, making Leocrates’ actions seem 
exceptional and even incomprehensible other than as the result of severe, even unnatural 
moral failings. To do so, he uses some terms that are familiar: 
Μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐπειδὴ χρόνος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἀφικνεῖτο Ἀθήνηθεν 
πλοῖα εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον, καὶ φανερὸν ἦν ὅτι οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἐγεγόνει περὶ τὴν πόλιν, 
φοβηθεὶς ἐκπλεῖ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς Ῥόδου καὶ ἀφικνεῖται εἰς Μέγαρα· καὶ ᾤκει ἐν 
Μεγάροις πλείω ἢ πέντε ἔτη προστάτην ἔχων Μεγαρέα, οὐδὲ τὰ ὅρια τῆς χώρας 
αἰσχυνόμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐν γειτόνων τῆς ἐκθρεψάσης αὐτὸν πατρίδος μετοικῶν.204 
 
The reference to his prostatês is similar to the use of the term in the speech against Philon, 
which is one reason why it has been suggested that Lycurgus had read and used that speech 
(in section 145 Lycurgus uses the formulation oikein epi prostatou, as did Lysias).
205
 More 
colour is added by the vivid detail of his living on the very borders of his homeland, which, it 
is stressed, raised him. The metaphor suggests ideas of kinship and family, personalising the 
relationship between polis and politês and making the betrayal appear more vivid. Equally, 
the more permanent nature of the departure enables Lycurgus to exaggerate the importance of 
Leocrates’ emigration far more than Lysias could Philon’s. Whereas in the earlier speech it 
was the opportunistic and shallowly self-interested aspect that was focused on, here it is the 
depth of the abandonment that is stressed, as can be seen in the next section of the speech: 
καὶ οὕτως αὑτοῦ κατεγνώκει ἀίδιον φυγήν, ὥστε μεταπεμψάμενος ἐντεῦθεν 
Ἀμύνταν τὸν τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ τὴν πρεσβυτέραν καὶ τῶν φίλων 
Ἀντιγένην Ξυπεταιόνα, καὶ δεηθεὶς τοῦ κηδεστοῦ πρίασθαι παρ’ αὑτοῦ τἀνδρά-  
ποδα καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδόσθαι ταλάντου, κἀπὸ τούτου προσέταξε τοῖς τε 
χρήσταις ἀποδοῦναι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα καὶ τοὺς ἐράνους διενεγκεῖν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν 
αὑτῷ ἀποδοῦναι.206 
 
The language serves to stress how unusual and, for a conventional Athenian, 
incomprehensible his behaviour was – he is said to have ‘condemned himself’ to exile. The 
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 Lyc. 1.21: ‘And so after this, when some time had passed, ships started to arrive in Rhodes from Athens, and 
it was clear that no disaster had occurred in the city; so he grew afraid and sailed away again, this time from 
Rhodes, and reached Megara. He lived in Megara for more than five years with a Megaran prostatês, living 
unashamed on the boundaries of his land, a metic on the borders of the country which raised him.’ 
205
 Carey 1989: 183. The many similarities between the speeches are listed by Whitehead 2006: 134-135. 
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 Lyc. 1.22: ‘He had condemned himself to such final exile that he sent for Amyntas, the husband of his elder 
sister, and his friend Antigenes of Xypete, and asked his brother in law to buy from him his slaves and his house, 
which he sold for a talent, and from this amount he arranged to pay back the debts he owed his creditors, to 
discharge his loans, and to return the rest to himself.’ 
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sale of his property, depicted here as proof of his intention to leave permanently, leads into 
the far more emotive removal of his family’s sacred images: 
ἄξιον δ’ ἐστὶν ἐφ’ οἷς μέλλω λέγειν ἀγανακτῆσαι καὶ μισῆσαι τουτονὶ Λεωκράτην. 
οὐ γὰρ ἐξήρκεσε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ χρήματα μόνον ὑπεκθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ πατρῷα, ἃ τοῖς ὑμετέροις νομίμοις καὶ πατρίοις ἔθεσιν οἱ πρόγονοι 
παρέδοσαν αὐτῷ ἱδρυσάμενοι, ταῦτα μετεπέμψατο εἰς Μέγαρα καὶ ἐξήγαγεν ἐκ 
τῆς χώρας, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῶν πατρῴων ἱερῶν φοβηθείς, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς 
πατρίδος αὐτὰ κινήσας συμφεύγειν αὑτῷ, ἐκλιπόντα τοὺς νεὼς καὶ τὴν χώραν ἣν 
κατεῖχεν, ἠξίωσε, καὶ ἱδρῦσθαι ἐπὶ ξένης καὶ ἀλλοτρίας, καὶ εἶναι ὀθνεῖα τῇ χώρᾳ 
καὶ τοῖς νομίμοις τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν εἰθισμένοις.207 
 
This particular facet of Leocrates’ emigration enables Lycurgus to intensify the extent of his 
betrayal, bringing in a religious and ancestral aspect. The importance of these images was 
recognised in the dokimasia questions which were discussed above – evidently they were 
regarded as a key part of Athenian identity. Leocrates made the images share his exile, and by 
moving them to Megara rendered them ‘strangers to the soil’. Here Lycurgus has used the 
idea of a strong connection between the Athenian dêmos and the land of Attica, using the 
image of its soil. This shows obvious parallels with the ‘born of the earth’ autochthony myth, 
giving it perhaps a strong resonance.  
 
Steinbock has pointed to another parallel which these ancestral images had, namely the 
ephebic oath, which the jurors themselves would have sworn in their younger days,
208
 and 
which Lycurgus specifically brings up later in the speech, along with a description of how 
Leocrates has broken it.
209
 In this instance, the reference is to the clause which reads τιμήσω 
ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια,210 which also has resonances with a passage which reads τί γὰρ χρὴ παθεῖν 
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 Lyc. 1.25: ‘I will now say something which will give you a good reason to feel angry with and hate this man 
Leocrates. For it was not enough for him to take only his own body and property to safety – he also took the 
sacred and ancestral images which, in accordance with your customs and ancestral habits, his forefathers set up 
and handed down to him. He sent these to Megara and took them out of their land, not fearing the name of 
“ancestral images” or caring that he had caused them to share his banishment from his fatherland with him, 
abandoning their temples and the land which they inhabited, to be established in a strange and foreign land, 
strangers to the soil and the traditional customs which were observed in Megara.’ 
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 Steinbock 2011: 306-308. 
209
 Lyc. 1.76-78. For the text of the inscribed version of the oath see Kellogg 2008: 373-375. 
210
 Lyc. 1.76: ‘I will honour the ancestral shrines’. 
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τὸν ἐκλιπόντα μὲν τὴν πατρίδα, μὴ βοηθήσαντα δὲ τοῖς πατρῴοις ἱεροῖς.211 For Steinbock, 
this parallel underpins the ‘relative success’ of the whole speech, and relied on the speech’s 
‘ability to conjure up the jurors’ memories of their own ephebate and, by doing so, tap into 
emotions and values that lie at the heart of Athenian collective identity’.212 Steinbock has 
made the resonances clear, but in my view extends them too far – our knowledge of the 
ephêbeia before the Lycurgan reforms (dated to 335 by Steinbock)
213
 is too vague to assume 
that Lycurgus’ references evoked personal experiences and memories in jurors who may have 
gone through a very different system.
214
 Equally, if the whole speech was designed around 
the ephêbeia, it is rather strange that it took so long for Lycurgus to mention the oath 
explicitly. Nevertheless, Steinbock is right to mention the emotions and values of Athenian 
identity – but I would regard these as being reflected by both the ephêbeia and the speech 
rather than the latter drawing purely or mainly on the former. 
 
Lycurgus’ view of Leocrates’ actions, of course, is not the only interpretation possible. The 
personal and individual connection with ancestors and family images could also be stressed, 
and Leocrates might, conceivably, have been able to argue that it was his duty to keep 
possession of them; a true betrayal would have been to leave them behind in Athens. It is 
possibly in part to counter such an explanation that Lycurgus goes on to claim that Leocrates’ 
actions harmed the entire community of Athens: 
καὶ οἱ μὲν πατέρες ὑμῶν τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ὡς τὴν χώραν εἰληχυίᾳ {ὁμώνυμον αὐτῇ} τὴν 
πατρίδα προσηγόρευον Ἀθήνας, ἵν’ οἱ τιμῶντες τὴν θεὸν τὴν ὁμώνυμον αὐτῇ 
πόλιν μὴ ἐγκαταλίπωσι· Λεωκράτης δ’ οὔτε νομίμων οὔτε πατρίδος οὔθ’ ἱερῶν 
φροντίσας τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐξαγώγιμον ὑμῖν καὶ τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν βοήθειαν 
ἐποίησε. καὶ οὐκ ἐξήρκεσεν αὐτῷ τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα τὴν πόλιν ἀδικῆσαι, 
ἀλλ’ οἰκῶν ἐν Μεγάροις, οἷς παρ’ ὑμῶν ἐξεκομίσατο χρήμασιν ἀφορμῇ χρώμενος, 
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 Lyc. 1.8: ‘For what should the man suffer who abandoned his fatherland, and did not come to the aid of his 
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ἐκ τῆς Ἠπείρου παρὰ Κλεοπάτρας εἰς Λευκάδα ἐσιτήγει καὶ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς 
Κόρινθον.215 
 
His actions are represented as deliberate attempts to harm the polis. His disregard for custom, 
country and sacred images amounted to an attempt to make the city’s divine protection 
‘exportable’;216 even the removal of his own property is seen as a betrayal, since it was used 
to ship corn to other poleis. The clear implications are that this is not how a real Athenian 
should behave, and that an Athenian owes an ongoing debt to the polis and is duty bound to 
serve it. Having established this, and Leocrates’ failure to live up to this standard, Lycurgus 
returns to the subject of his opponent’s actions during the aftermath of Chaeronea, showing 
how extreme was his failure to assist the polis: 
καίτοι κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους ὦ ἄνδρες τίς οὐκ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἠλέησεν, οὐ 
μόνον πολίτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένος ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἐπιδεδημηκώς; τίς δ’ 
ἦν οὕτως ἢ μισόδημος τότ’ ἢ μισαθήναιος, ὅστις ἐδυνήθη ἂν ἄτακτον αὑτὸν 
ὑπομεῖναι ἰδεῖν; ἡνίκα ἡ μὲν ἧττα καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς πάθος τῷ δήμῳ προσηγγέλλετο, 
ὀρθὴ δ’ ἦν ἡ πόλις ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, αἱ δ’ ἐλπίδες τῆς σωτηρίας τῷ δήμῳ ἐν 
τοῖς ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντ’ ἔτη γεγονόσι καθειστήκεσαν…217 
 
Even a xenos who had spent only a short time in the city (i.e. not enough time to have been 
required to register as a metic, assuming that Harpocration’s use of the term ὡϛ ξένοϛ 
ἐπιδημῶν to describe such people accurately reflects the Athenian terminology – see section 
1.3) would have felt for the city, and only hatred of Athens and its dêmos could explain a 
refusal to fight in the army. Leocrates is thus even worse than a passing visitor; his failure to 
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 Lyc. 1.26: ‘And your fathers called their country Athens for Athena, as she was the god who had been 
allocated their land, so that those who honoured the god should not abandon the city which shared her name; but 
Leocrates ignored customs, country and religion and did what he could to make the protection the city receives 
from the gods an exportable commodity. And it was not even enough for him to wrong the city to that great 
extent – when living in Megara, using the money which he had carried away from you as capital, he shipped 
corn bought from Cleopatra from Epirus to Leucas, and from there to Corinth.’ 
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 The religious aspect of the speech is stressed particularly by Whitehead 2006: 144-146. 
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 Lyc. 1.39: ‘And yet at that time, men of Athens, who would not have pitied the city, not just a citizen but 
even a foreigner who had been living there in former times? Who was there who so hated either the dêmos or 
Athens that he could bear to see himself remain out of the army? When the defeat and the disaster which had 
occurred had been announced to the dêmos, and the city was excited at what had happened, and the dêmos’ 
hopes of salvation had been placed on those over fifty years of age…’ 
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assist the polis is presented as virtually inhuman. His behaviour’s contrast to that of the rest 
of the polis is soon given further metaphorical embellishment, as Lycurgus continues: 
καίτοι κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἔστιν ἥτις ἡλικία οὐ παρέσχεν ἑαυτὴν εἰς  
τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν, ὅθ᾽ ἡ μὲν χώρα τὰ δένδρα συνεβάλλετο, οἱ δὲ 
τετελευτηκότες τὰς θήκας, οἱ δὲ νεῲ τὰ ὅπλα. ἐπεμελοῦντο γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῆς τῶν  
τειχῶν κατασκευῆς, οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν τάφρων, οἱ δὲ τῆς χαρακώσεως: οὐδεὶς δ᾽ ἦν 
ἀργὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἐφ᾽ ὧν οὐδενὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρέσχε τάξαι  
Λεωκράτης.218 
 
Again, the land of Attica itself is said to lend its support to the Athenians’ cause, and of the 
entire population present in the polis it is only Leocrates who does not help. In the next 
section of the speech Lycurgus reiterates that in the aftermath of the battle he did not make 
any further effort: 
ὧν εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἀναμνησθέντας τὸν μηδὲ συνεξενεγκεῖν μηδ’ ἐπ’ ἐκφορὰν ἐλθεῖν 
ἀξιώσαντα τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίας ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ 
τελευτησάντων θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι, ὡς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος ἀτάφων ἐκείνων τῶν 
ἀνδρῶν γεγενημένων· ὧν οὗτος οὐδὲ τὰς θήκας παριὼν ᾐσχύνθη, ὀγδόῳ ἔτει τὴν 
πατρίδα αὐτῶν προσαγορεύων.219 
 
The striking image of Leocrates returning and passing the graves, unashamed, when he would 
have left the fallen unburied is another attempt to load his actions with significance. Having 
thus depicted his opponent in a thoroughly negative, shameless light, Lycurgus throws him 
into relief by going on to praise the fallen Athenians, implicitly contrasting their heroism and 
worthiness with Leocrates’ base betrayal and cowardice. The contrast is explicitly raised as a 
justification for what might be seen as an unnecessary digression: 
Περὶ ὧν ὦ ἄνδρες μικρῷ πλείω βούλομαι διελθεῖν, καὶ ὑμῶν ἀκοῦσαι δέομαι καὶ 
μὴ νομίζειν ἀλλοτρίους εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους τῶν δημοσίων ἀγώνων· αἱ 
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 Lyc. 1.44: ‘And yet at that time those of every age gave themselves over to the city’s preservation, when the 
land was contributing its trees, the dead their graves, and the temples their arms. For some took care of 
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 Lyc. 1.45: ‘It is fair that you remember this, and punish with death this man who did not deign to carry out 
the bodies or go to the funerals of those men who died for freedom and the preservation of the dêmos at 
Chaeronea, as it would have been the fate of those men to stay unburied, if it had been down to him. He was not 
even ashamed at passing by their graves when he greeted their fatherland after eight years.’ 
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γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐλογίαι τὸν ἔλεγχον σαφῆ κατὰ τῶν τἀναντία 
ἐπιτηδευόντων ποιοῦσιν.220 
 
In the course of praising these men, then, Lycurgus overtly sets them up as a paradigm of 
good behaviour – but rather than establish them as exceptionally good, he implies that every 
Athenian should act in this way. Their conduct is treated as the norm, with the logical 
consequence that Leocrates’ was aberrant and unnatural. This can be seen in the next section, 
when Lycurgus comments on their attitude towards their homeland: 
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ τὴν χώραν κακῶς 
ποιεῖν προέμενοι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν αὑτῶν ἀνδρείαν ἀσφαλεστέραν 
φυλακὴν εἶναι νομίζοντες τῶν λιθίνων περιβόλων, τὴν δὲ θρέψασαν αὑτοὺς 
αἰσχυνόμενοι περιορᾶν πορθουμένην, εἰκότως· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς φύσει 
γεννήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ποιητοὺς τῶν πατέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν ἅπαντες ταῖς 
εὐνοίαις, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς χώρας τὰς μὴ φύσει προσηκούσας, ἀλλ’ ὕστερον 
ἐπικτήτους γενομένας καταδεέστερον διάκεινται.221 
 
Such sentiments are, according to Lycurgus, natural – they are held by everyone, within the 
oikos towards their parents and on a wider scale towards their fatherland. Everyone, that is, 
apart from the likes of Leocrates, whom Lycurgus has already depicted as a man who 
preferred another polis to his own. Given this, the jury can then convict him safe in the 
knowledge that he is not like them, and that they themselves would never have acted in such 
a way. In the customary fashion, Lycurgus goes on to claim that precedent also binds the 
jurors to convict:
222
 
ἀλλὰ μὴν Αὐτολύκου γε ὑμεῖς κατεψηφίσασθε, μείναντος μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς 
κινδύνοις, ἔχοντος δ’ αἰτίαν τοὺς υἱεῖς καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ὑπεκθέσθαι, καὶ 
ἐτιμωρήσασθε. καίτοι εἰ τὸν τοὺς ἀχρήστους εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπεκθέσθαι αἰτίαν 
ἔχοντα ἐτιμωρήσασθε, τί δεῖ πάσχειν ὅστις ἀνὴρ ὢν οὐκ ἀπέδωκε τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ 
πατρίδι;223 
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 Lyc. 1.46: ‘I want to say a little more about them, men of Athens, and I ask you to listen and not to regard 
such words as a digression in a public trial; for praise of good men makes a clear proof against those whose 
behaviour is the opposite.’ 
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 Lyc. 1.47-48: ‘They had no hope of safety from city walls, nor did they abandon their land for the enemy to 
devastate, but regarded their own courage as more trusty protection  than stone battlements, and thought it 
disgraceful to see the land which raised them ravaged – and rightly so. For just as people do not regard natural 
parents and adopted parents with the same affection, so also are they worse disposed towards countries that are 
not theirs by birth, but have been adopted in their lifetimes.’ 
222
 For the use of precedent by Attic orators see Rubinstein 2007. 
223
 Lyc. 1.53: ‘You convicted Autolycus, since although he himself remained in the city, he was guilty of 
sending away his children and wife, and you punished him. And yet if you punished him for sending away those 
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Even someone whose crime was the understandable decision to send away others deserved 
and received punishment; Leocrates’ greater crime must, therefore, also be punished. 
Lycurgus glosses over the fact that Autolycus’ actions had actually broken an order of the 
polis, whereas Leocrates’ must not have – he must have made his escape before the 
restrictions were passed, or else Lycurgus would certainly have mentioned his legal 
transgression explicitly.
224
 But the key point of the passage is that the personal relationship 
between the man and his country is again brought up – military service was required to repay 
the upbringing which he received from his patris. Lycurgus goes on to list various other 
examples of exemplary decrees and punishments enacted in the past, in each case arguing 
that Leocrates’ crime is even worse. 
 
Leocrates, then, by shirking his duty, fleeing his home polis, and residing in (and contributing 
to) another has proven that, in the words of Euripides as quoted by Lycurgus, he was a citizen 
in word but not in deed. The relevant part of the quotation runs as follows: 
ᾗ πρῶτα μὲν λεὼς οὐκ ἐπακτὸς ἄλλοθεν, 
αὐτόχθονες δ’ ἔφυμεν· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι πόλεις 
πεσσῶν ὁμοίως διαφοραῖς ἐκτισμέναι 
ἄλλαι παρ’ ἄλλων εἰσὶν εἰσαγώγιμοι. 
ὅστις δ’ ἀπ’ ἄλλης πόλεος οἰκήσῃ πόλιν, 
ἁρμὸς πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλῳ παγείς, 
λόγῳ πολίτης ἐστί, τοῖς δ’ ἔργοισιν οὔ.225 
 
Leocrates has thus, in effect, placed himself outside of his natural place and squandered his 
birthright as an autochthonous Athenian citizen. The consequences of this are brought up by 
Leocrates at the end of his speech, when he asks the jury a sequence of rhetorical questions: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
who were useless in war, what penalty should he pay who, though a man, did not pay the price of his upbringing 
to his fatherland?’ 
224
 Whitehead 2006: 144. 
225
 Lyc. 1.100: ‘[Athens,] in which there is no foreigner from another place; we were born autochthonous, while 
other cities, formed in the same way as moves in a game of draughts, are imported from elsewhere. Someone 
from one city who settles in another is like a bad peg in a piece of wood, a citizen in word but not in deed.’ 
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καὶ αὐτίκα μάλ’ ὑμᾶς ἀξιώσει ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ ἀπολογουμένου κατὰ τοὺς 
νόμους· ὑμεῖς δ’ ἐρωτᾶτε αὐτὸν ποίους; οὓς ἐγκαταλιπὼν ᾤχετο; καὶ ἐᾶσαι αὐτὸν 
οἰκεῖν ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι τῆς πατρίδος· ποίοις; ἃ μόνος τῶν πολιτῶν οὐ συνδιεφύλαξε; 
καὶ ἐπικαλέσεται τοὺς θεοὺς σώσοντας αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· τίνας; οὐχ ὧν 
τοὺς νεὼς καὶ τὰ ἕδη καὶ τὰ τεμένη προὔδωκε; καὶ δεήσεται καὶ ἱκετεύσει 
ἐλεῆσαι αὐτόν· τίνων; οὐχ οἷς τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρανον εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν εἰσενεγκεῖν 
οὐκ ἐτόλμησε; Ῥοδίους ἱκετευέτω· τὴν γὰρ ἀσφάλειαν ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων πόλει 
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι ἐνόμισεν εἶναι.226 
 
His betrayal means that Leocrates should not now call on the laws to defend him; he did not 
defend them, and thus no longer deserves their protection. The implication is that citizenship, 
while conferred purely by birth, must be paid for in action at certain times; a failure to do so 
can result in the forfeiture of citizen status in the eyes of the community if not in a strict legal 
sense. This, naturally enough, accords well with other socially-targeted policies of the 
Lycurgan era, such as the development of the reformed ephêbeia as described in the 
Athênaiôn Politeia.
227
  
 
The question of how influential such views were on the Athenian public at large is a different 
matter, although the fact that half of the jurors voted to convict in a case where the actual 
legal justification for doing so appears so thin suggests that they had a certain degree of 
resonance.
228
 Allen speculates that the military background of the case was important – if the 
citizens felt that Athens was still under threat they would be more likely to listen to Lycurgus’ 
extra-legal arguments.
229
 Steinbock, as we have seen, has argued that it was the resonance 
with the jurors’ own experience as ephebes that led to its ‘relative success’.230 Alternatively, 
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 Lyc. 1.143: ‘Very soon he will beg you to listen to his defence according to the laws. But you ask him – what 
kind of laws? The ones he abandoned and fled? And he’ll beg you to allow him to live within the walls of his 
fatherland – which walls? Those which he alone of the citizens did not protect? And he’ll call on the gods to 
save him from danger – which gods? Surely not those whose temples and statues and sanctuaries he deserted? 
And he will beg and pray for mercy – but from whom?  Is it not from those whose common contribution to the 
city’s safety he did not have the courage to match? Let him look for mercy from the Rhodians, since he thought 
he would be safer in their city than in his own fatherland.’ 
227
 Ath. Pol. 42.2-5. 
228
 Edwards 1994: 59 sees this as a testament ‘to the effect Lycurgus’ earnest eloquence had’; cf. Jebb 1876: 
280-381. 
229
 Allen 2000: 29. 
230
 Steinbock 2011: 282. 
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one could suggest that personal and political support of Lycurgus inflated his success; those 
jurors who approved of him might have voted his way even if they were unconvinced by the 
legal case, since, as Carey has noted, he ‘threw his enormous prestige into the prosecution’.231  
 
Whitehead, on the other hand, has approached the question form the opposite direction, 
asking why the prosecution failed
232
 rather than why it did relatively well, suggesting that, on 
the face of it,  it is surprising that ‘so many of his fellow citizens disagreed’, given Lycurgus’ 
position and prestige. He accepts that there is no ‘single or simple answer’,233 but suggests 
that one aspect was ‘the chilly psychological distance between speaker and audience’.234 His 
view is that the speech came across as a lecture – ‘he tells [his audience] what they should be 
feeling, rather than harnessing the feelings they are likely to be experiencing already’.235  
 
In my view Whitehead overestimates the ‘failure’ of the speech. Presumably Lycurgus 
expected to win, and therefore the final result fell short of his hopes, but a 50/50 split vote 
does not seem to require an explanation as extreme as the one Whitehead offers. If there was 
such a disconnect as he posits, we might have expected an outright defeat, perhaps by a 
significant margin; a tied decision would have been disappointing but not necessarily 
indicative of a great failure. Whitehead’s description of the speech as a lecture seems fair, but 
it does not follow that Lycurgus did not capture the feelings of many of the audience. Indeed, 
if the form of presentation was one which was not likely to engage their sympathies, it would 
suggest that the content must have played a role in gaining as many votes as Lycurgus did. 
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271 
 
All of this, of course, must be speculation; we cannot really know why the vote was so close, 
especially given our lack of knowledge about the other relevant factors in the case (the most 
obvious being how Leocrates conducted his defence).
236
 We can, however, use Lycurgus’ 
speech as an example of a way of dealing with individual, real-world failures to live up to the 
Athenian ideal. The central argument underpinning it appears to be that ‘no true Athenian’ 
would act as Leocrates did, and that therefore he was effectively not an Athenian at all. 
 
5.2 (c) Attempting to Cross Back – Demosthenes 57 
 
The final example of boundary crossing which I will discuss involves a rather different 
narrative. Whereas Lycurgus’ task was to show why an Athenian deserved to be effectively 
ejected from the citizen body, the speech Against Eubulides, written by Demosthenes (Dem. 
57), is an attempt to achieve the opposite; his client, Euxitheus, had lost his citizenship by the 
vote of his fellow demesmen during the purging of the citizenship lists which took place in 
346,
237
 and the speech is from the trial at which he appealed against the decision. The stakes 
were high – the initial decision had reduced him to metic status, but a defeat in court would 
have rendered him liable to being sold into slavery.
238
 He had thus taken a considerable risk, 
which he perhaps unsurprisingly explains as due to the importance of being an Athenian 
citizen and his love of his polis. The strategy employed is to represent himself as an ordinary 
man who has been the victim of corrupt, powerful enemies within his deme. 
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 Hesk 2012: 217-218 suggests that he attacked the relevance of Lycurgus’ historical examples. 
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 See section 4.3 (a). Other sources are Aesch. 1.77-78 (w. schol.), 86, 114; Dion. Hal. Din. 11; Harpocration 
s.v. Diapsêphis; Hypotheses of Dem. 57 (Libanius) and Isaeus 12 ( = Dion. Hal. Isaeus 16-17). 
238
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There are hints, however, that this is not the whole story, in the fact that he himself had been 
demarch in the past,
239
 during which time, he claims, his rigorous pursuit of rents owed for 
sacred lands and the repayment of embezzled money led to the enmity which caused his 
present predicament
240
 – although he also asserts that Eubulides had been ἐχθρὸς τῷ ἐμῷ 
πατρὶ, this time without being specific as to the reasons why.241 Earlier in the speech he gives 
a different explanation, claiming that it was testimony he had given against Eubulides in a 
previous trial that had been the cause of his hatred.
242
 Euxitheus’ prominence is also indicated 
by the fact that he had been elected phratriarchon by the members of his phratry.
243
 As Todd 
notes, we are dealing with ‘a feud between two leading members of the deme Halimous, both 
of them active in deme politics’.244 Perhaps most strikingly, however, there is also the fact 
that he evidently had the money or connections to get such a prominent logographer to write 
his speech. As with the other speeches I have examined, however, I am here concerned with 
the narrative as presented, and what it can tell us about strategies to deal with issues of 
identity, rather than with its truthfulness. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that while the case 
concerned figures who were prominent within their deme, there is no reason to suppose that 
the majority of jurors would have had any knowledge of them; they were not, as far as we can 
tell, prominent on a polis-wide level.
245
 This would have given the litigants more freedom to 
distort the truth, or even tell outright lies, as long as they could persuade witnesses to back 
them up, than in cases concerning figures and events that were in the realm of common 
knowledge around the polis. 
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 R. Osborne 1985: 87 describes demarchs as ‘big fish’ in ‘rather small’ ponds. 
240
 Dem. 57.63-64. 
241
 Dem. 57.61. 
242
 Dem. 57.8. 
243
 Dem. 57.23. 
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 Todd 1994: 134; see also Whitehead 1986a: 296-300. 
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 Though Whitehead 1986a: 298 speculates that Eubulides may have had ‘hopes of influence at city level’. 
273 
 
The strategy pursued by Euxitheus (and Demosthenes) involves the careful balancing of a 
couple of factors. On the one hand, given the political climate which had led to the purging of 
the lists in the first place, he could not afford to trivialise the matter, or imply that there was 
no problem of fraudulent citizens; in the light of this, he could not rely on a simple claim that 
he should be given the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, he of course had to prove that 
in his case the decision to reject him had been wrong. In other words, the general principle 
behind the investigation and rejection of fraudulent citizens was right, but the particular 
conduct of his case had been wrong. He expressly addresses this issue at the beginning of his 
speech: 
συμβαίνει δέ μοι τὸ μὲν καθ’ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τὸ προσήκειν μοι τῆς 
πόλεως, θαρρεῖν καὶ πολλὰς ἔχειν ἐλπίδας καλῶς ἀγωνιεῖσθαι, τὸν καιρὸν δὲ καὶ 
τὸ παρωξύνθαι τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὰς ἀποψηφίσεις φοβεῖσθαι· πολλῶν γὰρ 
ἐξεληλαμένων δικαίως ἐκ πάντων τῶν δήμων, συγκεκοινωνήκαμεν τῆς δόξης 
ταύτης οἱ κατεστασιασμένοι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν κατ’ ἐκείνων αἰτίαν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ καθ’ 
αὑτὸν ἕκαστος ἀγωνιζόμεθα, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέγαν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν φόβον. οὐ 
μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἃ νομίζω περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν πρῶτον 
εἶναι δίκαια, ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ οἴομαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς τοῖς μὲν ἐξελεγχομένοις 
ξένοις οὖσιν χαλεπαίνειν, εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ 
τῶν ὑμετέρων ἱερῶν καὶ κοινῶν μετεῖχον, τοῖς δ’ ἠτυχηκόσι καὶ δεικνύουσι 
πολίτας ὄντας αὑτοὺς βοηθεῖν καὶ σῴζειν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι πάντων 
οἰκτρότατον πάθος ἡμῖν ἂν συμβαίη τοῖς ἠδικημένοις, εἰ τῶν λαμβανόντων δίκην 
ὄντες ἂν δικαίως μεθ’ ὑμῶν, ἐν τοῖς διδοῦσι γενοίμεθα καὶ συναδικηθείημεν διὰ 
τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ὀργήν.246 
 
The principle is thus admitted, but with a warning not to allow the justified zeal to punish the 
malefactors to spill over into the indiscriminate charging of the innocent. The theme of the 
                                                          
246
 Dem. 57.2-3: ‘It happens, men of the jury, that while for my part I am confident about my citizenship, and 
have high hopes that I will do well in court, this particular occasion, and the city’s anger in cases of 
disfranchisement, make me afraid. Since many have been justly expelled from all demes, we who have been 
victims of factional strife have been caught up in this feeling against them, and have to fight the charge brought 
against them, and not just the individual charge against each of us, so that our fear must necessarily be great. But 
in spite of circumstances being as they are, I will tell you first what I think is right and just about them. I myself 
actually believe that you should treat those convicted of being foreigners harshly, since they have, without 
persuading you or asking your consent, by stealth and by force taken a share in your religious rites and 
communal activities – but those who have been unfortunate, and can demonstrate that they are citizens, you 
should help and protect, considering that, more than any other, the situation would be most pitiable for us who 
have been wronged, if, when by rights we should be handing out punishment with you, we found ourselves 
among those on the receiving end, unfairly condemned along with them because of the passion involved in this 
matter.’ 
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poor and defenceless innocent is already seen, as he exhorts the jurors to ‘help and save’ 
those unjustly accused, such as himself, who can prove their rightful claim to citizenship. 
 
This naturally raises the question of how someone’s citizen status can, in fact, be proved. The 
answer turns out to be quite simple. Most of what follows consists of attempts to discredit 
Eubulides and his allies, and the process by which Euxitheus was voted out of the deme, 
supplemented by attacks on what, Euxitheus claims, are his opponents’ arguments. The actual 
positive evidence for his citizenship which he offers, however, is summed up in the following 
passage: 
Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν καὶ τὰ πρὸς μητρός εἰμ’ ἀστὸς καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρός, τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὧν 
ἄρτι μεμαρτύρηται μεμαθήκατε πάντες, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ πατρός. 
λοιπὸν δέ μοι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἁπλούστατον οἶμαι καὶ 
δικαιότατον, ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀστῶν ὄντα με, κεκληρονομηκότα καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ 
τοῦ γένους, εἶναι πολίτην· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα πάντ’ ἐπιδείξω 
μάρτυρας παρεχόμενος, ὡς εἰσήχθην εἰς τοὺς φράτερας, ὡς ἐνεγράφην εἰς τοὺς 
δημότας, ὡς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τούτων προὐκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι 
τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, ὡς ἦρχον ἀρχὰς δοκιμασθείς. καί μοι κάλει 
αὐτούς.247 
 
It is essentially through the word of others, then, as concerns an individual’s birth and 
ancestry, and the fulfilling of rituals and rites of passage, that a citizen’s status is ‘proved’.248 
The problem is obvious – the latter evidence merely proves that one has acted like a citizen, 
not that one actually rightfully is one, whereas the former relies purely on the word of others. 
In Isaeus’ speech For Euphiletus, which is also an appeal against a loss of citizen status, this 
problem is addressed directly, when the speaker speculates on how someone could prove his 
status: 
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 Dem. 57.46: ‘Well then, that I am a citizen on both my mother’s and my father’s side you have all learned, 
from what has just been testified and what was testified before about my father. What’s left is for me to tell you 
about myself, which I think is most straightforward and reasonable: because I am born of citizen parents on both 
sides, and am the heir to both the property and the family, I am a citizen. Nevertheless, I will provide witnesses 
to show all the proper requirements – how I was introduced to the members of my phratry, how I was enrolled 
in the list of demesmen, how I was selected among the noblest-born by these same men to draw lots for the 
priesthood of Heracles, and how I passed my scrutiny and held offices. Please summon them.’ 
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 D. Cohen 1998: 58. 
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Ὥστε ἡδέως κἂν τῶν ἀντιδικούντων ἡμῖν τοῦ σεμνοτάτου πυθοίμην εἰ ἄλλοθέν 
ποθεν ἔχοι ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαι αὑτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἢ ἐκ τούτων ὧν καὶ ἡμεῖς Εὐφίλητον 
ἐπιδείκνυμεν. Ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶμαι ἄλλο τι ἂν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι ἡ μήτηρ ἀστή 
τέ ἐστι καὶ <γαμετὴ καὶ ἀστὸς> ὁ πατήρ, καὶ ὡς ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγει, παρέχοιτ’ ἂν 
αὑτῷ τοὺς συγγενεῖς μάρτυρας.249 
 
Unfortunately, we possess only an extract from the speech, so we do not know the full extent 
of the argument made on Euphiletus’ behalf. This section shows, however, that at least part of 
it involved raising the essentially weak basis of proofs of citizenship. While the speaker 
wonders how else his opponents might prove their status, the point would apply to any 
Athenians, including those on the jury. The idea of a single autochthonous group, secure in 
their identity, is implicitly undermined by this admission of the flimsy nature of its basis in 
practice. Euxitheus states it just as plainly as this in Dem. 57, when he addresses the jurors as 
follows: 
καὶ νῦν πῶς ἄν τις ὑμῖν σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξειεν μετὸν τῆς πόλεως αὑτῷ; 
ἐνθυμείσθω γὰρ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς ἑαυτῷ προσήκοντας τίν’ 
ἄλλον ἂν δύναιτ’ ἐπιδεῖξαι τρόπον ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμοί, μαρτυροῦντας, ὀμνύοντας, 
πάλαι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντας;250 
 
The essential weakness of the Athenian system for establishing identity has been examined 
by Scafuro, who stressed a point which underlies what the speakers are saying in these two 
extracts – ‘witnessed participation in communal events as a function of being born Athenian 
was perceived by Athenians as tantamount to “being Athenian”’.251 At least for male citizens, 
these events began with a purification ritual five days after birth, and included naming, 
acceptance into the oikos and phratry, and a marriage sacrifice, plus the civic dokimasia 
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 Isaeus 12.7: ‘I would love to hear from the most revered of our opponents if he has anything to prove that he 
is an Athenian, other than what we are providing for Euphiletus. For I personally don’t think there is anything he 
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undergone at the age of eighteen.
252
 In normal, everyday circumstances, this was likely not a 
problem or difficulty – the assumption that those who appeared to be Athenians were really 
Athenians was, no doubt, easy, practical and comforting. It must be remembered, however, 
that this was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Athenian ideology, according to 
which it mattered whether someone actually was a citizen, descended from citizen parents.  
 
The fact that this could only be demonstrated by witnesses and witnessed actions was an 
underlying difficulty which would come to the fore only when someone’s identity was 
questioned. In Euxitheus’ case, Scafuro notes that ‘everything depends on the credibility of 
the witnesses – and the discrediting of the motives of the opponent’.253  This is true; if 
Euxitheus’ witnesses are believable, and he can reasonably suggest that Eubulides had a 
nefarious purpose, he will have made a plausible argument, though not necessarily a 
successful one. But the wider point is that no citizen is really in a better position to prove his 
citizenship than Euxitheus – the Athenian system did not allow for anything other than a 
weak and dubious basis for establishing identity. Such reflections can hardly have given 
comfort to the jurors, but the logic of Euxitheus’ argument must have been intended to seem 
inescapable – to reject him as a citizen would be to doubt the validity of all citizenship. 
Indeed, Euxitheus seems aware of the possibility of disturbing his audience in this way when 
he tells them the following: 
ἐγὼ δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς θορυβήσῃ, μηδ’ ἐφ’ 
ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν ἀχθεσθῇ), ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὑπείληφ’ ὥσπερ ὑμῶν ἕκαστος 
ἑαυτόν, μητέρ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς νομίζων ἥνπερ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρας μὲν 
ὢν ταύτης δὲ προσποιούμενος· πατέρα πάλιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν αὐτὸν 
τρόπον.254 
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 Dem. 57.50: ‘I myself, men of the jury – and let no one, by Zeus and the gods, raise an uproar or be annoyed 
at what I’m about to say – believe myself to be Athenian for the same reasons as each of you does himself, 
having from the beginning regarded as my mother she who I present to you as such, and not merely pretending 
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Euxitheus raises another salient and related point when discussing his father, by noting that 
he was born before the law passed in 403 which re-enacted the Periclean requirement that 
citizens had to be born of parents who were themselves both citizens.
255
 This means that he 
would have to demonstrate that his father was a citizen on one side only.
256
 This must have 
reminded the jurors of the fact that, in times past, the supposedly unified Athenian descent 
group had admitted outsiders into it. Implicitly, the comforting and unifying fiction of 
Athenian common descent was questioned. 
 
Euxitheus claims, in fact, that his father was of pure Athenian descent, and the reference to 
the law is simply to further support his case – even if his father had not been of pure descent, 
the laws would still compel the jurors to find in his favour. It also, however, reflects a 
prominent difficulty with Euxitheus’ case, which, it would seem, was a key element in his 
opponents’ arguments. Euxitheus’ father spoke with a foreign accent – he ἐξένιζεν. 257 
Euxitheus’ explanation is that he was captured during the Decelean war, and was then sold 
into slavery, living for ‘a long time’ in Leucas; his ‘foreign’ speech must thus have been 
Greek with a Leucadian accent.
258
 The phrase used for his time there is πολλοστῷ χρόνῳ, 
which must be intended to mean a significant number of years if the story is to be believed. 
Euxitheus proves this by calling witnesses to the facts that his father was taken prisoner and 
ransomed, that he received family property when he returned to Athens, and  ὅτι οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς 
δημόταις οὔτ’ ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν οὔτ’ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ τὸν ξενίζοντ’ οὐδεὶς πώποτ’ ᾐτιάσαθ’ 
ὡς εἴη ξένος.259 Again, his argument depends, as it must, on the word of others and the 
observation that his father had passed unquestioned as a citizen for his whole life. 
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The possibility that the witnesses were paid to offer false testimony is dismissed on two 
grounds: first, because there were so many of them, and second because Euxitheus’ father’s 
poverty (apparently he was penês) meant it would have been impossible for him to bribe 
anyone.
260
 This neatly adds to the ‘poor innocent’ topos, which is further bolstered when, in a 
fascinating passage, he moves on to discuss his mother. Euxitheus claims that Eubulides had 
cast doubt on her citizen status because she had worked selling ribbons and as a nurse.
261
 He 
turns the meaning of these accusations around effectively, first by citing the laws: 
καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν 
διέβαλλεν ἡμᾶς Εὐβουλίδης, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, οἳ κελεύουσιν ἔνοχον 
εἶναι τῇ κακηγορίᾳ τὸν τὴν ἐργασίαν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ τῶν 
πολιτίδων ὀνειδίζοντά τινι. ἡμεῖς δ’ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ ταινίας πωλεῖν καὶ ζῆν οὐχ 
ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα. καὶ εἴ σοί ἐστιν τοῦτο σημεῖον, ὦ Εὐβουλίδη, τοῦ μὴ 
Ἀθηναίους εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι τούτου ὅλως τοὐναντίον ἐπιδείξω, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ξένῳ 
ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐργάζεσθαι.262 
 
He has thus cast his opponent as a law breaker (a law ‘of Solon’ is read out, followed by the 
law of Aristophon which re-enacted it, presumably intended to stress how serious a matter 
this was) and, crucially, decoupled the concept of Athenian identity from an individual’s 
social standing. Euxitheus and his family are Athenian in spite of the low occupations to 
which they were brought, and this is endorsed by laws sparing their dignity from reproach. 
This is a somewhat different conception from that found in, for example, funeral speeches, 
where the ‘nobility’ of the Athenians is stressed, and eugeneia given to all by virtue of 
descent and the honourable actions of ancestors. Euxitheus frankly admits that his family’s 
position is not what he would have wished, when discussing his mother’s work as a nurse: 
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 Dem. 57.24-25. 
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 Dem. 57.31, 34-35. 
262
 Dem. 57.30-31: ‘And yet, men of Athens, Eubulides was not only acting against your decree when he 
attacked us for working in the agora, but also acting against the laws, which make subject to the penalties for 
abusive language anyone who reproaches a citizen, either male or female, for working in the agora. We 
ourselves admit to selling ribbons and not living in the way we would wish – and if to you, Eubulides, that is a 
sign of our not being Athenians, I will prove to you the absolute opposite, that it is not allowed for a foreigner to 
trade in the agora.’ In the last clause the speaker must mean ‘without being subject to the restrictions placed on 
metics’, as referred to in section 34. 
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ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνο περὶ τῆς μητρὸς εἴρηκεν, ὅτι ἐτίτθευσεν. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅθ’ ἡ πόλις ἠτύχει 
καὶ πάντες κακῶς ἔπραττον, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα τοῦτο γενέσθαι· ὃν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὧν 
ἕνεκ’ ἐτίτθευσεν, ἐγὼ σαφῶς ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω. μηδεὶς δ’ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
δυσχερῶς ὑπολάβῃ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἀστὰς γυναῖκας πολλὰς εὑρήσετε τιτθευούσας, 
ἃς ὑμῖν καὶ κατ’ ὄνομα, ἐὰν βούλησθε, ἐροῦμεν. εἰ δέ γε πλούσιοι ἦμεν, οὔτ’ ἂν 
τὰς ταινίας ἐπωλοῦμεν οὔτ’ ἂν ὅλως ἦμεν ἄποροι. ἀλλὰ τί ταῦτα κοινωνεῖ τῷ 
γένει; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶμαι. μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς πένητας ἀτιμάζετε 
(ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ πένεσθαι κακόν), μηδέ γε τοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ζῆν ἐκ τοῦ 
δικαίου προαιρουμένους·263 
 
Descent is separated from an individual’s way of life and behaviour; it makes one Athenian 
regardless of anything else. This contrasts with the idea put forward in Lycurgus’ speech 
against Leocrates that citizen status can be compromised through un-Athenian behaviour. It 
also deprives Athenian citizenship as a concept of the fine, almost mystical connotations 
which it is given in other contexts. Euxitheus reiterates the point later on: 
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταπεινὸν ἡ τιτθή, τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐ φεύγω· οὐ γὰρ εἰ πένητες ἦμεν, 
ἠδικήκαμεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ πολῖται· οὐδὲ περὶ τύχης οὐδὲ περὶ χρημάτων ἡμῖν ἐστὶν 
ὁ παρὼν ἀγών, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ γένους. πολλὰ δουλικὰ καὶ ταπεινὰ πράγματα τοὺς 
ἐλευθέρους ἡ πενία βιάζεται ποιεῖν, ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεοῖντ’ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
δικαιότερον ἢ προσαπολλύοιντο. ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, πολλαὶ καὶ τιτθαὶ καὶ ἔριθοι 
καὶ τρυγήτριαι γεγόνασιν ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους 
συμφορῶν ἀσταὶ γυναῖκες, πολλαὶ δ’ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν.264 
 
It is generally assumed that Euxitheus is responding to genuine accusations, which had 
actually been made by his opponents, based on his background and mother’s occupation. 
David Cohen, for example, regards the fact of his mother’s selling ribbons as strong evidence 
for her status, and a charge which thus needed strong opposition (or explanation) in 
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 Dem. 57.35-36: ‘And then he has said this as well about my mother, that she worked as a nurse. We do not 
deny that, when the city was suffering misfortune and everyone was doing badly, this happened, but I will 
explain to you clearly the way it happened and the reasons why. None of you, men of Athens, should hold it 
against us, for even now you will find many citizen women working as nurses, whom I will mention by name if 
you want. If we were rich, we would not be selling ribbons, and nor would we be in want at all. But what does 
this have to with descent? Nothing, as far as I am concerned. Don’t in any way, men of the jury, dishonour the 
poor (for them their poverty is enough of an evil), or those who choose to work in trade and live by honest 
means.’ 
264
 Dem. 57.45: ‘And even if a nurse is a lowly thing, I do not flee from the truth; for it is not through being poor 
that we would be criminals, but through not being citizens. The present trial is not about our fortune or our 
money, but about descent. Poverty forces free men to do many servile and lowly things, for which they would 
more rightly be pitied, men of Athens, than ruined. For, so I hear, many citizen women became nurses and 
laboured as weavers and grape gatherers because of the city’s misfortunes in those days, many who have now 
come out of poverty and into wealth.’ 
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Euxitheus’ speech.265 We should be aware, however, of the possibility that he has twisted the 
accusations – as, for instance, is Lape when she suggests that originally an accusation of 
being a slave may have been behind the comments about his mother, and that Euxitheus 
turned it around by treating it as an accusation of poverty.
266
 
 
There is also the possibility that it formed only a minor part of the case against him; or, 
conceivably, no part at all – it is not beyond possibility that this is pure straw-manning on 
Euxitheus’ part, and he is bringing the story up in order to imply that Eubulides is the sort of 
arrogant, elitist snob who would doubt a citizen’s status based purely on his wealth or 
occupation.
267
 It is true that Euxitheus claims that the nursing was the origin of all the slander 
against him,
268
 but he may be lying; we do not really know the details of Eubulides’ case, and 
it is risky to take what Euxitheus says about it as accurate or fair. My own, entirely 
speculative suggestion is that Eubulides’ argument might have run as follows: Euxitheus’ 
mother was a genuine Athenian who was poor, as demonstrated by her servile occupations – 
this induced her to marry a wealthy foreigner from Leucas, Euxitheus’ father, who was 
passed off as an Athenian by assuming the identity of a real citizen who had gone missing in 
the Decelean war. His money enabled him to win over the necessary witnesses. If this is right, 
Euxitheus’ argument is part deflection, and part distortion, of his opponent’s case. 
 
In any case, Euxitheus takes the opportunity to make his point; whereas Lycurgus sought to 
broaden the scope of the Leocrates trial, Euxitheus seeks to narrow it down to the matter of 
descent pure and simple, confident, we must assume, in the effectiveness of the proofs which 
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 D. Cohen 2005: 34-35, 1998: 58. 
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 Lape 2010: 205-206. 
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 D. Cohen 1998: 58 points out that ‘on Eubulides’ view inferences from economic activity are themselves 
sufficient to establish social status and, hence, civic identity’ – but this is Eubulides’ view as presented (and 
criticised) by Euxitheus, so it should not necessarily be taken as typical or uncontroversial. 
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 Dem. 57.43. 
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he provides.
269
 These, as we have seen, are as much as any citizen could provide. He goes 
further, however, when, as part of an attack on his opponents, he raises the abuses which have 
been carried out in his own deme: 
ἐν οὐδενὶ τοίνυν εὑρήσετε τῶν δήμων δεινότερα γεγενημένα τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν. οὗτοι 
γὰρ ἀδελφῶν ὁμομητρίων καὶ ὁμοπατρίων τῶν μέν εἰσιν ἀπεψηφισμένοι, τῶν δ’ 
οὔ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνθρώπων ἀπόρων, ὧν τοὺς υἱεῖς ἐγκαταλελοίπασιν· καὶ 
τούτων ἂν βούλησθε, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. ὃ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον οἱ 
συνεστηκότες πεποιήκασιν (καί μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ 
δυσκόλως, ἐὰν τοὺς ἠδικηκότας ἐμαυτὸν πονηροὺς ὄντας ἐπιδεικνύω· νομίζω 
γὰρ ὑμῖν τὴν τούτων πονηρίαν δεικνὺς εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγειν τὸ γενόμενόν 
μοι)· οὗτοι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες  Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλομένους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ξένους 
πολίτας γενέσθαι, Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Νικόστρατον, κοινῇ διανειμάμενοι πέντε 
δραχμὰς ἕκαστος προσεδέξαντο.270 
 
This appears to be a somewhat dangerous strategy to pursue, since by admitting that such 
abuses had gone on in his deme he risks creating the impression that the ritual affirmations of 
citizenship carried out in Halimous were also suspect. The answer might be that if even they 
are tolerated as citizens, surely Euxitheus must be as well; and in any case, evidently the risk 
was thought to be worth taking for the ammunition which it gave him in attacking his 
opponent. The effect, however, is to remind the jurors again that the basis of Athenian 
identity is not as secure as the myths of autochthony and unity would suggest. Euxitheus, 
with his foreign-accented father and self-described penury, hardly fits into the mould of the 
idealised, prototypical Athenian, but he demonstrates to the jury that in many respects the 
Athenian system of citizenship does not live up to its idealised form. He remains as Athenian 
as any of them, however dubiously or flimsily this can actually be proved. His speech shows 
how individuals could create narratives that undercut the myths of citizenship to their own 
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 Modern scholars at least have generally found the weight of testimony he provides conclusive – see e.g. 
Kapparis 2005: 84. 
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 Dem. 57.59: ‘In none of the demes will you find that more terrible things have happened than in ours. For in 
cases of brothers born of the same mother and the same father they have expelled some, but not others, and they 
have expelled older men without resources, whose sons they have left alone – and I will provide witnesses to 
these things should you so wish. But this is the most terrible thing they have done – and by Zeus and the gods let 
no one hold it against me if I show the wretchedness of these men who have wronged me, for I think that in 
showing you their villainy I am speaking about the very point of what has happened to me – they, men of 
Athens, when the foreigners Anaximenes and Nicostratus wished to become citizens, accepted them for five 
drachmas each.’ 
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advantage, inviting audiences (in this case an audience of jurors) to consider the differences 
between the ideology of citizenship and the actual concept as it was lived in the real polis. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
Crossing the boundary between citizen and metic, or in-group and out-group, was a move 
which required careful handling in the public context of the lawcourt. Apollodorus and 
Phormion both chose to qualify their status and identity when their cases were presented to 
Athenian jurors, limiting their position and clearly defining themselves as different from the 
native Athenians. In this way they were able to negotiate the contradiction between the public 
ideology of unity and common descent and the more disparate reality, which they, as 
naturalised citizens, could be said to embody. They reassured the jurors that they were no 
threat to the Athenian group identity by marking themselves as, fundamentally, highly 
honoured outsiders. Apollodorus was able to espouse patriotic and exclusionary citizen 
rhetoric, but only after positioning himself as no more than this kind of qualified, marginal 
citizen. Having done so, he was able to depict his opponents as corruptors of the polis, and 
threats to its cohesion and values; in his prosecution of Neaera, an especial threat was that 
fraudulent citizens were not marked and limited in status in the way that legally naturalised 
ones were. 
 
Similarly, prosecutors were keen to bring in an idealised version of Athenian identity so that 
they could argue that citizens had fallen short of its standards. Lycurgus’ prosecution of 
Leocrates, in particular, draws on an almost mystical version of citizen identity to portray 
Leocrates as an aberrant and dangerous individual whose behaviour was, again, a threat to the 
polis’ cohesion, values and future. 
283 
 
 
This was not, however, the only type of narrative which could be used. The speech Against 
Eubulides adopts the opposite tack, depicting its speaker as far from the prototypical 
Athenian ideal but still, nevertheless, an Athenian. Citizenship is reduced to descent and no 
more, and the difficulties of proving it are frankly admitted; the weak foundations of an 
Athenian’s identity, and the inadequacy of the safeguards against infiltration, are also raised. 
Whereas Apollodorus and Lycurgus appealed to their audience’s idealised image of Athens, 
Euxitheus brought home the reality that fell short of it. He reminded the jurors of the 
individual, everyday experience which went against the high-minded ideology which they, no 
doubt, professed to believe when it suited them. Both strategies, it would seem, could be 
effective and succeed in winning the assent of a jury. We can thus see the contradictions 
which Athenian ideas of identity contained writ large; they were brought to the fore in 
situations where  individuals had an incentive to do so, such as high-stakes, agonistic context 
of the courtroom. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study of the metics in democratic Athens has demonstrated that their presence, diversity 
and behaviour had important effects on Athenian ideas about their own identity. They served 
as a contradiction of and challenge to Athenian ideas about who they were and what made 
them different from others. This challenge was met with a variety of responses. These 
involved creating and maintaining a barrier which was symbolic, theoretical and practical, but 
which was not impassable. It could be and was relaxed when it seemed necessary or 
advantageous, either to individuals and informally (as in the small-scale acceptance of 
dubious citizens into the demes) or to the citizens as a group when they made democratic 
decisions (as in the mass grants of citizenship). These breaches of the barrier did not, 
however, prevent the Athenians from re-erecting it on a clean-slate principle, or affect the 
propagation of their official, public ideology of autochthony, though they had good cause to 
doubt it. 
 
Identity in Athens, then, was far from a monolithic construct. There was a great deal of room 
for variety, reinvention and contradiction. Citizens could argue and imagine that ‘being 
Athenian’ had a special, exclusive, even mystical quality which was worthy of pride but 
required living up to, or that it was no more than an accident of birth, and even then based on 
rather shaky foundations. Similarly, they could form close friendships, relationships and 
business partnerships with metics, or draw on widely held prejudices to get the better of them. 
The metics themselves could also adopt very different personas. When faced with a powerful 
jury of Athenians they might play the part of the dutiful and grateful immigrant, but they 
could also win honours which they esteemed. In business or in private they could live 
integrated lives, gain personal prestige and form their own communities and networks of 
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support; in the background, however, they must always have been aware of the Athenian 
ideology which made them inferiors and outsiders, and could be used against them at any 
time. 
 
If one individual sums up these contradictions it is surely Apollodorus, the boundary crossing 
naturalised Athenian who had wealth, education, influence and the highest honour a metic 
could receive, citizenship. When in court, however, and faced with a jury of real Athenians, 
the strategy he adopted was to accept and endorse his inferiority and qualified status in order 
to win them over; this was all done, however, with his own advantage in mind. 
 
Given the significance and variety of the impact which metics had on identity in Athens, as 
demonstrated by this thesis, it seems insufficient to look at citizenship and Athenian identity 
alone and in isolation from them. Future research should examine the Athenians as part of a 
disparate, challenging and contradictory society made up of many groups, and not neglect the 
influence which this had. While the subject of this investigation has been metics, there seems 
to be scope for similar readings of the position of slaves, particularly those, such as public 
slaves, who did not fit comfortably into a simple oppositional scheme. 
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